Special Rules and Proceedings: Rule 82
RULE 82
Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation, and Removal of Executors or Administrators
Section 1. Administration revoked if will discovered. Proceedings thereupon. —
If after letters of administration have been granted
on the estate of a decedent as if he had died intestate,
his will is proved and allowed by the court,
the letters of administration shall be revoked
and all powers thereunder cease,
and the administrator shall forthwith
surrender the letters to the court,
and render his account with such time as the court directs.
Proceeding for the issuance of letters testamentary
or of administration under the will shall be as hereinbefore provided.
Revocation of Administration Upon Discovery of a Will (Section 1)
If a will is later discovered after intestate administration is granted, the administration is revoked.
The administrator must surrender the letters and render an account as directed by the court.
The court will proceed with appointing an executor or administrator under the will.
There are two instances when the court may revoke letters of administration that have already been granted:
When the decedent's will is discovered and admitted to probate; and
When letters of administration are illegally issued or issued without jurisdiction.
Mere discovery of the decedent's will is not sufficient basis to revoke the letters of administration.
The fact of discovery does not ipso facto nullify the letters of administration issued by the court.
The decedent's will must be probated first before the court may revoke the letters of administration.
While the second ground for revocation does not appear in Section 1, it is submitted that where the probate court acts in excess or without jurisdiction, the letters of administration may be revoked at any time.
The revocation of the letters of administration produces the following consequences:
All powers under the letters of administration cease;
The administrator shall surrender the letters to the court;
The administrator must render his account within the time given by the court; and
Proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or administration shall follow.
Section 2. Court may be remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceeding upon death, resignation, or removal. —
If an executor or administrator neglects o render his account
and settle the estate accordingt to law,
or to perform an order or judgment of the court,
or a duty expressly provided by these rules,
or absconds, or becomes insane,
or otherwise incapable or insuitable to discharge the trust,
the court may remove him,
or in its discretion, may permit him to resign.
When an executor or administrator
dies, resign, or is removed
the remaining executor or administrator
may administer the the trust alone,
unless the court grants letters
to someone to act with him.
If there is no remaining executor or administrator,
administration may be to any suitable person.
Removal or Resignation of Executor or Administrator
The court may remove or accept the resignation of an executor/administrator if they:
Fail to render accounts or settle the estate.
Disobey a court order or neglect their duties.
Abscond, become insane, or become otherwise unfit for the role.
Upon removal, resignation, or death:
A remaining executor/administrator may continue alone unless the court appoints another.
If none remain, the court may appoint a suitable replacement.
Removal or Resignation of Executor or Administrator
While Section 1 speaks of revocation of the letters of administration, Section 2 refers to the administrator's removal.
The difference lies in the fact that in Section 1, the letters of administration should not have been issued in the first place. In essence, letters of administration are revoked for circumstances or grounds that exist prior to their issuance.
Conversely, Section 2 presupposes that letters of administration were lawfully issued, but for reasons that occur after the letters are issued, there is sufficient basis to remove the person appointed as administrator.
An administrator may be removed or allowed to resign for the following grounds:
Neglect to render one's account and settle the estate according to law;
Neglect to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by the Rules of Court;
Absconding; and
Becoming insane or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust.
The enumeration of grounds for an administrator's removal is not exclusive.
A court is justified in removing an administrator if it loses confidence in him.
The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment, and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error.
The Supreme Court has recognized the following as sufficient basis to remove an administrator:
An administrator who disbursed funds of the estate without judicial approval;
False representation by an administrator in securing his appointment;
An administrator who holds an interest adverse to that of the estate or by his conduct showing his unfitness to discharge the trust; and
An administrator who has the physical inability and consequent unsuitability to manage the estate.
The removal of an administrator under Section 2 of Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the court appointing him.
The sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined by the said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court.
Consequently, appellate tribunals are disinclined to interfere with the action taken by a probate court in the matter of the removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown.
Notably, the grounds enumerated above pertain to the regular administrator. The probate court has wider latitude in the removal of a special administrator.
The question now is: who may ask for the removal of an administrator?
While the provision is silent as to who may seek from the court the removal of the administrator, jurisprudence provides that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief.
After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.
With respect to resignation, the following steps must be made before the court may accept the same:
The administrator submits a resignation letter to the court; and
The administrator prepares an inventory of the properties in his possession.
Suntay III v. Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died and was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), and five grandchildren:
three legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and
two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico's and Cristina's only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
Spouses Federico and Cristina raised Emilio III and Nenita. Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother, Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel's parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco.
More than three years after Cristina's death, Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
Isabel filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina's estate. Federico opposed the petition and nominated Emilio III to administer Cristina's estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration were issued to Federico. Federico died during the pendency of the case.
The trial court thereafter rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of Cristina's estate.
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to become a co-administrator thereof.
Was there basis to remove Emilio III as a co-administrator?
YES. Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III's demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate.
Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio III's appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof, as evidenced by the following:
Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete inventory, omitted in the partial inventories he filed several properties of the estate, including several parcels of land, cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles, and other personal properties, contrary to Section 1, paragraph (a), Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federico's settlement of the decedent's estate, which adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly belonging to said estate (whether wholly or partially) and which contained a declaration that the decedent did not leave any descendants or heirs, except for Federico, entitled to succeed to her estate.
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator, which is rooted in his failure to "make and return x x x a true and complete inventory." This failure became a proven fact when he actually filed partial inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on two occasions when Federico excluded Cristina's other compulsory heirs, including Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.
As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond, and executes an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of settling the decedent's estate with the end in view of distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio III's omission and inaction become even more significant and speak volumes of his unsuitability as administrator, as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each other. To our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-administrators of their grandmother's estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of Federico, and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged from their grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel.
More importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedent's estate to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said estate.
Section 3. Acts before revocation, resignation, or removal to be valid. —
The lawful acts of an executor or administrator
before the revocation of his letters testamentary or of administration,
or before his resignation or removal,
shall have the like validity
as if there had been no such revocation, resignation, or removal.
Validity of Acts Before Removal or Resignation
Any lawful actions taken by an executor/administrator before revocation, resignation, or removal remain valid.
The revocation of the letters of administration and the administrator's removal terminates his authority to administer the decedent's estate.
Acts done prior to the revocation or removal shall remain valid;
they are not nullified by the revocation of the letters of administration or administrator's removal.
If there are two or more joint administrators, the removal of one does not automatically extend to the other, unless the court provides for it. In that case, the other administrator shall administer the whole estate.
Whether intestate proceedings already commenced should be discontinued and a new proceeding under a separate number and title should be constituted is entirely a matter of form and lies within the court's sound discretion.
Section 4. Powers of new executor or administrator. Renewal of license to sell real estate. —
The person to whom letters testamentary or of administration
are granted after the revocation of former letters,
or the death, resignation, or removal of a former executor or administrator,
shall have the like powers to collect
and settle the estate not administered
that the former executor or administrator had,
and may prosecute or defend actions commenced
by or against the former executor or administrator,
and have execution on judgments recovered
in the name of such former executor or administrator.
An authority granted by the court
to the former executor or administrator
for the sale or mortgage of real estate
may be renewed in favor of such person .
without further notice or hearing.
Powers of New Executor or Administrator
The new appointee has the same authority to collect, settle, and manage the estate as the previous executor/administrator.
They may continue legal actions initiated by their predecessor.
A previously granted authority to sell or mortgage real estate may be renewed without further notice or hearing.
The new administrator or executor is given the following powers:
To collect and settle the estate not administered that the former executor or administrator had;
To prosecute or defend actions commenced by or against the former executor or administrator; and
To execute on judgments recovered in the name of such former executor or administrator.
The new administrator or executor cannot sell or mortgage the decedent's real estate pursuant to an authority granted to the former administrator or executor.
The new administrator or executor is required to secure a renewal of such authority from the court.
Notice and hearing are not required for purposes of renewing said authority.
Cases:
De ParreΓ±o vs. Aranzanso (116 SCRA 156)
Juliana Reyes died intestate in 1957, and her substantial estate is under settlement in Special Proceedings No. 34354 at the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Multiple litigations have arisen regarding the estate, including cases with docket numbers 23828, 26940, and 27130.
Several individuals and parties sought appointment as the regular administrator of the estate.
The court initially appointed Gregoria Aranzanso as regular administratrix on January 29, 1966, replacing special administratrix Araceli A. Pilapil.
Oppositions and motions for reconsideration followed, mainly questioning the qualifications of the appointed administrator.
On June 20, 1966, a different judge issued an order revoking Aranzanso’s appointment and instead appointed Paulina R. Santos de ParreΓ±o as special administratrix.
The order was based on a Supreme Court decision in G.R. No. L-23828, which ruled that Aranzanso and others had no right to intervene as heirs in the settlement of the estate.
Aranzanso appealed the revocation of her appointment.
Whether the lower court erred in removing Gregoria Aranzanso as the regular administratrix of Juliana Reyes' intestate estate.
The Supreme Court ruled that the removal of Gregoria Aranzanso was improper.
The decision in G.R. No. L-23828 only declared that Aranzanso had no right to intervene as an heir, but being an heir is not a requirement to be appointed as an administrator.
Since an administrator does not have to be an heir, Aranzanso’s removal was unjustified.
The Court reinstated Gregoria Aranzanso as the administrator of the estate.
Co vs. Rosario (GR No. 160671, April 30, 2008)
On March 4, 1998, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 66, appointed the petitioner Luis L. Co and Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as special administrators of the estate of Co Bun Chun.
The RTC later revoked the petitioner’s appointment upon the motion of the other heirs.
The petitioner then nominated his son, Alvin Milton Co, as co-administrator, and the RTC appointed him on August 31, 1998.
Nearly four years later, on January 22, 2002, the RTC revoked Alvin’s appointment due to several criminal cases filed against him, raising doubts about his fitness to administer the estate.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it on May 14, 2002.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the RTC’s ruling and dismissed the petition.
The petitioner then elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking Alvin Milton Co’s appointment as special co-administrator.
The Supreme Court ruled that the petition lacked merit and affirmed the CA’s decision.
It upheld the trial court’s discretion in appointing or removing special administrators, emphasizing that such decisions do not require the same grounds as those for regular administrators.
The Court found no grave abuse of discretion, as the removal was based on reasonable concerns regarding Alvin’s fiduciary duties, given the criminal cases filed against him.
The Court directed the RTC to proceed with the prompt appointment of a regular administrator to avoid further delays in estate administration.
Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals (GR No. 92999, October 11, 1990)
This case involves a dispute between two brothers, Reynaldo Mendiola (petitioner) and Redent Mendiola (respondent), over the appointment as executor of their father's estate.
The petitioner initially filed a petition for probate of their father’s will on March 30, 1987, in the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila.
On October 9, 1987, the RTC allowed the will and issued letters testamentary in favor of the petitioner.
On April 28, 1989, the private respondents filed a motion for the petitioner’s removal as executor, followed by a motion on May 2, 1989, to appoint Redentor Mendiola as executor.
On May 22, 1989, the RTC removed the petitioner as executor and revoked his letters testamentary.
The next day, May 23, 1989, the RTC appointed Redentor Mendiola as executor.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s ruling, prompting the petitioner to file a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Whether the RTC erred in removing the petitioner as executor and appointing his brother, Redentor Mendiola, in his place.
The Supreme Court found no merit in the petition and affirmed the CA’s decision.
The petitioner was removed due to his failure to:
Pay the estate tax.
Render an accounting of the estate.
Settle the estate in accordance with the law.
Honor a transaction with Villarica Pawnshop, which led to a civil suit against the heirs.
The Court cited Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, which allows the removal of an executor who fails to perform his legal duties.
The Court emphasized that the determination of suitability for an executor is within the discretion of the appointing court and will not be overturned unless there is a clear error.
The petition for review was denied for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner.
Hilado vs. Court of Appeals (GR No. 164108, May 8, 2009)
Roberto S. Benedicto, a sugar magnate, died intestate on May 15, 2000, leaving behind his wife, Julita Campos Benedicto, and daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.
Two civil cases were pending against Benedicto at the time of his death:
Civil Case No. 95-9137 (RTC Bacolod City, Branch 44)
Civil Case No. 11178 (RTC Bacolod City, Branch 44)
On May 25, 2000, Julita Campos Benedicto petitioned for letters of administration in the RTC of Manila, which were granted on August 2, 2000.
The estate was valued at ₱5 million, and liabilities included the pending claims from the two civil cases.
The petitioners (plaintiffs in the civil cases) filed motions to be furnished copies of processes/orders in the intestate proceedings and to set deadlines for estate inventories and accounts.
The RTC of Manila denied their motions, ruling that they were not "interested parties" under the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals upheld the denial, ruling that petitioners’ claims were contingent and did not give them standing to intervene.
Whether the petitioners, whose claims against the decedent were still pending in separate civil cases, had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto’s estate.
The Supreme Court ruled that while the petitioners did not have a general right to intervene under Rule 19 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, they could still seek specific reliefs under the Rules on Special Proceedings.
The Court recognized that "interested persons" could participate in specific aspects of estate proceedings, including creditors with contingent claims.
However, granting petitioners full intervention would unduly complicate the intestate process.
Instead, the Court allowed them limited participation, such as:
Access to copies of court processes and pleadings.
The right to be informed of estate developments to protect their interests.
The Supreme Court struck a balance—acknowledging the petitioners' potential claims without unduly burdening the estate proceedings.