Special Rules and Proceedings: Rule 80
RULE 80
Special Administrator
Section 1. Appointment of special administrator. —
When there is delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration
by any cause including an appeal
from the allowance or disallowance of a will,
the court may appoint a special administrator
to take possession and charge of the estate
of the deceased until the questions
causing the delay are decided
and executors or administrators appointed.
Nature of office
A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control, expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth administration and speedy settlement.
The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is a delay in granting letters testamentary (in case the decedent leaves behind a will) or administration (in the event that the decedent leaves behind no will) occasioned by any cause.
When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative of the parties suggesting the appointment. The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
The appointment of a special administrator is within the court's discretion, but such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice, and legal principles.
A court is not required to follow the order of preference prescribed under Rule 78, Section 6 for the appointment of a special administrator. The preference accorded by the aforementioned provision to the surviving spouse refers to the appointment of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate court.
While the rule is that the order of preference for a regular administrator need not be followed in the appointment of a special administrator, the Supreme Court has recognized that a court may take into account such principles in the appointment of a special administrator.
Distinguished from Regular Administrator
Regular Administrator
The court's order of appointment may be appealed.
One of the obligations is to pay and discharge all the debts of the estate.
Instances When Appointment Is Made by the Court:
Decedent dies intestate.
Decedent fails to appoint an executor in the will.
The will was disallowed.
Special Administrator
The court's order of appointment is interlocutory and not appealable. The appointment may only be challenged through a special civil action for certiorari, raising as a ground grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The special administrator is not empowered to pay the estate's debts.
Instances When Appointment Is Made by the Court:
There is a delay in the granting of the letters testamentary or administration.
When the executor or administrator is a claimant against the estate, but only as to the portion over which there is a claim.
When Special Administrator is Appointed
The rules provide for only two instances when the court may appoint a special administrator:
When there is a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause, including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will.
When the executor or administrator is a claimant against the estate he represents.
In this case, the special administrator administers only the portion over which there is such a claim.
In the first instance, the issuance of letters testamentary or administration is delayed due to any cause. The special administrator's powers exist
until the questions causing the delay are decided or
when the executor or administrator is appointed.
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration, such as:
A contest as to the will is being carried on in the same or in another court.
An appeal is pending regarding the removal of an executor or administrator.
The parties cannot agree among themselves.
Likewise, when general administration cannot be immediately granted for any reason, a special administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve the property of the deceased.
The ruling in Ocampo v. Ocampo is instructive:
Inasmuch as there was a disagreement as to who should be appointed as administrator of the estate of Vicente and Maxima, the RTC, acting as a probate court, deemed it wise to appoint joint special administrators pending the determination of the person or persons to whom letters of administration may be issued. The RTC was justified in doing so considering that such disagreement caused undue delay in the issuance of letters of administration, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 79, Section 3 Must Be Followed in the Appointment of a Special Administrator
May a probate court act on and/or grant motions for the appointment of a special administrator, for the issuance of a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person, and for assistance to preserve the estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate even before the court has caused notice to be served upon all interested parties pursuant to Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court?
In De Guzman v. Angeles, the Supreme Court resolved this issue as follows:
No. Notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders affecting other persons subsequent to the petition void and subject to annulment.
In the instant case, no notice as mandated by Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court was caused to be given by the probate court before it acted on the motions of the private respondent to be appointed as special administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person in the widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito de Guzman.
Order Appointing Special Administrator Not Appealable
The appointment of a special administrator is an interlocutory or preliminary order to the main case for the grant of letters of administration in a testate or intestate proceeding.
The appointment or removal of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. —
Such special administrator shall take
possession and charge
of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate
of the deceased
and preserve the same for the executors or administrator
afterwards appointed,
and for that purpose may
commence and maintain suits as administrator.
He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold.
A special administrator shall not be liable
to pay any debts of the deceased
unless so ordered by the court.
Powers and Duties (Section 2)
Takes possession and charge of the decedent’s assets (goods, chattels, rights, credits, estate).
Preserves the estate for the future executor or administrator.
May file and maintain suits as an administrator.
Can only sell perishable property or other assets with court approval.
Not liable for debts of the deceased unless ordered by the court.
The special administrator's powers are limited to the following actions:
Possession and charge of the decedent's estate;
Preservation of the decedent's estate;
Commencement and maintenance of suits as administrator;
Sale only of perishable and other property in accordance with the court's order;
Payment of the decedent's debts if ordered by the court;
Prepare and return a true inventory of the decedent's estate that may come into his possession or knowledge;
Render an accounting of the decedent's estate he received; and
Deliver the decedent's estate to the person appointed as executor or administrator or such other person authorized to receive them.
Section 3. When powers of special administrator cease. Transfer of effects. Pending suits. —
When letters testamentary or of administration
are granted on the estate of the deceased,
the powers of the special administrator shall cease,
and he shall forthwith deliver
to the executor or administrator
the goods, chattels, money, and estate of the deceased
in his hands.
The executor or administrator
may prosecute to final judgment
suits commenced by such special administrator.
Cessation of Powers (Section 3)
Powers end when letters testamentary or administration are granted.
Must immediately transfer all estate assets to the appointed executor or administrator.
The newly appointed executor or administrator may continue pending suits filed by the special administrator.
The selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators.
Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it.
This, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment.
Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the court finds the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, itis justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.
The special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control and who is expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect to its smooth administration and earliest settlement.
Cases:
Ocampo vs. Ocampo (GR No. 187879, July 5, 2010)
Petitioners:
Dalisay E. Ocampo (wife), Vince E. Ocampo, Melinda Carla E. Ocampo, and Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr.
children of deceased Leonardo Ocampo
Respondents:
Renato M. Ocampo and Erlinda M. Ocampo
siblings of deceased Leonardo
Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Ocampo died intestate in 1972 and 1996, respectively, leaving properties mostly in Biñan, Laguna.
Leonardo, Renato, and Erlinda were their only heirs.
After Leonardo’s death in January 23, 2004, petitioners alleged that respondents took full control of the estate, excluding them.
Petitioners filed for the judicial settlement of Vicente and Maxima’s estate and Leonardo’s estate in RTC Biñan, Laguna (Spec. Proc. No. B-3089).
Respondents opposed, arguing that combining two estates in one proceeding was improper and Leonardo’s estate settlement was premature.
RTC: Denied respondents’ opposition but admitted their counter-petition, clarifying that only Vicente and Maxima’s estate was being settled.
RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint administrators, with a ₱200,000 bond each.
Respondents filed Motion for Reconsideration, challenging Dalisay’s appointment.
RTC: Revoked Dalisay’s appointment, replacing her with Erlinda. Petitioners did not object.
Petitioners demanded an inventory and accounting of the estate’s income and assets.
Respondents sought exemption from posting an administrator’s bond, citing financial difficulty.
Petitioners moved to terminate special administration, claiming it was unnecessary and merely delayed their inheritance. They alleged respondents misrepresented property sales and falsely claimed petitioners owed the estate.
RTC: Revoked Renato and Erlinda’s appointments due to failure to post bond and comply with duties.
RTC appointed Melinda as regular administratrix, requiring a ₱200,000 bond.
CA: Ruled in favor of respondents, annulling RTC’s order for lack of due process in revoking their appointment and appointing Melinda.
Whether the CA erred in annulling and setting aside the RTC Order.
Special Administrator Appointment:
The RTC appointed joint special administrators due to a disagreement on who should administer the estate, as allowed by Section 1, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
Initially, Renato and Dalisay were appointed but later, Dalisay was replaced by Erlinda due to alleged incompetency.
Nature and Role of Special Administrators:
Special administrators are court officers tasked with preserving the estate until a permanent administrator is appointed.
Their appointment is discretionary, meaning the probate court can appoint or remove them based on reason, equity, and legal principles.
Requirement to Post an Administrator’s Bond:
Respondents requested an exemption from posting an administrator’s bond, but the RTC denied this request multiple times.
The court held that posting a bond is a qualification for administration and is meant to safeguard the estate.
The respondents failed to post their bonds and submit an inventory, leading to the revocation of their appointments.
Mismanagement of the Estate:
Despite not posting a bond, respondents continued administering the estate and distributing its income since 2002.
They executed questionable transactions, including a Deed of Conditional Sale and a Deed of Absolute Sale, excluding certain heirs.
The RTC found that their actions demonstrated insincerity in managing the estate.
No Grave Abuse of Discretion by the RTC:
The Supreme Court ruled that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in revoking the respondents' appointments.
The removal was justified due to their failure to comply with court orders and their improper handling of estate funds.
Improper Appointment of Regular Administratrix:
The RTC's appointment of Melinda as a regular administratrix was deemed improper.
The process for appointing a regular administrator requires compliance with Rule 78 and Rule 79, which include notice, a petition, and a hearing.
No proper petition or hearing was conducted before Melinda’s appointment, making it legally questionable.
Manungas vs. Loreto (GR No. 193161, August 22, 2011)
Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas; they had no children but adopted Samuel David Avila.
Florentino Manungas died intestate in 1977, and Avila predeceased Engracia, leaving his widow, Sarah Abarte.
Engracia filed a Motion for Partition of Estate in 1980, recognizing herself and Ramon Manungas (natural son of Florentino) as heirs.
Sarah Abarte waived her rights to Avila’s separate property in favor of Engracia.
A final decree distributed Florentino’s estate to Engracia and Ramon.
In 1995, Florencia Parreño, Engracia’s niece, was appointed as her judicial guardian.
Engracia, through Parreño, filed an illegal detainer case against Diosdado Salinas Manungas, who claimed to be Florentino’s illegitimate son.
MTC: Ruled against Diosdado; this decision was affirmed up to the Supreme Court.
After Engracia’s death, Diosdado filed a petition for letters of administration over her estate, claiming to be an heir.
RTC: Initially appointed Parreño as special administrator but later revoked it in favor of Diosdado.
Parreño and Margarita Avila Loreto appealed to the CA.
CA: Yound the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
The CA reinstated Parreño as special administrator.
Whether the RTC erred in revoking Parreño’s appointment and appointing Diosdado as special administrator.
Petition Denied
The Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA's ruling.
RTC Order Dated November 4, 2002, is an Interlocutory Order
Diosdado argued that Parreño should have appealed the RTC Order under Rule 45, claiming it became final and executory.
The Court clarified that the order was interlocutory, not final.
An interlocutory order does not dispose of the case completely and cannot be appealed under Rule 45.
The proper remedy was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
No Need for a Motion for Reconsideration
Generally, a motion for reconsideration is required before filing a certiorari petition.
However, an exception applies when the issue is purely a question of law, as in this case.
Therefore, the certiorari petition was valid despite the lack of a motion for reconsideration.
RTC Acted with Grave Abuse of Discretion
The RTC erroneously set aside Parreño’s appointment as special administrator based on Diosdado’s claim as an illegitimate heir.
The Court reiterated that a special administrator’s appointment is discretionary but must be exercised with reason, equity, and justice.
Diosdado was neither an heir of Engracia Manungas nor had an interest in preserving the estate.
Appointing a debtor of the estate as its special administrator constituted grave abuse of discretion.
Reinstatement of Parreño as Special Administrator
The CA correctly nullified the RTC’s November 4, 2002 Order.
The RTC’s May 15, 2002 Order, which appointed Parreño as special administrator, was reinstated.
Cobarrubias vs. Dizon (76 Phil 209; 1946)
On July 5, 1945, Magdalena Cobarrubias filed an urgent motion in Special Proceedings No. 70686 (Intestate Estate of Pilar Leyba y Cobarrubias), claiming that the deceased had jewelry worth P4,500 in a security deposit box at the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
She requested to be appointed as a special administrator and to be authorized to withdraw the jewelry, asserting that she was the sole compulsory heir of the deceased.
Judge Dizon granted her request and required a P200 bond.
On July 6, 1945, she was authorized to withdraw the jewelry and was ordered to report back within 48 hours.
On July 13, 1945, Magdalena requested a suspension of the proceedings, stating she needed time for an extrajudicial settlement with co-heirs.
Upon discovering that Magdalena’s initial claim of being the sole heir was false, the court revoked her appointment as administrator and her authorization to withdraw the jewelry on July 17, 1945.
Magdalena then filed an amended motion on July 20, 1945, acknowledging that the rightful heirs were the minor children of the deceased, Rosario and Carmencita, and renouncing any claim to the estate in their favor.
On August 28, 1945, the court declared that all properties in question belonged to the minors and converted the intestate proceedings into guardianship proceedings.
Magdalena later sought reconsideration, but Judge Ocampo denied it on January 2, 1946.
Magdalena filed a petition for certiorari, seeking to annul the orders of July 17, 1945, August 28, 1945, and January 2, 1946.
Whether the lower court acted within its jurisdiction and discretion in revoking Magdalena Cobarrubias' appointment as special administrator and in declaring Rosario and Carmencita as the rightful heirs.
The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or act outside its jurisdiction in revoking Magdalena’s appointment as administrator.
Since she obtained the appointment through false or misleading representations, the court had the authority to revoke it immediately.
The court acted properly to protect the estate, ensuring that the jewelry was not wrongfully taken by Magdalena, who was only bonded for P200 against the P4,500 worth of jewelry.
Magdalena’s renunciation of any interest in the estate was made under oath and approved by the court, making any subsequent attempts to retract it invalid.
The court dismissed her petition for certiorari and imposed costs against her.