The Supreme Court said that when an ad interim appointment (of the Chairman of the Commission on Elections) is not confirmed (as it was by-passed, or that there was not ample time for the Commission on Appointments to pass upon the same), another ad interim appointment may be extended to the appointee without violating the Constitution.

[g] The salaries of the Chairmen and members are relatively high and may not be decreased during continuance in office.

[h] The Commissions enjoy fiscal autonomy.

[i] ✨ Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 158791, July 22, 2005

The Supreme Court said that the “no report, no release” policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy, without violating Sec. 5, Art. IX-A of the Constitution.
The “automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.
However, petitioner’s claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress below the amount appropriated for the previous year, as in the case of the Judiciary, must be rejected.
Sec. 3, Art. VIII, prohibiting the reduction in the appropriation for the Judiciary below the amount appropriated for the previous year, does not appear in Sec. 5, Art. IX-A.
The plain implication of this omission is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year.

[ii] Commission on Human Rights Employees Association v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004

The Supreme Court said that the Commission on Human Rights, unlike the three Constitutional Commissions, does not enjoy fiscal autonomy.

[i] Each Commission may promulgate its own procedural rules, provided they do not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights [though subject to disapproval by the Supreme Court].

[j] The Chairmen and members are subject to certain disqualifications calculated to strengthen their integrity.

[k] The Commissions may appoint their own officials and employees in accordance with Civil Service Law.

3. Inhibitions / Disqualifications

[Sec. 2, Art. IX-A]

HP-AF

[a] Shall not, during tenure, hold any other office or employment.

[i] ✨ Dennis Funa v. Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014

Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of E.O. 864, dated February 22, 2010, which designated Francisco Duque, Chairman, Civil Service Commission, as ex officio member of the Board of Trustees or Board of Directors of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH), the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF).
Petitioner asserts that E.O. 864 and Sec. 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of E.O. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) — which allows the Chairman to be a member of the Board of Directors of government entities whose functions affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government employees — impair the independence of the CSC, and violate the constitutional prohibition against the holding of dual or multiple offices for Members of the Constitutional Commissions.
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that the CSC Chairman, being an appointive official who does not occupy a Cabinet position, is not subject to the prohibition in Section 13, Art. VII. Instead, he is covered by the general rule in Sec. 7(2), Art. IX-B, that allows him to hold any other office in Government during his tenure if such holding is allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office.
The Supreme Court ruled, as follows:

[ia] The Court finds no irregularity in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of E.O. 292, because it is clear that matters affecting the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees are among the primary functions of the Civil Service Commission and are, consequently, exercised through its Chairman. The CSC Chairman’s membership in the Board of such a government entity must, therefore, be considered to be derived from his position as such.

[ib] However, on the issue of the validity of E.O. 864, it is necessary to determine whether Duque’s designation as Board member of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF is in accordance with the Constitution and with the conditions laid down in Sec. 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of E.O. 292.

These GOCCs are vested by their respective charters with various powers and functions to carry out the purposes for which they are created. All these powers and functions, whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by their respective Boards. Thus, when the CSC Chairman sits as Board member of GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF, he may exercise powers that are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman, such as imposing interest on unpaid or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care providers, or approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations.

The Court also notes that Duque’s membership in the Board of the said GOCCs entitles him to receive per diem, a form of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position. This situation goes against the principle behind an ex officio position and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.

[ic] Apart from violating the principle against holding multiple offices, Duque’s designation impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Sec. 17, Art. VII, the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the control of the President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the Constitution.

[b] Shall not engage in the practice of any profession.

[c] Shall not engage in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office.

[d] Shall not be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

4. Rotational Scheme of Appointments

The first appointees shall serve terms of seven, five, and three years, respectively.
After the first commissioners are appointed, the rotational scheme is intended to prevent the possibility of one President appointing all the Commissioners.

[a] Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000

It was held that in order to preserve the periodic succession mandated by the Constitution, the rotational plan requires two conditions:

[i] The terms of the first commissioners should start on a common date; and

[ii] Any vacancy due to death, resignation, or disability before the expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.

5. Decisions

[a] Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. [Sec. 7, Art. IX-A].

[i] Estrella v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160465, May 27, 2004

The provision of the Constitution is clear that what is required is the majority vote of all the members, not only of those who participated in the deliberations and voted thereon, in order that a valid decision may be made by the Constitutional Commissions.
Under rules of statutory construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
This ruling abandons the doctrine laid down in Cua v. COMELEC, 156 SCRA 582.

[ii] ✨ Dumayas v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001

Because two Commissioners who had participated in the deliberations had retired prior to the promulgation of the decision, the Supreme Court said that the votes of the said Commissioners should merely be considered withdrawn, as if they had not signed the resolution at all, and only the votes of the remaining Commissioners considered for the purpose of deciding the controversy.
Unless the withdrawal of the votes would materially affect the result insofar as votes for or against a party is concerned, there is no reason to declare the decision a nullity.
In this case, with the withdrawal of the votes of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani, the remaining votes among the four incumbent Commissioners, still constituting a quorum at the time of the promulgation of the resolution, would still be 3 to 1 (and thus be a vote of the majority) in favor of the respondent.

[iii] Mamerto Sevilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 202833, March 19, 2013

Pursuant to COMELEC Rules of Procedure, when the COMELEC en banc is equally divided in an opinion and the necessary majority cannot be had, there shall be a rehearing.

If, on rehearing, no majority decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission;
in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and
in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

A protesting candidate cannot file a petition with the Supreme Court when the COMELEC vote is equally divided and a rehearing is not conducted; otherwise, the petition shall be considered premature and shall be dismissed.

[iv] Alvarez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 142527, March 1, 2001

As to the need to expedite resolution of cases and the 60-day period for decision, the Supreme Court said that the COMELEC has numerous cases before it where attention to minutiae is critical.
Considering the Commission's manpower and logistical limitations, it is sensible to treat the procedural requirements on deadlines realistically.
Overly strict adherence to deadlines might induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time.
This is not what the framers had intended.

[b] Any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof.

[i] Aratuc v. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251

The Supreme Court held that when it reviews a decision of the COMELEC, the Court exercises extraordinary jurisdiction; thus, the proceeding is limited to issues involving grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess of jurisdiction, and does not ordinarily empower the Court to review the factual findings of the Commission.

Loong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133676, April 14, 1999

The Court reiterated that certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to invalidate disputed COMELEC resolutions, i.e., final orders, rulings, and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

[ii] Reyes v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125129, March 29, 1999

The Court said that under Rule 64, Sec. 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments or final orders of the Commission on Audit may be brought by an aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65.
Even before the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the mode of elevating cases decided by the Commission on Audit to the Supreme Court was only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by the Constitution.
The judgments and final orders of COA are not reviewable by ordinary writ of error or appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Only when the COA acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

[iii] In the case of decisions of the Civil Service Commission, however, Supreme Court Revised Circular 1-91, as amended by Revised Administrative Circular 1-95, which took effect on June 1, 1995, provides that final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable by certiorari to the Court of Appeals within fifteen days from receipt of a copy thereof. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the party adversely affected thereby shall file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

[iiia] Mahinay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152457, April 30, 2008

Thus, the Supreme Court held that the proper mode of appeal from the decision of the Civil Service Commission is a petition for review under Rule 43 filed with the Court of Appeals.

[iiib] Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, November 17, 2004

Because the petitioner imputed to the Court of Appeals “grave abuse of discretion” for ruling that he had no legal standing to contest the disapproval of his appointment, the Supreme Court said that “grave abuse of discretion is a ground for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.”
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court resolved to give due course to the petition and to treat it appropriately as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The grounds alleged shall be deemed “reversible errors,” not “grave abuse of discretion.”

6. Enforcement of Decision

Vital-Gozon v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 235

It was held that final decisions of the Civil Service Commission are enforceable by a writ of execution that the Civil Service Commission may itself issue.

B. The Civil Service Commission

1. Composition

A Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be:

natural-born citizens of the Philippines and,
at the time of their appointment, at least 35 years of age,
with proven capacity for public administration, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the election immediately preceding their appointment.

They shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven (7) years without reappointment.
In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Brillantes v. Yorac, supra.

2. Constitutional Objectives / Functions

As the central personnel agency of the Government, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) is mandated to:

establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service.
It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resource development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability.

(Sec. 3, Art. IX-B)

[a] Torregoza v. Civil Service Commission, 211 SCRA 230

In the exercise of its powers to implement R.A. 6850 (granting civil service eligibility to employees under provisional or temporary status who have rendered seven years of efficient service), the Civil Service Commission enjoys wide latitude of discretion, and may not be compelled by mandamus to issue such eligibility.

Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 115863, March 31, 1995

However, the Commission cannot validly abolish the Career Executive Service Board (CESB); because the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the Legislature.

[b] Mathay v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 130214, August 9, 1999

Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Civil Service Commission has the power to hear and decide administrative cases instituted before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments.

The Omnibus Rules implementing the Administrative Code provide, among others, that notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled for violation of other existing Civil Service laws, rules, and regulations.
Thus, in Debulgado v. Civil Service Commission, 237 SCRA 184, it was held that the power of the Civil Service Commission includes the authority to recall an appointment initially approved in disregard of applicable provisions of the Civil Service law and regulations.

[c] Cruz v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 144464, November 22, 2001

The Commission has original jurisdiction to hear and decide a complaint for cheating in the Civil Service examinations committed by government employees.
The fact that the complaint was filed by the Civil Service Commission itself does not mean that it cannot be an impartial judge.

[d] Olanda v. Bugayong, G.R. No. 140917, October 10, 2003, citing Mantala v. Salvador, 206 SCRA 264

It is the intent of the Civil Service Law, in requiring the establishment of a grievance procedure, that decisions of lower-level officials (in cases involving personnel actions) be appealed to the agency head, then to the Civil Service Commission.
The Regional Trial Court does not have jurisdiction over such personnel actions.

[e] Ontiveros v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145401, May 7, 2001

The Commission does not have appellate jurisdiction over a case of separation from government service made pursuant to Sec. 2, Art. II of the Provisional Constitution, which provided:

“All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order, or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.”

3. Scope of the Civil Service

The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters [Sec. 2(1), Art. IX-B].

[a] TUPAS (Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services) v. National Housing Corporation (1990)

It was held that the NHC is not embraced in the Civil Service, and that the employer-employee relationship therein is governed not by the Civil Service Law but by the Labor Code of the Philippines.

See also National Service Corporation v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122.

✨ Juco v. NLRC, G.R. No. 98107, August 18, 1997

It was held that employment relations in the National Housing Corporation (NHC) are within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, not the CSC, even if the controversy arose prior to 1987, because, as held in NASECO v. NLRC, supra, it is the Constitution in place at the time of the decision which governs.
In this case, the Supreme Court declared that the phrase “with original charter” refers to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code.

[b] University of the Philippines v. Regino, 221 SCRA 598

Conversely, it was held that the University of the Philippines, having been created by a special law and having an original charter, is clearly part of the Civil Service.

Mateo v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284

It was held that the Morong Water District, a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to P.D. 198, is a government-owned corporation with an original charter.
Accordingly, its employees fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and the RTC has no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees in the said water district.

[i] EIIB v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129133, November 25, 1998

The Economic Intelligence and Information Bureau is a government agency within the scope of the coverage of the Civil Service.

Department of Health v. National Labor Relations Commission, 251 SCRA 700

Likewise, the Jose M. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital is a government hospital exercising governmental functions; it falls within the scope of the coverage of the Civil Service.

[c] Dante Liban v. Richard Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011

The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State—so as not to lose its character of neutrality as well as its independence—nor strictly as a private corporation, since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.
Based on the above, the sui generis status of the PNRC is now sufficiently established.
The earlier decision (July 15, 2009) of the Supreme Court in the same case, which declared several sections of the PNRC Charter (Republic Act No. 95) as unconstitutional, was reversed, inasmuch as the constitutionality of the said law was never raised by the parties as an issue and should not have been passed upon by the Court.
Thus, R.A. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety.

[i] Camporedondo v. NLRC and PNRC, G.R. No. 129049, August 6, 1999

The ruling that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation, is now abandoned.

4. Classes of Service

[a] Career Service

Characterized by:

entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications;
opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and
security of tenure.

The positions included in the career service are: OCCC-PPP

Open career positions

where prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required;

Closed career positions

e.g., scientific or highly technical in nature;

Career Executive Service

e.g., undersecretaries, bureau directors, etc.;

Career Officers

(other than those belonging to the Career Executive Service)who are appointed by the President, e.g., those in the foreign office;

Positions in the Armed Forces of the Philippines

although governed by a separate merit system;

Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters;
Permanent laborers

whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.

[i] Career Executive Service (CES)

On May 31, 1994, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, series of 1994, identifying the positions covered by the Career Executive Service, as well as “All other third-level positions of equivalent category in all branches and instrumentalities of the national government, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters,” provided that the position is a career position, is above division chief level, and the duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive or managerial functions.
“Incumbents of positions which are declared to be Career Executive Service positions for the first time pursuant to this Resolution who hold permanent appointments thereto shall remain under permanent status in their respective positions. However, upon promotion or transfer to other CES positions, these incumbents shall be under temporary status in said other CES positions until they qualify.”

[ia] Security of Tenure in the CES

To be a member of the Career Executive Service (CES) and be entitled to security of tenure, the officer must:

pass the career executive service examination;
be conferred Career Executive Service eligibility;
comply with the other requirements prescribed by the CES Board; and
be appointed to a CES rank by the President.

PEZA Board of Directors v. Gloria Mercado, G.R. No. 172144, March 9, 2010.
The Career Executive Service covers Presidential appointees only.

[ia1] ✨ General v. Roco, G.R. No. 143366, January 29, 2001

Earlier, the Court said that the two requisites that must concur in order that an employee in the career executive service may attain security of tenure are:

career executive service eligibility; and
appointment to the appropriate career executive service rank.

It must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the Career Executive Service (except first and second level employees in the civil service) pertains only to rank, and not to the office or the position to which they may be appointed.
Thus, a CES officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank, which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned.
In fact, a career executive service officer suffers no diminution in salary even if assigned to a CES position with a lower salary grade, as he is compensated according to his CES rank, and not on the basis of the position or office which he occupies.

[ia2] Cuevas v. Bacal, G.R. No. 139382, December 6, 2000

Respondent Josefina Bacal, who held CES Rank Level III, Salary Grade 28, could not claim that she had a valid and vested right to the position of Chief Public Attorney (CES Rank Level IV, Salary Grade 30).
Inasmuch as respondent did not have the rank appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be considered permanent, and she can claim no security of tenure in respect to that position.

[ia3] Dimayuga v. Benedicto, G.R. No. 144153, January 16, 2002

Accordingly, when the appointee does not possess the required career executive service eligibility, his appointment will never attain permanency.
On this basis, the appointment of the respondent as Ministry Legal Counsel, CESO IV, Department Legal Counsel of Director III was merely temporary, because he did not possess the appropriate CESO eligibility.

[ia4] Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185766, November 23, 2010

The position of Assistant Department Manager II in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) does not require an appointment by the President of the Philippines; thus, it does not fall under the CES.

[ib] Some Cases on CES

Atty. Anacleto Buena v. Dr. Sangcad Benito, G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014

The Assistant Schools Division Superintendent is a position in the career executive service.
The CES Board issued Resolution No. 945, dated June 14, 2011, which set the criteria to determine whether a position belongs to the Career Executive Service, namely:

The position belongs to the career service of the civil service;
The position is above division chief; and
The position entails the performance of executive or managerial functions.

In fact, Sec. 7, R.A. 9155 (Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001) explicitly provides that an appointee to the position must be a career executive service officer.

[ib1] Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, November 17, 2004

The petitioner, who was already holding the position of Department Manager of the Legal Services Department of EPZA (with the appropriate ELM eligibility required at that time), had the right to remain in his position even after the same had been declared a CES position in 1994.
However, when he retired as such Department Manager in 1996, his government service ended, and his right to remain in the CES position, notwithstanding his lack of CES eligibility, also ceased.
Upon his reemployment in January 1999 at Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority as Department Manager III, it was necessary for him to comply with the CES eligibility prescribed at the time for that position.
Not being a CES eligible, he could not validly challenge the disapproval of his appointment by the Civil Service Commission.

[ib2] De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127182, January 22, 2001

The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Executive Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on the applicant.
Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which, in turn, depends on his eligibility or lack of it.
A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it only in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles.
The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.
Such being the case, he could be transferred or reassigned without violating the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.

[b] Non-Career Service

Characterized by:

entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests utilized for the career service;
tenure:

limited to a period specified by law, or
which is co-terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or
which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment was made.

The officers and employees embraced in the non-career service are: EDCCE

Elective officials and their personal and confidential staff;
Department heads and officials of Cabinet rank who hold office at the pleasure of the President, and their personal and confidential staff;
Chairmen and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office, and their personal and confidential staff;
Contractual personnel or those whose employment in government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period not exceeding one year, under their own responsibility, with minimum direction and supervision; and
Emergency and seasonal personnel.

[i] Montecillo v. Civil Service Commission G.R. No. 131954, June 28, 2001

The Supreme Court said that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Civil Service Commission is expressly empowered to declare positions in the Civil Service as primarily confidential.
This signifies that the enumeration in the Civil Service Decree, which defines the non-career service, is not an exclusive list.
The Commission can supplement this enumeration, as it did when it issued Memorandum Circular No. 22, s. 1991, specifying positions in the Civil Service which are considered primarily confidential and, therefore, their occupants hold tenure co-terminus with the officials they serve.

[ii] Office of the President v. Buenaobra G.R. No. 170021, September 8, 2006

Under R.A. 7104, the respondent Chairman of the Komisyon ng Wikang Pilipino (KWP) has a fixed tenure of seven (7) years.
Respondent is a non-career service personnel whose tenure is fixed by law, and thus, her tenure in office is not at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
She enjoys security of tenure and may not be removed without just cause and without observing due process.

5. Appointments in the Civil Service

Appointments in the Civil Service are made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination [Sec. 2(2), Art. IX-B].

[a] PAGCOR v. Rilloraza, G.R. No. 141141, June 25, 2001

Three important points were underscored, viz:

The classification of a particular position as policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical amounts to no more than an executive or legislative declaration that is not conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position;
The exemption provided in this section pertains only to exemption from competitive examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the civil service; and
Sec. 16, P.D. 1869, insofar as it declares all positions within PAGCOR as primarily confidential, is not absolutely binding on the courts.

[b] Darangina v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 167472, January 31, 2007

A permanent appointment can issue only to a person who possesses all the requirements for the position to which he is appointed.
An exception to this rule is where, in the absence of appropriate eligibles, he or she may be appointed to the position merely in a temporary capacity for a period of 12 months, unless sooner terminated by the appointing authority.

Such a temporary appointment is made not for the benefit of the appointee; rather, it seeks to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the selection of a permanent appointee.
Thus, the temporary appointee accepts the position with the condition that he shall surrender the office when called upon to do so by the appointing authority.
Such termination of a temporary appointment may be with or without cause, as the appointee serves merely at the pleasure of the appointing power.
Accordingly, the Court held that where a non-eligible holds a temporary appointment, his replacement by another non-eligible is not prohibited.

[c] Exemptions from Competitive Examination

Exempt from the competitive examination requirement (to determine merit and fitness) are positions which are:

[i] Policy-Determining

Where the officer lays down principal or fundamental guidelines or rules, or formulates a method of action for government or any of its subdivisions.
Example: Department Head.

[ii] Primarily Confidential

Denoting not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment, or freedom from misgivings or betrayals on confidential matters of State; or one declared to be so by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Civil Service Commission.
De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289
Salazar v. Mathay, 73 SCRA 285

[iia] Civil Service Commission and PAGCOR v. Salas, G.R. No. 123708, June 19, 1997

The Supreme Court clarified that prior to the passage of the Civil Service Act of 1959, there were two recognized instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential, namely:

When the President, upon recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, has declared the position to be primarily confidential; and
In the absence of such a declaration, when from the nature of the functions of the office, there exists close intimacy between the appointee and the appointing authority which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals on confidential matters of State.

When R.A. 2260 was enacted on June 19, 1959, Sec. 5 thereof provided that "the non-competitive or unclassified service shall be composed of positions declared by law to be in the non-competitive or unclassified service or those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature."
Thus, at least since the enactment of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the nature of the position which determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining, or highly technical.

Pinero v. Hechanova, 18 SCRA 417

It was declared that executive pronouncements, such as P.D. 1869, can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict; otherwise, it would lie within the discretion of the Chief Executive to deny to any officer, by executive fiat, the constitutional protection of security of tenure.
This rule prevails even with the advent of the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987, despite the fact that the phrase “in nature” was deleted.
Furthermore, the “proximity rule” enunciated in De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289, is still authoritative—i.e., that the occupant of a particular position could be considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason why he was chosen by the appointing authority was the latter’s belief that he can share a close intimate relationship with the occupant which ensures freedom of discussion without fear of embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of State.
Where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant, and therefore, cannot be classified as primarily confidential.

[iib] Hilario v. CSC, 243 SCRA 206

Reiterates previous rulings that the position of City Legal Officer is primarily confidential, and the appointee thereto holds office at the pleasure of, and co-terminous with, the appointing authority.

[iic] PAGCOR v. Rilloraza, G.R. No. 141141, June 25, 2001

It was held that the respondent’s position of Casino Operations Manager (COM) is not primarily confidential.
In this case, the duties and responsibilities of respondent, as COM, show that he is a tier above the ordinary rank-and-file employees, and that faith and confidence in his competence to perform his assigned tasks are reposed upon him.
However, the degree of confidence of the appointing power—that intimacy which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayal of personal trust or confidential matters of state—is not present.
In fact, respondent does not report directly to the appointing authority but to a Branch Manager.

[iii] Highly Technical

Positions which require possession of technical skill or training in a supreme or superior degree.
Besa v. PNB, 33 SCRA 330

The position of Legal Counsel of the PNB was declared to be both primarily confidential and highly technical, with the former aspect predominating.

Cadiente v. Santos, 142 SCRA 280

The position of City Legal Officer is primarily confidential, requiring the utmost degree of confidence on the part of the Mayor.

Borres v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 120

It was held that the positions of Security Officer and Security Guards of the City Vice Mayor are primarily confidential positions.

[d] Discretion of the Appointing Authority

Luego v. CSC, 143 SCRA 327

Even in the career service of the Civil Service, where the appointee possesses the minimum qualification requirements prescribed by law for the position, the appointing authority has discretion who to appoint.

Civil Service Commission v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 158737, August 31, 2004

The appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
Not only is the appointing authority the officer primarily responsible for the administration of his office, he is also in the best position to determine who among the prospective appointees can effectively discharge the functions of the position. Thus, the final choice of the appointing authority should be respected and left undisturbed.

[i] Preference in Promotion

Even if officers and employees in the career service of the Civil Service enjoy the right to preference in promotion, it is not mandatory that the vacancy be filled by promotion.
The appointing authority should be allowed the choice of men of his confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible.
The Civil Service Commission cannot direct the appointment of its own choice, even on the ground that the latter is more qualified than the appointing authority’s choice.
Central Bank v. CSC, 171 SCRA 744; Uy v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 343.
For disregarding this doctrine, the CSC drew a stern rebuke from the Court in Lapinid v. CSC, 197 SCRA 106; was warned in Guieb v. CSC, 229 SCRA 779; and again “duly warned; henceforth, it disobeys at its peril,” in Mauna v. CSC, 232 SCRA 388.

[ii] Extent of discretion

The discretion of the appointing authority lies not only in the choice of the person who is to be appointed, but also in the nature or character of the appointment issued—i.e., whether the appointment is permanent or temporary.

Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 281

The Supreme Court reiterated the rule that the Civil Service Commission cannot convert a temporary appointment into a permanent one, as it would constitute an arrogation of a power properly belonging to the appointing authority.
The Civil Service Commission may, however, approve as merely temporary an appointment intended to be permanent where the appointee does not possess the requisite eligibility and the exigency of the service demands that the position be filled up, even in a temporary capacity.

[e] Role of the Civil Service Commission

Lopez v. CSC, 194 SCRA 269

The Supreme Court held: “All that the Commission is authorized to do is to check if the appointee possesses the qualifications and appropriate eligibility: ‘If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved.’
Sec. 6 of R.A. 6656 on government reorganization merely provides that the selection or placement should be done through the creation of a Placement Committee the members of which are the representatives of the head of the agency as well as representatives of the employees. The committee’s work is recommendatory and does not fix a stringent formula regarding the mode of choosing from among the candidates.”

University of the Philippines and Alfredo de Torres v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 132860, April 3, 2001

The Supreme Court said that the Civil Service Commission is not a co-manager or surrogate administrator of government offices and agencies.
Its functions and authority are limited to approving or reviewing appointments to determine their compliance with requirements of the Civil Service Law.
On its own, the Commission does not have the power to terminate employment or to drop members from the rolls.

[i] Submission Requirement

A substantive requirement under Sec. 11 of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations is that an appointment should be submitted to the Civil Service Commission within 30 days from issuance; otherwise, it shall be ineffective.
Oriental Mindoro National College v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 152017, January 15, 2004,

In as much as the alleged appointment of the respondent was submitted to the Civil Service Commission only after two years and twelve days after its issuance, it was held that there was no valid appointment.

[ii] Right to Challenge CSC Disapproval

Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, supra
Despite CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998, which provides that only the appointing authority has the right to challenge the CSC’s disapproval of an appointment, the Supreme Court, said that both the appointing authority and the appointee are the real parties in interest, and both have legal standing in a suit assailing a Civil Service Commission (CSC) order disapproving an appointment.
The CSC’s disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the appointing authority’s discretion; thus, the appointing authority has the right to contest the disapproval, as he stands to be adversely affected when the CSC disapproves an appointment.
Although the appointee has no vested right to the position, it was his eligibility that was being questioned. He should, therefore, be granted the opportunity to prove his eligibility. He has a personal stake in the outcome of the case, which justifies his challenge to the CSC act which denied his permanent appointment.

6. Disqualifications

[a] Election Losers

No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any government-owned or controlled corporation or in any of their subsidiaries [Sec. 6, Art. IX-B].

[b] Elective Officials

No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure [Sec. 7(1), Art. IX-B].

✨ Flores v. Drilon, supra

For violating this constitutional prohibition, the Supreme Court, declared as unconstitutional the provision in the law creating the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority which mandated the appointment of the City Mayor of Olongapo City as the first Administrator of the Authority.

[c] Holding Multiple Offices

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or funacontrolled corporations or their subsidiaries [Sec. 7(2), Art. IX-B].

[i] ✨ Dennis Funa v. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010

On the constitutional challenge to the validity of designating DOTC Undersecretary Maria Elena Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in a concurrent capacity, the Supreme Court ruled that Undersecretary Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC is unconstitutional, because it falls under the stricter prohibition of Sec. 13, Art. VII of the Constitution.
Quoting from Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, the Court, in reference to Sec. 13, Art. VII, said:

“These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials and employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.”

[ia] ✨ Dennis Funa v. Acting Secretary of Justice Alberto Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013

The petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the designation of respondent Alberto Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position as Acting Solicitor General, positing that the same is a violation of Sec. 13, Art. VII of the Constitution.
Calling attention to its rulings in Civil Liberties Union and Funa v. Ermita, the Court declared that Agra was undoubtedly covered by Sec. 13, Art. VII, whose text and spirit are too clear to be differently read.
Agra cannot validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as Acting Solicitor General, because the Constitution has not otherwise provided.

[ii] Dennis Funa v. Chairman, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014

The Supreme Court held that Executive Order No. 864, designating CSC Chairman Francisco Duque as Board Member of GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC, and HDMF, is unconstitutional for impairing the independence of the Civil Service Commission and for violating the general rule against holding multiple government positions, as well as the concept of ex officio positions.

[iii] Public Interest Center v. Elma, 494 SCRA 53 (2006)

The Supreme Court held that an incompatibility exists between the positions of PCGG Chairman and Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC).
The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies, and reviewing investigations involving such officials.
The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Executive Department.
Thus, the concurrent appointments of respondent Elma as PCGG Chairman and CPLC violate Sec. 7, Art. IX-B of the Constitution.

[iv] Ex Officio Positions

National Amnesty Commission v. COA, G.R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004

Where the other posts are held by a public officer in an ex officio capacity as provided by law or as required by the primary functions of his position, there is no violation, because the other posts do not comprise “any other office,” but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on the said public officer.
However, he is prohibited from receiving any additional compensation for his services in the said position, because these services are deemed already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.

Bitonio v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 147392, March 12, 2004

It also follows that a representative designated by the Secretary of Labor (who is ex officio member of the Board of Directors of PEZA) to attend the meetings of the PEZA Board may not claim any additional compensation for such attendance.
Otherwise, the representative would have a better right than his principal.

7. Security of Tenure

No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law [Sec. 2(3), Art. IX-B].

[a] The grounds and the procedure for investigation of charges and the discipline of [career] civil service officers and employees are provided in the Civil Service Law.

Non-compliance therewith constitutes a denial of the right to security of tenure.

[i] Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710

A Presidential appointee is under the direct disciplinary authority of the President.

[ia] Ma. Lourdes Domingo v. Rogelio Rayala, G.R. No. 155831, February 18, 2008

The Supreme Court acknowledged that it is the President, as the proper disciplining authority, who would determine whether there is a valid cause for removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. However, this power is qualified by the phrase “for cause as provided by law.”
Thus, when the President found that Rayala was, indeed, guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than that provided by law for the offense. The imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year.
Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an aggravating circumstance; and where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall be imposed, i.e., suspension for a period of one (1) year.

[ii] Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz, 160 SCRA 751

Unconsented transfer of the officer, resulting in demotion in rank or salary, is a violation of the security of tenure clause in the Constitution.

DECS v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555

But where the appointment of a principal does not refer to any particular school, reassignment does not offend the constitutional guarantee.

Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, 193 SCRA 520

Thus, it was held that since the appointment of private respondent Yap was that of District Supervisor at large, she could be assigned to any station as she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific station.

[iii] Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 112513, August 21, 1997

When an employee is illegally dismissed and his reinstatement is later ordered by the Court, for all legal intents and purposes he is considered as not having left his office, and notwithstanding the silence of the decision, he is entitled to payment of back salaries.

[iiia] Balitaosan v. Secretary, DECS, G.R. No. 138238, September 2, 2003

But where the reinstatement is ordered by the Court not as the result of exoneration but merely as an act of liberality of the Court of Appeals, the claim for back wages for the period during which the employee was not allowed to work must be denied.
The general rule is that a public official is not entitled to compensation if he has not rendered any service.

[iiib] Brugada v. Secretary of Education, G.R. Nos. 142332-43, January 31, 2005

Thus, in, where the petitioners were no longer pleading for exoneration from the administrative charges filed against them, but were merely asking for the payment of back wages computed from the time they could not teach pursuant to Secretary Cariño’s dismissal order minus the six months suspension until their actual reinstatement, the Supreme Court said that the petitioners have no right to back wages because they were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended.
In a host of cases, the Supreme Court has categorically declared that the payment of back wages during the period of suspension of a civil servant who is subsequently reinstated is proper only if he is found innocent of the charges and the suspension is unjustified.

[iv] General v. Roco, supra

Security of tenure in the Career Executive Service pertains only to rank, not to the position to which the employee may be appointed.

[b] De la Llana v. Alba, supra

Valid abolition of office does not violate the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.

Ginson v. Municipality of Murcia, 158 SCRA 1; Rama v. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 496

However, pretended abolition of office is a flimsy excuse to justify dismissal.

[i] Reorganization of office does not necessarily result in abolition of the office, and does not justify the replacement of permanent officers and employees.

See Dario v. Mison, supra;
Mendoza v. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108;
Gabriel v. Domingo, 189 SCRA 172.

Cabagnot v. CSC, 223 SCRA 59

But where, as a result of the reorganization, employees were effectively demoted by their assignment to positions lower than those they previously held, there is violation of security of tenure, and the Civil Service Commission may order their reinstatement.

[c] Under the Rules of Court, a career service officer or employee who has been unlawfully ousted from his office has one year within which to file an action in court to recover his office; otherwise, the right to recover the same prescribes.

Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175,

But the Supreme Court, on grounds of equity, allowed a suit filed nine years from the date of unlawful dismissal.

[d] Sec. 40 of the Civil Service Law provides for summary dismissal—when the charge is serious and evidence of guilt is strong; when respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there is reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the present charge; and when respondent is notoriously undesirable—and is reproduced verbatim in the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 [which took effect in 1989].

However, this provision is deemed repealed by Republic Act No. 6654, approved on May 20, 1988, and published in the Official Gazette on May 30, 1988 [Abalos v. CSC, 196 SCRA 81].

[e] Mendez v. CSC, 204 SCRA 965; Navarro v. CSC, 226 SCRA 522

Sec. 37, par. a, P.D. 807, as amended, provides for appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission only over the Merit System Protection Board's decisions in administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of the penalty of suspension, fine, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office — not over MSPB decisions exonerating the respondent.
Appeal to the Civil Service Commission may be made only by the party adversely affected by the MSPB decision; and the employer is not a party adversely affected [University of the Philippines v. CSC, 228 SCRA 207; Del Castillo v. CSC, 241 SCRA 317].

[i] Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999

However, the principle laid down in these decisions — Mendez, Magpale, Navarro, and Del Castillo — that the Civil Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges was abandoned.
The Supreme Court considered the factual situation in the case at bench:

The CSC found Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service. Dacoycoy, as the party adversely affected by the CSC decision, could go to the Court of Appeals for the review of the CSC decision, impleading the CSC as public respondent, being the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the CSC, and held Dacoycoy not guilty of nepotism.

At that point, the Civil Service Commission had become "the party adversely affected" by such a CA ruling which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Accordingly, as an aggrieved party, the Civil Service Commission may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.

Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, G.R. No. 141246, September 9, 2002

This was reiterated where the employer PNB was allowed to elevate on appeal the decision of the Civil Service Commission exonerating the employee.

[f] It is a well-settled rule that he who, while occupying one office, accepts another incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates the first office and his title thereto is thereby terminated without any other act or proceeding.

Canonizado v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133132, February 15, 2001

However, this rule on incompatibility was not applied.
In this case, the Supreme Court declared Sec. 8, R.A. 8551, unconstitutional for violating the security of tenure clause in the Constitution.
It appears that petitioners were removed as NAPOLCOM Commissioners by virtue of the law; thus, Canonizado's acceptance of the position of Inspector General during the pendency of this case (precisely to assail the constitutionality of his removal as Commissioner) cannot be deemed to be abandonment of his claim for reinstatement to the position of Commissioner.
The removal of the petitioners from their positions by virtue of a constitutionally infirm act necessarily negates a finding of voluntary relinquishment.

[g] For other cases, procedure in disciplinary cases, appeal, etc., see VIII - Termination of Official Relationship, Law on Public Officers, infra.

8. Partisan Political Activity

No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign [Sec. 2(4), Art. IX-B].

[a] The Civil Service Law prohibits engaging directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or taking part in any election except to vote, or to use official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any person or body.

But this does not prevent expression of views on current political problems or issues, or mention of the names of candidates for public office whom the public officer supports.

[b] Cailles v. Bonifacio, 65 Phil 328

The military establishment is covered by this provision.
Sec. 5(3), Art. XVI, provides that no member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity except to vote. But this prohibition applies only to those in the active military service, not to reservists.

[c] Exempt from this provision are members of the Cabinet [Santos v. Yatco, 106 Phil 745], and public officers and employees holding political offices (who are allowed to take part in political and electoral activities, except to solicit contributions from their subordinates or commit acts prohibited under the Election Code) [Sec. 45, Civil Service Law].

9. Right to Self-Organization

The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees [Sec. 2(5), Art. IX-B].
See also Sec. 8, Art. III.

[a] But while the right to organize and join unions, associations or societies cannot be curtailed, government employees may not engage in strikes to demand changes in the terms and conditions of employment because the terms and conditions of employment are provided by law.

See Alliance of Concerned Teachers v. Carino, 200 SCRA 323;
Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) v. Laguio, G.R. No. 95445, December 18, 1990;
SSS Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 686;
Alliance of Government Workers v. MOLE, 124 SCRA 1.

The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association; the right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages by public employees is clearly recognized at common law.
Thus, it has been frequently declared that modern rules which prohibit strikes, either by statute or judicial decision, simply incorporate or reassert the common law rules.
Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124678, July 23, 1997
Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124540, November 17, 1997.

10. Protection to Temporary Employees

"Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be provided by law" [Sec. 2(6), Art. IX-B].

11. Standardization of Compensation

"The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for, their positions" [Sec. 5, Art. IX-B].

See R.A. 6758 [An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Classification System in the Government].

[a] Intia v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 131529, April 30, 1999

Thus, it was held that the discretion of the Philippine Postal Corporation Board of Directors on matters of personnel compensation is not absolute; the salary structure of its personnel must still strictly conform with R.A. 6758, in relation to the General Appropriation Act.

[b] Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004

Challenged as a violation of the equal protection clause, is the provision in R.A. 7693 (The Central Bank Act) which creates two classes of employees in the BSP, viz:

the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (the exempt class); and
the rank-and-file (Salary Grade 19 and below) (non-exempt class).

The Supreme Court said that while the “policy determination” argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of BSP, it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between the BSP rank-and-file employees and those of other Government Financing Institutions (GFIs), who, in their respective charters, are exempt from the provisions of SSL.
These rank-and-file employees (of BSP and GFIs) are similarly situated; thus, the classification made in the Central Bank Act is not based on any substantial distinction vis-à-vis the particular circumstances of each GFI.

12. Double Compensation

"No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of Congress, any present, emoluments, office or title of any kind from any foreign government. Pensions and gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation" [Sec. 8, Art. IX-B].

[a] Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139792, November 22, 2000

The Supreme Court declared that the second sentence simply means that the retiree can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even after he accepts another government position to which another compensation is attached.
But he cannot credit his years of service in the Judiciary (for which he now receives his pension under R.A. 910) in the computation of the separation pay to which he may be entitled under R.A. 7924 for the termination of his last employment.
To allow this would be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same service.

13. Oath of Allegiance

"All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution" [Sec. 14, Art. IX-B].
Relate this to Sec. 18, Art. XI, which provides that public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times.

C. The Commission on Elections

Please go to Suffrage & Election Laws.

D. The Commission on Audit

1. Composition / Appointment

A Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be:

natural-born Filipino citizens,
at least 35 years of age,
CPAs with not less than 10 years of auditing experience or members of the Philippine Bar with at least 10 years practice of law, and
must not have been candidates in the election immediately preceding the appointment.

At no time shall all members belong to the same profession [Sec. 1(1), Art. IX-D].
They shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment [Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-D].

[a] Dennis Funa v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-D, and similar provisions do not peremptorily prohibit the promotional appointment of a Commissioner to Chairman, provided the new appointee's tenure in both capacities does not exceed seven (7) years.

2. Powers and Duties

[Sec. 2, Art. IX-D]

[a] Examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property owned or held in trust or pertaining to, the Government.

[i] On post-audit basis:

Constitutional Commissions and bodies or offices granted fiscal autonomy under the Constitution;
autonomous state colleges and universities;
other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and
non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government.

[ia] Orocio v. Commission on Audit, 213 SCRA 109

The Supreme Court held that the Commission on Audit has the power to overrule the National Power Corporation General Counsel on post-audit measures relative to the determination of whether an expenditure of a government agency is irregular, unnecessary, extravagant, or unconscionable.

[ib] Osmeña v. Commission on Audit, 238 SCRA 463

The participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable settlement of a pending litigation and its eventual execution of a compromise agreement relative thereto are indubitably within its authority and capacity as a public corporation, and a compromise of a civil suit in which it is involved as a party is a perfectly legitimate transaction, not only recognized but even encouraged by law.
Thus, COA committed grave abuse of discretion when it disallowed the City's appropriation of ₱30,000 made conformably with the compromise agreement.

[ic] TESDA v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 204869, March 11, 2014

The Supreme Court declared that the COA properly disallowed the payment of extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses (EMEs) in excess of that allowed under the 2004–2007 GAAs, as well as the EMEs reimbursed to TESDA officers who were not entitled to the EMEs.
The Director General’s blatant violation of the clear provisions of the Constitution, the 2004–2007 GAAs, and the COA circulars is equivalent to gross negligence amounting to bad faith. He is required to refund the EME he received from the TESDP Fund for himself.

[ii] Temporary or special pre-audit

Where the internal control system of the audited agency is inadequate.

[iii] Duty to pass in audit a salary voucher

Gonzales v. Provincial Board of Iloilo, 12 SCRA 711

The duty to pass in audit a salary voucher is discretionary.

Guevara v. Gimenez, 6 SCRA 813

But where the Supreme Court said that the authority of the Auditor General is limited to auditing — i.e., to determine whether there is a law appropriating funds for a given purpose, whether there is a contract, whether the goods or services have been delivered, and whether payment has been authorized.
When all these are found to be in order, then the duty to pass a voucher in audit becomes ministerial.

NOTE: However, under the 1987 Constitution, with its expanded powers, the Commission on Audit may validly veto appropriations which violate rules on unnecessary, irregular, extravagant, or unconscionable expenses.

[iv] Audit jurisdiction over corporations

Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 147402, January 14, 2004

The Commission on Audit has audit jurisdiction over “government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, as well as government-owned or controlled corporations without original charters.”
The nature or purpose of the corporation is not material in determining COA’s audit jurisdiction.
Neither is the manner of creation of a corporation, whether under a general or special law.
Local Water Districts (LWDs) are not private corporations because they are not created under the Corporation Code; they exist by virtue of P.D. 198, the special enabling charter which expressly confers on LWDs corporate powers. COA, therefore, exercises audit jurisdiction over LWDs.

[v] Audit of accounts of accountable officers

Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodolfo Zaldarriaga, G.R. No. 175349, June 22, 2010

In the audit of accounts of accountable officers, the COA auditors should act with great care and caution, bearing in mind that their conclusion constitutes sufficient basis for the filing of appropriate charges against the erring employee.

[b] Keep the general accounts of Government, and preserve vouchers and supporting papers for such period as provided by law.

[c] Authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, and establish techniques and methods required therefor.

Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 88435, January 15, 2002

The Supreme Court said that the power of the Commission to define the scope of its audit and to promulgate auditing rules and regulations and the power to disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive, but its power to examine and audit is not exclusive.

[d] Promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, expensive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds or property.

[i] Sambeli v. Province of Isabela, 210 SCRA 80

It was held that the Commission on Audit may stop the payment of the price stipulated in government contracts when found to be irregular, extravagant, or unconscionable.

Bustamante v. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 134,

COA Circular No. 75-6 — prohibiting the use of government vehicles by officials who are provided with transportation allowance — was held to be a valid exercise of its powers under Sec. 2, Art. IX-D of the Constitution; and the prohibition may be made to apply to officials of the National Power Corporation.

3. Jurisdiction of the Commission

No law shall be passed exempting any entity of government, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit [Sec. 3, Art. IX-D].

[a] De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 149154, June 10, 2003

The Court already ruled in several cases that a water district is a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) with a special charter, since it is created pursuant to a special law, P.D. No. 198.
The COA has the authority to investigate whether directors, officials, or employees of GOCCs receiving additional allowances and bonuses are entitled to such benefits under applicable laws. Thus, water districts are subject to the jurisdiction of the COA.

[b] ✨ Funa v. Manila Economic and Cultural Office, G.R. No. 193462, February 4, 2014

The Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation organized under the Corporation Code.
Through it, the Philippines maintains an unofficial relationship with Taiwan, and is thus authorized to perform certain consular and other functions to promote and protect Philippine interests in Taiwan.

The Supreme Court said that MECO is neither a government-owned or controlled corporation nor a government instrumentality, and is thus outside the audit jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.

[i] However, COA has the power to audit MECO with respect to the “verification fees” for overseas employment documents that MECO collects from Taiwanese employers. MECO receives these fees by reason of being the collection agent of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), a government agency. Hence, MECO is accountable for such fees and may be audited by COA.

[ii] COA also has the power to audit MECO with respect to the “consular fees” it collects for the issuance of visas, passports, and other documents pursuant to its consular functions. MECO remains accountable to the government for these collections and may therefore be subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA.

[c] ✨ Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011

Looking at the legislative history of its amended charter, the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) is a public corporation, and its funds are subject to COA audit.
The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No. 111, approved on October 31, 1936) created it as a public corporation. P.D. No. 460 (approved May 17, 1974) amended C.A. 111 and provided substantial changes in the BSP’s organizational structure. Subsequently, R.A. No. 7278 (approved March 24, 1992) further amended C.A. 111, strengthening the voluntary and democratic character of the BSP and reducing government representation in its governing body.
The purpose of the BSP, as stated in its amended charter, shows that it was created to implement a State policy declared in Sec. 13, Article II of the Constitution. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, it is also classified as an attached agency of the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports.

[i] Sec. 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibits the creation of private corporations except by general law. In Feliciano v. Commission on Audit, 464 Phil. 439 (2009), the Supreme Court said that the purpose of this prohibition is to ban private corporations created by special charter, which historically gave certain individuals, families, or groups special privileges denied to other citizens.

However, this constitutional provision should not be construed to prohibit the creation of public corporations or corporate instrumentalities of the government intended to serve a public interest or purpose — which should not be measured by economic viability, but by the public purpose it serves — as envisioned in paragraph (2), Article 44 of the Civil Code and the pertinent provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987.

[d] Philippine Airlines v. Commission on Audit, 245 SCRA 39

Philippine Airlines, having ceased to be a government-owned or controlled corporation, is no longer under the audit jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.

[e] Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization, supra,

The Court — interpreting COA Circular No. 89-296, which provides that there is a failure of bidding when (a) there is only one offeror, or (b) all the offers are non-complying or unacceptable — declared that the COA Circular does not speak of accepted bids but of offerors, without distinction as to whether they are disqualified or qualified.
Thus, since in the bidding of the 40% block of Petron shares there were three offerors — namely, Saudi Aramco, Petronas, and Westmont — although the latter two were disqualified, there was no failure of bidding.

[f] Nacion v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 204757, March 17, 2015

Section 18 of R.A. No. 6758 (Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989) prohibits officials and employees of COA from receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances, or other emoluments from any government entity, except compensation paid directly by COA out of its appropriations.
This prohibition is mandatory, given their mandate to ensure compliance with laws and standards in the handling of funds by the government agencies where they are assigned.

Political Law Review: Constitutional Commissions

1. Independent Constitutional Commissions

2. Safeguards insuring the independence of the Commissions

[a] They are constitutionally created; may not be abolished by statute.

[b] Each is expressly described as “independent.”

[c] Each is conferred certain powers and functions which cannot be reduced by statute.

[d] The Chairmen and members cannot be removed except by impeachment.

[e] The Chairmen and members are given a fairly long term of office of seven years.

[f] The Chairmen and members may not be reappointed or appointed in an acting capacity.