Special Rules and Proceedings: Rule 73
Settlement Of Estate Of Deceased Persons
RULE 73
Venue and Process
Succession
Succession is a mode of acquisition
by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations
to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person
are transmitted through his death to another or others
either by his will or by operation of law. (Art. 774.)
When succession vests
Article 777 of the Civil Code provides the substantive basis for the rules governing the estate of deceased persons.
The article states that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Nevertheless, before the actual transmission of rights, the procedural guidelines set forth in Rules 73 to 90 must be observed.
Once the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court is complied with, the rights of the heirs retroact to the time of death of the person whose estate was settled.
Modes of settlement of estate
The estate of a deceased person may be settled with or without court intervention.
Court intervention is not necessary in case of extrajudicial settlement, which presupposes that the deceased has left no will, no debts, and whose heirs are all of age.
The decedent's estate may also be settled with the intervention of the court in the following scenarios:
Summary settlement of estate of small value,
Partition, and
Settlement through letters testamentary or letters of administration with or without the will annexed.
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. —
If the decedents is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien,
his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted,
and his estate settled,
in the Court of First Instance in the province
in which he resides at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court,
so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court,
in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Proceedings for settlement of estate
In a special proceeding for settlement of estate, the petitioners seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact, i.e., the fact of death and to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.
The settlement of estate requires certain steps to be taken before a compulsory heir may get his legal share.
The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then all donations subject to collation would be added to it.
Net Estate = Gross Estate − Obligations and Charges
Partible Estate = Net Estate + Donations Subject to Collation
With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitime.
If the donations exceed the free portion of the estate (i.e., the remainder after satisfying the legitime), the excess must be reduced or returned to ensure the legitime is intact.
Jurisdiction over settlement of estate
Jurisdiction
It is the authority of a court to hear and decide a case.
It is a legal right that is granted by the Constitution and law.
Municipal Trial Courts and Regional Trial Courts are both empowered to take cognizance of estate proceedings. What determines which court has jurisdiction will depend on the gross value of the estate concerned.
The Municipal Trial Court has exclusive jurisdiction to settle an estate if its gross value does not exceed ₱300.000.00 or ₱400,000.00 if within Metro Manila.
gross estate ≤ ₱300,000 (outside Metro Manila)
gross estate ≤ ₱400,000 (within Metro Manila).
If it exceeds these amounts, then the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction.
gross estate > ₱300,000 (outside Metro Manila)
gross estate > ₱400,000 (within Metro Manila).
This is pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, which amended Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, effective April 15, 1994. Thus, for purposes of determining which court has jurisdiction in the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, neither residence nor citizenship is taken into account. In fact, the gross value of the estate delineates which court has jurisdiction therein.
It is only probate proceedings that fall under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. All other special proceedings are triable by, and fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and Family Courts.
Rule 73, Section 1 relates to venue, not jurisdiction
Jurisdiction
The power of a court to hear and decide a case.
Venue
The physical location where a case is heard.
Rule 73, Section 1 actually provides for the venue and actions for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons.
As held in Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals:
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause 'so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the state,' is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: 'Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons Venue and Processes' It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter 'existed was fixed before procedure in a given cause began.' That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain wording, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties.
Clearly, Rule 73, Section 1 relates to the matter of venue of estate proceedings when it refers to the decedent's place or residence or location of the decedent's estate.
In order to determine the proper venue in estate proceedings, one looks into the fact of residency in the Philippines and not the fact of citizenship.
If the decedent was residing in the Philippines at the time of death, regardless of whether the decedent is a citizen or alien, the estate must be settled in the decedent's place of residence.
Conversely, if the decedent was not a resident at the time of death, estate proceedings may be commenced in any place where any of the decedent's properties are located.
In order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
Preference, however, is given in favor of the court where testate proceedings, as compared to intestate proceedings, are held.
Consequently, as soon as the probate court acquires jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, no other court can dispose of such properties without the probate court's approval, for that would be tantamount to divesting the latter with jurisdiction. This rule however, is limited only to Philippine courts.
Example:
Once a special proceeding for the settlement or the estate of a decedent is filed in one of such court, that court has exclusive jurisdiction over said estate and no other special proceedings involving the same subject matter may be filed before any other court.
General Rule: Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it shall not be contested so far as it depends on the decedent's place of residence or the location of the estate.
Exception: Impropriety of venue may be raised in two instances:
in an appeal from the court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Thus, venue may be assailed only when the estate proceedings are brought up on appeal or if a plain reading of the records of the case will immediately show that venue was improperly laid.
Example:
To illustrate the second scenario, for example, while the petition for probate of the will alleges that the decedent was a resident of Makati City at the time of death, the petition was filed in the city of Paranaque.
Obviously, the petition should be dismissed for improper venue because the allegations of the petition indubitably show that it should have been filed in Makati City.
Nevertheless, the fact that the estate proceedings are initiated neither in the decedent's residence nor where the decedent's estate is located is not jurisdictional and may be waived if not raised.
Objection to improper venue should be made in a motion to dismiss, and before movant submits himself to the jurisdiction of the probate court.
How then is "residence" defined for purposes of settlement of estate?
Residence refers to "actual or physical" residence, as distinguished from "legal residence" or "domicile."
Though residence may be considered as synonymous with "domicile," such assertion only applies in election cases.
It has been held that for purposes of fixing the venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person refers to one's personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be one's legal residence or domicile provided one resides therein with continuity and consistency.
In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense; it signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen, GR No. 189121, July 31, 2013:
Thus, the fact that a deceased person's death certificate shows that he was a resident of Capas, Tarlac, did not stop the Supreme Court from upholding the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, where he actually resided.
Moreover, as a matter of principle, testate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings over the same estate.
Roberts v. Leonidad, GR No. L-55509, April 27. 1984:
The case involved two proceedings to settle the estate of Edward M. Grimm.
Intestate proceedings were initiated in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 20 by Ethel Grimm Roberts, the decedent's daughter from his first marriage.
Subsequently, a petition for reprobate of will was initiated by the decedent's second wife, which wills were already admitted into probate in Utah.
Ethel Roberts sought the dismissal of the testate proceedings.
In affirming the lower court's denial of the motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court held that the probate of the decedent's will is mandatory. It was further held that "li]t is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases."
The pronouncement in Roberts that the intestate and testate proceedings should be consolidated in the testate proceedings was not strictly followed in Uriarte v. Court of First Instance.
Uriarte v. Court of First Instance, GR Nos. 21938-39, May 29, 1970:
Petitioner Vicente, the alleged natural son of the decedent, initiated intestate proceedings to settle the estate of his father in Negros Occidental.
The decedent's other heirs opposed the intestate proceedings, claiming that the decedent left and executed a will. Instead of presenting the will for probate in the existing intestate proceedings in Negros Occidental, the private respondents filed a petition for probate of the decedent's alleged will in Manila.
The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondents should have submitted the decedent's will for probate either on motion in the pending intestate proceedings or as a separate proceeding.
The Court further held:
Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Cuanco v. Court of Appeals, GR No. L-24742, October 26, 1973:
The settlement of estate was instituted in two courts, an intestate and a testate proceeding. The question of jurisdiction was raised in both courts.
Former Senator Mariano Cuenco's children by his first marriage (respondents) instituted intestate proceedings in Cebu City, alleging that the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
A week later, Senator Mariano Cuenco's second wife (petitioner) filed a petition for probate of his will in Quezon City.
When the testate proceedings were initiated in Quezon City, the respondents had not yet complied with the Cebu Court's order to publish the notice of hearing.
Upon learning of the existence of the intestate proceedings in the Cebu Court, the petitioner opposed the same and filed a motion to dismiss.
The Cebu Court issued an order deferring to the testate proceedings in the Quezon City Court. Therespondents, on the other hand, questioned the Quezon City Court's jurisdiction, arguing that exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the Cebu Court when they instituted the intestate proceedings.
Thus, on the issue of which among the Quezon City Court and Cebu Court had jurisdiction, the Supreme Court qualified that the rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. In order for the court to which the estate proceeding is first filed to acquire exclusive jurisdiction, said court must also first take cognizance of the same, to wit:
A fair reading of the Rule – since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and coordinate jurisdiction – indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts. Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had bis conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
The factual milieus in Uriarte and Cuenco seem similar and yet the Court's ruling on which court should the proceedings be consolidated appears contradictory.
This is explained by the fact that in Uriarte, there was a showing that the petitioner in the probate proceeding had knowledge prior to filing the testate proceeding that an intestate proceeding was already pending.
In Cuenco, the petition for probate was filed without knowledge of an existing intestate proceeding, which was filed just a week earlier.
Extent of jurisdiction of probate court
A probate court acting as such exercises limited jurisdiction.
The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation, and distribution of the estate.
In fact, the main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration.
Thus, it has authority to:
determine the heirs, and
make a just and legal distribution of the estate
It is within the jurisdiction of the probate court:
to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication;
to determine who are the heirs of the decedent;
the recognition of a natural child;
the status of a woman claiming to be the legal wife of the decedent;
the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the testator; and
to pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights.
Moreover, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as:
the determination of the status of each heir and
whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse
Along the same track is the ruling in Romero v. Court of Appeals:
In the present case, petitioners assume that the properties subject of the allegedly illegal sale are conjugal and constitute part of their share in the estate. To date, there has been no final inventory of the estate or final order adjudicating the shares of the heirs. Thus, only the probate court can competently rule on whether the properties are conjugal and form part of the estate. It is only the probate court that can liquidate the conjugal partnership and distribute the same to the heirs, after the debts of the estate have been paid.
Pertinent is the following disquisition on the issue of jurisdiction:
Heirs of Ypon v. Ricaforte, G.R. No. 19868, July 8, 2013:
Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate, childless, and leaving certain properties.
Gaudioso Ricaforte (Gaudioso) claimed that he was the sole heir of Magdaleno, executed an Affidavit of Self Adjudication, and caused the cancellation of the titles covering Magdaleno's real properties.
Petitioners, together with their cousins, filed a complaint for the cancellation of title and reconveyance against Gaudioso.
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he was Magdaleno's lawful son, and claimed that the petitioners were not real-parties in- interest as there was no showing that they have been declared as Magdaleno's lawful heirs.
The trial court ruled that while the petitioners had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding, this did not mean that they could already be considered as his compulsory heirs.
Did the trial court have the authority to determine Magdaleno's lawful heirs.
NO. The rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
The declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action.
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality:
as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or
when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of the complaint.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of complaint was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding.
As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
Jurisdiction over questions of title to property
As a general rule, however, a probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and equally claimed as belonging to outside parties.
As an exception, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership, which may be instituted by the parties.
Order of inclusion or exclusion merely provisional and interlocutory
The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights, and credits which the law requires the administrator to set out in his inventory.
In compliance with this duty, the court also has the inherent power to determine what properties, rights, and credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded from the inventory.
Should an heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the court's attention to the fact that certain properties, rights, or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court's duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties.
Questions of title may be passed on provisionally, but the final determination of the ownership of the property must be threshed out in a separate civil action and not in the probate court.
Pacioles, Jr. v. Chuatoco-Ching, G.R. No. 127920, August 9, 2005:
Miguelita Ching-Pacioles died intestate leaving real properties with an estimated value of P10.5 million, stock investments worth P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner Emilio Pacioles, Jr., and their two minor children.
Consequently, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelite's estate, he prayed that:
(a) letters of administration be issued in his Wame, and
(b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelita's mother, respondent Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, filed an opposition on the grounds that
(a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and
(b) the bulk of Miguelita's estate is composed of paraphernal properties.
Respondent prayed that the letters of administration issue to her instead. Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special administratrix.
Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law. Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them "would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners.
In her omnibus motion, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator. The intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate. Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond. Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published but no claims were filed against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court. Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s estate. Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
The intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita. Petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing the partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs.
Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is "premature and precipitate," considering that there is yet no determination "whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture." Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelita’s estate as an "heir and co-owner."
The intestate court denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." indicating that it will first resolve the respondent's claim of ownership.
May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?
NO. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, we held:
"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title."
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the intestate court was actually to "determine the propriety of oppositor’s (respondent’s) claim." According to the intestate court, "if it is true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelita’s) properties," then it means that she has a "material and direct interest in the estate" and, hence, "she should be given her day in court." The intended "day in court" or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of respondent’s contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of Miguelita’s estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent’s ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against Miguelita’s estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to determine the accuracy of petitioner’s inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention. Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Jurisprudence teaches us that:
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."
Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.
Exceptions to probate court's limited jurisdiction
Notwithstanding the rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate action, the probate court may pass upon the issue of ownership where:
the interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the proceeding and
rights of third parties are not impaired.
In addition, without prejudice to the rights of third parties, all the parties may consent to the probate court passing upon the ownership of a property subject of probate proceedings.
Aranas v. Mercado, G.R. No. 156407, January 12, 2014:
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) owned shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for stocks in Mervir Realty and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Badian Property) to Mervir Realty.
Emigdio died intestate, survived by his second wife, Teresita and their five children. and his children from his first wife, including Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Teresita was appointed as administrator. Teresita indicated in her inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio "left no real properties but only personal properties.
Thelma claimed that Emigdio owned properties that were not included in the inventory. The parties agreed to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties should be included or excluded in the inventory Thereafter, the Regional Trial Court ruled that Teresita should have included in the Badian Property in the inventory.
Did the Regional Trial Court have the autharity to order the inclusion of the Badian Property in the inventory in the course of the intestate proceedings of Emigdio?
YES. The usage of the word all in Section 1, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is "to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate." Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of "positive abuse of discretion," for in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, "the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion. As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a separate action.
Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership.
Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
The exchange of shares of stock of Mervir Realty with the real properties owned by Emigdio would still have to be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed of assignment two days prior to his death was a circumstance that should put any interested party on his guard regarding the exchange, considering that there was a finding about Emigdio having been sick of cancer of the pancreas at the time. The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of the circumstances admittedly surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment.
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate.
Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 230404, January 31, 2018:
Deceased Spouses Reynaldo and Ester left several properties to their surviving children.
The respondent heirs – children of the spouses – executed an Extrajudicial Settlemant of the Estate of their deceased parents.
On the other hand, Petitioner Anita is a co-depositor in a Joint Account under the name Anita Ong Tan and Reynaldo with BPI.
When Reynaldo passed away, said joint account continued to be in active status. BPI sent a letter to Anita and informed her that her joint account with Reynaldo would become dormant if no transaction will be made. As such, Anita decided to withdraw her funds.
Due to the conflict of claims between the heirs and Anita, BPI withheld the release of the funds because of the conflicting claims between Anita and responderits.
Anita filed before the trial court a petition for the: (a) settlement of the Intestate Estate of the late Reynaldo and (b) issuance of letters of administration to any competent neutral willing person, other than any of the heirs of Reynaldo. The heirs filed a motion to dismiss the case.
Does the RTC, as a probate court having limited jurisdiction, incompetent to rule on issues involving inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge the question of title over properties?
NO. While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue orders involving inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over properties, it is no less true that such authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence, should be exercised judiciously, with due regard and caution to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case.
The facts obtaining in this case call for the determination of the ownership of the funds contained in the BPI joint account; for the intestate estate of Reynaldo has already been extrajudicially settled by his heirs. The trial court, in this case, exercised sound judiciousness when it ruled out the inclusion of the BPI joint account in the estate of the decedent.
Equally important is the rule that the determination of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (probate, land registration, etc.) is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in essence a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived."
Such waiver introduces the exception to the general rule that while the probate court exercises limited jurisdiction, it may settle questions relating to ownership when the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment.
Such waiver was evident from the fact that the respondents sought for affirmative relief before the court a quo as they claimed ownership over the funds in the joint account of their father to the exclusion of his co-depositor. In this case, the Court notes that the parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the intestate court in settling the issue of the ownership of the joint account. While respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, which hypothetically admitted all the allegations in Anita's petition, the same likewise sought affirmative relief from the intestate court. Said affirmative relief is embodied in respondents' claim of ownership over the funds in said joint account to the exclusion of Anita, when in fact said funds in the joint account was neither mentioned nor included in the inventory of the intestate estate of the late Reynaldo. Therefore, respondents impliedly agreed to submit the issue of ownership before the trial court, acting as an intestate court, when they raised an affirmative relief before it.
To reiterate, the exercise of the trial court of its limited jurisdiction is not jurisdictional, but procedural; hence, waivable.
Section 2. Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. —
When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife,
the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated,
and the debts thereof paid,
in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
If both spouses have died,
the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated
in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.
Summary
Death of One Spouse:
The community property is identified, managed, and distributed.
Debts are paid off.
Actions occur within the deceased's estate proceedings.
Community Property
Assets and properties acquired by either spouse during the marriage, excluding those obtained by gift, legacy, or descent, and excluding personal properties defined by law.
Death of Both Spouses:
The conjugal partnership is liquidated in the estate proceedings of either spouse.
Conjugal Partnership
Joint assets and liabilities acquired by both spouses during the marriage under the Conjugal Partnership of Gains regime. It includes properties obtained during the marriage through joint efforts or shared finances.
Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage
A creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for collection of sum of money chargeable against the conjugal property.
The proper remedy is for the creditor to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
The rationale behind this policy is that upon death of one spouse, powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to administrator appointed by probate court in the settlement proceedings.
Settlement of conjugal property.
Pursuant to Section 2 above, it is not necessary to file a separate proceeding in court for the proper disposition of the estate of the deceased husband or wife.
If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.
Section 3. Process. —
In the exercise of probate jurisdiction,
Courts of First Instance may issue warrants
and process necessary to compel the attendance of witnesses
or to carry into effect theirs orders and judgments,
and all other powers granted them by law.
If a person does not perform an order or judgment rendered by a court in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction,
it may issue a warrant for the apprehension and imprisonment of such person
until he performs such order or judgment, or is released.
Section 4. Presumption of death. —
For purposes of settlement of his estate,
a person shall be presumed dead if absent and unheard from for the periods fixed in the Civil Code.
But if such person proves to be alive,
he shall be entitled to the balance of his estate after payment of all his debts.
The balance may be recovered by motion in the same proceeding.
Presumption of death for purposes of succession
There is no independent action for the declaration of presumptive death, except that a spouse may seek the declaration of presumptive death of his or her spouse for the purpose of remarriage under the Family Code.
Under the Civil Code:
An absence of seven years it being unknown whether or not the absentee lives, is sufficient for the presumption of death to arise for all purposes except for succession.
An absence of ten years is necessary for purposes of opening up the absentee's succession.
Nevertheless, if the absentee disappeared after the age of 75, absence of five years is enough in order that his succession may be opened.
Absence of four years, however, is adequate for the presumption of death to arise in the following situations:
A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing;
A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing;
A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years.
If the absentee turns out to be alive, he or she may recover the balance of one's estate after the payment of all debts. The balance may be recovered on motion in the same proceedings.
A person who was erroneously declared presumptively dead, either because the absentee appears or the fact that the absentee is alive is proved, may recover one's property in the condition it may be found and the price of the property that may have been alienated or property acquired with such sums, but the fruits and rents may not be recovered.
Effect of absence on contingent rights of absentee
The relevant provisions of the Civil Code read:
CHAPTER 5
Effect of Absence Upon the Contingent
Rights ofthe Absentee
Article 393. Whoever claims a right pertaining to a person whose existence is not recognized must prove that he was living at the time his existence was necessary in order to acquire said right.
Article 394. Without prejudice to the provision of the preceding article, upon the opening of a succession to which an absentee is called, his share shall accrue to his coheirs, unless he has heirs, assigns, or a representative. They shall all, as the case may be, make an inventory of the property.
Article 395. The provisions of the preceding article are understood to be without prejudice to the action of petition for inheritance or other rights which are vested in the absentee, his representatives or successors in interest. These rights shall not be extinguished save by lapse of time fixed for prescription. In the record that is made in the Registry of the real estate which accrues to the coheirs, the circumstance of its being subject to the provisions of this article shall be stated.
Article 396. Those who may have entered upon the inheritance shall appropriate the fruits received in good faith so long as the absentee does not appear, or while his representatives or successors in interest do not bring the proper actions.
Cases:
Cuenco vs. CA (G.R. No. 24742, October 26, 1973, 53 SCRA 360)
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila.
He was survived by his widow, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (petitioner), their two minor sons, and his children from his first marriage (respondents).
Lourdes Cuenco (respondent) filed a Petition for Letters of Administration in the Cebu Court of First Instance, claiming the senator died intestate and was a resident of Cebu.
CFI-Cebu: Issued an order for publication and set the hearing for 10 April 1964.
However, the order was later modified due to procedural issues.
Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition for the probate of the senator’s last will and testament in the Quezon City Court of First Instance. She sought to be appointed as executrix.
Rosa filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in the Cebu court, arguing that the probate of the will should take precedence.
The Cebu court deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its decision on the probate petition.
CFI-QC: Denied the respondents’ motion to dismiss, asserting jurisdiction based on the senator’s residence in Quezon City.
The court admitted the will to probate and appointed Rosa as executrix.
CA: Instead of appealing the Quezon City court’s decision, respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, which ruled in their favor, annulling the Quezon City court’s proceedings.
Jurisdiction and Venue:
Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that the court first taking cognizance of the estate’s settlement exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of others.
However, this is a rule of venue, not jurisdiction.
The Quezon City court had jurisdiction over the probate proceedings based on the senator’s residence in Quezon City.
Precedence of Probate Proceedings:
Probate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings, especially when a valid will is presented.
The Cebu court correctly deferred to the Quezon City court.
Finality of Probate Orders:
The Quezon City court’s orders admitting the will to probate and appointing Rosa as executrix became final when respondents failed to appeal within the prescribed period.
Respondents’ failure to timely contest the Quezon City court’s jurisdiction and their participation in the probate proceedings amounted to waiver and laches.
Uriarte vs. CFI (33 SCRA 252)
Don Juan Uriarte y Goite was a nonresident alien who left properties in Negros Occidental and Manila.
Vicente Uriarte, claiming to be the natural son and sole heir of the deceased, filed Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental on November 6, 1961, for the intestate settlement of the estate.
Vicente Uriarte, during the lifetime of Don Juan Uriarte y Goite, filed a case to compel acknowledgment as his natural son, but no final judgment was rendered on this matter.
Negros Court: Appointed the Philippine National Bank as special administrator but the bank failed to qualify.
Higinio Uriarte, a nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition, alleging the existence of a last will executed by the deceased in Spain.
Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the probate of the alleged will.
Vicente Uriarte filed an omnibus motion in the Manila Court seeking to intervene and dismiss Special Proceeding No. 51396, which was denied.
Negros Court: Dismissed Special Proceeding No. 6344 on the grounds that the deceased had left a will and Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality to initiate intestate proceedings.
Testate Proceedings Take Precedence Over Intestate Proceedings:
Under settled jurisprudence, if a deceased left a will, testate proceedings for its probate must replace intestate proceedings, even if an administrator has already been appointed in the latter.
Jurisdiction and Venue:
While Courts of First Instance have concurrent jurisdiction over the estate of a nonresident alien in provinces where properties are located, the proper venue for probate proceedings is the court first taking cognizance of the matter. However, objections to venue are waivable.
Waiver of Venue Objection:
Vicente Uriarte, by failing to timely object to the venue of Special Proceeding No. 51396, waived his right to contest the jurisdiction of the Manila Court.
Uriarte was aware of the will's existence since December 19, 1961, but only contested the Manila proceedings in April 1963.
Summary of Uriarte v. Court of First Instance & Cuenco Case:
Uriarte Case:
Vicente, the alleged natural son of the decedent, initiated intestate proceedings in Negros Occidental to settle the estate.
The decedent's other heirs opposed the intestate proceedings, claiming that the decedent had a will.
Instead of presenting the will for probate in the intestate proceedings in Negros, the heirs filed a petition for probate in Manila.
The Supreme Court ruled that the will should have been submitted for probate either in the existing intestate proceedings in Negros or in a separate proceeding.
If intestate proceedings reveal the decedent left a will, probate proceedings should replace the intestate proceedings, even if an administrator has been appointed. If the will is rejected, intestate proceedings continue.
Probate proceedings for a will have priority over intestate proceedings.
Cuenco Case:
The children of Senator Mariano Cuenco's first marriage filed intestate proceedings in Cebu, claiming the decedent was a resident of Cebu.
A week later, the second wife of Senator Cuenco filed for probate of his will in Quezon City.
The Cebu Court deferred to the Quezon City Court after learning about the will.
The respondents in Cebu questioned the Quezon City Court's jurisdiction, asserting exclusive jurisdiction for Cebu.
The Court ruled that the first court to accept jurisdiction over the estate, after learning of the will, can defer to the other court handling the probate.
The court must first "take cognizance" of the estate for exclusive jurisdiction to apply.
Comparison and Explanation of Contradiction:
Uriarte:
The petitioner knew of the intestate proceeding before filing for probate in Manila, thus violating the principle of avoiding unnecessary litigation and creating jurisdictional conflict.
Cuenco:
The probate petition was filed without knowledge of the intestate proceeding, thus the jurisdictional issue was not as evident.
Despite the similar factual scenarios, the Court's rulings differed because of the petitioner's knowledge in Uriarte versus lack of knowledge in Cuenco.
Heirs of Marcelino Doronio vs. Heirs of Fortunato Doronio (541 SCRA 479)
The property in question is a parcel of land located at Barangay Cabalitaan, Asingan, Pangasinan, originally registered in the names of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante.
On April 24, 1919, spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante executed a private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of Marcelino Doronio and his wife, Veronica Pico. The deed described a portion of the land with different boundaries, notably identifying Fortunato Doronio as the owner of the adjacent property on the eastern side, unlike in OCT which listed Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda as the eastern owners. The deed remained a private document and was never notarized.
Both the heirs of Marcelino Doronio (petitioners) and the heirs of Fortunato Doronio (respondents) have been occupying the property for several decades.
Petitioners claim ownership of the entire property based on the deed of donation, while respondents argue that only half of the property was donated, with the other half belonging to Fortunato Doronio.
Petitioners filed a petition for the registration of the private deed of donation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The petition was granted, leading to the cancellation of OCT No. 352 and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico.
Respondents later filed a petition for reconsideration, which was dismissed, prompting them to file an action for reconveyance and damages.
The impairment of legitime should be addressed in an action for the settlement of estates, not in a civil action for reconveyance and damages.
Impairment of Legitime Must Be Resolved in a Special Proceeding:
The issue of whether Fortunato Doronio’s legitime was impaired should be settled in estate proceedings, not in a civil case for reconveyance and damages.
Probate courts have exclusive jurisdiction over estate settlements and legitime-related matters.
Civil actions enforce rights or seek damages.
Special proceedings establish a status, right, or fact (e.g., estate settlements).
The RTC lacked authority to decide on the advancement of property since it was not acting as a probate court.
Before determining the legal share of a compulsory heir, the decedent’s net estate must be ascertained by deducting obligations and charges, adding donations subject to collation.
Only after determining the partible estate can the legitime be established and whether a donation impaired it.
Validity of Donation:
Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias of real property must be made in a public instrument. The deed of donation, being a private document, was void and did not convey any title to the land.
Petitioners claimed the donation’s validity could no longer be questioned because:
Respondents allegedly admitted it.
A final RTC decision in Petition Case No. U-920 already upheld it.
The only issue in reconveyance is who has a better right over the land.
The Court rejected these arguments because:
A void contract is inexistent from the start and can be challenged by anyone directly affected.
Petition Case No. U-920 was not binding on respondents since they were not parties to it.
Res judicata does not apply because there was no identity of parties and causes of action.
The donation’s validity directly impacts the rightful ownership of the property.
Aranas vs. Mercado (G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014)
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) owned shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson).
He assigned his real properties in exchange for stocks in Mervir Realty and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Badian Property) to Mervir Realty.
Emigdio died intestate, survived by his second wife, Teresita, and their five children, and his children from his first wife, including Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Teresita was appointed as administrator. Teresita indicated in her inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio "left no real properties but only personal properties."
Thelma claimed that Emigdio owned properties that were not included in the inventory. The parties agreed to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties should be included or excluded in the inventory.
RTC: Ruled that Teresita should have included the Badian Property in the inventory.
Did the Regional Trial Court have the authority to order the inclusion of the Badian Property in the inventory in the course of the intestate proceedings of Emigdio?
Court's Authority:
The RTC had the authority to include the Badian Property in the inventory under Section 1, Rule 83, which requires inclusion of all properties known to the administrator. The RTC can include any property in the inventory unless it belongs to a third party with adverse title.
Administrator's Discretion:
The RTC has broad discretion in determining which properties should be included in the inventory to aid in estate distribution.
Courts should not interfere unless there’s clear abuse of discretion.
Probate Court's Role:
The probate court can provisionally include/exclude properties from the inventory during intestate proceedings without deciding ownership, leaving final ownership determination to separate actions. It can also resolve incidental issues like property classification if all heirs agree.
Issue of Assignment:
The exchange of real property for stocks and the deed assignment executed just before Emigdio’s death raised concerns, especially since Emigdio was ill.
Properties in Mervir Realty's name should not be excluded from the inventory without further investigation.
The RTC properly included properties in the inventory to avoid excluding potentially valid estate assets, acting within its discretion and following principles of estate administration.
Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon vs Ricaforte (G.R. No. 198680, July 8, 2013)
Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate, childless, and leaving certain properties.
Gaudioso Ricaforte (Gaudioso) claimed that he was the sole heir of Magdaleno, executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, and caused the cancellation of the titles covering Magdaleno's real properties.
Petitioners, together with their cousins, filed a complaint for the cancellation of title and reconveyance against Gaudioso.
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he was Magdaleno's lawful son, and claimed that the petitioners were not real parties in interest as there was no showing that they had been declared Magdaleno's lawful heirs.
RTC: Ruled that while the petitioners had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding, this did not mean that they could already be considered as his compulsory heirs.
Whether the trial court have the authority to determine Magdaleno's lawful heirs?
Special Proceedings:
The determination of a decedent's lawful heirs must be made in a special proceeding, not in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance.
In the case of Hrica of Teofilo Gabotan v. Court of Appeals, the Court emphasized that determining lawful heirs should occur in a special proceeding.
Jurisprudence dictates that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding and cannot be made in a civil action for recovery of property ownership.
A civil action is for enforcing a right or redressing a wrong, while a special proceeding seeks to establish a status, right, or fact.
The trial court cannot declare heirship in a civil action as such declarations can only be made in a special proceeding.