Special Rules and Proceedings: Rule 79
RULE 79.
OPPOSING ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY.
PETITION AND CONTEST FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
Section 1. Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous petition for administration. –
Any person interested in a will
may state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary
should not issue to the persons named therein as executors, or any of them,
and the court, after hearing upon notice,
shall pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds.
A petition may, at the same time,
be filed for letters of administration with the will annexed.
Opposition to Issuance of Letters Testamentary
Any interested person may file a written opposition stating grounds for disqualification of the named executor(s).
The court will evaluate the sufficiency of the opposition after a hearing.
A petition for letters of administration with the will annexed may be filed simultaneously.
The interested person who is allowed to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary is one who stands to benefit, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
The interest must be material and direct and not merely indirect or contingent.
Where the right of the person filing a petition for the issuance of letters of administration is dependent on a fact which has not been established or, worse, can no longer be established, such contingent interest does not make her an interested party.
It has been further clarified that the heir who may be interested in the issuance of letters testamentary refers to forced heirs only:
"As stated above, the appellants in this case are not forced heirs of the deceased and therefore have no right to any part of the property left by the testator, once he had disposed of the same by will. If any of them were forced heirs, they would be entitled to intervene in this case and protect their interest insofar as they may have been prejudiced by the will. It is evident, therefore, that they have not been injured or prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. Only forced heirs whose rights have been prejudiced have a right to intervene in a case of this character.
This principle was elucidated in Maloles I v. Phillips:
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an heir of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:
'One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.'
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator's:
Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
The widow or widower;
Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the testator's will.
The rule does not require that the oppositor be qualified as an administrator.
A person may oppose the petition for probate without simultaneously seeking appointment as administrator.
As an example, an heir who is a minor may oppose the appointment of his drunkard brother as administrator of their parents' estate.
In such a case, even if the minor is disqualified as administrator, he is given standing to contest the appointment of an incompetent person.
Section 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. –
A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person
and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed; and
(e) That no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
Contents of Petition for Letters of Administration
Must be filed by an interested person and include:
The jurisdictional facts;
The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors of the decedent;
The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed; and
That no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
The contents of a petition for letters of administration are similar to the contents required for a petition for the probate of a will.
The only difference between the two is the requirement in a petition for probate that the name of the will's custodian be stated if the will has not yet been delivered to the court.
The jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the issuance of letters of administration are:
The death of the testator;
Residence at the time of death in the province where the probate court is located; and
If the decedent was a non-resident, the fact of being a resident of a foreign country and that the decedent has left an estate in the province where the court is sitting.
Section 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. –
When a petition for letters of administration
is filed in the court having jurisdiction,
such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition
and shall cause notice thereof
to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent,
and to any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate,
in the manner provided in Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
Court Hearing and Notice
The court sets a hearing date and location upon filing.
Notice must be given to:
Heirs and creditors
Other persons with an interest in the estate
Notice follows the publication and service requirements under Rule 76.
Publication and notice are jurisdictional.
Publication and notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders affecting other persons subsequent to the petition void and subject to annulment.
Without the requisite publication and notice, the court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Therefore, the court has the following obligations as soon as a petition for letters of administration is filed:
Fix the time and place of hearing;
Cause notice of the time and place of hearing to be given to:
Decedent's known heirs;
Decedent's known creditors; and
Other persons believed to have an interest in the estate.
Following the mandate of Rule 76, Section 3, the notice must be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province where the court has jurisdiction once a week for three consecutive weeks.
Also, under Section 4, notice must be sent either by personal service or registered mail.
There must be notice to "known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any other person believed to have an interest in the estate if names and addresses are known."
Section 4. Opposition to petition for administration. —
Any interested person may,
by filing a written opposition,
contest the petition on the ground of the incompetency
of the person for whom letters are prayed therein,
or on the ground of the contestant's own right to the administration,
and may pray that letters issue to himself,
or to any competent person or person named in the opposition.
Opposition to Petition for Administration
Any interested person may contest the petition by:
Challenging the competency of the proposed administrator.
Claiming a better right to the administration.
The oppositor may propose a different administrator.
Any person interested in a will may oppose in writing the issuance of letters testamentary to persons named as executors and, at the same time, file a petition for letters of administration with the will annexed.
Section 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. —
At the hearing of the petition,
it must first be shown that notice has been given as hereinabove required,
and thereafter the court shall hear the proofs
of the parties in support of their respective allegations,
and if satisfied that the decedent left no will,
or that there is no competent and willing executor,
it shall order the issuance of letters of administration
to the party best entitled thereto.
Hearing and Issuance of Letters
Proof of proper notice must be shown at the hearing.
The court will determine if:
The decedent left no will.
There is no competent and willing executor.
If satisfied, the court issues letters of administration to the most entitled party.
Section 6. When letters of administration granted to any applicant. —
Letters of administration may be granted to any qualified applicant,
though it appears that there are other competent persons
having better right to the administration,
if such persons fail to appear
when notified and claim the issuance of letters to themselves.
When Letters of Administration May Be Granted to Any Applicant
If persons with a better right to administration fail to appear and claim it, the court may grant letters to any qualified applicant.
Cases:
De Guzman vs. Angeles (GR No. 78590, June 20,1988)
On May 5, 1987, Elaine G. de Guzman filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of her husband, Manolito de Guzman,.
The petition alleged:
Manolito de Guzman died on March 22, 1987, in Makati.
He left personal and real properties, presumed conjugal.
The estate’s probable net value was around ₱4,000,000.00.
The compulsory heirs were the surviving spouse and their two minor children.
The petitioner, as the widow, sought appointment as administrator.
On May 22, 1987, the petitioner filed a motion for a writ of possession over five vehicles, allegedly conjugal but in the possession of the deceased’s father, Pedro de Guzman.
On May 28, 1987, the petitioner filed an ex parte motion to be appointed special administratrix.
RTC-Makati:
June 5, 1987: Granted the ex parte motion to be appointed special administratrix without prior notice to all interested parties.
June 8, 1987: Granted another ex parte motion for assistance to preserve the estate, appointing sheriffs and police officers to enforce it.
The officers attempted to take vehicles from Pedro de Guzman’s residence, leading to a near shootout, defused by then Mayor Jejomar Binay.
Pedro de Guzman challenged the June 5 and June 8 orders, arguing they were issued without due process, violating Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court, which requires notice and publication.
Whether a probate court appoint a special administrator, issue a writ of possession, and grant motions to preserve the estate before serving notice to all interested parties, as required under Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The probate court acted without jurisdiction.
While the court acquired jurisdiction upon the filing of the petition, it did not yet have jurisdiction over the interested parties since it failed to provide notice as required under Section 3, Rule 79.
Notice and publication are jurisdictional requirements to bring all interested persons within the court’s jurisdiction.
Without it, proceedings are void.
The appointment of a special administrator is a fiduciary role, requiring notice and a hearing to determine the applicant’s suitability.
No emergency situation justified the ex parte orders.
The respondent judge should have issued notices first.
The court’s order for preservation was vague and led to forceful seizures, creating unnecessary conflict.
The respondent judge voluntarily inhibited himself, making the issue of judicial bias moot.
The June 5 and June 8 orders were annulled for lack of due process.
Judge Angeles’ voluntary inhibition was accepted.
Duran vs. Duran (20 SCRA 378)
On February 28, 1961, Pio Duran died intestate in Guinobatan, Albay.
His alleged heirs included Josefina Duran (as the surviving spouse), siblings, nephews, and nieces.
On June 2, 1962, Cipriano Duran, one of Pio’s brothers, executed a public instrument renouncing and assigning his hereditary rights in favor of Josefina Duran for ₱2,500.
A year later, on June 8, 1963, Cipriano filed a petition for intestate settlement and requested to be appointed administrator.
Josefina Duran opposed the petition, arguing Cipriano was not an "interested person" due to his prior renunciation.
Cipriano countered that Josefina was not legally married to Pio and claimed his assignment was procured through fraud and gross inadequacy of price.
Another brother, Miguel Duran, later attempted to join the petition, which Josefina opposed.
CFI-Albay: Dismissed Cipriano’s petition due to his lack of interest in the estate, given his prior renunciation.
Whether Cipriano Duran remained an "interested person" in the estate despite having assigned his hereditary rights.
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Cipriano’s petition.
The Court distinguished Cipriano’s case from In re Irene Santos, where an assignment required court approval because it occurred during pending settlement proceedings.
Cipriano’s assignment happened before any settlement proceedings, meaning it did not require court approval and was valid between the parties.
Any claims of fraud or lesion must be resolved in a separate rescission or annulment action, not in the settlement proceedings.
Consequently, Cipriano lacked the legal interest required to petition for settlement.
Miguel Duran’s attempt to join as co-petitioner was denied, as there was no valid settlement case to intervene in.
Josefina’s alternative prayer to be administratrix did not validate Cipriano’s petition.
The dismissal of the petition was upheld, with costs against Cipriano and Miguel Duran.
Tayag vs. Tayag-Gallor (GR No. 174680, March 24, 2008)
Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag, claiming to be one of his three illegitimate children.
Ismael Tayag was married to Victoria C. Tayag, the petitioner, and allegedly had no children with her.
On September 7, 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate leaving real properties and a motor vehicle, which Victoria sold.
Victoria allegedly promised ₱100,000 each to Felicidad and her brothers but only gave half of the promised amount.
Felicidad claimed that Victoria annotated an affidavit from 1984 declaring the properties as her paraphernal assets and intended to sell them, prejudicing the rights of the alleged illegitimate children.
Victoria opposed the petition, asserting that she solely owned the properties and that she and Ismael had an adopted daughter.
She argued that Felicidad did not allege being legally acknowledged by Ismael, making her claim one to compel recognition, which cannot be filed after the putative father’s death.
RTC: Denied Victoria’s motion to dismiss.
CA: Upheld this denial, stating that the allegation of being an illegitimate child sufficed for a cause of action.
Whether Felicidad’s petition for letters of administration states a cause of action despite not alleging that she was acknowledged or recognized as an illegitimate child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling, allowing the proceedings to continue.
Interested Party Requirement in Letters of Administration
Under Rule 79 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an "interested person," meaning someone with a material and direct claim to the estate, such as an heir or creditor.
If a petitioner’s right to file is based on a fact that has not been or can no longer be established, their interest is considered contingent and insufficient.
Establishing Successional Rights of an Illegitimate Child
The right to file a petition for administration depends on whether the claimant has successional rights as an illegitimate child, which can be proven through voluntary or compulsory recognition:
Voluntary recognition occurs through official records, court judgments, or signed documents and does not require judicial action.
Compulsory recognition must be established during the lifetime of the putative parent.
Unlike Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals, where the claimant admitted to having no proof of recognition, Felicidad had yet to present evidence.
The mere allegation of being an illegitimate child suffices to establish an initial claim, allowing the proceedings to continue.
The respondent must still prove her claim, while the petitioner has the right to challenge it.
The appellate court’s ruling was upheld, and the petition was denied.
Gutierrez Del Campo vs. Calderon (GR No. 39769, March 9, 1934)
The judicial administrator of the estate of Francisco Varela Calderon submitted a project of partition for court approval.
The appellants, who are the legitimate siblings of the deceased, opposed the partition, arguing that they were entitled to inherit.
CFI-Manila: Dismissed the opposition, ruling that the appellants were not forced heirs since the deceased was unmarried and had no ascendants.
The court approved the partition in favor of the heirs designated in the probated will, which had been previously affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the appellants to intervene in the partition proceedings.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that:
Under Article 763 of the Civil Code, a person with no forced heirs may freely dispose of their property by will.
The appellants, as siblings, were not forced heirs and thus had no right to contest the will.
Even if the will's beneficiaries were illegitimate children, they were still qualified to inherit as the testator had full discretion to designate heirs.
Only forced heirs whose rights were prejudiced could challenge the will.
Since the appellants were not forced heirs, they had no standing to intervene.
Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the partition and dismissed the appeal with costs against the appellants.
Maloles II vs. Phillips (GR. No. 129505, Jan. 31, 2020)
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for the probate of his will.
He declared that he had no compulsory heirs and named the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. as his sole legatee and devisee.
The estate was valued at not less than P2 million.
Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was designated as executrix.
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. (RTC-Makati Branch 61) allowed the probate of the will.
The court found that the will was validly executed and that Dr. de Santos was of sound mind, free from duress or fraud.
On February 26, 1996, Dr. de Santos passed away, shortly after the probate was granted.
On April 3, 1996, Octavio S. Maloles II, claiming to be the testator’s full-blooded nephew and creditor, sought to intervene and have the order allowing the will reconsidered.
He also requested to be appointed as administrator of the estate.
Pacita de los Reyes Phillips initially filed for letters testamentary in Branch 61 but later withdrew the motion. She refiled a petition for issuance of letters testamentary in RTC-Makati, Branch 65.
On June 28, 1996, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch 65 appointed Pacita de los Reyes Phillips as special administrator.
On July 29, 1996, Maloles sought to intervene, opposing Phillips' appointment and asserting his right to administer the estate.
On August 26, 1996, Judge Gorospe of Branch 61 denied Maloles’ motion for intervention.
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 transferred the proceedings to Branch 61.
On September 4, 1996, Judge Gorospe returned the proceedings to Branch 65, stating that the initial proceedings had already been resolved.
On October 21, 1996, Judge Abad Santos decided to retain jurisdiction "to expedite the proceedings."
RTC-Makati Branch 65: Granted Maloles' motion for intervention.
Phillips filed a certiorari petition in the Court of Appeals.
CA: Ruled in favor of Phillips, setting aside the trial court’s order allowing Maloles’ intervention, citing lack of legal interest.
Whether RTC-Makati, Branch 61 lost jurisdiction over the probate proceedings after issuing an order allowing the will.
Whether RTC-Makati, Branch 65 had jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of letters testamentary.
Jurisdiction Over Probate Proceedings
Petitioner’s Argument: Probate proceedings in Branch 61 did not terminate with the allowance of the will and should continue until full estate distribution. Thus, Branch 65 could not issue letters testamentary.
Probate courts only determine extrinsic validity of wills (mental capacity, formalities).
Once allowed, the probate court issues a certificate of allowance.
Settlement of the estate proceeds separately.
Venue rules under Rule 73, §1 do not bar another branch from handling estate settlement.
Whether Maloles, as a creditor, had the right to intervene and oppose the issuance of letters testamentary.
Right to Intervene
Petitioner’s Argument: As the nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, he has a direct interest in opposing the issuance of letters testamentary.
Petitioner is neither an heir nor a legatee under the will.
He can inherit only in intestacy, which does not apply.
His creditor claim was belated and unsupported.
An "interested person" under Rule 79, §1 must have a direct material interest, which he lacks.
Whether Phillips was guilty of forum shopping by filing her petition in Branch 65 despite pending probate proceedings in Branch 61.
Alleged Forum Shopping
Petitioner’s Argument: Filing the petition for letters testamentary (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while the probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223) were pending constitutes forum shopping.
No forum shopping exists.
The probate petition was only to authenticate the will, which ended upon its allowance.
The petition for letters testamentary aimed to administer the estate, a separate proceeding.
Garcia Vda. De Chua vs. CA (GR No. 116835, March 5, 1998)
Roberto Lim Chua and Florita A. Vallejo lived together from 1970 to 1981.
They had two illegitimate children:
Roberto Rafson Alonzo Chua (born 1977)
Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua (born 1978).
On May 28, 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.
His estate was valued at approximately ₱5,000,000, including real estate, vehicles, and stockholdings.
On July 2, 1992, Vallejo filed a petition in RTC Cotabato City seeking:
Declaration of her two children as heirs.
Appointment as their guardian.
Issuance of letters of administration over Chua’s estate.
She claimed that Chua had no legitimate descendants or ascendants, making her children the sole heirs under Article 988 of the Civil Code.
Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua claimed to be Chua’s surviving spouse and filed a Motion to Dismiss on July 21, 1992, alleging the case was improperly filed in Cotabato City, as Chua’s residence was Davao City at the time of his death.
Vallejo opposed the motion, asserting:
The petition was primarily for guardianship, and under Rule 92, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, venue should be where the minors reside (Cotabato City).
Antonietta had no standing to intervene as she was not related to the minors.
Chua died a bachelor and had no legitimate wife.
Vallejo later amended her petition to clarify that the case also involved settlement of the intestate estate.
She revised the petition title and explicitly stated that Chua was a resident of Cotabato City before his death.
RTC-Cotabato: Denied Antonietta’s motion, ruling that:
She failed to prove she was Chua’s lawful wife (no valid marriage contract was produced).
Cotabato City was Chua’s actual residence despite business operations in Davao.
Even if concurrent venue existed, Cotabato RTC took first jurisdiction over the estate settlement.
The Court appointed Romulo Lim Uy as special administrator.
Florita Vallejo was appointed guardian over the minors’ persons and properties.
Petitioner alleged grave abuse of discretion by the trial court in:
Converting guardianship proceedings into intestate proceedings.
Holding intestate proceedings without jurisdiction or notice.
Issuing ex parte orders denying petitioner’s standing.
CA: Denied petition; ruled that the original petition had a twin purpose: guardianship and intestate estate administration.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the original petition was for both guardianship and intestate estate proceedings.
Mischaracterization of the Original Petition
Petitioner argues the original petition did not meet the jurisdictional requirements for intestate estate proceedings, including:
Last residence of the decedent
Names, ages, and residences of heirs
Names and residences of creditors
Private respondent allegedly admitted the petition was only for guardianship.
The title and content of the petition clearly indicated intestate proceedings, making the twin-purpose conclusion valid.
Misplaced Reliance on Case Law
Petitioner cited Gomez vs. Imperial to argue that estate settlement should not be mixed with guardianship.
Supreme Court ruled that the case does not apply, as the original petition in this case expressly included both guardianship and estate settlement.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was no need to publish the amended petition for administration.
Lack of Publication for Amended Petition
Petitioner claims this violates the Rules of Court and Supreme Court rulings.
However, the Supreme Court found that the original petition already contained the required jurisdictional facts, making publication unnecessary.
Whether the Court of Appeals failed to nullify ex parte orders issued by the Regional Trial Court without prior hearing or notice to petitioner.
Denial of Due Process
These orders included:
Appointment of a special administrator for the estate
Appointment of private respondent as guardian of the minors
Transfer of remains of the deceased
Surrender of estate property (e.g., Mitsubishi Gallant car)
Inventory of estate properties by breaking into the deceased’s house
Supreme Court ruled that petitioner lacked legal standing since she failed to prove her marriage to the decedent.
Even without prior notice, petitioner had opportunity to be heard through motions for reconsideration.
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner should have filed an appeal instead of a special civil action for certiorari.
Incorrect Remedy Used by Petitioner
Certiorari applies only when no other adequate remedy exists, which was not the case here.
Petitioner’s claim that an ordinary appeal was inadequate was not substantiated.
Petition lacked merit.
Petitioner failed to prove legal standing as surviving spouse or creditor.
Due process was observed since petitioner had the opportunity to be heard.
Certiorari was improper as an ordinary appeal was available.