Case Digest: Layugan vs. IAC, G.R. No. 73998, November 14, 1988
Torts and Damages
Sarmiento, J.:
Facts:
Pedro T. Layugan filed a complaint for damages against Godofredo Isidro.
Allegations:
On May 15, 1979, while Layugan and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck with which was parked along the right side of the National Highway, Isidro's truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the him, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized.
Layugan spent P10,000, and expected further expenses. He claimed P70,000 for lost lifetime income and P10,000 for legal fees.
Isidro admitted owning the vehicle. He countered:
that the Layugan was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver of said truck;
that the truck allegedly being repaired was parked, was occupying almost half of the right lane, right after the curve; and
that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the early warning device, hence the driver of the parked car should be liable for damages sustained by the truck.
Layugan testified that he was married and employed as a security guard. He also worked as a truck helper, earning P200-300 per month.
Due to the accident, his left leg was amputated, making him unable to work, and his family became dependent on his parents.
Daniel Serrano, the driver, admitted to hitting the parked truck. The police report and Serrano’s testimony confirmed the injuries caused to Layugan.
RTC-Cabanatuan: Ruled in favor of Layugan, ordering Isidro to pay damages.
IAC: Reversed the trial court’s decision, dismissing the original complaint, the third-party complaint, and all counterclaims.
Issue: Whether Pedro T. Layugan is negligent under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. NO
Held:
The crux of the controversy lies in the correctness or error of the decision of the respondent court finding the petitioner negligent under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur (The thing speaks for itself).
Corollary thereto, is the question as to who is negligent, if the doctrine is inapplicable.
The respondent corporation stresses that the issues raised in the petition being factual, the same is not reviewable by this Court in a petition for review by certiorari.
Indeed, it is an elementary rule in the review of decisions of the Court of Appeals that its findings of fact are entitled to great respect and will not ordinarily be disturbed by this Court. For if we have to review every question of fact elevated to us, we would hardly have any more time left for the weightier issues compelling and deserving our preferential attention. Be that as it may, this rule is not inflexible. Surely there are established exception —when the Court should review and rectify the findings of fact of the lower court, such as:
when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise, or conjecture;
the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
there is grave abuse of discretion;
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case if the findings are contrary to the admission of both the appellant and the appellee;
the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
the said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted on record.
Exceptions 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 9 obtain in the instant case to warrant a deviation from the general rule.
From its finding that the parked truck was loaded with ten (10) big round logs 1the Court of Appeals inferred that because of its weight the truck could not have been driven to the shoulder of the road and concluded that the same was parked on a portion of the road at the time of the accident. Consequently, the respondent court inferred that the mishap was due to the negligence of the driver of the parked truck.
The inference or conclusion is manifestly erroneous. In a large measure, it is grounded on speculation, surmise, or conjecture. How the respondent court could have reversed the finding of the trial court that a warning device was installed escapes us because it is evident from the record that really such a device, in the form of a lighted kerosene lamp, was installed by the driver of the parked truck three to four meters from the rear of his parked truck.
We see this negative finding of the respondent appellate court as a misreading of the facts and the evidence on record and directly contravening the positive finding of the trial court that an early warning device was in proper place when the accident happened and that the driver of the private respondent was the one negligent.
On the other hand, the respondent court, in refusing to give its "imprimatur to the trial court's finding and conclusion that Daniel Serrano (private respondent Isidro's driver) was negligent in driving the truck that bumped the parked truck", did not cite specific evidence to support its conclusion. In cavalier fashion, it simply and nebulously adverted to unspecified "scanty evidence on record."
On the technical aspect of the case, the respondent corporation would want us to dismiss this petition on the ground that it was filed out of time. It must be noted that there was a motion for extension, albeit filed erroneously with the respondent court, dated March 19, 1986, requesting for 30 days from March 20, 1986, to file the necessary petition or pleading before the Supreme Court". Also, on April 1, 1986, an appearance of a new lawyer for the petitioner before the Supreme Court" with motion was filed, again erroneously, with the Court of Appeals, requesting for 20 days extension "to file the Petition for Review on Certiorari."
Likewise a similar motion was filed with this Court also on April 1, 1986. On the other hand, the instant petition for review was filed on April 17, 1986 but it was only after three months, on August 1, 1986, in its comment that the respondent corporation raised the issue of tardiness. The respondent corporation should not have waited in ambush before the comment was required and before due course was given. In any event, to exact its "a pound of flesh", so to speak, at this very late stage, would cause a grave miscarriage of justice. Parenthetically, it must be noted that private respondent Isidro did not raise this issue of late filing.
We now come to the merits of this petition.
The question before us is who was negligent?
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do or as Judge Cooley defines it, "The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
In Picart vs. Smith, decided more than seventy years ago but still a sound rule, we held:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The Law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
Respondent Isidro posits that any immobile object along the highway, like a parked truck, poses serious danger to a moving vehicle which has the right to be on the highway. He argues that since the parked cargo truck in this case was a threat to life and limb and property, it was incumbent upon the driver as well as the petitioner, who claims to be a helper of the truck driver, to exercise extreme care so that the motorist negotiating the road would be properly forewarned of the peril of a parked vehicle. Isidro submits that the burden of proving that care and diligence were observed is shifted to the petitioner, for, as previously claimed, his (Isidro's) Isuzu truck had a right to be on the road, while the immobile cargo truck had no business, so to speak, to be there. Likewise, Isidro proffers that the petitioner must show to the satisfaction of a reasonable mind that the driver and he (petitioner) himself, provided an early warning device, like that required by law, or, by some other adequate means that would properly forewarn vehicles of the impending danger that the parked vehicle posed considering the time, place, and other peculiar circumstances of the occasion. Absent such proof of care, as in the case at bar, Isidro concludes, would, under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur, evoke the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper, the petitioner herein, who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck.
Respondent Isidro's contention is untenable.
The evidence on record discloses that three or four meters from the rear of the parked truck, a lighted kerosene lamp was placed. Moreover, there is the admission of respondent Isidro's driver, Daniel Serrano, to Wit:
Question No. 8 (by Patrolman Josefino Velasco)—Will you narrate to me in brief how the accident happens (sic) if you can still remember?
Answer: (by Daniel Serrano)
That on or about 10:40 p.m., 15 May 1979 while driving Isuzu truck at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya and at KM 285, I met another vehicle who (sic) did not dim his (sic) lights which cause (sic) me to be blinded with intense glare of the light that's why I did not notice a parked truck who (sic) was repairing a front flat tire.
When I was a few meters away, I saw the truck which was loaded with round logs. I step (sic) on my foot brakes but it did not function with my many attempts. I have (sic) found out later that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not function.
Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the right side of the road would be of no moment taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed three or four meters from the back of the truck. But despite this warning which we rule as sufficient, the Isuzu truck driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the private respondent, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot. His left leg was later amputated from below the knee when gangrene had set in.
It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence.
It follows that in stamping its imprimatur upon the invocation by respondent Isidro of the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur to escape liability for the negligence of his employee, the respondent court committed reversible error.
The respondent court ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
In addition to this, we agree with the following arguments of appellant Godofredo Isidro which would show that the accident was caused due to the negligence of the driver of the cargo truck:
xxx xxx xxx
... In the case at bar the burden of proving that care and diligence was (sic) observed is shifted evidently to the plaintiff, for, as adverted to, the motorists have the right to be on the road, while the immobile truck has no business, so to speak, to be there. It is thus for the plaintiff to show to the satisfaction of a reasonable mind that the driver and he himself did employ early warning device such as that required by law or by some other adequate means or device that would properly forewarn vehicles of the impending danger that the parked vehicle posed considering the time, place and other peculiar circumstances of the occasion. Absent such proof of care, as in the case at bar, will evoke the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as plaintiff who was fixing the flat tire of said truck. (pp. 14-17, Appellant's Brief).
At this juncture, it may be enlightening and helpful in the proper resolution of the issue of negligence to examine the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur.
This doctrine is stated thus:
Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
Or as Black's Law Dictionary puts it:
Res ipsa loquitur.
The thing speaks for itself.
Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence.
Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of alleged wrongdoer.
Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under exclusive control and management of defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.
In this jurisdiction we have applied this doctrine in quite a number of cases, notably in Africa et al. vs. Caltex, Inc., et al., and the latest is in the case of F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. vs. CA.
The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience.
The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the part of the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care
The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption of inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear.
Finally, once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely eludicated that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence, as in this case.
The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection, or both. Such presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently, may be rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in the supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
In disclaiming liability for the incident, the private respondent stresses that the negligence of his employee has already been adequately overcome by his driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving.
We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission.
In the first place, it is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided.
Moveover, to our mind, the fact that the private respondent used to intruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the driver was licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any accident, as found by the respondent court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the trial .
The private respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove that the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner.
But even if we concede that the diligence of a good father of a family was observed by Isidro in the supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of evidence on record of the observance by Isidro of the same quantum of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who would be directly in charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But that is not all.
There is paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, if any, in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and thus prevent damage to others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated in Article 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the respondent court as well as its Resolution denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court, dated January 20, 1983, is hereby REINSTATED in toto. With costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
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