Private International Law: Principles on Personal Status and Capacity
Definition
Personal status
the general term that includes both condition and capacity, and more specifically embraces such matters as the:
beginning and end of human personality
capacity to have rights in general
capacity to engage in legal transactions
protection of personal interests
family relations, particularly the relations between:
husband and wife
parent and child
guardian and ward
also transactions of family law, especially:
marriage
divorce
separation
adoption
legitimation
emancipation
succession both testate and intestate.
Status
taken from the Roman doctrine of:
status libertates (freedom)
status civitates (citizenship)
status familiae (position as head of the house or as free person subject to the pater familia).
It has no exact meaning and its concept considered nebulous since modern law does not recognize absolute legal characteristics inherent in every person.
Capacity
juridical capacity
the fitness of a man to be the subject of legal relations
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death
capacity to act
the power to do acts with juridical effects.
acquired and may be lost
The union of both juridical capacity and a capacity to act produces complete civil capacity.
Article 37 of the Philippine Civil Code—
Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
In the determination of status and capacity of a person, Article 15 of our Civil Code follows the nationality principle.
Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
This provision applies to Filipino nationals but in cases of aliens, the court may refer to their national law if they belong to a country following the nationality principle or the law of their domicile if they follow the domiciliary principle.
Recto v. Harden 100 Phil 427 (1956)
Fred Harden, an American, and Esperanza Perez Harden were married in the Philippines on December 14, 1917. They separated in 1938, after which Mrs. Harden pursued legal action regarding their conjugal properties to secure increased support and preserve her rights to conjugal property in anticipation of a divorce suit.
In 1941, Mrs. Harden hired Claro M. Recto to represent her in a case for accounting and administration of the conjugal properties. She agreed to pay Recto 20% of her share in the properties.
The case was suspended due to World War II but resumed after the war, with the properties placed under receivership in 1946. Mrs. Harden won the case in 1949, and the judgment was appealed by Mr. Harden.
In 1952, the Hardens reached an amicable settlement in Canada, and Recto was instructed to discontinue proceedings. However, Recto filed for his attorney's fees.
The Hardens argued that the contract with Recto was invalid because it was intended to secure a divorce, which violated Philippine law.
Held:
The contract's purpose was not to facilitate a divorce but to protect Mrs. Harden’s interests in the conjugal partnership during her pending divorce suit in the United States.
Since both Hardens were U.S. citizens, their marital status and divorce proceedings were governed by U.S. law, which permits divorce.
The contract between Mrs. Harden and Recto was not in violation of Philippine law, morals, or public policy.
Legislative Jurisdiction Distinguished from Judicial Jurisdiction
It is a basic principle that status, once established by the personal law of the party, is given universal recognition.
This doctrine was explained by a conflicts expert when he said that–
these elementary reflections lead, as I think inevitably, to the conclusion that universality is the basic principle of status in private international law… that the particular status brought into existence by the law of country A must have attributed to it by country B the self-same personal capacity or incapacity, and the self-same rights and duties, which country A conferred or imposed upon that person, natural or artificial; and that the court of country B can introduce into that status no exceptions or qualifications unknown to the status of its creation unless they are bound to by some definite and protected rule of municipal law
Aliens can sue and be sued in our courts subject to Philippine procedural law even on matters relating to their status and capacity. However, the law to be applied by our courts indetermining their status and capacity is their personal law.
Barnuevo v. Fuster 29 Phil 606 (1913)
Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yanez married in MΓ‘laga, Spain, in 1875.
In 1899, they formally separated through a public document.
In 1909, Constanza filed for divorce in Manila, alleging Gabriel’s adultery.
Whether the wife’s dowry of 30,000 Spanish dollars was paraphernal property.
Whether Philippine courts had jurisdiction to grant the divorce, considering the couple were Spanish nationals.
Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the divorce case because the couple were residents of Manila at the time, despite being Spanish nationals.
Jurisdiction and authority to grant divorce are public law matters, not private or personal.
Courts can enforce judgments only within their territorial reach.
While the court could try the case, it could not grant a divorce due to the conflict with Philippine public policy, which does not recognize absolute divorce.
Since our laws do not recognize absolute divorce, our courts no longer try actions for divorce even if brought by persons whose national laws allow it. Divorce is considered a violation of public policy.
Beginning and End of Personality
The determination of the exact moment personality begins is referred to the individual's personal law.
Various countries have different laws regarding this.
German Civil Code
personality begins with the completion of the person's birth
Civil Code of Spain
requires that a person be alive for at least twenty-four hours before he is considered to have acquired a personality.
Articles 40 and 41 of our Civil Code give our internal rules on the beginning of human personality.
Art. 40.
Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered bern for all purposes that are favourable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.
Art. 41.
For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb.
However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
An individual is recognized as a person once he is born regardless of the length of time he stays alive except if he had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months.
Tolentino, a Civil law expert, comments that—
before birth, the foetus is not a person, but merely a part of the internal organ of the mother.
However, because of the expectancy that it may be born, the law protects it and reserves its rights, making its legal existence, if it should be born alive, retroact to the moment of its conception.
Geluz v. Court of Appeals—
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs.
In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its prenatal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act).
It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article."
In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the fetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civil Code, Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230).
As civil personality is commenced at birth, it is extinguished by death.
Under the principle of personal law, a declaration of death issued by a competent court is considered valid for all purposes.
Upon the death of a person, some of his rights and obligations are totally extinguished while others are passed on to his successors.
Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Fragante—
The Court decided on the issue of whether the estate of a deceased applicant was a "person" who could be issued a certificate of public convenience. It held that:
Within the philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of a deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said State said:
It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made * * *.
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures.
We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, we hold that within the framework of the constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.
xxx
Upon the whole, we are of opinion that for the purposes of prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
Geluz v. CA
Oscar Lazo, husband of Nita Villanueva, filed a lawsuit against Dr. Antonio Geluz, claiming damages for his role in performing multiple abortions on his wife.
Lazo sought damages after Geluz performed a third abortion on Nita without her husband's knowledge or consent.
Nita had an abortion performed by Geluz in 1950 to conceal her pregnancy, followed by another abortion in 1953 when she was employed at the Commission on Elections. In 1955, she had a third abortion performed by Geluz without her husband’s consent while he was away. Lazo filed for damages after the third abortion.
Whether the husband could recover damages for the abortion of his unborn child, even though the child had no juridical personality according to Philippine law.
Damages based on the death of the unborn child could not be granted because the unborn fetus did not have legal personality or the capacity to have rights under Philippine law.
No basis for awarding damages under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, as it applies to the death of a person, not an unborn child.
Although parents could not recover for the loss of the unborn child’s life, they could seek moral damages for the distress caused by the abortion.
The case was referred to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners for further investigation into Dr. Geluz’s conduct.
Absence
The domestic laws of different countries do not treat absentees alike and this has given rise to difficult problems in conflict of laws.
There are three suggested ways of dealing with the problem:
first, there is a rebuttable presumption that a person is dead when he has been absent for a number of years;
second, a person's unexplained absence is judicially investigated and established which results in legal effects similar to those of death; and
third, a judicial decree shall have to be issued declaring the person dead before legal effects of death take place.
Philippine laws follow the rebuttable presumption of the common law. Our Civil Code states:
Art. 390.—
After the absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391.—
The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:
A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an airplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or airplane;
A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known, for four years.
However, for specific purposes, our laws require that a declaration of death be issued before certain legal effects of death arise.
For instance, Article 41 of the Family Code requires that for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage, the spouse present must first institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse without which the subsequent marriage is void ab initio.
For purposes of remarriage under Article 41, the periods in Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code were reduced to four and two years, respectively, considering more modern means of communications, which would enable the absentee spouse to make known his whereabouts sooner.
The legal effects of absence and restrictions on the absentee's capacity to act are determined by his personal law.
Name
Professor Beale believed that the determination of an individual's name is not a problem of status since a person is traditionally free to assume a name and change it at will."
However, today the more prevalent view is that a person's name is determined by law and cannot be changed without judicial intervention.
Articles 364-366 of the Philippine Civil Code lay down rules that govern the use of surnames of legitimate, illegitimate, legitimated and adopted children; married women; separated and widowed women and even make distinctions between the right of a woman whose marriage has been annulled to use her former husband's name depending on whether or not she gave cause for the annulment of the marriage.
The law expressly states that "no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority."
Case lawshows that courts have allowed petitions on grounds that the name;
is ridiculous or tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to pronounce; or
when the change is necessary to avoid confusion;
when the right to a new name is a consequence of a change in status; or
a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality which unduly hamper social and business life.
Padilla v. Republic—
The court stressed the importance of one's name as a reflection of one's paternity which will inevitably affect the status of a child as legitimate or illegitimate. Confusion as regards one's paternity has been held to justify the court's denial of a petition for change of name.
Whether an alien's change of name is valid depends solely on his personal law.
Age of Majority
The legal disability attached to minority and rights recognized upon attainment of the age of majority are aspects of personal status.
It is the individual's personal law which determines whether he has reached the age of majority.
Once emancipated, parental authority over the person and property of the child is terminated and he is qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases, such as the parent's continued observance of their responsibilities under Article 46 of P.D. 603.
Likewise, although Republic Act No. 6809 lowered the age of majority to 18 years from 21 years, it expressly stated that parental consent for contracting marriage is required until the age of twenty-one.
Capacity
A person's ability to act with legal effects is governed by his personal law. One's personal law is viewed as best qualified to decide what restrictions should be imposed on the individual.
Rules on capacity of an individual to bind himself by contract with other persons or by unilateral acts are the very core of the rules that identify his legal position.
The inevitable conclusion is that the incapacities attached to his legal status go with him wherever he is.
Corollary to this is the presumption that all those who contract with another must first ascertain his legal capacity.
In practical terms, this calls for a nearly impossible task of investigating what the personal law of the other party is end finding out if he is suffering from any liability such as minority, insanity, or being under guardianship which limits his capacity to contract.
The general rule on capacity is subject to several exceptions.
These include liability in tort, which is subject to the law of the place of the tort and the restrictions on the contracting capacity of a married woman, which in some jurisdictions are subject to the law governing the personal relations between the spouses and not the personal law of the wife.
Another problem arises when a person who is fully capacitated under his personal law enters into a contract which will be performed in a foreign country that does not consider him capable of contracting due to an impediment such as minority.
This was the issue raised in Insular Government v. Frank.
Insular Government v. Frank 13 Phil 236 (1909)
On April 17, 1903, the Insular Government of the Philippines entered into a two-year contract with George Frank for a position as a stenographer, with a salary of $1,200 per year.
The contract stipulated that Frank would be reimbursed for his travel expenses from Chicago to Manila and receive half of his salary during the travel period. If Frank violated the contract, he would be liable for the amount spent by the government on his travel and half salary during that period.
Frank began his employment on April 30, 1903, and was paid half salary until June 4, 1903, when he arrived in the Philippines.
On February 11, 1904, Frank left the service and refused to comply with the terms of the contract.
The Insular Government filed an action in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila to recover the amount paid to Frank.
Defense:
Frank argued that he was a minor at the time the contract was made and, therefore, the contract could not be enforced against him under the law.
He claimed that while he was an adult under Illinois law when the contract was made, he was considered a minor under Philippine law at the time of enforcement.
Whether Frank had the legal capacity to enter into the contract as he was an adult under Illinois law.
The court ruled that Frank had the legal capacity to enter into the contract as he was an adult under Illinois law, where the contract was made.
The principle of lex loci contractus means the laws of the place where the contract was made govern its execution, interpretation, and validity.
The Philippine law, which considers males minors until 23, did not apply since the contract was executed in Illinois, where Frank was an adult.
The validity and interpretation of contracts are determined by the laws of the place where the contract is made, and the performance of the contract is governed by the law of the place where it is performed.
The defense of minority was not valid as Frank had the capacity to contract at the time and place the contract was made.