Political Law Review: Fundamental Powers of the State
IV. FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
A. General Principles
The inherent powers of the State
Police Power
Power of Eminent Domain
Power of Taxation
Similarities
INI-CL
Inherent in the State, exercised even without need of express constitutional grant.
Necessary and indispensable; the State cannot be effective without them.
Methods by which the State interferes with private property.
Presuppose equivalent compensation.
Exercised primarily by the Legislature.
Distinctions
Scope:
Police power regulates both liberty and property;
Eminent domain and taxation affect only property rights.
Who Exercises:
Police power and taxation are exercised only by the government;
Eminent domain may be exercised by private entities.
Nature of Property Taken:
Property taken in police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose and may thus be destroyed;
In eminent domain and taxation, the property is wholesome and devoted to public use or purpose.
Form of Compensation:
Compensation in police power is the intangible, altruistic feeling that the individual has contributed to the public good;
In eminent domain, it is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken;
In taxation, it is the protection given and/or public improvements instituted by the government for the taxes paid.
*Purple Notes.
Limitations.
Generally, the Bill of Rights.
Although in some cases the exercise of the power prevails over specific constitutional guarantees.
The courts may annul the improvident exercise of police power.
Quezon City v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-34915, June 24, 1983.
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119694, May 22, 1995
B. Police Power
Definition.
The power of promoting public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use and enjoyment of liberty and property.
Scope / Characteristics
Police power is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the three powers.
The justification is found in the Latin maxims:
salus populi est suprema lex
the welfare of the people is the supreme law
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas
use your own property so as not to injure that of another.
[a] Police power cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract.
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[b] The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power.
Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148
Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987
Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, G.R. No. L-77194, March 15, 1988
Osmeña v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993
[c] Eminent domain may be used as an implement to attain the police objective.
Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989
[d] A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts.
Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts but equally to those already in existence.
Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of the police power.
Ortigas & Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000:
PNB v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 104528, January 18, 1996:
Thus, despite the retroactive effect of P.D. 957 (Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree), there is no violation of the non-impairment clause, because the decree is a valid exercise of the police power, and police power prevails over contracts.
[e] St. Luke's Medical Center Employees Association-AFW v. NLRC, G.R. No. 162053, March 7, 2007:
While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people.
Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers.
In this case, Santos, employed in 1984 as an X-ray technician by St. Luke's Medical Center, had to be separated from employment when R.A. 7431 (Radiologic Technology Act of 1992) required that no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or X-ray technician without having obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology.
[f] The Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people.
This regulation assumes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance.
Professional Regulation Commission v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004:
[g] The right to bear arms is merely a statutory privilege.
The license to carry a firearm is neither a property nor a property right.
It does not create a vested right.
A permit to carry a firearm outside one’s residence may be revoked at any time.
Even if it were a property right, it cannot be considered as absolute as to be beyond the reach of police power.
Chavez v. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004:
[h] Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the non-impairment and due process clauses, since the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, modify, or amend the same in accordance with the demands of the general welfare.
Southeast Mindanao Goldmining Corporation v. Balite Portal Mining, G.R. No. 135190, April 3, 2002:
[i] A license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the State, which may be suspended or revoked by the State in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements.
MMDA v. Garin, G.R. No. 130230, April 15, 2005:
[j] R.A. 9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003,” is a legitimate exercise of police power.
Administrative Order No. 177 issued by the Department of Health, providing that the 20% discount privilege of senior citizens shall not be limited to the purchase of unbranded generic medicine but shall extend to both prescription and non-prescription medicine, whether branded or generic, is valid.
When conditions so demand, as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by the due process clause, must yield to the general welfare.
Carlos Superdrug Corporation v. DSWD, G.R. No. 166494, June 29, 2007:
[k] In the exercise of police power, the State can regulate the rates imposed by a public utility, such as an electric cooperative.
Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative v. Energy Regulatory Commission, G.R. No. 183626, October 4, 2010
Who may exercise the power.
The power is inherently vested in the Legislature.
However, Congress may validly delegate this power:
to the President,
to administrative bodies, and
to lawmaking bodies of local government units.
Local government units exercise the power under the general welfare clause [Sec. 16, R.A. 7160], and under Secs. 391, 447, 458, and 468, R.A. 7160.
Sec. 16, R.A. 7160: General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied there from, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
[a] Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative v. Torres, G.R. No. 127249, February 27, 1998:
While police power may be validly delegated to the President by law, R.A. 6939 and P.D. 260, as amended, do not authorize the President, or any other administrative body, to take over the internal management of a cooperative.
Accordingly, Memorandum Order No. 409, issued by the President, constituting an ad hoc committee to temporarily take over and manage the affairs of CANORECO is invalid.
[b] The regulation by local legislatures of land use in their respective territorial jurisdiction through zoning and reclassification is an exercise of the police power.
The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial, and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality.
Buklod ng Magbubukid v. E.M. Ramos, G.R. No. 131481, March 10, 2011:
Zoning and regulation of the construction of buildings are valid exercises of the police power.
Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City, G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011:
Legislative delegation of authority for cities, such as Parañaque, to enact zoning ordinances and for reclassification is found in Sec. 447, R.A. 7160.
United BF Homeowners Associations v. The City Mayor, Parañaque, G.R. No. 141010, February 7, 2007:
[i] Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008:
Manila City Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area from industrial to commercial, and ordered owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the classification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six (6) months from the effectivity of the ordinance.
It was enacted "for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare" of the residents of the City of Manila, and is a valid exercise of the police power.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security, and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila, and not just of a particular class.
The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist target.
As long as there is such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat.
[c] MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000:
Unlike the legislative bodies of local government units, there is no provision in R.A. 7924 that empowers the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.
Thus, MMDA may not order the opening of Neptune St. in the Bel-Air Subdivision to public traffic, as it does not possess delegated police power.
MMDA v. Garin, G.R. No. 130230, April 15, 2005:
While Sec. 5(f), R.A. 7924, does not grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, the same law vests the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.
Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative power has been delegated (the City of Manila, in this case), the MMDA is not precluded — and in fact is duty-bound — to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services, and traffic education programs.
[i] Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City, G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011:
The Supreme Court reiterated this pronouncement that MMDA does not have the power to enact ordinances, and declared that it is liable for the illegal demolition of the petitioner’s property.
[ii] Francisco v. Fernando, G.R. No. 166501, November 16, 2006:
A petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed against the MMDA and its Chairman, Bayani Fernando, to enjoin the further implementation of the "Wet Flag Scheme" and to compel respondents to "respect and uphold" the pedestrians' right to due process and right to equal protection of the law.
As implemented, police mobile units bearing wet flags with words "Maglakad and mag-abang sa bangketa" were deployed along major Metro Manila thoroughfares.
It was held that the petitioner failed to show the lack of basis or the unreasonableness of the Wet Flag Scheme.
On the alleged lack of legal basis, the Court noted that all the cities and municipalities within MMDA's jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions for pedestrian regulation. This serves as sufficient basis for the respondent's implementation of schemes to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations.
The MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities. The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion, absent any proof that respondents implemented the Flag Scheme in that city.
[d] MMDA v. Viron Transportation, G.R. No. 170656, August 15, 2007:
While concededly, the President has the authority to provide for the establishment of the Greater Manila Mass Transport System, in order to decongest traffic by eliminating bus terminals along major Metro Manila thoroughfares, E.O. No. 179, which designates the Metro Manila Development Authority as the implementing agency for the project, is ultra vires.
Under the provisions of E.O. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement such a project. The President must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development, and regulation of networks of transportation. By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency, the President overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law.
Limitations (Tests for Valid Exercise)
[a] Lawful Subject.
The interests of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the power.
This means that the activity or property sought to be regulated affects the general welfare; if it does, then the enjoyment of the rights flowing therefrom may have to yield to the interests of the greater number.
Taxicab Operators v. Board of Transportation, G.R. No. L-59234, September 30, 1982
Velasco v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-24153, February 14, 1983
Bautista v. Juinio, G.R. No. L-50908, January 31, 1984
Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71169, December 22, 1988
[i] Lim v. Pacquing, G.R. No. 115044, January 27, 1995:
It was held that P.D. 771, which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including jai-alai) issued by local governments, was a valid exercise of the police power.
Gambling is essentially antagonistic to the objectives of national productivity and self-reliance; it is a vice and a social ill which the government must minimize (or eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic development.
Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, G.R. No. 98332, January 16, 1995:
Upheld the validity of Administrative Orders Nos. 57 and 82 of the DENR Secretary which effectively converted existing mining leases and other mining agreements into production-sharing agreements within one year from effectivity, inasmuch as the subject sought to be governed by the questioned orders is germane to the objects and purposes of E.O. 279, and that mining leases or agreements granted by the State are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.
[ii] Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93891, March 11, 1991:
The Supreme Court held that ex parte cease and desist orders issued by the Pollution Adjudication Board are permitted by law and regulations in situations such as stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of police power.
The ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests through the exercise of police power.
[b] Lawful Means.
The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on individuals.
Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987;
Tablarin v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987;
Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, G.R. No. L-38429, June 29, 1988.
[i] Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare or the common good.
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, August 5, 1996:
A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of DOLE Order No. 3 (establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists as a prerequisite to the processing of any contract of employment by POEA) shows that the assailed order was issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.
[ii] Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119694, May 22, 1995:
However, Sec. 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2772, which mandates newspapers of general circulation in every province or city to provide free print space of not less than 1/2 page as COMELEC space, was held to be an invalid exercise of the police power, there being no showing of the existence of a national emergency or imperious public necessity for the taking of print space, nor that the resolution was the only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity.
[This was held to be an exercise of the power of eminent domain, albeit invalid, because the COMELEC would not pay for the space to be given to it by the newspapers.]
City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-34915, June 24, 1983:
The Quezon City ordinance which required commercial cemetery owners to reserve 6% of burial lots for paupers in the City was held to be an invalid exercise of the police power, but was instead an exercise of the power of eminent domain which would make the City liable to pay the owners just compensation.
[iii] The proper exercise of the police power requires compliance with the following requisites:
The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference by the State; and
The means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner, G.R. No. 148339, February 23, 2005:
An ordinance aimed at relieving traffic congestion meets the first standard; but declaring bus terminals as nuisances per se and ordering their closure or relocation contravenes the second standard.
[iv] Cabrera v. Lapid, G.R. No. 129098, December 6, 2006:
The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal by the Office of the Ombudsman of criminal charges against respondents local government officials who had ordered and carried out the demolition of a fishpond which purportedly blocked the flow of the Pasak River in Sasmuan, Pampanga.
The Court agreed with the findings of the Ombudsman that "those who participated in the blasting of the subject fishpond were only impelled by their desire to serve the best interest of the general public."
Additional Limitations [When exercised by delegate]
[a] Express grant by law
e.g., Secs. 16, 391, 447, 458 and 468, R.A. 7160, for local government units
[b] Within territorial limits
for local government units, except when exercised to protect water supply
[c] Must not be contrary to law
An activity prohibited by law cannot, in the guise of regulation, be allowed;
An activity allowed by law may be regulated, but not prohibited.
De la Cruz v. Paras, G.R. No. L-41053, February 27, 1976;
City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, supra;
Villacorta v. Bernardo, G.R. No. L-31249, August 19, 1986.
[i] Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782, December 11, 1991:
Reiterated in Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, March 11, 1992, and in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994, the Supreme Court declared that for municipal ordinances to be valid, they: CUPPU-GC
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
must not be unfair or oppressive;
must not be partial or discriminatory;
must not prohibit, but may regulate, trade;
must not be unreasonable; and
must be general in application and consistent with public policy.
Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, March 11, 1992
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994
[ii] City of Manila v. Judge Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005:
The Supreme Court declared as an invalid exercise of the police power City of Manila Ordinance No. 7783, which prohibited “the establishment or operation of businesses providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area.”
Concededly, the ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins.
Despite its virtuous aims, however, the enactment of the ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on.
Local legislative bodies cannot prohibit the operation of sauna and massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, supper clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns, or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws — not even in the guise of police power.
[iii] Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 142359 and 142980, May 25, 2004:
The authority of a municipality to issue zoning classification is an exercise of the police power, not the power of eminent domain.
A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs.
[iv] Valentino Legaspi v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013:
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Cebu City Ordinance No. 1664, imposing penalties for illegally parked motor vehicles.
Considering that traffic congestion was already retarding the growth and progress in population and economic centers of the country, the plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public interest and advance the general welfare of the City of Cebu.
The immobilization of illegally parked vehicles by clamping their tires was deemed necessary because the transgressors were not around at the time of apprehension. Under such circumstances, notice and hearing would be superfluous.
[v] Social Justice Society v. Alfredo Lim, G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014:
The petitions assailed the validity of Ordinance No. 8187, enacted in 2009, which reclassified the Pandacan area (site of oil terminals) into an industrial zone, effectively allowing the oil companies to maintain their oil terminals in the area.
The Supreme Court declared Ordinance No. 8187 invalid and unconstitutional.
Using the same “best interest of the public” as guide, the Court noted that the Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened.
Suffice it to state that the objective adopted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod to promote the constituents’ general welfare in terms of economic benefits cannot override the very basic rights to life, security and safety of the people. Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property, as they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate.
However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. So, when the exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’ right to property, the former should prevail.
Additional Cases from Syllabus:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators v. City of Manila, July 31, 1967
Republic v. Meralco, G.R. No. 141314, Nov. 15, 2002
Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323
C. Power of Eminent Domain
Definition / Scope
Also known as the power of expropriation.
[a] Constitutional Basis.
Sec. 9, Article III (Bill of Rights)
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Sec. 18, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony)
The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government.
Secs. 4 and 9, Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights)
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to under-privileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners.
[b] Distinguished from police power.
Police power is the power of the State to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the State to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation.
Although both police power and eminent domain have the general welfare for their object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two with the latter being used as an implement of the former, there are still traditional distinctions between the two/
Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, hence no compensation is paid. Likewise, in the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the State.
Where a property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking. However, when a property interest is appropriated applied to some public purpose, there is need to pay just compensation.
In the exercise of police power, the State restricts the use of private property, but none of the property interests in the bundle of rights which constitute ownership is appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public. Use of the property by the owners is limited, but no aspect of the property is used by or for the benefit of the public.
The deprivation of use can, in fact, be total, and it will not constitute compensable taking if nobody else acquires use of the property or any interest therein. If, however, in the regulation of the use of the property, somebody else acquires the use or interest thereof, such restriction constitutes compensable taking.
Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose Association v. Gozun, G.R. No. 157882, March 30, 2006:
In the exercise of police power, a property right is impaired by regulation, or the use of the property is merely prohibited, regulated or restricted in order to promote public welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable taking, hence, payment of just compensation is not required.
On the other hand, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, property interests are appropriated and applied to some public purpose, and thus, payment of just compensation is necessary.
Manila Memorial Park v. Secretary, DSWD, G.R. No. 175356, December 3, 2013:
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 132922, Apr 21, 1998:
[c] Sec. 9, Art. III, limits the exercise.
It is well settled that eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that need not be granted even by the fundamental law.
Sec. 9, Art. III of the Constitution, in mandating that “private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation,” merely imposes a limit on the government’s exercise of this power and provides a measure of protection to the individual’s right to property.
An ejectment suit should not ordinarily prevail over the State’s power of eminent domain.
Republic v. Tagle, G.R. No. 129079, December 2, 1998:
[d] Easement of right of way.
The acquisition of an easement of a right of way falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain.
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109338, November 20, 2000:
Republic v. PLDT, G.R. No. L-18841, January 27, 1969:
The power of eminent domain normally results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property. But no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title or possession.
It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of a right of way.
National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, G.R. No. 150936, August 18, 2004:
It was reiterated that an action for a right of way filed by an electric power company for the construction of transmission lines falls within the scope of the power of eminent domain.
National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. L-60077, January 18, 1991:
The Supreme Court said that where the right of way easement perpetually deprives the defendants of their proprietary rights, then there is taking which entitles defendants to payment of just compensation.
Spouses Cabahug v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 186069, January 30, 2013:
It was held that when the right of way easement similarly involves transmission lines which not only endanger life and limb but restrict as well the owner’s use of the land traversed thereby, the Gutierrez ruling remains doctrinal and applicable.
[e] Court that has jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over a complaint for eminent domain is with the Regional Trial Court.
While the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms—for the court is duty bound to determine the amount of just compensation to be paid for the property—it is merely incidental to the expropriation suit.
Barangay San Roque, Talisay, Cebu v. Heirs of Francisco Pastor, G.R. No. 138896, June 20, 2000:
Bardillon v. Barangay Masili of Calamba, Laguna, G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003:
[i] The question of “whether or not the court that hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in the same proceedings, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned” should be answered in the affirmative; this is evident from Sec. 9, Rule 67.
Section 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. — If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made.
Republic v. Rural Bank of Kabacan, G.R. No. 185124, January 25, 2012:
[ii] Republic (DPWH) v. Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 187677, April 17, 2013:
The Supreme Court clarified that the expropriation court’s authority to resolve ownership should be taken in the proper context, i.e., to determine who is entitled to be indemnified by the expropriation.
Thus, the finding of ownership in an expropriation proceeding should not be construed as final and binding on the parties.
By filing an action for expropriation, the condemnor merely serves notice that it is taking title to, and possession of, the property, and that the defendant is asserting title to or interested in the property, not to prove right to possess but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.
The situation is akin to ejectment cases in which the court is temporarily authorized to determine ownership if only to determine who is entitled to possession. This is not conclusive, and it remains open to challenge through the proper action.
[f] Defenses.
The defendant in an expropriation case who has objections to the taking of his property is now required to file an answer, and in it raise all his available defenses against the allegations in the complaint for eminent domain.
City of Manila v. Melba Tan Te, G.R. No. 169263, September 21, 2011:
[g] Plaintiff’s right to dismiss complaint.
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff’s matter of right to dismiss the complaint, precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the taking.
The plaintiff’s right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to court approval and to certain conditions.
National Power Corporation v. Pobre, G.R. No. 106804, August 12, 2004:
Who May Exercise the Power
Congress and, by delegation:
the President,
administrative bodies,
local government units, and
even private enterprises performing public services.
[a] Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain; they can exercise the power only when expressly authorized by the Legislature.
Sec. 19 of the Local Government Code confers such power to local governments, but the power is not absolute; it is subject to statutory requirements.
Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006.
Lagcao v. Judge Labra, G.R. No. 155746, October 3, 2004.
The grant of the power of eminent domain to local government units under R.A. 7160 cannot be understood as equal to the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government.
The power of eminent domain must, by enabling law, be delegated to local governments by the national legislature, and thus, can only be as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be.
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002:
[b] The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights. Hence, strict construction will be made against the agency exercising the power.
Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation v. Municipality of Pasig, G.R. No. 152230, August 9, 2005:
In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written, definite and valid offer to acquire the property, as required under Sec. 19, R.A. 7160 [].
[c] The exercise of the power of eminent domain is clearly superior to the final and executory judgment rendered by the court in an ejectment case.
Filstream International Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125218, January 23, 1998:
[d] Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102976, October 25, 1995:
It was held that when the statutory life of the Iron & Steel Authority (ISA), a non-incorporated entity of government, expired in 1988, its powers, duties and functions, as well as its assets and liabilities, reverted to and were re-assumed by the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of any special provision of law specifying some other disposition thereof.
Accordingly, the Republic may be substituted as party plaintiff in the expropriation proceedings originally instituted by ISA.
[e] San Roque Realty v. Republic, G.R. No. 163130, September 7, 2007:
The Supreme Court said that time and again, we have declared that eminent domain cases are to be strictly construed against the expropriator.
If the Republic had actually made full payment of just compensation, in the ordinary course of things, it would have led to the cancellation of the title or at least, the annotation of the lien in favor of the government on the certificate of title.
Thus, while the general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel or laches by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents, this rule, however, admits of exceptions—one of which is when the strict application of the rule will defeat the effectiveness of a policy adopted to protect the public, such as the Torrens system.
Requisites for Exercise
Necessity
Public Property
Taking in the Constitutional Sense
Public Use
Just Compensation
Due Process of Law
[a] Necessity
[i] When the power is exercised by the Legislature, the question of necessity is generally a political question; but when exercised by a delegate, the determination of whether there is genuine necessity for the exercise is a justiciable question.
Reason: Separation of Powers
Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72126, January 29, 1988:
Republic v. La Orden de PP. Benedictinos, G.R. No. L-12792, February 28, 1961:
[ii] The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly addressed to the Regional Trial Court in the course of the expropriation proceedings.
If the property owner objects to the necessity of the takeover, he should say so in his Answer to the Complaint.
The RTC has the power to inquire into:
the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and
to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it.
Bardillon v. Barangay Masili of Calamba, Laguna, G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003.
[iii] The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character.
Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated.
Lagcao v. Judge Labra, G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004:
In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners' property was singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection.
Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners' property as the site of a socialized housing project.
[b] Private Property
[i] Private property already devoted to public use cannot be expropriated by a delegate of the Legislature acting under a general grant of authority.
City of Manila v. Chinese Community, 40 Phil 349:
[ii] All private property capable of ownership may be expropriated, except money and choses in action.
choses in action — debts, claims, or rights to sue
Reason: They do not serve a public use in the same way tangible property does, and their nature makes them unsuitable for condemnation.
Even services may be subject to eminent domain.
Republic v. PLDT, G.R. No. L-18841, January 27, 1969:
[c] Taking in the Constitutional Sense
[i] May include:
trespass without actual eviction of the owner,
material impairment of the value of the property, or
prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property was intended.
Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, 9 Phil 215:
The imposition of an easement of a 3-meter strip on the plaintiff's property was considered taking.
People v. Fajardo, 104 Phil 44:
A municipal ordinance prohibiting a building which would impair the view of the plaza from the highway was likewise considered taking.
In these cases, it was held that the property owner was entitled to payment of just compensation.
[ii] National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. L-60077, January 18, 1991:
The Court said that the exercise of the power of eminent domain does not always result in the taking or appropriation of title to the expropriated property; it may only result in the imposition of a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title or possession.
In this case, while it is true that the plaintiff is only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon the defendants that below said transmission lines, no plant higher than three meters is allowed. Besides, the high-tension current conveyed by the transmission lines poses continuing danger to life and limb.
[iia] Spouses Cabahug v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 186069, January 30, 2013:
The petitioner executed a Grant of Right of Way in favor of NPC, giving a continuous easement of right of way for the latter's transmission lines and their appurtenances, making an express reservation to seek additional compensation in light of National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez.
On the issue of petitioners' entitlement to additional compensation, the Supreme Court said that even without the reservation, the Gutierrez ruling may be applied. Where the right of way easement similarly involves transmission lines which not only endanger life and limb but restrict as well the owner's use of the land traversed thereby, the ruling in Gutierrez remains doctrinal and should be applied.
The owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land if the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment, and disposal of the property.
[iii] Republic v. Castelvi, G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974:
The Supreme Court enumerated the following requisites for valid taking: EMU-PO
the expropriator must enter a private property;
entry must be for more than a momentary period;
entry must be under warrant or color of authority;
property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
[iii.a] Republic (DPWH) v. Ortigas & Co. Ltd., G.R. No. 171496, March 3, 2014:
Upon request of the DPWH, respondent segregated its parcel of land in Pasig City into lots, among which was a 1,445 sq. m. portion reserved and designated for the road widening of Ortigas Ave. pursuant to the C-5 flyover project.
Ortigas also caused the annotation of the term "road widening" on the title, which was then inscribed with an encumbrance that it was for road widening and subject to Sec. 50 of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529). The flyover, completed in 1999, utilized only 396 sq. m. of the allotted portion. Consequently, Ortigas further subdivided the portion into two: the portion actually used for the road widening and the unutilized portion.
Then Ortigas filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for authority to sell to the government the portion that was actually used for the road widening. Petitioner Republic filed an opposition, claiming that the Ortigas property segregated for public use may only be conveyed by way of donation to the government, citing Sec. 50 of the Property Registration Decree.
The Supreme Court ruled that where there is "taking" of private property for some public purpose, the owner of the property is entitled to be compensated. In this case, all the elements of "taking" are present, namely:
(i) the government must enter private property;
(ii) the entry must be indefinite or permanent;
(iii) there is color of legal authority in the entry;
(iv) the property is devoted to public use or purpose; and
(v) the use of the property for public use removed from the owner all beneficial enjoyment of the property.Petitioner's reliance on Sec. 50 of the Property Registration Decree is erroneous as it contemplates roads and streets in a subdivision, not public thoroughfares built on a private property that was taken from an owner for public purpose. A public thoroughfare is not a subdivision road or street.
While the government is already in possession of the property, it has yet to acquire title which remains under Ortigas' name. To legitimize such possession, the Republic must acquire the property from Ortigas by instituting expropriation proceedings or through negotiated sale, which has already been recognized in law as a mode of government acquisition of private property for public purposes.
In situations such as this, where government has not taken the trouble of initiating expropriation proceedings, the private owner has the option to compel payment of the property taken. While it could have brought action to recover possession of the property, Ortigas instead chose to sell it to the Republic.
This is both fair and convenient as the road construction has long been completed and the road is already being utilized by the public.
[iv] "Taking" also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and approved by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) for CARP coverage through the stock distribution scheme (SDS).
Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2012:
Thus, when Hacienda Luisita, Inc. submitted its stock distribution scheme for approval, it was acknowledgment on its part that the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita are covered by CARP.
However, it was the PARC approval which should be considered as the effective date of "taking", as it was only at this time that the Government officially confirmed the CARP coverage of these lands.
[v] Where there is taking in the constitutional sense, the property owner need not file a claim for just compensation with the Commission on Audit; he may go directly to court to demand payment.
Amigable v. Cuenca, G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972;
De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-71998-99, June 2, 1993;
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, supra
[vi] The owner of the property can recover possession of the property from squatters, even if he agreed to transfer the property to the Government, until the transfer is consummated or the expropriation case is filed.
Velarma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113615, January 25, 1996:
[d] Public Use
[i] Concept.
As a requirement for eminent domain, "public use" is the general concept of meeting public need or public exigency.
It is not confined to actual use by the public in its traditional sense.
The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been abandoned.
The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest", "public benefit", "public welfare", and "public convenience."
Reyes v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003.
The "public use" requirement for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.
It is accurate to state then that at present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
Estate of Salud Jimenez v. PEZA, G.R. No. 137285, January 16, 2001.
The meaning of "public use" has also been broadened to cover uses which, while not directly available to the public, redound to their indirect advantage or benefit.
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-60549, October 26, 1983.
Filstream International Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra:
Thus, in the fact that the property is less than 1/2 hectare and that only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation does not diminish its public use character, inasmuch as "public use" now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including, in particular, urban land reform and housing.
Manosca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996:
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by Iglesia ni Cristo members than most others could well be true, but such peculiar advantage still remains merely incidental and secondary in nature. That only few would actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
[ii] When exercised by a local government unit.
By express legislative authority granted by Congress in Sec. 19, R.A. 7160, local government units may expropriate private property for public use, or purpose, or welfare, for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
Before filing an expropriation case in court, the LGU must issue a written notice to the property owner, which includes:
Offer to purchase the property at a fair market value
Purpose of the taking, clearly stating the public use or public purpose
Details of the property to be acquired (location, size, description)
Timeframe for response or negotiation.
Moday v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107916, February 20, 1997:
The Supreme Court held that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (of Agusan del Sur) was without authority to disapprove Bunawan Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 because, clearly, the Municipality of Bunawan has the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate the assailed resolution.
Municipality of Parañaque v. V. M. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 127820, July 20, 1998:
The Supreme Court declared that there was lack of compliance with Sec. 19, R.A. 7160, where the Municipal Mayor filed a complaint for eminent domain over two parcels of land on the strength of a resolution passed by the Sangguniang Bayan, because what is required by law is an ordinance.
Lagcao v. Judge Labra, G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004:
The Supreme Court said that condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion, or the random expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters, is certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the Constitution.
This deprives a citizen of his property for the convenience of a few without perceptible benefit to the public. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners' property, as required by Sec. 19, R.A. 7160.
[e] Just Compensation
[i] Concept.
The full and fair equivalent of the property taken;
It is the fair market value of the property.
It is settled that the market value of the property is "that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor."
Republic, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Asia Pacific Integrated Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 192100, March 12, 2014:
The Supreme Court said: "the measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss."
A writ of possession in expropriation is a court order that allows the government to take physical control of private property while the legal proceedings to determine just compensation are still ongoing.
When the Republic of the Philippines initiates expropriation—typically through the Office of the Solicitor General—it may request a writ of possession immediately after filing the complaint, provided it deposits the provisional value of the property with the court or authorized government office.
[ia] The aforementioned rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated.
In such a case, the owner is not restricted to payment of the market value of the portion actually taken.
In addition to the market value of the portion taken, he is also entitled to payment of consequential damages, if any, to the remaining part of the property.
At the same time, from the total compensation must be deducted the value of consequential benefits, if any, provided consequential benefits shall not exceed consequential damages.
National Power Corporation v. Spouses Chiong, G.R. No. 152436, June 20, 2003.
[ia1] No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages.
Consequential damages are awarded if, as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from impairment or decrease in value.
Republic, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 203039, September 11, 2013.
[ia2] No consequential damages should be awarded if the entire property, and not merely a portion, is being expropriated.
Republic (DPWH) v. Soriano, G.R. No. 211666, February 25, 2015.
[ib] National Power Corporation v. Felicisimo Tarcelo and Heirs of Comia Santos, G.R. No. 198139, September 8, 2014:
Respondents are owners of two lots, measuring 4,404 sq. m. and 2,611 sq. m., respectively. Sometime in 2000, the petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain, seeking to expropriate 1,595.91 sq. m. of the property, through which petitioner would construct and maintain a natural gas pipeline project.
After the RTC had determined the amount to be paid as just compensation, the Court of Appeals ruled, among others, that the petitioner had to pay, by way of just compensation, for the entire area (7,015 sq. m.), because the construction of gas pipes in the property would affect the full agricultural potential of the entire property.
The Supreme Court reversed the CA ruling, and pointed out that the RTC decision was explicit in fixing the amount of just compensation only with respect to the 1,595.91 sq. m. portion which petitioner would actually use.
[ic] Just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also payment within a reasonable time from its taking.
Eslaban v. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001.
Compensation must be just not only to the property owner but also to the public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.
Secretary, DPWH v. Spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013:
[ic1] In agrarian reform cases, just compensation determined in accordance with R.A. 6657, and not in accordance with P.D. 27 or E.O. 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from the owner, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
Land Bank v. Magin Ferrer, G.R. No. 172230, February 2, 2011:
Land Bank v. Manuel Gallego, G.R. No. 173226, July 29, 2013:
[id] The tax credit given to commercial establishments for the discount enjoyed by senior citizens pursuant to R.A. 7432 (Senior Citizens Act) is a form of just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use, since the privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but from the private establishments concerned.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, G.R. No. 148512, June 26, 2006:
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bicolandia Drug Corporation, G.R. No. 148083, July 21, 2006:
[ie] For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of the expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of actual taking.
These are the three important concepts in this definition.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, G.R. No. 170685, September 22, 2010:
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Escarilla & Co., G.R. No. 178046, June 13, 2012:
It is a settled rule that the nature and character of the land at the time of the taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner.
Moises Tinio v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 160923, January 24, 2011:
[ie1] Just compensation cannot be arrived at arbitrarily; several factors must be considered such as, but not limited to:
acquisition cost,
current market value of like properties,
tax value of the condemned property,
its size, shape and location.
These factors must be supported by documentary evidence.
National Power Corporation v. YCLA Sugar Development Corporation, G.R. No. 193936, December 11, 2013]:
If the trial court fails to consider these, including other relevant facts such as the zonal valuation, tax declaration and current selling price, as supported by documentary evidence, then the court did not judiciously determine the amount of just compensation.
Republic (DPWH) v. Asia Pacific Integrated Steel, G.R. No. 192100, March 12, 2014:
[if] The Land Bank of the Philippines is not merely a nominal party in the determination of just compensation but an indispensable participant in such proceedings.
As such, Land Bank possesses the legal personality to institute a petition for determination of just compensation.
Davao Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank, G.R. No. 181566, March 9, 2011:
[ii] Judicial prerogative.
The ascertainment of what constitutes just compensation for property taken in eminent domain cases is a judicial prerogative, and P.D. 76, which fixes payment on the basis of the assessment by the assessor or the declared valuation by the owner, is unconstitutional.
EPZA v. Dulay, G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987:
P.D. 1533 and P.D. 42, insofar as they sanction executive determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases, are unconstitutional.
Panes v. Visayas State College of Agriculture, G.R. No. 56219-20, November 27, 1996:
Another Presidential Decree (P.D. 1670) which authorizes the City Assessor to fix the value of the property is also unconstitutional.
Belen v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76182, March 11, 1991:
This declaration of unconstitutionality may be given retroactive effect.
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 401:
[iia] Legislative enactments, as well as executive issuances, fixing or providing the method of computing just compensation are tantamount to impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives.
Thus, they are not binding on the courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount of just compensation.
National Power Corporation v. Spouses Rodolfo Zabala & Lilia Baylon, G.R. No. 173520, January 30, 2013:
[iib] Even in agrarian reform, it is a settled rule that the determination of just compensation is a judicial prerogative.
The Department of Agrarian Reform's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party.
Land Bank v. Glenn Escandor, G.R. No. 171685, October 11, 2010:
Thus, while the courts should be mindful of the different formulas created by DAR in arriving at the proper amount of just compensation, they are not strictly bound to adhere thereto if the situation before them does not warrant it.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Castro, G.R. No. 189125, August 28, 2013:
Land Bank v. Fortune Savings and Loan Association, represented by Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 177511, June 29, 2010:
The Supreme Court said that although there is a formula found in Sec. 17 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, it is by no means the only formula that the court may adopt in determining just compensation.
[iib1] The fact that the agricultural land was acquired under the Operation Land Transfer program pursuant to P.D. 27 does not necessarily mean that the determination of just compensation must be made under such decree.
Land Bank v. Spouses Bona, G.R. No. 180804, November 12, 2012:
In fact, the Court had earlier held that if the issue of just compensation is not settled prior to the passage of R.A. 6657 (CARL), it should be computed in accordance with the said law, even if the property was acquired under P.D. 27.
Land Bank v. Heirs of Jesus Yujuico, G.R. No. 184714, March 21, 2012:
Land Bank v. Jose Lahom, G.R. No. 184982, August 20, 2014:
Land Bank v. Emiliano Santiago, G.R. No. 182209, October 3, 2012:
[iib2] The DAR, as the administrative agency tasked with the implementation of the land reform program and pursuant to its rule-making power under R.A. 6657, translated the factors enumerated in Sec. 17 thereof into a basic formula in DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1992, and those found in subsequent DAR administrative regulations.
The application of this basic formula is mandatory and imposes upon the RTC-Special Agrarian Courts the duty to apply it.
[iic] Republic (DAR) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122256, October 30, 1996:
It was held that under R.A. 6657 (CARL), the decision of the provincial adjudicator need not be appealed to the DARAB before resort may be made to the RTC.
The RTC, as special agrarian court, is given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, namely:
all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners; and
the prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. 6657.
[iii] Need to appoint commissioners.
Manila Electric Co. v. Pineda, G.R. No. L-59791, February 13, 1992:
The Supreme Court held that in an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of the amount of just compensation, a trial before the commissioners is indispensable, in order to give the parties the opportunity to present evidence on the issue of just compensation.
Trial with the aid of commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all.
[iiia] While commissioners are to be appointed by the court for the determination of just compensation, the latter is not bound by the commissioners' findings.
Republic v. Santos, G.R. No. L-57524, January 8, 1986; Republic (MECS) v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71176, May 21, 1990:
However, the court may substitute its own estimate of the value of the property only for valid reasons, to wit: ICG
the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them;
they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence; or
where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive.
National Power Corporation v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 156093, February 2, 2007:
Thus, the Supreme Court said that in expropriation cases, the trial court has discretion to act upon the commissioners' report.
Republic, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Spouses Tan Song Bok and Josefina Tan, G.R. No. 191448, November 16, 2011:
[iiib] But trial by commissioners is not mandatory in agrarian reform cases, because Sec. 58 of R.A. 6657 provides that the appointment of a commissioner or commissioners is discretionary on the part of the Special Agrarian Court (SAC), or upon the instance of one of the parties.
Thus, the modality provided in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court for the appointment of 3 commissioners is not compulsory on the SAC.
Spouses Edmond Lee and Helen Huang v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170422, March 7, 2008:
[iv] Form of compensation.
Compensation is to be paid in money and no other.
Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, supra:
It was held that in agrarian reform, payment is allowed to be made partly in bonds, because under the CARP, “we do not deal with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain; we deal with a revolutionary kind of expropriation.”
[iva] Land Bank v. Court of Appeals (and Department of Agrarian Reform v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 118712, October 6, 1995 reiterated in Sta. Rosa Realty & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112526, October 12, 2001:
The Court declared that, as explicitly provided by Sec. 16(e), R.A. 6657, the deposit of compensation must be in “cash” or in “Land Bank bonds”, not in any other form, and certainly not in a “trust account.”
While the Association ruling allowed a deviation in the traditional mode of payment other than cash, this did not dispense with the settled rule that there must be payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred.
Thus, in the Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, July 5, 1996, the Court said that upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by DAR of the compensation in cash or in Land Bank bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded construction, which would include the opening of “trust accounts” within the coverage of the term “deposit.”
[ivb] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Eusebio, G.R. No. 160143, July 2, 2014:
The Supreme Court faulted the Land Bank for having opened a trust account, saying that the explicit provision of Sec. 16(e), R.A. 6657, does not include “trust accounts,” but only cash and bonds, as valid modes of satisfying the government’s obligation to pay just compensation.
[v] Withdrawal of deposit by rejecting landowner.
In the same Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration [Land Bank v. Court of Appeals], supra, the Supreme Court also allowed the withdrawal by the rejecting landowner of the money deposited in trust pending the determination of the valuation of the property.
By rejecting and disputing the valuation of the DAR, the landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just compensation. If we are to affirm the withholding of the release of the offered compensation despite depriving the owner of the possession and use of his property, we are in effect penalizing the latter for simply exercising a right.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just,” for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
To allow the taking of the landowners’ properties, and in the meantime leave them empty-handed by withholding payment of just compensation while the government speculates on whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse, for government to subsequently decide to abandon the property and return it to the landowner when it has already been rendered useless by force majeure, is undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent domain that must never be sanctioned.
Land Bank v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, G.R. No. 183279, January 25, 2010:
The Supreme Court declared again that “to withhold the right of the landowner to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR’s valuation, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain.”
[vi] Reckoning point of market value of the property.
General Rule: Compensation is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain.
Exception: But where the filing of the complaint occurs after the actual taking of the property and the owner would be given undue incremental advantages arising from the use to which the government devotes the property expropriated, just compensation is determined as of the date of the taking.
National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113194, March 11, 1996:
Republic v. Lara, 50 O.G. 5778:
Republic v. Castelvi, G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974:
Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos, G.R. No. L-36706, March 31, 1980:
National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, supra:
Belen v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76182, March 11, 1991:
National Power Corporation v. Spouses Luis and Magdalena Samar, G.R. No. 197329, September 8, 2014:
[via] Eslaban v. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001:
The Supreme Court said that in the instances where the appropriating agency takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, just compensation shall be determined as of the time of the taking, not as of the time of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain.
Thus, it was declared that the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking or the filing of the complaint, whichever comes first.
[vib] It should be noted that the principal criterion in determining just compensation is the character of the land at the time of the taking.
National Power Corporation v. Henson, G.R. No. 129998, December 29, 1998:
Where the trial judge based his computation on the price of lots in the adjacent developed subdivision—although the five parcels were agricultural but later reclassified as residential—the Supreme Court said that the trial judge had no valid basis for his computation.
The tax declaration is only one of the factors to be used in determining the market value of the property for purposes of arriving at the amount to be paid by way of just compensation.
Republic v. Ker & Co., G.R. No. 136171, July 2, 2002:
[vic] When eminent domain is exercised by a local government unit, the “amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property” [Sec. 19, R.A. 7160].
City of Cebu v. Spouses Dedamo, G.R. No. 142971, May 7, 2002:
This was applied precisely because the expropriator was the City of Cebu, a local government unit, and the Rules of Court cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, a substantive law.
Nepomuceno v. City of Surigao, G.R. No. 146091, July 28, 2008:
It was held that the value of the property shall be ascertained as of the date it was actually taken, because it is as of that time that the real measure of the owner’s loss may be fairly adjudged.
[vid] Export Processing Zone Authority v. Estate of Salud Jimenez, G.R. No. 188995, August 24, 2011:
By way of exception to these principles, the Supreme Court said that the market value of the lot should be determined as of the time the parties signed the compromise agreement and the same was approved, because this is tantamount to EPZA impliedly agreeing to pay the market value (of the lot) in 1993.
[vii] Entitlement of Owner to Interest
Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010:
The Supreme Court said to be just, the compensation must not only be the correct amount to be paid; it must also be paid within a reasonable time from the time the land is taken from the owner.
Five years according to jurisprudence.
If not, the State must pay the landowner interest, by way of damages, from the time the land is taken from the owner.
The interest, deemed a part of just compensation due, has been established by prevailing jurisprudence to be 12% per annum."
[viia] In Apo Fruits, the Court said that the imposition of the 12% per annum interest in Reyes v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003, did not depend on either the finality of the decision of the expropriation court, or on the finding that the NHA's refusal to pay just compensation was unfounded and unjustified.
Clearly, the Court imposed the 12% interest based on the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002, that:
If property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interest on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when the compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.
In fine, between the time of the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interest(s) accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.
[viib] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Emiliano Santiago, Jr., G.R. No. 182209, October 3, 2012:
The high tribunal declared:
"The Court deems it proper to impose a 12% interest per annum, computed from the date of taking of the subject property on the just compensation to be determined by the Special Agrarian Court due the respondent."
This award of 12% per annum interest on the amount to be paid was upheld in:
Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. Nos. 154211-12, June 22, 2009:
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Obias, G.R. No. 184406, March 14, 2012:
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Gallego, G.R. No. 173226, July 29, 2013:
[viic] Wycoco v. Judge Caspillo, G.R. No. 146733, January 13, 2004:
The Court imposed an interest of 12% per annum on the just compensation due the landowner.
The imposition of interest was in the nature of damages for delay in payment which, in effect, makes the obligation on the part of government one of forbearance.
It follows that the interest in the form of damages cannot be applied where there was prompt and valid payment of just compensation. Conversely, where there was delay in tendering a valid payment of just compensation, imposition of interest is in order.
In this case, the replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation, for essentially, the determination of this compensation was marred by the lack of due process.
Thus, it was held that the compensation due Wycoco should bear 12% interest per annum from the time LBP opened a trust account in his name up to the time said account was actually converted into cash and LBP bonds.
[viid] Land Bank v. Heirs of Jesus Alsua, G.R. No. 211351, February 4, 2015:
It was held that the Court allowed the grant of legal interest where there is delay in the payment because the just compensation due the landowner is deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State.
Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% per annum from the time of taking until June 30, 2013 only.
Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, interest shall be at the rate of 6% per annum, in line with the amendment introduced by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board (BSP-MB) Circular No. 799, Series of 2013 (entitled, "Rate of Interest in the Absence of Stipulation").
[viie] These cases should be considered as having abandoned National Power Corporation v. Angas, G.R. Nos. 60225-26, May 8, 1992, where the Court fixed the interest due the property owner at the rate of 6% per annum, in the nature of damages as prescribed in Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, and not 12% per annum under Central Bank Circular No. 416, because the latter applies to loans or forbearance of money, goods or credits, or judgments involving such loans or forbearance of money, goods or credits.
[viif] But when the government (expropriating agency), before the taking of the property, deposits an amount representing the zonal value of the property being taken, there is deemed to be no forbearance and the owner is not entitled to the 12% per annum interest.
Republic (DPWH) v. Soriano, G.R. No. 211666, February 25, 2015:
[viii] Who Else May Be Entitled to Just Compensation
Entitlement to the payment of just compensation is not, however, limited to the "owner", but includes all those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned, including:
a mortgagee,
a lessee and
a vendee in possession under an executory contract.
Knecht v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108015, May 20, 1998:
But where, as in this case, the intervenors had no longer any legal interest in the property because at the time of the expropriation their claim of ownership had already been resolved and put to rest, then they are not entitled to be impleaded as parties or to payment of just compensation
[ix] Title to the Property
Title does not pass until after payment.
Visayan Refining v. Camus, 40 Phil 550:
Exception: Agrarian reform
Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration, Land Bank v. Court of Appeals, July 5, 1996:
[ixa] Thus, the owner of land subject to expropriation may still dispose of the same before payment of just compensation.
Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 137569, June 23, 2000:
[ixb] Taxes paid by owner after taking by the expropriator are reimbursable.
City of Manila v. Roxas, 60 Phil 215:
But capital gains tax due on the sale of real property in expropriation cases is to be paid by the seller, not the government.
Each of the parties to the transaction shall be liable for the documentary stamp tax due, unless there is an agreement to the contrary.
Republic (DPWH) v. Soriano, G.R. No. 211666, February 25, 2015:
[x] Right of Landowner in Case of Non-Payment of Just Compensation
As a rule, "non-payment of just compensation in an expropriation proceeding does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots," but only to demand payment of the fair market value of the property plus interest, as discussed above.
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002:
Reyes v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003:
[xa] Republic of the Philippines v. Vicente Lim, G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005:
The Supreme Court said that the facts of the case do not justify the application of the rule. In this case, the Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice, the first was in the expropriation proceedings, and the second, in the action for recovery of possession, but it never did.
Fifty-seven (57) years passed since the expropriation case was terminated, but the Republic never paid the owners. The Court construed the Republic's failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstances, recovery of possession is in order.
It was then held that where the government fails to pay just compensation within five years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property.
[f] Due Process of Law
The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard.
Belen v. Court of Appeals, supra:
The Supreme Court declared PDs 1670 and 1669 unconstitutional for violating the due process clause because the decrees do not provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which the petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation or the reasonableness of the compensation to be paid for the property.
Filstream International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra:
[i] Notice is part of the constitutional right to due process of law. It informs the landowner of the State's intention to acquire a private land upon payment of just compensation, and gives him the opportunity to present evidence that his land is not covered or otherwise excused from the agrarian reform law.
Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank, G.R. No. 169913, June 8, 2011:
Writ of Possession
Sec. 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides:
"Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary. x x x After such deposit is made, the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court, with service of copies to the parties."
[a] Thus, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial upon:
the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and
upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property sought to be expropriated per current tax declaration.
Biglang-awa v. Judge Bacalla, G.R. Nos. 139927-139936, November 22, 2000:
The determination of whether the taking of the property is for a public purpose is not a condition precedent before the court may issue a writ of possession.
Once the requisites mentioned above are established, the issuance of the writ becomes a ministerial matter for the expropriation court
Francia, Jr. v. Municipality of Meycauayan, G.R. No. 170432, March 24, 2008:
[b] A hearing will have to be held to determine whether or not the expropriator complied with the requirements of R.A. 7279.
City of Manila v. Serrano, G.R. No. 142302, June 20, 2001:
It is, therefore, premature for the Court of Appeals to insist on finding whether petitioner resorted to the other modes of acquisition provided in R.A. 7279, as this question will have to await the hearing on the complaint itself.
This hearing, however, is not a hearing to determine if a writ of possession is to be issued, but whether there was compliance with the requirements for socialized housing.
For the writ of possession to issue as a ministerial duty of the court, only the two requisites in Sec. 2, Rule 67, are necessary.
City of Iloilo v. Judge Legaspi, G.R. No. 154616, November 25, 2004:
Plaintiff's Right to Dismiss the Complaint in Eminent Domain
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff's matter-of-right to dismiss the complaint, precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the taking.
The plaintiff's right to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to Court approval and to certain conditions.
National Power Corporation & Pobre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106804, August 12, 2004:
Right to Repurchase or Re-acquire the Property
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139495, November 27, 2000:
It was held that the property owner's right to repurchase the property depends upon the character of the title acquired by the expropriator, i.e., if land is expropriated for a particular purpose with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned, the property shall revert to the former owner, then the former owner can re-acquire the property.
In this case, the terms of the judgment in the expropriation case were very clear and unequivocal, granting title over the lot in fee simple to the Republic.
No condition on the right to repurchase was imposed.
[a] Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002:
In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is different from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales to which the remedy of rescission may perhaps apply.
Expropriation is an in rem proceeding, and after condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title.
Expropriation under Sec. 18, Art. XII
"The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government."
[a] Distinguish this from Sec. 17, Art. XII:
"In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest."
[i] Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., G.R. No. 155001; Baterina v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., G.R. No. 155547; Lopez v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., G.R. No. 155661, May 5, 2003:
The Supreme Court said that PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, contravene this constitutional provision, and obligate the government to pay "reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal complex."
The constitutional provision envisions a situation wherein the exigencies of the times necessitate the government to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
It is the welfare and interest of the public which is the paramount consideration in determining whether or not to temporarily take over a particular business.
Clearly, the State, in effecting the temporary takeover, is exercising its police power.
[ii] The temporary takeover by the government extends only to the operation of the business and not to the ownership thereof.
As such, the government is not required to compensate the private entity-owner of the said business as there is no transfer of ownership, whether permanent or temporary.
The private entity-owner affected by the temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just compensation for the use of said business and its properties, as the temporary takeover by the government is in exercise of the police power and not the power of eminent domain.
Agan, Jr. v. PIATCO, supra.:
[iii] David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra.:
The Court declared that Sec. 17, Art. XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause.
The taking over of private businesses affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed in Congress.
Thus, when Sec. 17, Art. XII provides that "The State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms and conditions prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest", the word State refers to Congress, not the President.
Whether the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress delegates it to the former pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
DSee Sec. 23(2), Art. VI, on the delegation by Congress of emergency powers to the President.
In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
Expropriation under Secs. 4 and 9, Art. XIII
[a] R.A. 6657 [Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law]
[i] Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, supra:
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) as an exercise of the police power of the State, using eminent domain as an instrument to accomplish the police objective.
Land Bank v. Spouses Orilla, G.R. No. 194168, February 13, 2013:
The Supreme Court said that as an exercise of the police power, the expropriation of private property under CARL puts the landowner, not the government, in a situation where the odds are already stacked against his favor.
His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the property. By rejecting and disputing the valuation of the DAR, the landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just compensation.
[ia] Land Bank v. Benecio Eusebio, G.R. No. 160143, July 2, 2014:
The Court said that the taking of private property for agrarian reform is an exercise of eminent domain and does not involve police power.
[ib] Sta. Rosa Realty & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112526, October 12, 2001:
This apparent contradiction is partly reconciled where the Supreme Court held that to the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution.
But where to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also taking under the power of eminent domain.
The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation on the use of the land, but the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the beneficiary.
Paris v. Alfeche, G.R. No. 139083, August 30, 2001:
Read on the validity of the retention limits prescribed under the law.
[ii] Heirs of Teresita Montoya v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 181055, March 19, 2014:
The Supreme Court said that the sale of private lands that Sec. 6 of R.A. 6657 (CARL) contextually prohibits and considers as null and void are those which the original owner executes in violation of this provision, i.e., sales or dispositions intended to circumvent the retention limits set by the agrarian reform law.
In this case, the act of the Gonzaleses in selling the property to the National Housing Authority (NHA) did not violate Sec. 6, R.A. 6657.
P.D. 1472 exempts from land reform those lands that NHA acquires for its housing and resettlement programs, regardless of when the lands were acquired, before or after the land reform law took effect.
Second, the NHA purchased the property for a public purpose; it acquired the property in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The NHA's mandate under P.D. 757 includes the sovereign power of eminent domain.
Third, the respondents were willing and had offered to pay the tenants disturbance compensation, for the valid conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses.
[iii] Alangilan Realty & Development v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 180471, March 28, 2010:
Petitioner sought to exempt its landholding from the operation of agrarian reform, because in 1982, it was classified as agricultural, reserved for residential, and in 1994, it was reclassified as residential-1.
The Court held that indubitably, at the time of the effectivity of CARL in 1988, the subject landholding was still agricultural.
This is bolstered by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had to pass an ordinance in 1994, reclassifying the land as residential-1, showing very clearly that if it had already been earmarked for residential use, there would have been no need for the 1994 ordinance.
[iv] Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is still incomplete, such as when the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled, just compensation should be determined and the process be concluded under R.A. 6657.
Land Bank v. Santiago, G.R. No. 182209, October 3, 2012:
Land Bank v. Heirs of Jesus Alsua, G.R. No. 211531, February 4, 2015:
The fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of the taking, or "the time when the landowner is deprived of the use and benefit of his property," such as, in this case, when title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries.
[v] In the exercise of its essentially judicial function of determining just compensation, the RTC-SAC is not granted unlimited discretion.
It must consider and apply the factors enumerated in R.A. 6657 and the DAR formula (that reflects these factors) as they provide the uniform framework or structure by which just compensation for property subject to agrarian reform is determined.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Benecio Eusebio, G.R. No. 160143, July 2, 2014:
[vi] The clear intent of the constitutional guarantee of just compensation, whether understood within the terms of Article III, Sec. 9, or of Article XIII, Sec. 4, is to secure to any owner the "full and fair equivalent" of the property taken.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Benecio Eusebio, G.R. No. 160143, July 2, 2014:
[b] R.A. 7279 [Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992]
[i] Filstream International Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra:
The Court took judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a paramount task of Government in view of the acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas, particularly in Metro Manila.
Nevertheless, local government units are not given an unbridled authority when exercising this power in pursuit of solutions to these problems.
The basic rules still have to be followed, i.e., Sec. 1 and Sec. 9, Art. III of the Constitution.
Thus, even Sec. 19 of the Local Government Code imposes certain restrictions on the exercise of the power of eminent domain.R.A. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) — the governing law which deals with the subject of urban land reform and housing — provides the order in which lands may be acquired for socialized housing, and very explicit in Secs. 9 and 10 thereof is the fact that privately-owned lands rank last (6th) in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing.
Expropriation proceedings may, therefore, be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted.
Compliance with these conditions must be deemed mandatory because they are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to due process when their property is expropriated for public use.
Lagcao v. Judge Labra, G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004:
[ii] City of Mandaluyong v. Francisco, G.R. No. 137152, January 29, 2001:
The Supreme Court reiterated that under R.A. 7279, lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order:
Government lands;
Alienable lands of the public domain;
Unregistered, abandoned, or idle lands;
Lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement sites which have not yet been acquired;
BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and
Privately owned lands.
The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions, namely:
It shall be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; and
Parcels owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition.
Small property owners are:
Owners of residential lands with an area not more than 300 sq. m. in highly urbanized cities and not more than 800 sq. m. in other urban areas; and
They do not own residential property other than the same.
In this case, the respondents fall within the classification of small property owners.
[iii] City of Manila v. Alegar Corporation, G.R. No. 187604, June 24, 2012:
There is nothing infirm in an agreement which impliedly waives the right of the City of Manila to present evidence that it was acquiring the subject lots by expropriation for a proper public purpose, because it may be assumed that the parties knew what they were doing, and since such agreement would facilitate early disposal of the case.
D. Power of Taxation
Definition, nature and scope of power.
Taxation is a mode of raising revenue for public purposes.
Taxes, on the other hand, are:
enforced proportional contributions
from persons and property
levied by the state
by virtue of its sovereignty
for the support of the government and for all its public needs.
They are not arbitrary exactions but contributions levied by authority of law, and by some rule of proportion which is intended to insure uniformity of contribution and a just apportionment of the burdens of government.
Thus:
Taxes are enforced contributions.
Taxes are obligations created by law.
Taxes are never founded on contract or agreement, and are not dependent for their validity upon the individual consent of the persons taxed.
Taxes are proportional in character, since taxes are on one's ability to pay.
Taxes are levied by authority of the law.
The power to impose taxes is a legislative power; it cannot be imposed by the executive department nor by the courts.
Taxes are for the support of the government and all its public needs.
Who may exercise:
Primarily, the legislature;
also: local legislative bodies [Sec. 5, Art. X, Constitution]; and
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
to a limited extent, the President when granted delegated tariff powers [Sec. 28 (2), Art. VI].
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
Limitations on the exercise
Due process of law
Equal protection clause
Public purpose
[a] Due process of law: Tax should not be confiscatory.
[i] With the legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine the nature, object, extent, coverage, and situs of taxation.
But where a tax measure becomes so unconscionable and unjust as to amount to confiscation of property, courts will not hesitate to strike it down, for despite all its plenitude, the power to tax cannot override constitutional prescriptions.
This postulate, however, has not been demonstrated in the challenge to the constitutionality of the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme (SNITS).
Tan v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994:
[b] Equal protection clause: Taxes should be uniform and equitable [Sec. 28 (1), Art. VI].
The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation
[c] Public purpose.
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960.
[i] Tax for special purpose [Sec. 29 (3), Art. VI]:
Treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only; when purpose is fulfilled, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
Osmeña v. Orbos, supra.
Double Taxation
Additional taxes are laid on the same subject
by the same taxing jurisdiction
during the same taxing period
and for the same purpose.
Punzalan v. Municipal Board of Manila, 95 Phil 46.
[a] Despite lack of specific constitutional prohibition, double taxation will not be allowed if the same will result in a violation of the equal protection clause.
Tax Exemptions
Requisite: No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of Congress [Sec. 28 (4), Art. VI, Constitution].
[a] Sec. 28 (3), Art. VI: Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and improvements, actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
[b] Sec. 4 (3), Art. XIV: All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Proprietary educational institutions, including those co-operatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions subject to the limitations provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment.
[c] Sec. 4 (4), Art. XIV: Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations, or contributions used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.
[d] Where tax exemption is granted gratuitously, it may be revoked at will; but not if granted for a valuable consideration.
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos, G.R. No. 120082, September 11, 1996
Casanova v. Hord, 8 Phil 125
Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-19201, June 16, 1965
Police Power v. Taxation
Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007:
The Court made a conservative and pivotal distinction between police power and taxation, holding that the distinction rests in the purpose for which the charge is made.
If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is an exaction that invokes the State's police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, gleaned from Sec. 34 itself which enumerates the purposes of the Universal Charge which can be amply discerned as regulatory in character.
[a] License fee v. Tax
[i] License fee is a police measure; tax is a revenue measure.
[ii] Amount collected for a license fee is limited to the cost of permit and reasonable police regulation [except when the license fee is imposed on a non-useful occupation]; amount of tax may be unlimited provided it is not confiscatory.
Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board of Manila, G.R. No. L-10448, August 30, 1957
[iii] License fee is paid for the privilege of doing something, and may be revoked when public interest so requires; tax is imposed on persons or property for revenue.
Compania General de Tabacos v. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-16119, June 29, 1963:
[b] Kinds of license fee
[i] For useful occupations or enterprises.
[ii] For non-useful occupations or enterprises.
When a license fee is imposed in order to discourage non-useful occupations or enterprises, the amount imposed may be a bit exorbitant.
Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board of Manila, G.R. No. L-10448, August 30, 1957
Supremacy of the national government over local governments in matters of taxation
When local governments invoke the power to tax national government instrumentalities, the exercise of the power is construed strictly against local governments.
The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax.
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006:
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that airports, lands and buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax for the following reasons:
MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government; and
The real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines, and thus, exempt from local taxation.
Additional Cases from Syllabus
Sison v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654
Philex Mining v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Aug. 28, 1998
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA, 298 SCRA 83
Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, G.R. No. 127105 June 25, 1999