Assignment 11: Marriage

Marriage

Marriage is a special contract of permanent union

between a man and a woman

entered into in accordance with law

for the establishment of conjugal and family life.

It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution

whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law

and not subject to stipulation,

except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations

during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

Essential requisites:

Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.

Formal requisites:

Authority of the solemnizing officer;
A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Marriage Conflict of Laws

Conflict of laws usually arises in marriage cases due to the presence of a foreign element.
This foreign element may appear in a situation where the marriage is celebrated abroad and this marriage is sought to be recognized in another jurisdiction.
It may also appear in situations where the parties to the marriage are citizens or nationals of different states such that their capacity to contract marriages is governed by their national laws. In these instances, the validity of the marriage is implicated as forum law may not look kindly on the marriage celebrated abroad.

Full Faith and Credit

Marriages celebrated outside the Philippines are valid and binding unless they violate public policy or contravene our prohibitive laws.
The Philippines gives full faith and credit to marriages celebrated abroad as a matter of comity with other nations.
Recognition of foreign marriages is important since almost all societies value marriage as a social institution.

In determining the validity of foreign marriages, courts usually look to the compliance by the parties of the requirements of foreign laws.
Hence, if a marriage is valid in the place of celebration, it must also be valid here. (Lex loci celebrationes)
Validity is adjudged according to the law of the place where the marriage is celebrated. The reason for this rule is the "predictability and the interstate order arising from society's interest in marriage."'
Otherwise, chaos would ensue if a man or a woman can or may be married in one jurisdiction and not considered married in another.Society would disintegrate if marriages were only valid in the place of execution.
While some requirements of foreign law may be strange and not similar to ours, so long as the marriage is considered valid by the law of the place of execution, it is also valid here. It must be noted that certain rituals performed by members of indigenous tribes are also considered valid through state recognition and practice.

US. vs. Jarvison, 409 F.3d 1221 (2005)

Facts:

Esther and Ben Jarvison, both members of the Navajo tribe, were married in Navajo rites in 1953.
Ben is accused for the sexual molestation of their granddaughter and the government is now compelling Esther to testify against Ben for circumstances known to her concerning the molestation.
Esther refused to testify and invoked spousal testimonial privilege.
The district court sustained her on the ground that the Jarvisons had a valid marriage based on their 1953 traditional Navajo marriage ceremony.
The government appealed.

Issues:

Whether the Jarvisons' marriage in a traditional Navajo ceremony on June 25, 1953 was valid.
Whether full faith and credit should be accorded said marriage.

Held: Yes to both.

Our analysis of the district court's conclusion that the Jarvisons had a valid marriage requires us first to examine what law would apply to the question of a marriage between two Navajo tribal members who live completely within the boundaries of the Navajo Reservation.

It is often assumed without discussion by courts that, in cases arising on an Indian Reservation within a State, the substantive law of the State is controlling in such situations.
However, because the Navajo Nation retains sovereign authority to regulate domestic relations laws, including marriage of its Indian subjects, Navajo law is dispositive as to the validity of the marriage in question.

Navajo law currently recognizes multiple ways to establish a valid marriage.

It recognizes both those marriages contracted outside the Navajo Reservation (if valid by the laws of the place where contracted), and those within the Reservation under the requirements of Title 9 of the Navajo Nation Code.
Navajo Code recognizes both traditional and common law marriage.

Under Navajo tradition, celebration of a traditional marriage ceremony and the knowledge thereof by the community were sufficient to create a valid marriage.

A marriage license or other documentation was unnecessary.
Current Navajo law allows parties to contract marriage through a traditional ceremony or by common-law marriage within the Navajo Nation.

In this case, Esther testified to having married Jarvison in a traditional Navajo ceremony on June 25, 1953 at Coyote Canyon within the Navajo Reservation.

She identified the particular Navajo medicine man who performed the ceremony.
She answered yes when the court asked her "lis] that a traditional marriage under Navajo law?" Although the government makes much of the fact that Esther did not testify to the exact requirements outlined in the Navajo Code provision, the statute itself requires only that the couple "engage in a traditional Navajo wedding ceremony which shall have substantially the following features ... "
Esther's testimony and the inferences arising therefrom support the district court's conclusion that a valid traditional Navajo marriage ceremony occurred in 1953, crediting "due regard to the district court's opportunity to judge witness credibility." Under Navajo law, such an unlicensed traditional marriage occurring prior to 1954 was valid.

The Jarvisons' failure to license or validate their 1953 traditional marriage does not result in their marriage being invalid under

Navajo law. As noted above, the 1954 Navajo Tribal Council Resolution explicitly validated unlicensed traditional marriages performed prior to 1954.

Taken as a whole, the Navajo Domestic Code takes care to maintain the validity of prior marriages that would not necessarily meet current code requirements for marriage.

In addition to longstanding Navajo common law and current Navajo Code recognizing unlicensed or unvalidated traditional marriages performed at times when licenses were ostensibly required, current Navajo law does not necessarily require a license.
Thus, the government's contention that the Jarvisons' marriage is invalid because they did not have their marriage validated or licensed fails under Navajo law.

Recit Ver:

Esther and Ben Jarvison, members of the Navajo tribe, were married in a traditional Navajo ceremony in 1953.
Ben was accused of sexually molesting their granddaughter, and the government sought to compel Esther to testify against him. Esther refused, invoking spousal testimonial privilege.
The district court upheld her refusal, ruling that the Jarvisons’ 1953 traditional Navajo marriage was valid.
The government appealed claiming that the Jarvisons' marriage is invalid because they did not have their marriage validated or license.
Was the Jarvisons’ traditional Navajo marriage valid under Navajo law?
Should full faith and credit be accorded to the traditional Navajo marriage?

Recognition Under Navajo Law:

The Navajo Nation retains sovereign authority over domestic relations among its members, including the regulation of marriage.
Navajo law allows for traditional marriages, which require a ceremony and community acknowledgment, without the need for licensing or documentation.
Esther credibly testified about their traditional 1953 ceremony at Coyote Canyon, performed by a Navajo medicine man.

Validation by Navajo Code and Tribal Resolution:

A 1954 Navajo Tribal Council Resolution explicitly validated unlicensed traditional marriages performed before that year.
The Navajo Domestic Code upholds the validity of such traditional marriages, ensuring compliance with cultural customs over formal documentation.

Full Faith and Credit:

The court ruled that the Jarvisons’ marriage was valid under Navajo law and entitled to full faith and credit, affirming Esther’s spousal testimonial privilege.

Cook vs. Cook, 104 P.3d 857 (2005)

Facts:

Alan and Peggy Cook were first cousins and they were married in Virginia on April 7, 1984. Marriage between first cousins are valid in Virginia.
They then moved to Arizona in 1989. At that time, Arizona considered as void marriages between first cousins except that "[m]arriage valid by the laws of the place where contracted are valid in this state."(§ 63-108, Arizona Code of 1939)
In 1996, Arizona marriage laws were amended to provide that "marriages valid by the laws of the place where contracted are valid in this state, except marriages that are void and prohibited by § 25-101."

Issue: Whether the marriage of Allan and Peggy Cook is valid under Arizona law.
Held: Yes.

The first question we must decide is whether the validity of the marriage should be determined under Arizona or Virginia law.

If determined under Virginia law, the marriage is valid;
If determined under Arizona law, we are presented with statutory and constitutional issues as to whether the marriage is valid.
It is unnecessary to address those issues if Virginia law applies.

Under a conflict-of-law analysis, Arizona authorities require us to recognize the preeminence of the Arizona legislature's express statutory enactments as to whether a particular out-of-state marriage is valid or void in Arizona.

We do not apply the law from the state of Virginia, even though Virginia had the most significant relationship to the parties at the time of the marriage.

Though not controlling, our conclusion that appellee has a vested right in the validity of her marriage is also supported by Arizona law pertaining to community property.

A spouse's interest in the marital community includes a "vested property interest."

By construing the statute to apply prospectively only, we harmonize the 1996 amendments with Arizona's constitutional prohibitions against retroactive legislation.

We do not impair the legislature's expressly recognize ability to declare as "void" marriages recognized as valid in other jurisdictions, so long as the party asserting the right to the valid out-of-state marriage did not have a vested right as defined herein.

Further, A.R.S. § 1-244 (2000) expressly provides that "No statute is retroactive unless expressly declared therein."

We can give effect to the legislature's use of the word "void" in the 1996 amendments by applying that term to exclude vested rights in evisting marriages as we have described them. Had the legislature chosen to nullify existing marriages (thus having the retroactive effect described) it could have expressly stated so. It did not.

Accordingly, we can give legitimate meaning to the term "void" in the 1996 amendments by applying it to marriages from other jurisdictions in which the parties had no vested right to have their marriage recognized in Arizona.

By construing the term "void" to apply to marriages where rights in Arizona have not "vested," we adopt an "alternate construction" that "avoids constitutional difficulty" as required by our law.

Recit Ver:

In 1984, Alan and Peggy Cook, first cousins, were married in Virginia, where such marriages are valid.
In 1989, they moved to Arizona, which considered as void marriages between first cousins except that marriage valid by the laws of the place where contracted are valid.
In 1996, Arizona amended its marriage laws to declare marriages valid by the laws of the place where contracted are valid, except marriages that are void and prohibited.
Whether the marriage between Alan and Peggy Cook valid under Arizona law, given the 1996 statutory amendments. Yes, the marriage is valid.
The court upheld the validity of Alan and Peggy Cook’s marriage under Arizona law, reasoning that the 1996 statutory amendments could not retroactively invalidate their vested marital rights.

Conflict of Law and Vested Rights:

The validity of the marriage is determined under Arizona law, not Virginia law.
Arizona law prohibits retroactive application of statutes unless explicitly stated.
The 1996 amendments did not retroactively void marriages contracted before the amendments.

Vested Rights in Marriage:

The Cooks' marriage, validly contracted in Virginia and recognized in Arizona before 1996, created vested rights in the marital relationship. Arizona law, including community property statutes, recognizes vested property interests in a marriage. These vested rights cannot be retroactively impaired without explicit legislative intent.

Constitutional Considerations:

The court adopted a construction of the term "void" in the 1996 amendments to avoid constitutional issues.
The term applies only prospectively to marriages formed after the amendment or to out-of-state marriages without vested rights in Arizona.
The legislature did not explicitly declare existing marriages void, affirming the validity of the Cooks' marriage.

Validity of Marriages in Consulates

Marriages in foreign consulates present novel and complicated issues since the laws of two jurisdictions are implicated here.

First are the laws of the country which the consulate represents and second are the laws of the country where the consulate is located.

Many questions arise concerning marriages celebrated in consulates.

First and foremost, what law governs the validity of marriages celebrated in consulates and officiated by consuls.
Second, can a foreign court, like the courts where the consulate is located, invalidate marriages celebrated in consulates when the marriage is asserted to be valid before that court.

Resolution of these issues requires not only a consideration of the local and forum laws but also of the Consular Convention between countries like the Philippines and the United States.
In re Marriage of Antonia R. Medina, 2019 WL 7212282:

Gil R. Medina and Virginia L. Bonifacio, both Filipino citizens, were married at the Philippine Consulate in Saipan, CNMI, in 1993.
Virginia later returned to the Philippines, while Gil remained in CNMI.
In 1997, Gil married Antonia R. Medina, a Chuukese woman, in Chuuk.
Upon Gil's death in 2017, Virginia claimed his body, asserting her status as his legal spouse, and sought a declaratory judgment in CNMI to validate her marriage.
Is a marriage performed in a foreign consulate, without compliance with local CNMI law, valid and enforceable? No. The marriage is invalid.
Failure to Comply with Local Marriage Laws

CNMI Statutory Requirements:

Under CNMI law (8 CMC § 1201), a valid marriage requires:

Parties to meet minimum age requirements.
Absence of a lawful spouse.
Performance by a duly authorized official, with a marriage license issued by the Governor or Mayor, and registration with the Clerk of Court.

The marriage of Gil and Virginia failed to meet these requirements, as no marriage license was issued by the Governor or Mayor, and the marriage was not registered in the CNMI.
CNMI’s legislature intended for strict compliance with marriage statutes. Failure to meet these statutory requirements invalidates the marriage.

Consular Marriages Must Comply with Local Law

Article 5 of the Vienna Convention permits consular officers to act as civil registrars, provided their actions are not contrary to local laws.
CNMI law requires compliance with its marriage statutes, rendering the consular marriage invalid.
Consular premises are not considered foreign soil under international law.
Actions taken within a consulate must still adhere to the host country’s laws to have legal force.

Philippine Law on Marriage

The court incorrectly analyzed Philippine law, stating that Philippine consuls could not issue marriage licenses.
However, under Article 10 of the Philippine Family Code, consuls may issue licenses and solemnize marriages between Filipino citizens abroad.
Despite this misinterpretation, the lack of compliance with CNMI laws was sufficient to invalidate the marriage.

The marriage between Gil and Virginia, performed at the Philippine Consulate in Saipan, CNMI, is invalid under CNMI law due to non-compliance with statutory requirements, particularly the absence of a marriage license and proper registration.

Importance of Marriage

All societies consider marriage as essential to the functioning of society.
Marriage holds the members together and prevents the disintegration of family life.
It is an institution whose maintenance the public is deeply interested, for it is the "foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress."
Section 2, Article XV of the 1987 Constitution defines marriage as an "inviolable social institution" and as the foundation of family life. This is reiterated in Article 1, Chapter 1, Title 1 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The same Section 2 of the Constitution mandates the state to protect the marriage institution, with the State defending the "right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions."

Marriages Not Subject of Recognition

While the Philippines gives full faith and credit to conventions and contracts performed abroad, the same is true only when the acts and contracts do not violate public policy or prohibitive laws.
Hence, not all marriages celebrated abroad and valid in the place of celebration are valid in our jurisdiction. There are exceptions to the general rule of according validity to marriages celebrated abroad.
The following marriages shall not be recognized in our jurisdiction: IPPS

Incestuous Marriages under Article 37, Chapter 3, Title 1 of the Family Code

Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

Void Marriages by reason of public policy under Article 38, Chapter 3, Title 1 of the Family Code

Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
Between step-parents and step-children;
Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse.

Polygamous or Bigamous Marriages under Article 35, Chapter 3, Title 1 of the Family Code
Same-sex marriages (contracting parties must be male and female under Article 2, Chapter 1, Title 1 of the Family Code)

If the foreign marriage falls under any of the foregoing categories, the same is not recognized in our jurisdiction. Hence, there can be no marriage between first cousins in our jurisdiction, though other jurisdictions may allow the same.
Also, while same-sex marriages have been legalized in some jurisdictions, the Philippines is still sticking to the time-honored definition of marriage as "being between a man and a woman." The Philippines also has no law on same-sex unions, as the same is still a union between man and man or woman and woman.

Obergefell vs. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)

Facts:

Fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased filed suits before the district courts in their home states against state officials responsible for enforcing state laws that define marriage as a union between one man and one woman.
They claimed that the respondent state officials violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them their right to marry or to have their marriages, lawfully performed in another State, given full recognition.
The district courts ruled in their favor but on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the district courts. Petitioners then sought review with the Supreme Court.

Whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex. Yes.

The ancient origins of marriage confirm its centrality, but it has not stood in isolation from developments in law and society. The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change. That institution — even as confined to opposite-sex relations — has evolved over time.
This analysis compels the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry. The four principles and traditions to be discussed demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.

A first premise of the Court's relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy. This abiding connection between marriage and liberty is why Loving invalidated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause. The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality. This is true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation. There is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices.
A second principle in this Court's jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals. As this Court held in Lawrence, same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association.
A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education. As all parties agree, many same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing homes to their children, whether biological or adopted. And hundreds of thousands of children are presently being raised by such couples. Most States have allowed gays and lesbians to adopt, either as individuals or as couples, and many adopted and foster children have same-sex parents. This provides powerful confirmation from the law itself that gays and lesbians can create loving, supportive families. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus conflicts with a central premise of the right to marry. Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated through no fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue here thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples.
Fourth and finally, this Court's cases and the Nation's traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of our social order.

For that reason, just as a couple vows to support each other, so does society pledge to support the couple, offering symbolic recognition and material benefits to protect and nourish the union. Indeed, while the States are in general free to vary the benefits they confer on all married couples, they have throughout our history made marriage the basis for an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and responsibilities.
There is no difference between same- and opposite- sex couples with respect to this principle. Yet by virtue of their exclusion from that institution, same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage. This harm results in more than just material burdens. Same-sex couples are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would deem intolerable in their own lives. As the State itself makes marriage all the more precious by the significance it attaches to it, exclusion from that status has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects. It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock them out of a central institution of the Nation's society. Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage and seek fulfillment in its highest meaning.
The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but rights come not from ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era. Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here. But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied. Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.
The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment's guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive, yet in some instances, each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case, one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right. This interrelation of the two principles furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must become.
The synergy between the two protections is illustrated further in Zablocki. There the Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause as its basis for invalidating the challenged law, which, as already noted, barred fathers who were behind on child-support payments from marrying without judicial approval. The equal protection analysis depended in central part on the Court's holding that the law burdened a right "of fundamental importance." It was the essential nature of the marriage right, discussed at length in Zablocki, that made apparent the law's incompatibility with requirements of equality. Each concept - liberty and equal protection - leads to a stronger understanding of the other. Indeed, in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has recognized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.
This dynamic also applies to same-sex marriage. It is now clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty of same- sex couples, and it must be further acknowledged that they abridge central precepts of equality. Here, the marriage laws enforced by the respondents are in essence unequal: same- sex couples are denied all the benefits afforded to opposite- sex couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them. And the Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohibits this unjustified infringement of the fundamental right to marry.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same- sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be denied to them. Baker v. Nelson must be and now is overruled, and the State laws challenged by Petitioners in these cases are now held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite sex couples.

Whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to recognize a same-sex marriage licensed and performed in a State which grants that right. Yes.

The Court, in this decision, holds same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States. It follows that the Court also must hold - and it now does\ hold - that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.

Recit Ver:

It is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States which ruled that the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The ruling requires all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the Insular Areas to perform and recognize the marriages of same-sex couples on the same terms and conditions as the marriages of opposite-sex couples, with equal rights and responsibilities.
Marriage as a Fundamental Right:

The right to marry is deeply rooted in the history and traditions of the nation and is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.
Marriage is a profound expression of individual autonomy and liberty. This liberty applies equally to same-sex couples, as denying them access to marriage would demean their dignity and autonomy.

Principles Supporting the Right to Marry: PSSS

The right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.
The right to marry supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.
The right to marry safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.
Marriage is a keystone of our social order.

Equal Protection and Due Process:

The Court recognized the synergy between the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Denying same-sex couples the right to marry perpetuates inequality and injustice, violating principles of liberty and equality.

Recognition Across States:

Denying recognition to same-sex marriages performed in other States undermines the fundamental right to marry and perpetuates inequality.
Marriage laws must not impose limitations based on sexual orientation, as such exclusions contravene constitutional guarantees.

Social Evolution and Justice:

The decision acknowledges that societal understandings and constitutional interpretations evolve to address historical injustices.
Religious and philosophical objections to same-sex marriage are respected, but these cannot justify laws that deny fundamental rights.

Civil Unions

Certain jurisdictions have enacted laws recognizing the right of same-sex couples to live together as husband and wife.
Some jurisdictions call these civil unions, while others refer to them as same- sex unions.
However, these unions are different from the traditional marriage relationship. Civil unions are a creation of statute where the rights and obligations of the parties are governed by the law creating the relationship.
Hence, no husband-wife relationship is created in civil unions as this kind of relationship inheres only in the traditional marriage relationship.
Same-sex couples cannot therefore rely on the rights and obligations of couples in the traditional marriage relationship as these two kinds of civil unions are different from one another.

Langan v. St. Vincent Hosp. of N.Y, 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)

Facts:

Neil Conrad Spicehandler and John Langan were a same-sex couple who entered into a civil union in November 2000 in Vermont.
Conrad met an accident in New York and was brought to St. Vincent's Hospital of New York where he subsequently died.
John sued the hospital for wrongful death.
The defendant hospital moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff had no standing as a surviving spouse to institute the present action. The Supreme Court denied the motion and plaintiff appealed.

Issue: Whether plaintiff had standing as surviving spouse to sue the defendant hospital for wrongful death.
Held: No, plaintiff was not a surviving spouse.

An action alleging wrongful death, unknown at common law, is a creature of statute requiring strict adherence to the four corners of the legislation. The relevant portion of EPTL 5-4.1 provides as follows:

"The personal representative, duly appointed in this state or any other jurisdiction, of a decedent who is survived by distributees may maintain an action to recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect or default which caused the decedent's death" (emphasis added).

The class of distributees is set forth in EPTI. 4-1.1. Included in that class is a surviving spouse. At the time of the drafting of these statutes, the thought that the surviving spouse would be of the same sex as the decedent was simply inconceivable and certainly there was no discriminatory intent to deny the benefits of the statute to a directed class. On the contrary, the clear and unmistakable purpose of the statute was to afford distributees a right to seek compensation for loss sustained by the wrongful death of the decedent.
Similarly, this Court, in ruling on the very same issue in Matter of Cooper. 187 AD2d 128 [1993], appeal dismissed, 82 NY2d 801 [1993] not only held that the term "surviving spouse" did not include same-sex life partners, but expressly stated as follows: "Based on these authorities [including Baker, supra], we agree with Acting Surrogate Paused's conclusion that 'purported (homosexual] marriages do not give rise to any rights ... pursuant to ... EPTL 5-1.1 [and that] In]o constitutional rights have been abrogated or violated in so holding'" (Matter of Cooper, id. at 134-135 [emphasis added]).
The fact that since the perfection of this appeal the State of Massachusetts has judicially created such right for its citizens is of no moment here since the plaintiff and the decedent were not married in that jurisdiction. They opted for the most intimate sanctification of their relationship then permitted, to wit, a civil union pursuant to the laws of the State of Vermont. Although the dissenters equate civil union relationships with traditional heterosexual marriage, we note that neither the State of Vermont nor the parties to the subject relationship have made that jump in logic.
In following the ruling of its Supreme Court in the case of Baker v. State, the Vermont Legislature went to great pains to expressly decline to place civil unions and marriage on an identical basis. While affording same-sex couples the same rights as those afforded married couples, the Vermont Legislature refused to alter traditional concepts of marriage (i.e., limiting the ability to marry to couples of two distinct sexes). The import of that action is of no small moment. The decedent herein, upon entering the defendant hospital, failed to indicate that he was married. Moreover, in filing the various probate papers in this action, the plaintiff likewise declined to state that he was married. In essence, this Court is being asked to create a relationship never intended by the State of Vermont in creating civil unions or by the decedent or the plaintiff in entering into their civil union. For the same reason, the theories of full faith and credit and comity have no application to the present fact pattern.
The circumstances of the present case highlight the reality that there is a substantial segment of the population of this state that is desirous of achieving state recognition and regulation of their relationships on an equal footing with married couples. There is also a substantial segment of the population of this state that wishes to preserve traditional concepts of marriage as a unique institution confined solely to one man and one woman. Whether these two positions are not so hopelessly at variance (to all but the extremists in cach camp) to prevent some type of redress is an issue not for the courts but for the Legislature. Unlike the court, which can only rule on the issues before it, the Legislature is empowered to act on all facets of the issue including, but not limited to, the issues of the solemnization and creation of such relationships, the dissolution of such relationships and the consequences attendant thereto, and all other rights and liabilities that flow from such a relationship. Any contrary decision, no matter how circumscribed, will be taken as judicial imprimatur of same-sex marriages and would constitute a usurpation of powers expressly reserved by our Constitution to the Legislature. Accordingly, the order must be reversed insofar as appealed from.

Recit Ver:

Neil Conrad Spicehandler and John Langan, a same-sex couple, entered into a civil union in Vermont in November 2000.
Neil died following an accident in New York while receiving care at St. Vincent's Hospital.
John Langan filed a wrongful death action against the hospital, claiming standing as Neil's surviving spouse.
The hospital moved to dismiss the claim on the basis that Langan lacked standing.
Does a partner in a same-sex civil union have standing as a "surviving spouse" to file a wrongful death action under New York law? No, the court held that John Langan did not have standing as a surviving spouse under New York's wrongful death statute.
John Langan, as a partner in a Vermont civil union, was not a "surviving spouse" under New York law and therefore lacked standing to bring a wrongful death action.

Strict Construction of Statutes:

Wrongful death actions are governed by statute, which allows a decedent's "personal representative" to file suit on behalf of the "distributees," including a surviving spouse.
At the time the statute was drafted, "spouse" was not intended to include same-sex partners, as the concept of same-sex marriage or civil unions was inconceivable. There was no discriminatory intent in excluding same-sex couples, as the law's intent was to benefit surviving family members.

Nature of Civil Unions in Vermont:

While Vermont recognized civil unions, these unions were explicitly distinguished from marriage.
The Vermont Legislature, following Baker v. State, granted same-sex couples rights similar to those afforded married couples but stopped short of equating civil unions with marriage. The court noted this distinction as critical to its analysis.

Full Faith and Credit/Comity:

The doctrines of full faith and credit and comity were deemed inapplicable, as New York law did not recognize civil unions as equivalent to marriage.

Legislative Prerogative:

Resolving the broader issue of recognizing same-sex unions as equivalent to marriage falls within the Legislature's domain, not the judiciary’s.
Judicial recognition of civil unions as marriages would amount to overstepping the judiciary's role and encroaching on legislative powers.

Plaintiff’s Own Actions:

The decedent did not identify himself as married when admitted to the hospital, and Langan did not assert a marital status in probate filings. This further supported the conclusion that the relationship was not intended to be regarded as a marriage.

This case must be related to Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of same- sex marriages and ordered the respective states to recognize same-sex marriages. However, even with the U.S. Supreme Court upholding the validity of same-sex marriages, it may not affect the validity of the ruling in Langan, since Langan involved a same-sex union and not same-sex marriage.
Hence, the relationship of the parties in same-sex unions is still governed by the law creating their union, which does not grant the parties therein the same relationship as husband and wife. At most, the decision in Langan may be deemed to be only modified by Obergefell insofar as Langan held that the equal protection clause is not violated by denying same-sex couples the right pertaining to traditionally-wed heterosexual couples.
The approach in Langan may well be the approach by a court in a jurisdiction which does not recognize same-sex marriages.
These jurisdictions definitely would refuse to sanction the validity of same-sex marriages for public policy reasons or may consider said marriages to be violative of their own laws.
Countries are sovereign and autonomous in their own right and are not compelled to recognize conventions adopted in other countries that may violate their internal laws.
Note that Langan also held that the case of a same-sex union does not implicate the full faith and credit doctrine because same-sex union is not the same as the traditional heterosexual marriage which most countries recognize.

Divorce and Public Policy

The Philippines values the sanctity of marriage more than anything else.
Marriage for us is an institution and not a mere contract subject to abrogation by the parties.
Hence, acts that will weaken the foundation of the family as a social institution will not be recognized or given effect in our jurisdiction.
Among the acts deemed to be inimical to the marriage institution are divorces obtained abroad.
Pursuant to Article 17 of the Civil Code, courts are mandated not to recognize judgments issued by foreign courts nor to laws and conventions promulgated in foreign countries when to do so would violate the public policy of our government.

Article 17.

xxx Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Also, Philippine citizens who may be outside the Philippine territory are still under obligation under Article 15 of the Civil Code to follow our prohibitive laws and their acts which violate our public policy will not be given effect in our jurisdiction.

Article 15.

Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Article 16 is an example of a law that has extraterritorial application as Congress intended the legislation to be so.

Tenchavez vs. Escano, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965

Facts:

Plaintiff Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escano were married on February 24, 1948 in Cebu City.
Their relationship subsequently became strained. Vicenta then went to the United States and filed a complaint for divorce on August 22, 1950 before a court in the State of Nevada. The complaint was granted and an absolute decree of divorce was issued on October 21, 1950.
Vicenta subsequently married an American, Russell Leo Moran, and acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958.
Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against Vicenta, her parents, and the Catholic Church before the Court of First Instance of Cebu ("CFI").
In her defense, Vicenta presented the decree of divorce issued by the Nevada court. The CFI decided to deny Tenchavez's plea for legal separation so he appealed to the Supreme Court.

Whether the divorce issued by a Nevada court can be recognized in our jurisdiction. No.

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on October 21, 1950, from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce (quo ad vinculo matrimonii); and in fact, does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710).
Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97–108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, especially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, policy, and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code, Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area v. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, it flows as a necessary consequence that, in this jurisdiction, Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved.
It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and her desertion of her husband constitute, in law, a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitutes, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this Court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature).
As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now fully applicable.

Recit Ver:

In 1948, Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño were married in Cebu City. Their relationship subsequently became strained. Vicenta traveled to Nevada, USA, where she filed for divorce.
In 1950, the Nevada court issued a decree of absolute divorce on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."
Following the divorce, Vicenta married an American citizen, Russell Leo Moran.
In 1958, Vicenta acquired U.S. citizenship.
Pastor Tenchavez, still considering himself married under Philippine law, filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against Vicenta, her parents, and the Catholic Church.
Can the divorce decree issued by a Nevada court be recognized in the Philippines? No, the divorce obtained in Nevada cannot be recognized in the Philippines.

Marriage Under Philippine Law:

At the time of the divorce, both Pastor and Vicenta were Filipino citizens. Under Article 15 of the Civil Code, Filipino citizens are bound by Philippine laws concerning family rights and duties, regardless of their residence abroad.
The Philippine Civil Code does not recognize absolute divorce.
Legal separation is allowed but does not dissolve the marital bond

Public Policy:

Recognizing a foreign divorce decree between Filipino citizens would contravene the state’s public policy, as stated in Article 17 of the Civil Code, which bars the effectivity of foreign laws or judgments that violate public order or policy.
Granting recognition to such divorces would result in discriminatory outcome favoring those wealthy enough to travel abroad to obtain a divorce.

No Jurisdiction in Foreign Divorce Court:

Vicenta’s Nevada divorce decree does not bind Philippine courts because jurisdiction over a Filipino citizen cannot be established merely by their appearance in a foreign court.

Adultery, Legal Separation and Damages:

Vicenta’s subsequent marriage and cohabitation with Russell Moran constitute adultery under Philippine law, entitling Pastor Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation.
Vicenta’s desertion and refusal to fulfill her marital obligations caused harm to Pastor Tenchavez, warranting indemnity under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

Limited Recognition of Divorce

While divorce is against public policy in the Philippines, the courts have, however, held that if the non-recognition thereof will work injustice and unfairness to Philippine nationals, the same may be given limited recognition in our jurisdiction.
Hence, if the divorce decree prejudices the rights of a Philippine citizen, our courts are more than willing to give effect thereto.
Thus, a divorced American husband may not go against the Filipina wife for accounting of conjugal property once the divorce decree is issued. The husband here should not be allowed to deny his representations in the divorce proceedings.
Also, once there is a decree of divorce, the foreign spouse can no longer claim to be the spouse of his or her Filipino partner. The foreign spouse can therefore not maintain a criminal case against the former spouse on the ground that he or she is no longer an interested party to the case.
Oftentimes, foreign nationals would invoke our restrictive laws on divorce to enforce or maintain a right against their divorced spouses. However, they cannot be allowed to invoke the provisions of our laws when to do so will work great harm to the interest of Filipinos who still labor under the policy of non-recognition of foreign divorce.
Hence, to remove the unfairness of the public policy on marriage and divorce, our courts are more than willing to give effect to the divorce decree issued by a foreign court.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139 (1985) G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985

Facts:

Petitioner Alice Van Dorn and private respondent Richard Upton were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982.
Private respondent filed suit against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for accounting of petitioner's business, the Galleon Shop, alleging the same to be conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the basis of bar by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court, where private respondent acknowledged that they had no conjugal property.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the divorce proceedings had no effect on the case. Petitioner appealed.

Whether the divorce decree should be recognized in our jurisdiction. Yes.

The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner, who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent, who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations.
As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of Karp & Gradt Ltd., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do all things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:

That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the Court.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.

The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that, owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage under the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

San Luis vs. San Luis, 514 SCRA 294 (2007) G.R. No. 134029, February 6, 2007

Facts:

Former Laguna Governor Felicisimo T. San Luis died, leaving as heirs the following:

Children from first wife Virginia Sulit: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita, and Manuel;
Second wife, Merry Lee Corwin, and son, Tobia (Merry has since obtained a decree of divorce from a court in Hawaii); and
Third wife, Felicidad Sagalongos.

On December 17, 1993, Felicidad filed a petition for letters of administration with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action.
He alleged that Laguna was Felicisimo's place of residence before his death and that Felicidad had no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo, as the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Linda likewise filed a motion to dismiss based on the same grounds.
The RTC denied both motions to dismiss, but upon a motion for reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the petition for letters of administration on the ground that Felicisimo was a resident of Laguna and that Felicisimo's marriage to Felicidad was bigamous. It ruled that the divorce obtained by Merry Lee cannot be given effect in the Philippines.
Respondent Felicidad appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which, in reversing the RTC decision, held that venue was properly laid in Makati City and that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by the Hawaii divorce decree. Petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Whether the divorce obtained by Merry Lee in Hawaii could be recognized in our jurisdiction. Yes.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad's legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad's marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2), considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph (2), Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court's rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee, which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989) G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989

Facts:

Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany in 1979.
Their relationship became strained, and private respondent was able to get a decree of divorce in 1986 from a German court.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent sued his former wife for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila. The City Fiscal found probable cause, and two complaints for adultery were filed with the RTC of Manila. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations, but this was denied by the RTC. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the divorced husband may file a case for adultery against his divorced wife.
Held: No.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents, or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses mentioned does not apply to adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity, or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.
In the so-called "private crimes," or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, such as the present prosecution for adultery, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned, in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of the status of persons.
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Roehr vs. Rodriguez, 452 Phil. 608 (2003) G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003

Facts:

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Rochr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipino citizen, on December 11, 1980, in Germany.
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Petitioner sought to dismiss the petition, but this was denied by the trial court.
In the meantime, petitioner was able to obtain a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese on December 16, 1997. The decree included the award of custody of the children to the petitioner.
Petitioner then filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage between petitioner and private respondent. The RTC granted the Second Motion to Dismiss.
Private respondent moved to reconsider, praying that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody and the distribution of properties. Petitioner opposed this on the ground that there was nothing to be done anymore as the marriage had been dissolved by the decree of divorce. The RTC granted the partial motion for reconsideration of private respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the RTC was correct in reopening the case to litigate the issues of custody and distribution of assets despite the divorce between the parties.
Held: Yes.

The divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997, has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent with the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care, and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is a basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary.
As to what was the extent of private respondent's participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the proceedings nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office. Unlike petitioner, who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings.
More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue of who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support, and education, mindful of the best interests of the children.
This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child's welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning their care and custody.

Right to Re-marry after Divorce

Citizens of the Philippines whose foreign spouses have obtained a divorce abroad are capacitated to remarry under our laws. We give implicit recognition to the divorce as a way of equalizing the rights of the Filipino spouse to the foreign spouse who is now freed from the marital bonds by virtue of the divorce. If this were not the case, the Filipino spouse would forever be held "hostaged" by the marriage which no longer exists.
Hence, to remove the unfairness of the situation, Filipinos are now allowed to remarry once their foreign spouses obtain a divorce decree. Thus, paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code provides the following:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37, and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

It is important, however, that the divorce be judicially recognized first by Philippine courts before the Philippine national can rely on the effects of the divorce. For one, the Filipino cannot remarry until and unless the divorce is properly recognized and annotated in the local civil registry.

Recognition of Foreign Divorce and Correction of Entry

When the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce, the same may be given effect in the Philippines by filing a petition for correction of entry in the civil registry. Under Section 2 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, the entries pertaining to marriage, judgments of annulment of marriage, and judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning may be canceled or corrected upon petition by a party.
In addition, Section 1 of the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry. Rule 108 is a special proceeding for the declaration of a status or condition and is different from a civil case, which enforces a right against another.
The Supreme Court has simplified the procedure in recognizing foreign divorce decrees. To avoid multiplicity of suits, both the recognition of divorce and the correction of entry may now be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. The Court has held that Rule 108 proceedings will also include the recognition of the foreign divorce itself.
This is the logical procedure since mere recognition under Rule 39 may still require a party to file another petition for correction of entry. A proceeding for the recognition of a foreign divorce under Rule 39 may not give the party desiring to establish their status the relief they desire.
As a practical application, even though the foreign divorce is already recognized, the Filipino spouse may not be able to get the necessary certifications from the civil registry to allow them to remarry.
In sum, recognitions of foreign divorces now only require one proceeding, which is a special proceeding for correction of entry in the civil registry. There is no more need to file an initial petition for recognition since the establishment of the authenticity and validity of the foreign divorce may now be made in the Rule 108 proceeding itself.

Continuing Liberalization of Divorce

The trend of Supreme Court decisions is to liberalize the recognition of divorce decrees obtained abroad. Prescinding from Republic v. Orbecido, the Court subsequently ruled that divorces applied for and obtained abroad by Filipinos against their foreign spouses are subject to recognition in the Philippines.
Showing the Court's liberal tilt in interpreting Article 26 of the Family Code, the Court allowed a Filipina to have her Japanese divorce recognized and registered in the civil registry to correct the anomaly of Filipinos still being shackled in a marriage relationship that their foreign spouses have already been freed from.

Nature of Recognition of Foreign Divorce Proceedings

Recognition of foreign divorces involves proceedings to prove the validity of a foreign judgment.
The party applying for recognition must present proof of the appropriate foreign laws as well as the authenticity of the documents obtained from foreign courts and offices.
These are proceedings with the sole objective of giving effect to a foreign judgment, not to review the judgment of the foreign court. Philippine courts are not allowed to relitigate the issues already settled by a foreign court. The decision of the foreign tribunal is already res judicata to the case.
Where the foreign court decides a case, it settles the legal issues between the parties, and a local court has no power to reopen the issues decided by the foreign court. A Philippine court exceeds its jurisdiction if it reviews the judgment of the foreign court.
So long as the foreign judgment does not patently violate public policy or prohibitive laws, a local court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the foreign court. The role of a local court is only to ensure that:

There is indeed a foreign judgment.
The judgment is in conformity with foreign law.
The foreign laws are duly proved in the proceedings.

Foreigners may petition for the recognition of foreign divorce so long as the foreign judgment affects their status or condition as a person. For instance, if the wife of a foreigner marries someone else under bigamous conditions, the husband in the first marriage has an interest in having the second marriage annulled. This validates the first marriage and removes the cloud on his status as the husband of his wife.

Tan-Andal vs Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021

Mario Victor M. Andal (Mario) and Rosanna L. Tan (Rosanna) married on December 16, 1995.
They had one child, Ma. Samantha, born on July 27, 1996, and lived with Rosanna’s parents in a duplex in Parañaque City.
Mario exhibited erratic behavior, emotional immaturity, and drug abuse even before and during the marriage. He disappeared for days, ignored their child, and showed symptoms of paranoia after Ma. Samantha’s birth.
Rosanna filed for nullity of marriage, citing Mario’s psychological incapacity.
She presented Dr. Valentina Del Fonso Garcia, a psychiatrist, who diagnosed Mario with narcissistic antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse disorder with psychotic features, rooted in his personality and deemed incurable.
RTC: Declared the marriage void based on Dr. Garcia’s testimony and Rosanna’s evidence.
CA: Reversed the RTC, deeming Dr. Garcia’s evaluation unscientific as Mario was not personally examined.
Psychological incapacity does not need to be medically or clinically identified.

The Court abandoned the second Molina guideline requiring the root cause to be medically or clinically identified. Instead, psychological incapacity must manifest as enduring dysfunctionality in a person’s personality structure, undermining the family.
It need not be proven by expert testimony; ordinary witnesses may testify on consistent behaviors of the incapacitated spouse. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 is incurable in a legal, not medical, sense, implying persistent incompatibility and irreparable breakdown of the marriage.

The marriage was declared void.

The Court found Mario psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations.
Rosanna provided clear and convincing evidence of Mario’s psychological incapacity through testimony about his personality structure, rooted in his childhood and adult experiences.
Dr. Garcia’s findings supported the claim, showing Mario’s chronic irresponsibility, impulsivity, lack of empathy, and inability to fulfill marital duties.

Assignment 12: Wills and Succession

Succession

Article 774.

Succession is a mode of acquisition

by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations

to the extent of the value of the inheritance

of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others

either by his will or by operation of law.

Conflict of Laws in Succession

In the area of wills and succession, conflict of laws occurs all too frequently, especially when there is a foreign element involved.
The foreign element can be in the form:

of a will executed overseas,
of a foreigner dying within Philippine territory and leaving properties here and abroad,
of a Filipino dying overseas with properties in the Philippines, or
of a testator specifying a foreign law to govern the disposition of his estate.

In these instances, the law of a foreign country is implicated, and they should be harmonized with our laws to determine the successional rights of individuals.
While some countries have similar succession laws, others have starkly different laws that will ultimately be determinative of the successional rights of the parties.

Definition

Article 774 of the Civil Code of the Philippines defines succession as "a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law."
Article 778 thereof enumerates the types of succession to be testamentary, intestate, or mixed.

Article 779 defines testamentary succession to be "that which results from the designation of an heir, made in a will executed in the form prescribed by law."
Intestate succession occurs when a person dies without leaving a will.
Mixed succession is a combination of both testate and intestate succession.

Article 783 describes a will as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death." A person may also execute a holographic will, which is a handwritten will signed by the testator himself. Holographic wills may be in any form, require no witnesses, and may be made in or outside of the Philippines (Art. 810, Civil Code)

In the will, the testator is allowed to designate persons who will be beneficiaries of his estate.
Under Philippine law, he is free to dispose of his properties to people of his own choosing, subject only to the requirement that he does not deprive compulsory heirs of their legitimes.

Extrinsic Validity of Wills

Wills are governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
Article 17 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
This rule is exemplified in Article 815, which allows a Filipino to execute a will "in any of the forms established by the law of the country in which he may be."
Article 816, on the other hand, allows an alien who is abroad to execute a will according to:

the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides,
the formalities observed in his country, or
in conformity with those prescribed by the Civil Code.

Formalities are important since they must be validated during probate proceedings. Any deviation from the prescribed formalities may mean that the will would not be allowed and that the last testament of the testator will not be respected or enforced.
The following are additional provisions of the Civil Code dealing with the formalities of wills:

Art. 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject of another country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country, shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of the Philippines.
Art. 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly, or in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person.
Art. 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country where they may have been executed.
Art. 829. A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a person who does not have his domicile in this country, is valid when it is done according to the law of the place where the will was made, or according to the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile at the time; and if the revocation takes place in this country, when it is in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

From the foregoing rules, it is clear that a Filipino citizen may execute a will according to the formalities prescribed by the law of the place of execution.
For aliens, they may follow the formalities prescribed by their home countries, those prescribed in the place where they have their domicile, or the formalities prescribed by the Civil Code. The same rules apply with respect to the revocation of wills.
Under Philippine law, revocation may be made by will or by codicil, or by burning, tearing, canceling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, or revoked by implication of law (Art. 830, Civil Code).
Hence, if there are certain formalities in foreign countries that differ from Philippine laws, they will be deemed valid so long as they are not violative of Philippine public policy. One need only prove the foreign law on the matter, and the will may then be probated or allowed in the Philippines. If the foreign law is not proved, processual presumption arises, and Philippine law will take the place of the foreign law.
Those laws or conventions in foreign countries that are violative of Philippine laws are deemed invalid and ineffectual in our jurisdiction. Article 17 specifically provides:

“[P]rohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered effective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.”

Thus, joint wills are not allowed in our country in view of the undue influence that one party may exert on the other in the execution of the will. Even if the joint will is executed in a jurisdiction allowing the same, the Philippines will still not recognize it because the foreign law sanctioning the joint will conflicts with our public policy. The Philippines does not recognize foreign laws violative of its internal laws.

Allowance of Will Proved Outside of the Philippines

Wills proved outside of the Philippines may be allowed in the country.
The procedure for such allowance is provided by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court:

Rule 77 — Allowance of Will Proved Outside of Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder

Section 1: Will proved outside Philippines may be allowed here.

Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.

Section 2: Notice of hearing for allowance.

When a copy of such will and of the order or decree of the allowance thereof, both duly authenticated, are filed with a petition for allowance in the Philippines by the executor or other interested person in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing and cause notice thereof to be given as in the case of an original will presented for allowance.

Section 3: When will allowed, and effect thereof.

If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the court, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk.

Section 4: Estate, how administered.

When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters testamentary or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as it may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country.

Thus, when a will is duly probated in a foreign country, the same may also be allowed in the Philippines by filing a petition for its allowance.
In the petition, it is important that an authenticated copy of the decree of allowance from the foreign court be duly attached to comply with the rules on proof of foreign law and documents.
When these jurisdictional requirements are properly complied with, the will may then be allowed here as if it were originally probated in our jurisdiction.
The will may then be enforced by the issuance of letters testamentary by the court.

Dalton vs. Giberson, 91 Phil. 524 (1952)

Facts:

Lela Dalton filed for the probate of the holographic will of William Giberson, which was executed in San Francisco, California.
William's son, Spring Giberson, opposed the probate on the ground that it was not executed according to Philippine laws.
The lower court ruled in favor of Spring.

Issue:

Whether a probated foreign will may be reprobated in the Philippines.

Held:

Yes, the foreign will may be reprobated in the Philippines.
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.

Intrinsic Validity of Will

Intrinsic validity refers to the validity of the dispositions made by the decedent.
For example, certain jurisdictions provide for legitimes of compulsory heirs.
Hence, a testator is not entirely free in disposing of their properties, as certain properties have already been reserved under the law for compulsory heirs.
Provisions of the will as to the terms and conditions of the dispositions thereof, including the institution of heirs, are matters relating to the intrinsic validity of the will.
Article 17 of the Civil Code provides:

"Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."

It is therefore clear that the national law of the decedent shall govern the intrinsic validity of the will. If a person who is a citizen of another country dies in the Philippines, the manner of the distribution of their estate, as well as the amount of successional rights of their heirs, are matters governed by their national law.
Hence, lower courts should look to the law of the country where the decedent is a citizen and apply that law accordingly. It must be noted, however, that this foreign law has to be properly proved; otherwise, processual presumption will apply, making Philippine law applicable.
The more contentious issues facing Philippine courts with respect to wills concern the issue of legitimes. Legitime is that part of the testator's property which they cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs. These heirs consist of legitimate children, legitimate parents, surviving spouse, and illegitimate children (See Articles 886 and 887, Civil Code).
Article 904 of the Civil Code provides: "[T]he testator cannot deprive his compulsory heirs of their legitime" and neither can he impose any burden, encumbrance, or condition on the right to receive the legitime.

Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867 (1927)

Facts:

Brimo, a Turkish national, executed a will providing that his properties shall be disposed of in accordance with Philippine law. His will provided that:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.

Issue: Is this stipulation valid?
Held: No, because the disposition should be in accordance with his national law.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for Article 792 of the Civil Code provides the following: Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
Said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to Article 10 of the Civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

Bohanan vs. Bohanan, 106 Phil. 997 (1960)

Facts:

Bohanan was a citizen of the United States and Nevada at the time of his death. In his will, he distributed the majority of his estate to his grandson, to his brother, and to his sister.
He gave his two children the paltry sums of P6,000 each and left nothing to their mother, his former wife, whom he had already divorced. The former wife and her two children opposed the project of partition.

Issue: Is the former wife and her two children entitled to their legitime?
Held: No, they are not entitled to their legitime.

The court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron, and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had already found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can no longer claim any portion of the estate left by the testator.
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be governed by the national law of the person whose succession is in question. Says the law on this point:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country in which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2, Art. 16, new Civil Code)

As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions is to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will.

Cayetano vs Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522 (1984)

Facts:

Adoracion Campos died in 1977, leaving her father, Hermogenes Campos, and three sisters, including Nenita C. Paguia.
Hermogenes, the only compulsory heir, claimed ownership of the estate under Rule 74, Section 1 (Extrajudicial Settlement).
Nenita filed a petition to reprobate Adoracion’s will, allegedly executed in the U.S. (Pennsylvania law).
Hermogenes opposed the will initially but later withdrew his opposition, waiving his rights after verifying the will's authenticity.
CFI-Manila allowed the will's reprobation and appointed Nenita as administratrix.
Hermogenes later filed a petition for relief, claiming fraud, but failed to appear at hearings and was denied relief.
Hermogenes died in 1982, and his executrix, Polly Cayetano, sought substitution, which was granted.

Issues: Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the withdrawal of Hermogenes’ opposition.
Whether the law of Pennsylvania (Adoracion’s national law) governs the validity of the will’s provisions.

No grave abuse of discretion:

The court found no evidence to support that the motion to withdraw Hermogenes' opposition was fraudulent.
Hermogenes' prior counsel had withdrawn, and the new counsel filed the motion. The court allowed the probate of the will ex-parte after there was no opposition.

Validity of the will under Pennsylvania law:

The court affirmed that the law of Pennsylvania governs the validity of the will’s provisions, including the distribution of the estate.
Under Pennsylvania law, there are no forced heirs (legitimes), so Hermogenes’ legitime claim under Philippine law was not applicable.

Jurisdiction of the probate court:

The probate court in Manila had jurisdiction over the estate as Adoracion was a resident of Pennsylvania at the time of her death and had property in Manila.
The court’s jurisdiction was upheld, and Hermogenes was estopped from questioning it after seeking relief.

Suntay vs Suntay, 95 Phil 500 (1954)

Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay was married to Dr. Federico Suntay, and they had a son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay I, who was married to Isabel Cojuangco.
They had three children: Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II.
Their marriage was annulled, and the children lived with their mother.
Emilio I later had two children out of wedlock: Emilio III with Concepcion Mendoza and Nenita with Isabel Santos.
Both Emilio III and Nenita were acknowledged as Emilio I's natural children and were raised by Federico and Cristina.
In 1979, Emilio I died, and in 1990, Cristina died intestate.
Federico adopted Emilio III and Nenita in 1993.
In 1995, Isabel filed for letters of administration for Cristina's estate.
Federico opposed this, claiming he should be the administrator. The RTC initially appointed Emilio III as the administrator, but the CA reversed the decision and appointed Isabel instead.
Emilio III, though an illegitimate grandchild, was qualified to act as administrator due to his close relationship with the decedent, Cristina, who raised him as her own child.

The Court emphasized that Emilio III's qualifications and experience in managing property made him better suited for the role.
The Court also noted that the law’s preference for legitimate heirs should not override the decedent’s presumed wishes, given that Emilio III had been treated as a legitimate family member.

The Court reversed the CA's decision and appointed both Isabel and Emilio III as co-administrators of Cristina’s estate, ordering them to pay bonds and settle the estate promptly. The Court directed further proceedings to determine the rightful heirs and settle the estate.

Vda. De Perez vs Tolete, 232 SCRA 722 (1994)

Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, executed similar wills in 1979, leaving their property to each other and their children. Tragically, the entire Cunanan family died in a fire in 1982.
Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., trustee and substitute executor, filed for the probate of the wills in New York, which were admitted in 1983.
However, Salud Teodoro Perez, Dr. Evelyn's mother, sought the reprobate of the wills and the appointment of herself as special administratrix of the estates in the Philippines.
The Cunanan heirs contested this, claiming they were excluded from the process and that the proceedings were not properly notified. Salud argued that the Cunanan heirs were not heirs under New York law, and her status as Dr. Evelyn’s sole heir granted her the estate. The RTC in Bulacan initially disallowed the reprobate, citing insufficient proof of New York law, but allowed more time for additional evidence.
Whether the wills probated outside the Philippines could be reprobated. Yes.

The Court ruled in favor of allowing the reprobate of the wills. It emphasized the necessity of submitting evidence that the wills conformed with the formalities of New York law, and that they were admitted to probate in New York. The Court also ruled that the probate proceedings for the two wills could be conducted jointly, as they were similar in terms of provisions and concerned conjugal property. The RTC Judge was instructed to allow time for submission of evidence and to ensure proper notice to all heirs.

The wills of Dr. Jose and Dr. Evelyn Cunanan were probated in New York and contested in the Philippines by Salud Perez, who sought to be the special administratrix.
The Cunanan heirs claimed exclusion and lack of proper notice.
The Court ruled that the wills could be reprobated in the Philippines, but required proper evidence of New York law and compliance with the formalities of both New York and Philippine law.
The probate of the two wills was to be handled jointly, considering practical reasons and the fact that both wills were similar and likely dealt with conjugal property.
The RTC Judge was instructed to give proper notice to all known heirs and allow additional time to submit necessary evidence for reprobation.

The questioned Order was set aside, and the RTC was instructed to allow reasonable time for the submission of evidence for joint probate and to ensure the proper notification of all heirs.

Assignment 13: Adoption

Adoption

Adoption is a process of granting social, emotional and legal family and kinship membership to an individual from the Philippines, usually a child. It involves a transfer of parental rights and obligations and provides family membership.
Adoptions are governed by the law of the place where the adoption is made.
The validity of an adoption usually hinges on the adoption's compliance with the laws of the place where the adoption proceedings are instituted. Since the right to adopt is vested in the place where the adoption is made, it is proper that the law of that place governs the validity of the adoption.
For this reason, adoptions made in one jurisdiction are usually recognized in other jurisdictions. This is one way of giving full faith and credit to legal processes adopted in other countries, as well as a form of comity accorded to co-equal sovereigns.
Adoptions made overseas are considered valid in our country so long as they are compliant with the laws of the place where the adoption is made. Since foreign adoptions are recognized in our jurisdiction, the fact of adoption may be duly registered in our civil registry. It is not only local adoptions that are entitled to recording, but also foreign adoptions.

Ramirez Marcaida vs. Aglubat, 21 SCRA 1033 (1962)

Facts:

Maria Garnier Garreau instituted adoption proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Madrid, Spain.
She wanted to adopt Josefina Juana de Dios Ramirez Marcaida, a Filipino citizen and resident of Madrid, Spain.
The court approved the application for adoption and authorized the execution of the adoption document, or escritura de adopcion.
The document was then attempted to be registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, but it was refused. M
arcaida filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of First Instance of Manila, but it was denied on the grounds that only adoptions made by a Philippine court are registrable with the civil registry.

Issue: Is the adoption document registrable in the Philippines?
Held: Yes, it is registrable in the Philippines.

The Solicitor General argued that the petitioner's case does not fall under Article 409 of the Civil Code, which states:

ART. 409. In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization, and other judicial orders mentioned in the preceding article, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been done, to send a copy of said decree to the civil registry of the city or municipality where the court is functioning.

SEC. 11 of Act 3753 also states:

SEC. 11. Duties of clerks of court to register certain decisions. - In cases of legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, naturalization, and change of given or family name, or both, upon the decree of the court becoming final, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been done, to have said decree recorded in the office of the civil registrar of the municipality where the court is functioning.

These legal provisions clearly refer to adoptions effected in the Philippines.
The limitation of registration of adoptions to those granted by Philippine courts is a misconception that can be corrected through a broader view. If registration were to be limited to local adoptions, it is for Congress, not the Court, to impose such a limitation. The Court cannot create a prohibition where the law does not.
Private international law does not obstruct the recognition of foreign adoptions. The status of adoption, once created by the law of a foreign state, will be given the same effect in another state as the latter would give to adoptions created by its own law. Therefore, a foreign adoption will be recognized in the Philippines, except where public policy or local interests prohibit its enforcement and demand the application of local law.
It is time for the Court to establish a rule on the registration of foreign adoptions. An adoption created under the law of a foreign country is entitled to registration in the corresponding civil register of the Philippines, with the understanding that the effects of the adoption will be governed by Philippine law.

Applicable Law at Time of Adoption

Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, an alien had the right to adopt in our jurisdiction. However, all this changed on August 3, 1988, when the Family Code took effect.
Under Section 184(3) thereof, aliens were not allowed to adopt in our country.
What happened then to adoptions made by aliens prior to August 3, 1988? What about petitions for adoption instituted before August 3, 1988?
On the theory of vested rights and the non-retroactivity of laws, adoptions granted prior to August 3, 1988 are considered valid, and petitions filed before such date shall be processed under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which allowed aliens to adopt.
The rights of the adopting parents and the adopted child had already vested prior to August 3, 1988, and these rights can no longer be taken away by the State. Additionally, making the law retroactive would be a violation of due process.

Republic vs. Miller, 306 SCRA 183 (1999)

Facts:

On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, both U.S. citizens, filed a petition for adoption with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City for the adoption of Michael Magno Madayag.
On May 12, 1989, the court granted the petition.
The Solicitor General, however, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court.
The Solicitor General argued that aliens are not allowed to adopt under the Family Code.

Issue: Are the spouses Miller entitled to adopt in the Philippines?
Held: Yes, they are allowed.

This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right that could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.
Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents, who are aliens, to adopt a Filipino child because the right had already vested at the time of the petition’s filing and shall be governed by the law in effect at that time.
An alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family Code, although denied the right to adopt under Article 184 of said Code, may continue with their petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code.

Resident or Non-resident Aliens May Adopt

In Ellis v. Republic, 7 SCRA 962 (1963), it was held that non-resident aliens could not adopt in our jurisdiction. The Court held that Article 335 of the Civil Code barred them from doing so.
This is no longer true, as Ellis has been overruled by subsequent legislation.
Aliens, whether resident or non-resident, are now permitted to adopt in our jurisdiction. The adoption may be processed under either the Domestic Adoption Act or the Inter-Country Adoption Act, depending on the circumstances of the adopting parent.

Spouses Park vs. Liwanag, G.R. No. 248035, November 27, 2019

Spouses Joon Hyung Park and Kyung Ah Lee ("Spouses Park"), both U.S. citizens and residents of the Philippines since 2007 and 2009, respectively, filed a petition for adoption of the minor child, Innah, with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City ("RTC").
The RTC ruled that since both the adopting parents were foreigners, the petition was a proper case for inter-country adoption instead of domestic adoption under the Domestic Adoption Act.
The RTC issued an order endorsing the case to the Inter-Country Adoption Board ("ICAB") for appropriate action. The spouses questioned the order before the Court of Appeals, which dismissed their petition.
Issue: Whether the Spouses Park are qualified to adopt under the Domestic Adoption Act.
Held: Yes.
The Rule on Adoption (Domestic Adoption) provides as follows:
SEC. 4. Who may adopt. - The following may adopt:

(1) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, who has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; who is emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of a 16-year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent;
(2) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above-stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he has been certified by his diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency to have the legal capacity to adopt in his country, and that his government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted child.

We note that petitioners, who are both American citizens, have been residing since the year 2007 (in the case of petitioner Park) and since 2009 (in the case of petitioner Lee), and are thus living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, as required by the Domestic Adoption Act.
This Court finds that petitioners' Petition for Adoption was appropriately filed under the Domestic Adoption Act in order for the appropriate Family Court or RTC to take cognizance thereof.
Even if the instant adoption proceeding would be referred to the ICAB, as what the RTC did, there is still a high probability that the ICAB will file a manifestation so that the domestic adoption before the trial court could be pursued, considering the circumstances of the case. Consequently, the referral to the ICAB would only cause a delay in the adoption proceedings, a matter that would be clearly prejudicial to the interest of the adoptee and the petitioners.
In view of this, we hold that since the case properly falls under the Domestic Adoption Act, it is for the best interest of the child that the instant case be speedily disposed of by continuing the proceedings in the trial court for the determination of whether petitioners are indeed qualified to adopt the child, instead of inappropriately referring the instant domestic adoption case to the ICAB where proceedings may have to start anew and might be referred back to the trial court for the continuation of the domestic adoption proceedings. Settled is the rule that in adoption proceedings, the welfare of the child is of paramount interest.

Domestic and Inter-Country Adoption

The Philippines has two laws on adoption:

One is Republic Act No. 8552, or the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
The other is Republic Act No. 8043, or the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995.

As their titles indicate, Republic Act No. 8552 applies to domestic adoptions while Republic Act No. 8043 applies to foreign adoptions.

Salient provisions of Republic Act No. 8552 involve Section 7 thereof, which specifies the persons who may adopt in our jurisdiction. Section 7 allows aliens to adopt, provided:

that his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines,
that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered,
that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter.

It must be noted that Republic Act No. 8552 allows aliens to adopt only if they have been living in the Philippines for three years. This may be a difficult requirement to follow, as it requires the aliens to virtually establish residence or domicile in the Philippines.
Under the Inter-Country Adoption Act, however, no such requirement is provided.

Hence, the law defines inter-country adoption as "the socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino child by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad, where the petition is filed, the supervised trial custody is undertaken, and the decree of adoption is issued outside the Philippines."
Precisely, the objective of inter-country adoption is to allow foreigners to adopt in our jurisdiction, subject to substantive and procedural requirements. While allowing foreigners to adopt, however, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8043 provides that inter-country adoption should be the last resort and that domestic adoption is still preferred.

For purposes of conflict of laws, the salient provisions of Republic Act No. 8043 consist of Sections 9(e), 9(g), 9(h), 9(i), 10, 14, and 15. Section 9(e) provides that the alien should be "eligible to adopt under his/her national law," thereby affirming our adherence to the nationality principle enunciated under Article 15 of the Civil Code. Article 15 provides that the status of a person, especially Filipino citizens, is governed by his/her national law.
Sections 9(g)-(i) are the standard requirements of comity and reciprocity. Hence, there must be diplomatic relations between the country of the adopting parent and the adopted child, that adoption is allowed by the adopting parent's country, and that he is in compliance with Philippine laws.
Applications for inter-country adoption are filed with the Regional Trial Court or with the Inter-Country Adoption Board. It may also be filed with the counterpart agency of the Board in a foreign country. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8043 provides that our Rules of Court govern the adoption by judicial proceedings.
If the trial custody and the pre-adoptive relationship between the applicant/s and the child prove satisfactory, the applicant shall file a petition for adoption with the court or tribunal in the country where the applicant resides (Sec. 49, Implementing Rules and Regulations, Republic Act No. 8043). When a decree of adoption is issued by the foreign court, the same shall be recorded with the appropriate foreign and local civil registers (Id., Sec. 50). Such recording is an effective way of recognizing the adoption of the child both locally and internationally.

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Private International Law: Marriage, Succession & Adoption

US. vs. Jarvison, 409 F.3d 1221 (2005)

Cook vs. Cook, 104 P.3d 857 (2005)

Obergefell vs. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)

Langan v. St. Vincent Hosp. of N.Y, 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)

Tenchavez vs. Escano, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965

Van Dorn vs. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139 (1985) G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985

San Luis vs. San Luis, 514 SCRA 294 (2007) G.R. No. 134029, February 6, 2007

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989) G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989

Roehr vs. Rodriguez, 452 Phil. 608 (2003) G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003

Tan-Andal vs Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021

Dalton vs. Giberson, 91 Phil. 524 (1952)

Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867 (1927)

Bohanan vs. Bohanan, 106 Phil. 997 (1960)

Cayetano vs Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522 (1984)

Suntay vs Suntay, 95 Phil 500 (1954)

Vda. De Perez vs Tolete, 232 SCRA 722 (1994)

Ramirez Marcaida vs. Aglubat, 21 SCRA 1033 (1962)

Republic vs. Miller, 306 SCRA 183 (1999)

Spouses Park vs. Liwanag, G.R. No. 248035, November 27, 2019

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