Special Rules and Proceedings: Rule 78
Rule 78. Letters Testamentary and Administration, When And to Whom Issued
(Sections 1 to 6)
Section 1.
Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. —
No person in competent to serve as executor or administrator who:
(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
Executors and Administrators
An executor is a person nominated by a testator in his will to carry out his direction and request thereof and to dispose of the property according to his testamentary provisions after his death.
An administrator, on the other hand, is a person appointed by the court of probate to administer and settle intestate estates and such testate estates where no executor is named, or the executors named are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond.
The differences between an executor and an administrator are set out below:
How Appointed
Executor — Nominated by the testator and appointed by the court.
Administrator — Appointed by the court in the following instances:
The will did not appoint an executor.
The executor appointed in the will is incompetent, refused the appointment, or failed to give a bond.
The will was disallowed.
The deceased died intestate.
Obligation to Present the Will to Court
Executor — Required to present the will to the court within 20 days after knowledge of the testator's death or after he knows that he was appointed as executor.
Administrator — No such requirement.
Bond
Executor — The testator may direct that the executor serve without bond or with only his individual bond conditioned only to pay the testator’s debts. However, the court may require the executor to execute a bond in case of a change in circumstances or for other sufficient cause.
Administrator — Always required to execute a bond.
Amount of Compensation
Executor — If the testator makes a provision in the will for the compensation of his executor, that provision shall be for his services, unless he renounces by a written instrument all claims to the compensation as provided in the will.
Administrator — Amount of compensation is fixed by Rule 85, Section 7.
An executor or administrator occupies a position of trust and confidence.
The law considers them as trustees of the estate and the funds of the estate as trust funds.
As such, they are required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance of that trust.
Although the executor and administrator are not guarantors or insurers of the safety of the estate nor are they expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care, and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of one's own serves as the standard by which one's conduct is to be judged.
The provisions in the Rules of Court providing for the appointment of an administrator where there is no will or the will does not name an executor seek to protect not only the estate of the deceased but also the rights of the creditors in order that they may be able to collect their credits, and of the heirs and legatees in order that they may receive the portion of the inheritance or legacy appertaining to them after all the debts and expenses chargeable against the deceased's estate have been paid.
Under the provisions of the law, therefore, the judicial administrator is the legal representative not only of the testate or intestate estate but also of the creditors, heirs, and legatees, inasmuch as he represents their interest in the estate of the deceased.
Who are Incompetent to Become an Executor or Administrator
Section 1 lists down the disqualifications of an executor or administrator.
By inference, the requirements for an executor or administrator are as follows:
At least 18 years old;
A resident of the Philippines; and
The court deems such person as fit.
Minors are disqualified as executors or administrators because they have no legal capacity to enter into contracts on their own.
With regard to the residency qualification, it must be noted that there is no statutory requirement that only residents may be appointed as executors or administrators of the estate.
Guerrero v. Teran, G.R. No. L-4898. March 19. 1909:
The courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.
The fitness or unsuitability of a person's appointment as executor or administrator is within the sound judgment of the court and will not be interfered with. The court may consider a person unfit for the following reasons:
Drunkenness;
The degree of drunkenness that is sufficient to disqualify a person from being an executor or administrator refers to that degree which would impair a person's sound judgment and reason that would necessarily affect the person's integrity and honesty.
Improvidence (unwise spending);
The second consideration is improvidence, i.e., unwise or ill-advised spending. An improvident person lacks the good judgment and foresight necessary for the fulfillment of the executor and administrator's responsibilities to manage and preserve the estate.
Want of understanding or integrity; or
When the rules speak of lack of understanding, it refers to a person's inability to know the nature and functions of an executor or administrator.
On the other hand, lack of integrity connotes a lack of credibility, which affects his honesty in the management of the estate.
Conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
Not all criminal offenses involve moral turpitude.
In explaining crimes that involve moral turpitude, the Supreme Court, in Republic v. Marcos, citing Villaber v. Commission on Elections, ruled:
"As to the meaning of 'moral turpitude,' we have consistently adopted the definition in Black's Law Dictionary as 'an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.'"
In In re Vinzon, the term moral turpitude is considered as encompassing "everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals."
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections that "not every criminal act involves moral turpitude," and that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine."
The enumeration of bases for "unfitness" is not exclusive to those stated in Section 1.
The court may consider other factors that may show that the person is unfit as executor or administrator.
Lim v. Diaz, G.R. No. L-17633, October 19, 1966:
The Supreme Court considered adverse interest as a ground for disqualification.
It ruled that one is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he has an adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
Section 2.
Executor of executor not to administer estate. —
The executor of an executor shall not,
as such, administer the estate of the first testator.
When the executor dies his executor cannot administer the estate of the first testator.
In this situation, the court may appoint an administrator de bonisnon as the new administrator after the death of an executor who was not able to settle the estate of the first decedent during his lifetime.
Section 3.
Married women may serve. —
A married woman may serve as executrix or administratrix,
and the marriage of a single woman shall not affect her authority
so to serve under a previous appointment.
Section 4.
Letters testamentary issued when will allowed. —
When a will has been proved and allowed,
the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon
to the person named as executor therein,
if he is competent, accepts the trust, and gives bond as required by these rules.
Authority issued by the court
If the court admits the will to probate, it may issue either of three possible authorities:
letters testamentary,
letters of administration with the will annexed, or
letters of administration.
The authority issued by the court will depend on whether:
the testator names an executor in the will and
the executor's competence, willingness to accept the trust, and compliance with the bond required by the rules.
The table below summarizes the authority that may be issued by the court depending on the surrounding circumstances.
Letters Testamentary
The authority issued to the executor named in the will to manage and administer the estate.
Issued when executor:
Is competent;
Accepts the trust; and
Gives the required bond.
Letters of Administration with the Will Annexed
The authority issued by the court to a competent person to administer the estate of the deceased if the executor named in the will refuses to accept the office or is incompetent.
Issued when there is a will, but the executor:
Is incompetent;
Refuses the trust; or
Fails to give the bond required by the rules.
Letters of Administration
The authority issued by the court to a competent person to administer the estate of the deceased who died intestate or with a void will.
Issued when:
The decedent dies intestate; or
The will is void or is not admitted to probate.
The order of the court admitting the will to probate may be appealed by the party aggrieved by such decision.
In such a case, the court must still issue the letters testamentary to the person named as executor.
Ozaeta v. Peeson, G.R. No. L-5436, June 30, 1953:
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of the estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered as a curtailment of the right to dispose. And as the rights granted by will take effect from the time of death, the management of his estate by the administrator of his choice should be made as soon as practicable, when no reasonable objection to his assumption of the trust can be interposed any longer. It has been held that when a will has been admitted to probate, it is the duty of the court to issue letters testamentary to the person named as executor upon his application. It is the testator that appoints his executor, as the question as to his peculiar fitness for such a position or his want of ability to manage the estate cannot be addressed to the discretion of the county judge.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the estate.
Section 5.
Where some co-executors disqualified others may act. —
When all of the executors named in a will can not act
because of incompetency, refusal to accept the trust, or failure to give bond,
on the part of one or more of them,
letters testamentary may issue to such of them as are competent,
accept and give bond,
and they may perform the duties and discharge the trust required by the will.
The testator is not prohibited from nominating more than one person as bis executor.
In such case. the co-executors exercise joint administration over the estate.
As such, the co executors cannot designate only one of them to administer the testator's estate because this would be contrary to the testator's wishes.
Section 6.
When and to whom letters of administration granted. —
If no executor is named in the will,
or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust,
or fail to give bond,
or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife,
as the case may be, or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court,
or to such person as such surviving husband or wife,
or next of kin, requests to have appointed,
if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife,
as the case may be, or next of kin,
or the person selected by them,
be incompetent or unwilling,
or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person
to apply for administration or to request that administration
be granted to some other person,
it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors,
if may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors,
if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve,
it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
Granting of Letters of Administration
Letters of administration shall be granted in the following order of preference:
If no executor is named in the will or the named executor is:
Incompetent
Refuses the trust
Fails to give bond
The deceased dies intestate
Priority in granting administration:
To the surviving spouse or next of kin, or both, at the discretion of the court.
If the spouse or next of kin:
Is incompetent or unwilling
Neglects to apply for administration within 30 days from death
Then, administration may be granted to one or more principal creditors (if competent and willing).
If no creditor is competent and willing, the court may appoint any other suitable person.
Order of Preference
Section 6 on the order of preference in appointment as administrator may be simplified as follows:
Surviving spouse;
Next of kin;
Persons requested by the surviving spouse or next of kin;
Principal creditors; or
Other persons selected by the court
Interest in the Estate
In determining who should be appointed as administrator, the principal consideration of the court is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as such administrator.
Nevertheless, the preference established by law is not absolute if there are other reasons justifying the appointment of an administrator other than the surviving spouse.
If the interest in the estate is what principally determines the preference in the appointment of an administrator of the estate of a deceased person, and if, under the circumstances of each case, it develops that there is another who has more interest therein than the surviving spouse, the preference established in the latter's favor becomes untenable.
An "interested party" in estate proceedings is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.
Thus, in Quiazon v. Belen, G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013:
The Supreme Court held:
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo's estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners' pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent's estate is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratrix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo's estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
The underlying assumption behind the order of preference shown above is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, and economical administration of the estate—or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence, or mismanagement—have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.
The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, especially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate.
The Supreme Court has sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein, viz.:
To have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented;
Where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased;
Where the estate is large, or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle;
To have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interest of the estate; and
When a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office.
When the rules speak of the surviving spouse, it refers to the partner in the conjugal partnership and the decedent's heir.
The surviving spouse is the preferred administrator precisely because one is interested in the decedent's estate as the partner in the conjugal partnership.
As owner of one-half of the conjugal properties and at the same time a compulsory heir, it would be unfair if the surviving spouse were deprived of any hand in the administration of the deceased spouse's estate.
While the surviving spouse is entitled to preference in the appointment, circumstances might warrant his rejection and the appointment of someone else, at the discretion of the court.
The preference for the surviving spouse assumes that the marriage to the decedent is valid.
If the marriage between the surviving spouse and decedent is voidable, it does not affect the preference for the surviving spouse.
Where the marriage is void, the "surviving spouse" cannot be preferred since the very basis for the preference (i.e., the marital union) is absent.
Meaning of Next of Kin
Angeles v. Maglaya, G.R. No. 163798, September 2, 2005:
Defines "next of kin" as those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir.
In determining the decedent's "next of kin," the probate court may pass upon the issue of filiation, especially when the application for letters of administration claims to be the decedent's heir.
A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits.
Ventura v. Ventura, G.R. No. L-26306, April 27, 1988:
The Supreme Court held: In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura (legitimate children by his late wife Paulina Simpliciano) and Maria and Miguel Ventura (illegitimate children).
The 'next of kin' has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property. It is generally said that 'the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator.'
Among members of a class, the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred. As the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are entitled to preference over Maria and Miguel Ventura.
Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, in the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both interests.
The court may appoint any of the decedent's principal creditors only when the surviving spouse or next of kin:
Is incompetent or unwilling to be appointed, or
Neglects for at least 30 days after the decedent's death to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person.
Furthermore, the order of preference provided above is limited to the selection of a regular administrator and does not apply to the selection of a special administrator.
The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court and is not appealable.
Cases:
Nittscher vs. Nittcher (537 SCRA 681)
In 1990, Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed a petition for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales.
RTC-Makati: Allowed the probate of the will in 1991.
In 1994, Dr. Nittscher passed away ,
Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters testamentary,.
Dr. Nittscher’s wife, Cynthia V. Nittscher, opposed.
RTC: Denied Cynthia’s motion to dismiss and granted the petition for letters testamentary in favor of Atty. Nogales.
CA: Affirmed the RTC’s ruling.
Whether Atty. Nogales' petition for letters testamentary should have been dismissed due to lack of a certification against forum-shopping.
Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 require a certification against forum-shopping for all initiatory pleadings.
The petition for letters testamentary is not an initiatory pleading but a continuation of the original probate petition.
Failure to include a certification against forum-shopping is not a ground for dismissal.
Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the probate of Dr. Nittscher’s will.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, probate jurisdiction lies with the RTC where the decedent was a resident or had an estate.
Dr. Nittscher was a resident of Las PiΓ±as, Metro Manila, at the time of his death. Since Las PiΓ±as was then under the RTC of Makati City, the probate court had proper jurisdiction.
Whether proper summons were issued and due process was observed.
Whether Cynthia was deprived of due process.
Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states that when the testator files for the probate of their own will, notice is required only for compulsory heirs.
Cynthia Nittscher and Dr. Nittscher’s children from his previous marriage were duly notified by registered mail.
Cynthia actively participated in the proceedings, filed a motion to dismiss, and sought reconsideration.
The claim of denial of due process was unfounded, as she had every opportunity to be heard.
Limited Authority of Probate Court
Probate courts only determine the due execution of the will—whether it was freely made by a competent testator following legal formalities.
Cynthia’s claim over the properties should be resolved in an ordinary civil action, not in probate proceedings.
Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon (GR. No. 139868; June 8, 2006)
Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard Guersey were American citizens who lived in the Philippines for 30 years.
They had an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.
In 1979, Audrey died leaving her entire estate to Richard.
The will was probated in Maryland, USA, with James N. Phillips as executor and Atty. Alonzo Ancheta as ancillary administrator in the Philippines.
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon and had two children.
In 1984, Richard did leaving his estate to respondent except for his A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.
Special Proceeding No. 9625:
Audrey’s will was probated in the Philippines.
Atty. Ancheta was appointed as administrator.
The estate included a property in Makati, bank funds, and company shares.
CFI-Rizal: Approved a project of partition in 1988.
Richard — ¾ of the Makati property, most of the company shares, and bank funds
Kyle — ¼ of the Makati property, shares, and cash.
Special Proceeding No. M-888:
Richard’s will was probated in Maryland and later in the Philippines.
Atty. William Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator.
Ancillary administrator proposed:
Guersey-Dalaygon —2/5 of Richard’s ¾ interest in Makati property
Richard’s three children — ⅗ of Richard’s ¾ interest in Makati property
Respondent opposed, she claimed that Maryland law dictates that a legacy passes the entire interest of the testator to the legatee. Since Audrey left everything to Richard, and Richard left everything (except A/G shares) to respondent, the entire Makati property should go to her.
CA: Annulled the RTC Orders of February 12 and April 7, 1988, ruling that:
Petitioner’s failure to follow Maryland law amounted to extrinsic fraud.
Audrey’s estate should have been distributed entirely to Richard.
Whether the CA erred in annulling the trial court’s final and executed orders.
Whether petitioner’s actions amounted to extrinsic fraud.
Whether respondent’s claim was filed within the prescriptive period.
Prescriptive Period for Annulment Based on Extrinsic Fraud
The four-year prescriptive period begins upon discovery of fraud, not at the time of the fraudulent act.
Respondent's knowledge of Audrey’s will is irrelevant; the fraud alleged is the petitioner’s failure to present Maryland law in court.
In 1991, the project of partition of Richard’s estate was opposed and later disallowed.
Respondent only realized the full implications of petitioner’s actions through Special Proceeding No. M-888.
The annulment case was filed in 1993, well within the prescriptive period.
Nature of Extrinsic Fraud
Fraud preventing a fair trial or full presentation of a case constitutes extrinsic fraud.
Examples include preventing a party from appearing in court, deceiving them into inaction, or an attorney’s unauthorized connivance.
The essence of extrinsic fraud is that it denies a party their day in court.
Petitioner’s Fiduciary Duty as Ancillary Administrator
An ancillary administrator must act with prudence and diligence in managing an estate.
Petitioner failed to distribute Audrey’s estate as per her will and applicable Maryland law.
His failure amounted to extrinsic fraud, justifying the annulment of the RTC orders.
Governing Law for Audrey’s Estate
As a U.S. citizen domiciled in Maryland, Audrey’s succession is governed by Maryland law (Civil Code, Article 16).
Under Maryland law, a legacy passes the entire interest of the testator in the property.
Petitioner was required to introduce Maryland law but failed to do so, leading the trial court to erroneously apply Philippine law.
Courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws unless properly introduced in evidence.
Petitioner merely assumed Philippine law applied, despite knowing Audrey’s nationality and domicile. His negligence caused the trial court to misapply succession laws, affecting the rightful distribution of the estate.
Resulting Miscarriage of Justice
The RTC’s orders favored Richard and Kyle, disregarding Audrey’s actual testamentary wishes.
The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that petitioner’s omission led to an unfair trial, justifying annulment.
The Makati property should have passed to respondent upon Richard’s death, as per Maryland law.
Legal and Moral Obligation of Courts
The courts must ensure rightful heirs are not deprived of their inheritance due to procedural lapses.
Justice requires correcting errors that arise from fiduciary misconduct, even if not intentionally fraudulent.
Ultimately, a testator’s will must be honored over personal interpretations or assumptions of good faith.
Tan vs. Del Rosario (GR No. L35903, October 27, 1932)
Prudencia Chua Tan and others appealed the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, which dismissed their complaint and absolved Lucia del Rosario, the administratrix of the intestate estate of Chua Toco.
The appellants claimed that the lower court committed errors, including:
Sustaining the defense of res judicata based on a prior Supreme Court decision.
Holding that the P20,000 belonged exclusively to Chua Toco, despite evidence suggesting it was partly from his adoptive father, Chua Piaco.
Failing to recognize that half of the P77,118.60 used by Chua Toco to purchase land should belong to the heirs of Chua Piaco.
Wrongfully dismissing their complaint and imposing costs.
Denying their motion for a new trial.
Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies, barring the present case from being re-litigated.
The Supreme Court ruled that res judicata applies because:
Identity of parties – Though the plaintiffs differ, the administrator in the prior case legally represented the heirs.
In Civil Case No. 25797, the plaintiff was Benedicta Santa Juana as administratrix of Chua Piaco’s estate, while the defendant was Lucia del Rosario as administratrix of Chua Toco’s estate.
In the present case, the plaintiffs are the heirs of Chua Piaco, while the defendant remains Lucia del Rosario in the same capacity.
Though the plaintiffs differ, they are legally represented by the former plaintiff, making the previous decision binding on them.
The defendant remains unchanged, appearing in the same legal capacity.
Identity of subject matter – Both cases involved the same disputed funds.
The previous case sought an accounting of funds allegedly held in trust by Chua Toco for Chua Piaco.
The present case seeks partition of the same funds and their proceeds among the heirs.
Since the disputed funds remain the subject of both cases, there is a complete identity of subject matter.
Identity of cause of action – The basis of the claim in both cases was the alleged trust between Chua Piaco and Chua Toco.
Both cases stem from the same allegation: Chua Piaco entrusted funds to Chua Toco.
The former case demanded an accounting of these funds, while the present case seeks partition.
Despite the difference in relief sought, the fundamental issue remains the ownership of the funds.
Identity of issue – The previous case already determined the ownership of the funds.
The crucial question in both cases is whether the funds belonged to Chua Piaco or Chua Toco.
This issue was already resolved in the prior case in favor of the defendant, leading to a final dismissal.
Since all elements of res judicata are present, the prior judgment is conclusive.
Because all elements of res judicata were present, the court affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto, with costs against the appellants.
A final judgment on the merits against an administratrix, acting as legal representative of an estate, is binding on the heirs in subsequent litigation involving the same subject matter.
Sioca vs. Garcia (GR No. L-20080, March 27, 1923)
Geronima Uy Coque died.
CFI-Samar:
September 30, 1922:
Denied the request of Juan Navas L. Sioca, the surviving spouse of the deceased, to be administrator.
November 11, 1922:
Appointed Jose Garcia as administrator.
Sioca argued that the court erred in appointing Jose Garcia instead of him. He argued that his preferential right as the surviving spouse was disregarded.
Whether trial court erred in appointing Jose Garcia as administrator instead of the surviving spouse, despite the latter’s preferential right.
The court affirmed the trial court’s decision and dismissed the appeal.
While a surviving spouse generally has a preferential right to administer the deceased spouse’s estate, the court may appoint someone else if the preferred person is found unsuitable under Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The trial court ruled the appellant unsuitable due to adverse interests in the estate, citing evidence from Civil Case No. 1041.
Since the appellant did not challenge the September 30, 1922 order, the issue could be considered res judicata (already decided).
The appellate court deferred to the trial court’s judgment, stating it would not interfere unless there was affirmative proof of error, which was not present.
The order appointing Jose Garcia was affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Villaber vs. Commissions on Elections (GR. No. 148326, Nov. 15, 2001)
Petitioner: Pablo C. Villaber
Respondent: Douglas R. Cagas
Case: Petition for certiorari seeking nullification of COMELEC resolutions disqualifying Villaber from running as Congressman in Davao del Sur (May 14, 2001 elections).
COMELEC (Second Division) disqualified Pablo C. Villaber and canceled his certificate of candidacy for Congressman in Davao del Sur for the 2001 Election.
COMELEC en banc denied Villaber’s motion for reconsideration.
In 1990, Villaber was convicted of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) (bouncing checks law), upheld by the Court of Appeals in 1992 and the Supreme Court in 1993.
COMELEC ruled that a B.P. 22 violation involves moral turpitude, disqualifying Villaber under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Douglas R. Cagas also argued that Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy by declaring himself eligible to run despite his conviction.
Whether a violation of B.P. 22 involves moral turpitude, thereby disqualifying Villaber from running for public office.
Supreme Court upheld COMELEC’s decision, dismissing Villaber’s petition.
Definition and Nature of Moral Turpitude
A conviction for B.P. 22 involves moral turpitude because issuing a worthless check "imports deceit" and violates good morals and honesty (as established in People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda).
The argument that Tuanda applies only to lawyers was rejected—the ruling applies to all individuals.
Not every criminal act automatically involves moral turpitude; however, when an act manifests deceit or fraud that undermines public trust, it is labeled as such.
The removal of imprisonment penalties in later cases (Vaca v. CA, Rosa Lim v. People) does not negate the fact that a B.P. 22 violation still involves moral turpitude.
As to the meaning of 'moral turpitude,' we have consistently adopted the definition in Black's Law Dictionary as 'an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Villanueva vs. Chavez (GR No. 7671, Jan. 25, 1913)
Gualberto Galve died.
On September 17, 1910, Hugo Chavez was appointed administrator.
A committee was assigned to appraise the estate’s assets and review claims.
On December 31, 1910, the claimants, heirs of Lucio Villanueva, presented a claim of P5,575.80.
The claim was allowed by the committee, but the administrator appealed.
CFI: Ordered claimants to file a complaint to proceed with the case.
Claimants contested the appeal's validity, but their objections were overruled.
SC: Denied claimants’ mandamus petition on August 12, 1911.
On October 24, 1911, Chavez reported readiness to distribute the estate.
The court disallowed the claim for failure to prosecute to final judgment.
Claimants were not notified of the disallowance or the distribution order.
Claimants filed a complaint against Chavez on October 28, 1911.
On November 4, 1911, without notifying claimants, Chavez settled accounts and was discharged.
On November 20, 1911, Chavez argued he was no longer administrator, as the estate had been distributed.
Whether the discharge of the administrator and the settlement of his accounts terminated his legal capacity to defend the action, despite the claimants’ contention that he was aware of the proceedings against him prior to obtaining the discharge.
Erroneous Declaration of Abandonment
The trial court wrongly declared the claimants’ right of action abandoned on October 28, 1911.
No deadline was set for filing the complaint; orders to file must be understood as requiring action within a reasonable time.
Claimants had been actively asserting their rights, even seeking mandamus relief.
Only two months passed from the denial of the mandamus petition to the abandonment ruling—not an unreasonable delay.
Some justices considered the order void due to lack of notice to claimants.
Consequences of the Erroneous Ruling
Since abandonment was wrongly declared, the following actions were also erroneous:
Disallowance of the claim
Order for estate distribution
Discharge of the administrator
Right to Proceed Against the Administrator
The claimants have the right to continue their action against the administrator, despite his discharge.
A court cannot order distribution until all valid debts have been settled.
Mississippi precedent supports the principle that an estate remains open for creditors until proper settlement.
Suntay vs. Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay (GR No. 183053, October 10, 2012)
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay is married to Dr. Federico Suntay.
They had a son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay I.
Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco. They had three children:
Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
Margarita Cojuangco-Suntay
Emilio Cojuangco-Suntay II
Their marriage was subsequently annulled.
The siblings lived with their mother separately from their father and paternal grandparents.
Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock:
Emilio A. M. Suntay III with Concepcion Mendoza
Nenita Suntay TaΓ±edo with Isabel Santos
Emilio III and Nenita are both acknowledged natural child of Emilio I.
They were reared by the spouses Federico and Cristina.
In 1979, Emilio I died, predeceasing both his parents.
After Emilio's death, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. However, it was stopped due to a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel for the unwanted visits of her grandparents.
In 1990, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died intestate.
In 1993, Federico adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
In 1995, Isabel filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration for Cristina's estate.
Federico opposed alleging that he should be the one appointed as a part owner of the mass conjugal properties left by Cristina, and that Isabel and her family had been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years.
In 1999, Federico nominated his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedent’s estate on his behalf.
In 2000, Federico died.
RTC-Bulacan: Appointed Emilio A.M. Suntay as administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay.
CA: Reversed the decision and appointed Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay as administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay.
Whether Emilio A.M. Suntay III, an illegitimate grandchild, is qualified to act as administrator of the decedent’s estate.
RTC Ruling (Trial Court) in Favor of Emilio III
The best interest of the estate is served by appointing Emilio III as administrator.
The respondent’s family and the decedent’s family are estranged, making respondent’s appointment impractical.
The decedent raised Emilio III from infancy as her own child, reflecting her presumed wishes.
The surviving spouse, Federico, nominated Emilio III, and his preference should not be ignored.
As a businessman, Emilio III is better qualified than respondent, a physician, to manage real estate and financial matters of the estate.
Court of Appeals (CA) Ruling in Favor of Respondent
Emilio III’s appointment was subject to a suspensive condition (Federico’s appointment), which became inoperative upon Federico’s death.
Respondent, a legitimate grandchild, is preferred under the Rules of Court over an illegitimate grandchild like Emilio III.
Article 992 of the Civil Code bars illegitimate children from inheriting from legitimate relatives, disqualifying Emilio III.
Respondent is as competent as Emilio III, possessing no legal disqualifications.
Supreme Court (SC) Ruling: Reversal of CA Decision
Legal preference is not absolute; the court has discretion in appointing administrators.
Presumed will of the decedent is a key consideration in intestate succession.
The "iron curtain rule" (Art. 992) does not apply given the close familial bond between the decedent and Emilio III.
Federico's properties are commingled with Cristina’s, reinforcing Emilio III’s interest in the estate.
Emilio III was legally adopted by Federico, making him a direct heir of Federico, not just a representative of his illegitimate father.
Joint Administration
The RTC's decision is reinstated, allowing both Emilio III and respondent to jointly administer the estate.
The RTC is directed to determine the heirs of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay before proceeding with estate distribution.
The question of heirship must be resolved first, following procedural rules.