Case Bits: Local Government Code
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
Fugitive from Justice
1. Marquez, Bienvenido v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 112889, April 18, 1995
Bienvenido Marquez, Jr., a defeated gubernatorial candidate for Quezon Province, filed a quo warranto petition against Eduardo T. Rodriguez, the winning candidate.
Alleging: Rodriguez was disqualified under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code as a "fugitive from justice" due to pending criminal charges in the United States.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to COMELEC for further proceedings to determine if Rodriguez qualified as a "fugitive from justice."
The term is not limited to those convicted by final judgment.
A "fugitive from justice" as including not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but also those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
When a law is clear and unambiguous, it should be applied as written.
Administrative regulations must align with and not expand or restrict the law's provisions.
2. Rodriguez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120099, July 24, 1996
The Supreme Court ruled that Eduardo T. Rodriguez is not a "fugitive from justice" and is thus eligible to serve as governor of Quezon Province.
The Court clarified that a "fugitive from justice" under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code includes those who flee after being charged to avoid prosecution and those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment.
Intent to evade is a key element in this definition. Since Rodriguez left the United States on June 25, 1985, and the criminal charges were filed on November 12, 1985, it was impossible for Rodriguez to have knowledge of the charges or an intent to evade them at the time of his departure.
Therefore, he could not be considered a "fugitive from justice."
Residence v. Domicile
3. Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, Sept. 18, 1995 (248 SCRA
300)
The Court clarified that for election purposes, "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," which requires both the intention to reside in a fixed place and actual presence there.
The Court found that Marcos's domicile of origin was Tacloban City, Leyte, and while she had various residences over the years, she never abandoned her domicile of origin.
4. Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996
Retroactivity of Repatriation:
The Court held that Frivaldo’s repatriation retroacted to the date of his application, curing his lack of citizenship at the time of the election and proclamation.
Frivaldo was deemed stateless prior to his repatriation, having renounced his American citizenship, which prevented him from having dual citizenship at the time of his election.
Purpose of Citizenship Qualification:
The citizenship qualification for elective officials must be possessed at the latest by the time of proclamation and the start of the term, not necessarily at the time of election or filing of the certificate of candidacy.
5. Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989
Philippine citizenship is lost through naturalization in a foreign country, express renunciation, or subscribing to an oath of allegiance to a foreign country. Labo’s naturalization in Australia and his oath of allegiance to Australia resulted in the loss of his Philippine citizenship.
Term v. Tenure
6. Guekeko v. Santos, G.R. No. L-128, March 2, 1946
The term of office is the fixed period during which an officer may claim to hold the office as of right, while tenure refers to the actual period the incumbent holds the office.
A policy to reinstate pre-war elected officials does not create a legal entitlement, as it is within the President’s discretion to follow or not follow such a policy.
7. Borja v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998
The term referred to in both the Constitution and Local Government Code pertains to the terms to which an official was elected. Capco’s assumption to mayorship via succession did not count as a term he was elected for, thus not counting towards the three-term limit.
The people’s freedom to elect competent leaders should not be unduly restricted by mechanical application of term limits.
Elective term limits apply only to terms obtained by election, not by succession, to uphold electoral freedom and prevent monopolization of power.
8. Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15, April 3, 2001 (356 SCRA 108)
The Court held that Estrada’s actions, including his departure from MalacaΓ±ang and his public statement, demonstrated his intent to relinquish the presidency.
This constituted an effective resignation under the Constitution.
The Court recognized the role of "people power" in the peaceful transition of power, affirming that the events of EDSA II were a legitimate exercise of the people’s sovereign will.
The Court emphasized that the loss of moral authority and public confidence in a leader can justify their removal from office, especially when coupled with constitutional processes.
9. Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, February, 2002
The disqualification under Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution applies only if an official has been elected and has fully served three consecutive terms in the same position.
Talaga, Jr.'s defeat in the 1998 election and his subsequent service as a private citizen for nearly two years constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor.
Talaga, Jr.'s victory in the recall election did not count as a full term for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
Involuntary severance from office (such as losing an election) interrupts the continuity of service, unlike voluntary renunciation, which does not.
A recall election was a special election and distinct from regular elections.
10. Socrates v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002
Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons.
First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms.
Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
Hagedorn’s candidacy in the recall election did not constitute a fourth consecutive term because of the clear break in service. The Constitution prioritizes the electorate's right to choose their leaders, construing term limits strictly to preserve this freedom
11. Latasa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003
The city’s territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants remained the same despite the conversion from a municipality to a city. T
Running for the city mayorship after serving three terms as municipal mayor is indeed a violation of the three-term limit imposed by the Constitution.
The conversion of a municipality into a city does not circumvent the three-term limit for local elected officials as provided by the Constitution. The essence of the term-limit rule is to prevent the same individual from holding elective office more than three consecutive terms in the same jurisdiction.
12. Abundo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013
The three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC) requires that an official must have been elected and have fully served three consecutive terms. Abundo did not fully serve the 2004-2007 term, as he only served 1 year and 1 month due to the election protest.
The two-year period during which Torres served as mayor was an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s term. An interruption need not be for the full term; any involuntary break in service disrupts the continuity of terms for the purpose of applying the three-term limit rule.
13. Tallado v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 246679, March 2, 2021
An interruption of term occurs when an elective official involuntarily loses title to office, even for a short period. This is distinct from a temporary inability to exercise the functions of the office, which does not constitute an interruption.
Tallado's dismissals resulted in the loss of his title to the office of Governor, making the interruptions valid under the three-term limit rule.
For elective officials, the loss of title and interruption of term have constitutional consequences, making the preventive suspension rule inapplicable.
Dismissal = interrupted
Suspension = not interrupted
Age Qualification
14. Garvida v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997
The Local Government Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 set a clear age limit for SK candidates. A candidate must not be more than 21 years old on election day. The phrase “not more than 21 years” means exactly 21 years, not 21 years and a fraction. Garvida’s age exceeded this limit, making her ineligible.
The age qualification is a matter of public policy. Even if a candidate wins the election, ineligibility due to age cannot be cured by the will of the electorate. The law’s requirements must be strictly followed.
The Court emphasized that ineligibility is not a ground for succession under Section 435 of the Local Government Code. Instead, the vacancy should be filled by the SK members themselves to avoid a hiatus in leadership.
Rule on Succession
15. Labo v. COMELEC, supra
The second placer cannot replace the disqualified candidate because they were not the choice of the majority of voters. Elective offices must be filled by candidates with the highest number of votes, as it reflects the democratic will of the electorate. Declaring the second placer as the winner undermines the constitutional right to suffrage.
16. Ortega v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105384, July 3, 1992
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will.
Labo’s disqualification does not automatically entitle Ortega to the mayoralty. Receiving the second-highest votes does not reflect the electorate’s will.
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void. This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides.
17. Borja v. COMELEC, supra
The term referred to in both the Constitution and Local Government Code pertains to the terms to which an official was elected. Capco’s assumption to mayorship via succession did not count as a term he was elected for, thus not counting towards the three-term limit.
The people’s freedom to elect competent leaders should not be unduly restricted by mechanical application of term limits.
Elective term limits apply only to terms obtained by election, not by succession, to uphold electoral freedom and prevent monopolization of power.
18. Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120905, March 7, 1996
A person removed from office as a result of an administrative case is disqualified from running for any elective local position. This provision applies regardless of reelection.
The candidate who obtains the second-highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed the winner if the winning candidate is disqualified. The votes cast for the disqualified candidate are presumed valid and cannot be invalidated retroactively.
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances.
19. Salaysay v. Castro, G.R. No. L-9669, January 31, 1956
The Court examined whether an acting Mayor legitimately “holds” the office of Mayor. While conceding that an acting Mayor executes the duties and exercises the powers of the Mayor, the Court emphasized a temporary nature, making the holding provisional and thus not constituting legitimate occupancy of the office.
Under Section 27, Salaysay’s filing for the office of Mayor resulted in automatic resignation from his office as Vice-Mayor, the only office he legitimately held. The automatic cessation was consistent with the legislative intent to mitigate disruption within local governance during elections.
Section 27 of the Revised Election Code automatically considers a local elective official to have resigned from his office upon filing for another office, unless running for the same position.
20. FariΓ±as v. Barra, et al., G.R. No. 116763, April 19, 1996
The “local chief executive” for the purposes of Section 45(c) in vacancies within Sangguniang Bayan caused by non-political party members is the Governor, acting on recommendations by the Sangguniang Bayan.
A valid recommendation from the corresponding Sanggunian is a condition sine qua non for the appointment by the appropriate appointing authority (Governor).
21. Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141307, March 29, 2001
Section 44 governs permanent vacancies in local offices, while Section 45 governs appointments to fill vacancies in the Sanggunian.
The "last vacancy" in Section 45(b) refers to the vacancy created by the elevation of a Sanggunian member to a higher position, not the vacancy resulting from the succession of the lowest-ranking member.
The law aims to maintain the party representation in the Sanggunian as willed by the electorate.
Since Danny B. Tamayo (REFORMA-LM) was elevated to Vice-Mayor, the vacancy in the Sanggunian should be filled by a member of his party to preserve REFORMA-LM’s representation.
Substitution
22. Talaga, Ruby v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012
A candidate who is disqualified before the election cannot be substituted.
Substitution is only allowed if the original candidate withdraws, dies, or is incapacitated, but not if they are disqualified.
Preventive suspension does not interrupt the continuity of service for purposes of the three-term limit rule. A candidate who has served three consecutive terms is disqualified from running for the same position.
Under Section 44 of the LGC, a permanent vacancy in the office of the Mayor shall be filled by the Vice-Mayor. This provision ensures continuity in local governance.
The ineligibility of a candidate does not entitle the second placer to assume the office. The electorate’s votes for the disqualified candidate cannot be transferred to the second placer unless the disqualification was notoriously known before the election.
Hold-Over Capacity
23. Sambarani v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160427, September 15, 2004
Section 5 of RA 9164 explicitly provides that incumbent barangay officials shall remain in office in a hold-over capacity until their successors are elected and qualified. This ensures continuity in governance and prevents a hiatus in public service.
Section 43(c) of the Local Government Code limits the term of elective barangay officials to three years. However, Section 5 of RA 9164 explicitly provides that incumbent barangay officials may continue in office in a hold over capacity until their successors are elected and qualified.
Nuisance candidates
24. Marquez, Norman v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 244274, September 3, 2019
Imposing property qualifications (e.g., financial capacity) on candidates is unconstitutional. The COMELEC’s requirement effectively imposed a property qualification, which is inconsistent with the Constitution’s republican system and principle of social justice.
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 1, Rule 24 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, which govern nuisance candidates, do not include financial capacity as a ground for disqualification.
Section 13 of RA 7166 merely sets allowable campaign expense limits and does not require candidates to prove financial capacity as a prerequisite for candidacy.
Bonus case:
Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009
Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within (the period for filing) shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.
Thus, upon filing of her certificate of candidacy, Penera was deemed a candidate only for purposes of printing of ballots.
Other than that, the law did not consider Penera a candidate before the start of the campaign period. Such being the case, the political activities of Penera before the start of the campaign period (i.e., joining a motorcade) were within the realm of her freedom of expression.
Recall
25. Paras vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996
The "regular local election" in Section 74(b) of the Local Government Code refers to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and filled by the electorate.
The SK election, which is held every three years, does not fall under this definition because it does not involve the same office (Punong Barangay) as the recall election.
The Court acknowledged that recall elections are potentially disruptive and costly. The prohibition against recall elections within one year preceding a regular local election is intended to avoid such disruptions when the electorate can soon choose a replacement in the regular election.
However, the Court noted that the recall election in this case was no longer possible due to the proximity of the next regular barangay election in May 1997.
26. Angobung vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 126576, March 5, 1997
We cannot sanction the procedure of the filing of the recall petition by a number of people less than the foregoing 25% statutory requirement, much less, the filing thereof by just one person, as in the instant case, since this is indubitably violative of clear and categorical provisions of subsisting law.
The 25% requirement is not arbitrary; it aligns with similar provisions in various American states and aims to prevent abuse of the recall process. Recall is intended to be a collective action by the electorate, not a tool for a single disgruntled individual or a small group. This requirement serves to stabilize governance and ensure that the recall process reflects the will of a significant portion of the electorate.
27. Socrates vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154512, supra
A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY ACTION AND PROCEDURES ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
– Three-Fold Liability Rule
Any act or omission of any public official or employee can result in criminal, civil, or administrative liability, each of which is independent of the other.
– Grounds for administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the r following grounds:
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
– Categories of/Grounds for suspension
1. Hagad vs. Gozodadole, G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995
The Ombudsman's authority to investigate and discipline public officials, including local elective officials, is derived from the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770. The Local Government Code of 1991 did not repeal or diminish this authority. The two laws can coexist, as they are not irreconcilable. The rule against implied repeal applies, and all efforts must be made to harmonize conflicting statutes.
The Ombudsman's power to impose preventive suspension without a hearing is valid, as such suspension is not a penalty but a preventive measure to ensure the integrity of the investigation. The Ombudsman's determination that there was strong evidence of guilt justified the suspension.
2. Festejo vs. Crisologo, G.R. No. L-25853, July 30, 1966
Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code provides two categories of grounds for suspension:
Category 1: Acts related to the discharge of official duties (e.g., neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or maladministration).
Administrative action (including suspension) can be taken even without a final judgment of conviction, as these acts are directly connected to the official’s duties.
Category 2: Crimes involving moral turpitude not connected to official duties
A final judgment of conviction is required before administrative action can be taken, as these acts are not directly related to official duties.
3. Lacson vs. Roque, G.R. No. L-6225, January 10, 1953
The President’s authority to remove or suspend public officers is governed by specific laws and does not include discretionary removal or suspension. Misconduct in office must directly affect the performance of official duties. Lacson’s remarks, made during a radio broadcast, were personal and did not pertain to his official functions. Therefore, they did not constitute misconduct in office.
4. Palma, Sr. vs. Fortich, G.R. No. L-59679, January 29, 1987
Misconduct in office must relate to the performance of official duties, not merely to the private character of the individual. Acts of Lasciviousness, while involving moral turpitude, do not constitute "misconduct in office" unless they are linked to the performance of official duties, such as neglect of duty, oppression, corruption, or maladministration.
For crimes not connected to official duties, a final conviction is required before administrative action can be taken. Since the criminal cases against Mayor Palma were dismissed, there was no legal basis for the administrative case or his suspension.
5. Bunye vs. Escareal, G.R. No. 110216, September 10, 1993
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 mandates the suspension of public officers upon the filing of a valid information. This is not a penalty but a precautionary measure to prevent the accused from influencing witnesses or tampering with evidence.
The suspension is mandatory and not violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence.
6. Bautista vs. Peralta, G.R. No. L-21967, September 29, 1966
Preventive suspension is not a penalty but a precautionary measure.
If an employee is exonerated or serves the imposed penalty, they are entitled to reinstatement with full pay for the suspension period.
In Bautista's case, the two-month suspension was served during his preventive suspension, and he was entitled to back salaries for the remaining period.
7. Bolastig vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503, August 4, 1994
Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, preventive suspension is mandatory upon the filing of a valid information. The court has no discretion to determine its necessity.
The suspension aims to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses, tamper with records, or commit further acts of malfeasance. The maximum period of suspension is 90 days, and the court has no authority to impose a shorter period.
The temporary deprivation of the services of an elected official does not outweigh the mandatory nature of the suspension under the law.
8. Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 86899-903, May 15, 1989
Indefinite suspension violates the constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. It deprives the electorate of the services of the official they elected and nullifies the presumption of innocence.
Preventive suspension under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 should not exceed 90 days, consistent with the Civil Service Decree. This period is deemed reasonable and sufficient to achieve the purpose of preventive suspension without unduly prejudicing the official or the electorate.
The Court rejected Deloso's argument that Section 13 does not apply to him because he is now a governor, not a mayor. The provision applies to any office held by the accused, not just the office under which the charges were filed.
9. Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 111304, June 17, 1994
Strict personal discipline is expected of an occupant of a public office because a public official is a property of the public. He is looked upon to set the example how public officials should correctly conduct themselves even in the face of extreme provocation.
Petitioner Yabut urges that his preventive suspension of 82 days should be credited to the penalty of 2-month suspension imposed on him.
A preventive suspension is not meant to be a penalty but a means taken to insure the proper and impartial conduct of an investigation.
A preventive suspension may be ordered even before the charges are heard, as well as before the official concerned is given an opportunity to prove his innocence, being merely a measure that is precisely designed in order not to hamper the normal course of an investigation through the use of influence and authority.
10. Carpio-Morales vs. C.A., G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
The Condonation doctrine, which holds that a public official's re-election condones administrative liabilities from a prior term, does not apply to preventive suspension. Preventive suspension is not a penalty but a measure to ensure the integrity of the investigation.
The Condonation doctrine is abandoned, reinforcing the principle that public office is a public trust and elected officials are accountable for their conduct in office, irrespective of re-election.
11. Crebello vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 232325, April 10, 2019
The doctrine of condonation, which absolves re-elected officials of administrative liabilities from prior terms, was abandoned in Morales v. Court of Appeals. Its abandonment took effect on April 12, 2016, the date the Supreme Court denied the Ombudsman’s motion for reconsideration with finality.
Condonation is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the respondent during administrative proceedings. Failure to invoke it constitutes a waiver of the defense.
12. Pablico vs. Villapando, G.R. No. 147870, July 31, 2002
Section 60 of the Local Government Code explicitly states that the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may only be decreed by a court of law.
The legislative intent behind Section 60 is clear: the power to remove elective local officials is a judicial prerogative, not an administrative one.
The decisions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of the President imposing the penalty of dismissal on respondent Villapando were declared void.
13. Joson vs. Torres, G.R. No. 131255, May 20,1998
The DILG has jurisdiction over administrative cases involving elective local officials under the Local Government Code.
Elective officials are entitled to a formal investigation and hearing in administrative cases, especially when factual disputes exist. Position papers alone are insufficient to satisfy due process requirements.
Preventive suspension is a preliminary measure and must be based on a valid administrative process. The suspension of Joson was invalid due to the denial of his right to a formal hearing. The rules for administrative cases against elective officials are more stringent than those for appointive officials. Elective officials, being directly accountable to the public, are entitled to greater procedural protections.
14. Mendoza vs. Laxina, Sr., G.R. No. 146875, July 14, 2003
Once a public officer is duly proclaimed and sworn in, the oath operates as a full investiture of the rights of the office. Retaking the oath is not required unless the initial oath is invalidated.
A public officer's re-assumption of office is effective from the date the lawful order reinstating them is issued, regardless of physical possession of the office. Dilatory tactics by the opposing party do not delay the effectivity of the reinstatement.
15. Llamas vs. Orbos, G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991
The President’s power to grant executive clemency extends to administrative cases, as the Constitution does not limit this power to criminal cases alone. The President’s authority to commute or reduce administrative penalties is implicit in her power of control over the executive branch.
KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY
1. Morata vs Go, G.R. No. 62339, October 27, 1983
Section 2 of P.D. 1508 grants the Lupon authority to settle "all disputes" involving parties residing in the same city or municipality, except for specific exclusions listed in the law. The term "all disputes" is comprehensive and does not distinguish between cases cognizable by inferior courts and those within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
The law’s objectives, as stated in its preamble, include promoting the speedy administration of justice, decongesting court dockets, and preserving Filipino culture through amicable settlement of disputes. These objectives would be undermined if the law were limited to inferior courts.
2. Vda de Borromeo vs. Pogoy, G.R. No.63277, November 29, 1983
Conciliation process at the barangay level condition precedent for filing actions in applicable cases under PD 1508;. Failure of complaint to allege compliance with the requirement of referral of case first to the barangay courts under PD 1508, fatal.
The main issue was whether the ejectment case should have been referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation before being filed in court, as required by Presidential Decree No. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law). The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the referral to the Barangay Lupon was not required in this case because one of the parties was a juridical person (the intestate estate) and not an individual.
Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are 'individuals'. An 'individual' means 'a single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution.' Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc."
3. Cecilia Ledesma vs CA, G.R. No. 96914, July 23, 1992
Ledesma did not personally appear as required. The lack of her appearance, represented instead by her son and lawyer, contravened Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508. The personal confrontation was mandatory under these provisions.
The compliance with pre-ligation personal conciliation at the barangay level under P.D. 1508 is mandatory and non-negotiable. This conciliation procedure demands personal appearance by the parties involved, barring exceptions for minors or incompetents only.
4. Montoya vs Escayo, G.R. No. 82211-12, March 21 1989
P.D. No. 1508 is intended to relieve courts of justice of docket congestion, as evidenced by its "WHEREAS" clauses, which refer exclusively to courts and judicial resources.
There is no mention of labor disputes, labor arbiters, or labor commissions in the law’s provisions. The law does not apply to labor cases.
The Labor Code (P.D. No. 442) vests original and exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes in the Bureau of Labor Relations and its regional offices, not in barangay courts. Article 226 of the Labor Code mandates that labor disputes undergo conciliation and mediation at the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) before being referred to a Labor Arbiter.
5. Galuba vs Laureta, G.R. No. 71901, January 29, 1988
An amicable settlement has the force and effect of a final judgment unless repudiated within 10 days. Repudiation must be based on fraud, violence, or intimidation and must be filed with the barangay captain.
P.D. 1508 does not provide for judicial annulment of amicable settlements. The remedy of repudiation is the exclusive means to challenge such settlements.
6. Gegare vs CA, G.R. No. 83907, September 13, 1989
When the government or its instrumentality is only one of the contending parties, a confrontation should still be undertaken among the other parties.
The purpose of this confrontation is to enable the parties to settle their differences amicably.
If the other only contending party is the government or its instrumentality or subdivision the case falls within the exception but when it is only one of the contending parties, a confrontation should still be undertaken among the other parties.
7. Royales vs IAC, G.R. No. 65072, January 31, 1984
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo.
8. Fernandez vs Militante, G.R. No. L-59801, May 31, 1988
The conciliation process under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement. The failure to comply with this requirement does not affect the jurisdiction already acquired by the court over the subject matter or the parties involved.
The petitioners had waived their right to raise the issue of non-compliance with the conciliation requirement by not including it in their answer.
Even if the motion to dismiss had been timely filed, the Lupon Tagapayapa may not have had jurisdiction over the dispute due to the residency of the parties, as one petitioner was a resident of the United States.
9. San Miguel Village School vs Pundogar, G.R. No. 80264, May 31, 1989
Non-compliance with P.D. No. 1508 does not affect the court’s jurisdiction. It is a procedural requirement that, if not met, may render the complaint premature or insufficient, but it does not strip the court of its authority to hear the case.
The issuance of the certificate by the Barangay Captain of Palao, stating that Trino "could not be contacted," satisfied the requirements of P.D. No. 1508. Trino’s refusal or failure to appear for conciliation cannot be used to invalidate the proceedings.
Trino’s failure to timely raise the defense of non-compliance with P.D. No. 1508 in a motion to dismiss or answer resulted in a waiver of that defense. Her default and subsequent Petition for Relief from Judgment came too late to challenge the judgment on the merits.
10. Abalos vs CA, G.R. No. 94436, April 30, 1991
The conciliation process under P.D. No. 1508 applies only to parties residing in the same city or municipality. Since the petitioners and respondents resided in different cities, the requirement did not apply.
Waiver of Defense: By participating in the trial without objecting to the correction of the petitioners' residence, the respondents waived their right to raise the defense of non-compliance with P.D. No. 1508.
11. Alisugay vs Hon. Cagampang, Jr., et al., G.R. No. L-69334, July 28, 1986
Non-compliance of one party to appear for barangay conciliation as mandated by PD 1508 is a valid ground for the issuance of a “certification to file action,” allowing the aggrieved party to pursue formal litigation.
12. Zamora vs Heirs of Izquierdo, G.R. No. 146195, November 18, 2004
The law requires parties to undergo conciliation before filing a case in court. In this case, the parties had nine conciliation sessions, and the issues were thoroughly discussed. The failure to constitute a Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo did not invalidate the process, as substantial compliance was achieved.
13. Espino vs Legarda, G.R. No. 149266, March 17, 2006
The Certification to File Action issued by the barangay chairman is sufficient to prove that conciliation efforts were made. The act of the barangay chairman enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
Petitioners did not object to the presentation of the Certification during the trial, nor did they question its validity.
14. Aquino vs Aure G.R. No. 153567, February 18, 2008
Barangay conciliation is a compulsory precondition under the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160) and Presidential Decree No. 1508. However, non-compliance does not affect the court’s jurisdiction but may render the complaint premature.
Defenses not raised in the Answer are deemed waived under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Aquino’s failure to raise the issue of non-compliance with barangay conciliation in her Answer precluded her from later invoking it as a ground for dismissal.
15. Miguel vs Montaez, G.R. No. 191336, January 25, 2012
Under Article 2041 of the Civil Code, if one party fails to comply with an amicable settlement, the other party may either enforce the settlement or regard it as rescinded and insist on the original demand. Montanez’s non-compliance with the Kasunduang Pag-aayos allowed Miguel to rescind the agreement and pursue her original claim.
16. Agbayani vs CA, G.R. No. 183632, June 25, 2012
The Local Government Code mandates barangay conciliation for disputes between parties residing in the same city or municipality, unless an exception applies. Agbayani’s failure to comply with this requirement justified the dismissal of her complaint.