Case Digest: People vs. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009
Criminal Law | Juvenile Justice
Richard Sarcia was charged with rape committed in 1996 against a 5-year-old girl, AAA.
The case was filed in 2000.
RTC (2003): Convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
CA (2005): Modified the penalty to death.
Sarcia was approximately 18 years old at the time of the offense, and 24 when convicted.
While his appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) took effect.
Whether Sarcia, who was below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, is entitled to the benefits of R.A. No. 9344, particularly the automatic suspension of sentence and appropriate disposition measures.
R.A. No. 9344 applies retroactively to Sarcia, who was a minor when the crime was committed.
However, since Sarcia was already 31 years old at the time of the decision, the automatic suspension of sentence under Section 38 was no longer applicable.
Instead, the Court ordered the case remanded for appropriate disposition under Section 51 of R.A. No. 9344.
Sarcia may serve his sentence in an agricultural camp or training facility, rather than a regular penal institution.
The Court emphasized that the Juvenile Justice Law applies even to heinous crimes and that its goal is rehabilitation and reintegration, not just punishment.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond reasonable doubt, we discuss now the proper penalty to be imposed on him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was the governing law at the time the accused-appellant committed the rape in question. Under the said law, the penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven years of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time the rape was committed, was alleged in the information and proven during trial by the presentation of her birth certificate, which showed her date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot agree with the CA’s conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place "in any month and date in the year 1996." Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age.
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages provided in the Civil Code, in case a crime is committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides that "in crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances." The issue now is whether the award of damages should be reduced in view of the presence here of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the accused at the time of the commission of the offense.
A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the convicted offender is in order. Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code defines the term "indemnification," which is included in the civil liability prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as follows:
Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. – Indemnification for consequential damages shall include not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime.
Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor ratiocinated as follows:
The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of ₱50,000.00 to the offended party as being in the nature of moral damages. We have heretofore explained in People v. Gementiza that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to be considered as moral damages thereunder, the latter being based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated and the legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less than ₱75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law, and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity. (Emphasis Supplied)
The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. In San Andres v. Court of Appeals,37 we held:
x x x Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. (Emphasis Supplied)
In another case, this Court also explained:
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25 C.J.S. 815).38 (Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and compensatory damages for the injury caused to the offended party and that suffered by her family, and moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority of the offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury caused to the victim and her family, particularly considering the circumstances attending this case. Here, the accused-appelant could have been eighteen at the time of the commission of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority because of a lack of proof regarding his actual age and the date of the rape rather than a moral or evidentiary certainty of his minority.
In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, which warrants the lowering of the public penalty by one degree, there is no justifiable ground to depart from the jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in the case of qualified rape, considering the compensatory nature of the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. This was the same stance this Court took in People v. Candelario,39 a case decided on July 28, 1999, which did not reduce the award of damages. At that time, the damages amounted to ₱75,000.00 for civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 for moral damages, even if the public penalty imposed on the accused was lowered by one degree, because of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v. Salome40 and People v. Quiachon41 is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome explained the basis for increasing the amount of said civil damages as follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to Sally in accordance with the ruling in People v. Sambrano which states:
"As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim shall ₱75,000.00 … Also, in rape cases, moral damages are awarded without the need proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the trial court’s award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages should also be increased to ₱75,000 pursuant to current jurisprudence on qualified rape."
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still ₱75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing jurisprudence, correctly awarded the following amounts; ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty; ₱75,000.00.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral damages even without proof thereof, x x x
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in People v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of ₱75,000.00 shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary or corrective damages are imposed in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of right. The requirements of an award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimant’s right to them has been established; (2) they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.42 Since the compensatory damages, such as the civil indemnity and moral damages, are increased when qualified rape is committed, the exemplary damages should likewise be increased in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.
In sum, the increased amount of ₱75,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages should be maintained. It is also proper and appropriate that the award of exemplary damages be likewise increased to the amount of ₱30,000.00 based on the latest jurisprudence on the award of damages on qualified rape. Thus, the CA correctly awarded ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However the award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages is increased to ₱75,000.0044 and that of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages is likewise increased to ₱30,000.00.
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the outcome of his appeal before this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively. The promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-appellant handed down by the RTC was not suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that time, in accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. Accused-appellant is now approximately 31 years of age. He was previously detained at the Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi City and transferred to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. – Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review. Hence, it is necessary to examine which provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall apply to accused-appellant, who was below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the offense charged. It reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is quoted below:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child’s restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied)
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. (emphasis ours)
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the appropriate disposition measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua;53 and (2) accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amount of ₱75,000.00 and ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages, respectively. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00 is maintained. However, the case shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.