“No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election”

N40-RRR10

Natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
At least 40 years old on the day of the election.
Registered voter.
Able to read and write.
Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the election.

2. Election

[Sec. 4, Art. VII].

[a] Regular Election

Second Monday of May.

[b] Congress as Canvassing Board

Returns of every election for President and Vice President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to Congress, directed to the Senate President who, upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, shall, not later than 30 days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, shall canvass the votes.
Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
In case two or more candidates shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall be chosen by a majority vote of all the members of Congress.

[i] Makalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003:

Sec. 18.5 of R.A. 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003), insofar as it grants sweeping authority to the COMELEC to proclaim all winning candidates, is unconstitutional as it is repugnant to Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution vesting in Congress the authority to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of President and Vice President.

Overseas Filipinos were granted voting rights under R.A. 9189, but Sec. 18.5 gave the Commission on Elections the authority to proclaim the President and Vice President, conflicting with Article VII, Section 4’s exclusive grant of that power to Congress. The Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 18.5 is unconstitutional and reaffirmed Congress’s sole role as the canvassing board for those offices.

[ii] Ruy Elias Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163556, June 8, 2004:

In the exercise of this power, Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee, composed of members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate.
The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have deprived petitioner and the other members of Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint session of both Houses of Congress, voting separately.

Lopez challenged rules that set up a Joint Committee to handle initial review of electoral certificates before Congress’s final canvass, claiming it infringed on legislative canvassing powers. The Supreme Court upheld the rules, confirming that Congress may delegate preliminary tasks internally as long as the final authority to approve or reject remains with the House and Senate.

[iii] Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. v. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for President and Vice President, G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004:

Even after Congress has adjourned its regular session, it may continue to perform this constitutional duty of canvassing the presidential and vice-presidential election results without need of any call for a special session by the President.
The joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly-elected President and Vice President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio.

After sine die adjournment, Senator Pimentel challenged the Joint Committee’s continued canvassing, claiming it needed a presidential special session. The Court ruled that Congress may continue canvassing until completion without a special session call, denying the petition.

[iv] Brillantes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004:

There is no constitutional or statutory basis for COMELEC to undertake a separate and an “unofficial” tabulation of results, whether manually or electronically.
By conducting such “unofficial” tabulation, the COMELEC descends to the level of a private organization, spending public funds for the purpose.
This not only violates the exclusive prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an “unofficial” count, but also taints the integrity of the envelopes containing the election returns and the election returns themselves.
Thus, if the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice President, the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from making an “unofficial” canvass of said votes.

Brillantes challenged COMELEC’s unofficial quick count for intruding on Congress’s sole power to canvass presidential votes. The Court granted the petition and held that COMELEC may not perform any unofficial tabulation of those results.

[c] Supreme Court as Presidential Electoral Tribunal:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

[i] Romulo Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010:

Election lawyer Macalintal questioned the creation of a purportedly “separate tribunal” with its own chairman and seal complemented by a budget allocation for its own employees and staff.
He also pointed out that the PET’s power is quasi-judicial in nature, and that Sec. 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution prohibits the designation of the Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts to any government agency performing quasi-judicial powers.

Macalintal challenged the creation of the PET—with its separate chairman, seal, staff, and budget—claiming it violated Sections 4 and 12 of the Constitution by improperly delegating quasi-judicial power. The Court dismissed his petition for lack of standing and held that the PET’s structure is a valid exercise of the Supreme Court’s rule-making authority and does not breach the constitutional prohibition on designating justices to quasi-judicial bodies.

[ia] The Supreme Court said that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal.

It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies — not unlawfully defies — the constitutional directive.
The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special electoral court.

[ib] On the second issue, the Court held that the set-up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.

With the explicit provisions in Art. VIII, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with the latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof.
The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but nevertheless distinct, line between the PET and the Supreme Court.

3. Term of Office

Six [6] Years

[a] No re-election; and no person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.

[b] The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, extended to noon of June 30, 1992 (Sec. 5, Art. XVIII).

Osmeña v. Comelec, 199 SCRA 750.

Congress passed R.A. 7056 to hold local elections on a different date and extend incumbents’ terms, but this clashed with the Constitution’s rule that all local officials serve exactly three years and face elections together on the second Monday of May. The Supreme Court struck down the law, holding that the Constitution’s synchronized-election mandate cannot be overridden by ordinary legislation.

4. Oath of Office

[Sec. 5, Art. VII]

Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take the following oath or affirmation:

“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice-President or Acting President) of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God.” (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.)

5. Privileges

[Sec. 6, Art. VII]

[a] Official Residence

The President shall have an official residence.

[b] Salary

Determined by law; shall not be decreased during tenure.
No increase shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved.

[c] Immunity from Suit

Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393

It was held that while the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting suit.

President Aquino filed libel charges against journalists after a preliminary investigation confirmed a prima facie case, and they argued her immunity from suit barred her prosecution. The Court ruled that although the President cannot be sued during her term, her immunity does not prevent her from initiating legal actions.

See also In Re: Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160.

Bermudez filed a petition to clarify who the draft constitution’s transitory provision meant by the “incumbent President and Vice-President.” The Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, stressed that it cannot issue advisory opinions against a sitting President who enjoys immunity from suit, and confirmed that the Commission’s language unambiguously covered Aquino and Laurel.

Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534

The Supreme Court said that the President is immune from civil liability.

Chuoco Tiaco, a Chinese resident of the Philippines, sued Governor-General Forbes and other officials for wrongful deportation and sought damages and an injunction. The Supreme Court ruled that executive officials acting in their official capacities are immune from suit, and their actions related to deportation fall under inherent governmental powers not subject to judicial restraint.

[i] Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

After his tenure, the Chief Executive cannot invoke immunity from suit for civil damages arising out of acts done by him while he was President which were not performed in the exercise of official duties.

Estrada sought to enjoin Ombudsman investigations and civil claims against him by invoking presidential immunity after leaving office. The Court denied his petitions, ruling that immunity from suit ends with the term for non-official acts and cannot bar civil damages for private wrongs once the presidency has concluded.

[ii] Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000

Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the President, he cannot invoke the President’s immunity from suit in a case filed against him because the questioned acts are not the acts of the President but merely those of a department Secretary.

The DECS Secretary faced a prohibition petition after reassigning a schools superintendent and claimed presidential immunity as the President’s alter ego. The Court denied his claim, holding that only the President himself enjoys immunity from suit.

[d] Executive Privilege

It has been defined as “the right of the President and high-level executive branch officials to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately, the public.”

Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006

Thus, presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings—like the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either House of Congress—are recognized as confidential.
This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government.

The Senate asked Executive Secretary Ermita for confidential Cabinet minutes and presidential memoranda, and Ermita, by presidential order, refused to comply on executive-privilege grounds. The Supreme Court upheld that such internal communications are protected by executive privilege and denied the Senate’s petition to compel disclosure.

Neri v. Senate Committees, G.R. No. 180843, March 25, 2008

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of the inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as in the area of military and foreign relations.
Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

NEDA Director-General Romulo Neri refused to answer Senate questions on his presidential communications regarding the NBN-ZTE deal and was held in contempt. The Supreme Court ruled that those communications were protected by executive privilege as they involved a non-delegable foreign-relations power and quashed the contempt order.

[i] Senate v. Ermita, supra:

However, the privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information (in this case to Congress), the necessity for withholding the information must be of such a high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President (and to the Executive Secretary, by order of the President) the power to invoke the privilege.

[ii] Neri v. Senate Committees, G.R. No. 180843, March 25, 2008

A majority of the members of the Supreme Court upheld the refusal of the petitioner to answer the three questions asked during the Senate inquiry because the information sought by the three questions are properly covered by the presidential communications privilege, and executive privilege was validly claimed by the President, through the Executive Secretary.

First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” (the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries) of the President.
Second, the communications were received by a close advisor of the President—Secretary Neri being a member of the Cabinet—and by virtue of the “proximity test,” he is covered by executive privilege.
Third, there was no adequate showing by the respondents of the compelling need for the information as to justify the limitation of the privilege, nor was there a showing of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

6. Prohibitions/Inhibitions

[Secs. 6 & 13, Art. VII]

Paragraphs (a) to (d) apply to the Vice President;
Paragraphs (b) to (d) also apply to Members of the Cabinet, their deputies, or assistants.

During tenure:

Shall not receive any other emoluments from the government or any other source.
Unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall not hold any other office or employment.
[Shall not directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by, the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
May not appoint spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree as Members of Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Under Secretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

[a] Shall not receive any other emoluments from the government or any other source.

[i] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003:

The Court noted that the total accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple amounted to ₱2,319,583.33 which, when converted to dollars at the exchange rate then prevailing, would have an equivalent value of $304,372.43.
This sum should be held as the only known lawful income of the respondents Marcos since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities, as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined.
Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand Marcos, as President, could not receive "any other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities," and under the 1973 Constitution, could not "receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source."
In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution.

The PCGG sought to forfeit US$658 million held for the Marcoses, and the Sandiganbayan released part of it pending appeal. The Supreme Court ruled that under both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions the Marcoses’ only lawful income was their combined ₱2.3 million salary, upheld the absolute emolument ban, and granted forfeiture in full.

[b] Unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall not hold any other office or employment.

[i] Note, however, that by express provision of the Constitution, the Vice President may be appointed to the Cabinet, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and the Secretary of Justice is an ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.

[ii] Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991

The Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 which allowed Cabinet members to hold two other offices in government, in direct contravention of Sec. 13, Art. VII.
The prohibition on the President and his official family is all-embracing and covers both public and private office or employment, not being qualified by the phrase "in the Government."
This is proof of the intent of the Constitution to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

Executive Order No. 284 permitted Cabinet members and their deputies to hold two additional government posts, prompting a challenge under Section 13, Article VII. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 13 absolutely bars such concurrent offices and struck down EO 284.

[iia] Dennis Funa v. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010

The Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional the designation of DOTC Undersecretary Maria Elena Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in a concurrent capacity, as it falls clearly within the prohibition.

The President designated Undersecretary Bautista as Officer-in-Charge of MARINA while she still held her DOTC post, prompting a challenge under the constitutional prohibition on concurrent offices. The Supreme Court ruled that her dual designation violated Section 13, Article VII and invalidated the appointment.

Dennis Funa v. Acting Justice Secretary Alberto Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013

The Supreme Court likewise declared as unconstitutional the designation of Alberto Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position as Acting Solicitor General.

Alberto Agra was simultaneously appointed Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting Solicitor General, prompting a challenge under the constitution’s ban on holding other paid offices. The Supreme Court ruled that only unpaid ex officio duties qualify as exceptions and invalidated Agra’s dual appointments.

[iii] This prohibition must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials without additional compensation in an ex officio capacity, as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the said officials’ office.

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra

The term ex officio means ‘from office’ or ‘by virtue of office’.
It refers to an authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position.
Ex officio likewise denotes an act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office.

[iiia] National Amnesty Commission v. COA, G.R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004:

The reason is that these posts do not comprise “another office” within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition, but properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.
To illustrate, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority and the Light Rail Transit Authority.
The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in said position.
These services are deemed already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to the principal office.

The NAC sought to pay honoraria to ex officio board representatives, but COA disallowed the payments as barred by constitutional prohibition on other offices. The Supreme Court upheld that ex officio duties are inherent to the primary office and carry no separate compensation, thus denying extra honoraria.

[iiib] Bitonio v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 147392, March 12, 2004

The Secretary of Labor, who sits in an ex officio capacity as member of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), is prohibited from receiving any compensation for this additional office, because his services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.
It follows that the petitioner, who sits in the PEZA Board merely as representative of the Secretary of Labor, is likewise prohibited from receiving any compensation therefor. Otherwise, the representative would have a better right than his principal.
The fact that the petitioner’s position as Director IV of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) is not covered by the ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment. After all, the petitioner attended the PEZA Board meetings by authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor; without such designation or authority, petitioner would not have been in the Board at all.

Bitonio, acting as the Secretary of Labor’s ex officio representative on the PEZA Board, sought extra pay for his additional duties, but COA refused. The Supreme Court held that ex officio functions are inherently part of the primary office with no separate compensation and denied his petition.

[c] Shall not directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by, the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

[d] Strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

[e] May not appoint spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree as Members of Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Under Secretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

7. Rules on Succession

[a] Vacancy at the Beginning of the Term

[i] Death or permanent disability of the President-elect

The Vice President-elect shall become President.

[ii] President-elect fails to qualify

The Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have qualified.

[iii] President shall not have been chosen

The Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and qualified.

[iv] No President and Vice President chosen nor shall have qualified, or both shall have died or become permanently disabled

The President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act as President until a President or a Vice President shall have been chosen and qualified.
In the event of inability of the officials mentioned, Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice President shall have qualified.

[b] Vacancy During the Term

[i] Death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President

The Vice President shall become the President.

[ia] ⭐ Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001

The Supreme Court declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañang.
In the press release containing his final statement:

he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
he emphasized he was leaving the palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country; and
he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

The Court declared that the elements of a valid resignation are:

intent to resign; and
act of relinquishment.

Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.

Mass protests on January 20, 2001, led Estrada to leave Malacañang and issue a statement acknowledging Arroyo’s oath while citing peace and healing. The Supreme Court ruled his words and departure met the constitutional tests of intent and relinquishment, declared his resignation valid, and upheld Arroyo’s succession.

[ii] Death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of President and Vice President

The Senate President or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or Vice President shall be elected and qualified.
Congress, by law, shall provide for the manner in which one is to act as President in the event of inability of the officials mentioned above.

[c] Temporary Disability

[i] When the President transmits to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary: such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.

[ii] When a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the Senate President and the Speaker their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the Senate President and Speaker his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.
Meanwhile, should a majority of the Members of the Cabinet transmit within 5 days to the Senate President and Speaker their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, Congress shall decide the issue.
For this purpose, Congress shall convene, if not in session, within 48 hours. And if, within 10 days from receipt of the last written declaration or, if not in session, within 12 days after it is required to assemble, Congress determines by a 2/3 vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.

[d] Constitutional Duty of Congress in Case of Vacancy in the Offices of President and Vice President

At 10 o’clock in the morning of the 3rd day after the vacancy occurs, Congress shall convene without need of a call, and within 7 days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice President to be held not earlier than 45 nor later than 60 days from the time of such call.
The bill shall be deemed certified and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by Congress.
The convening of Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed.
No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within 18 months before the date of the next presidential election.

8. Removal of the President

By impeachment (Secs. 2 & 3, Art. XI).

B. The Vice President

1. Qualifications, Election, Term of Office, and Removal

The same as the President [Sec. 3, Art. VII], but no Vice President shall serve for more than two successive terms.
The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

2. Vacancy in the Office of the Vice President [Sec. 9, Art. VII]

The President shall nominate a Vice President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of Congress, voting separately.

C. Powers of the President

1. The Executive Power

[Secs. 1 & 17, Art. VII]
“The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”
“He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”

[a] The executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws.

National Electrification Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143481, February 15, 2002,

The Supreme Court said that as the administrative head of the government, the President is vested with the power to execute, administer, and carry out laws into practical operation. Executive power, then, is the power of carrying out the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.

NEA paid the final tranche of 1997 salary increases to its officials and employees in a single advance payment, citing available funds, but COA disallowed the payments for violating EO 389 and DBM rules. The Supreme Court affirmed COA, ruling that the President and DBM control the timing and implementation of salary adjustments, so NEA’s unilateral acceleration was unauthorized.

[b] Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451, and in Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62,

The Supreme Court declared that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines and no other, and that all executive authority is thus vested in him.

Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451

Mayor Villena tried to halt an investigation and suspension ordered by the Secretary of the Interior under presidential authority and the Administrative Code. The Supreme Court affirmed that only the President holds executive power and may delegate investigative and disciplinary functions to enforce the law.

Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62

Planas challenged a presidential order directing her to explain critical newspaper statements before the Civil Service Commission, claiming immunity as an elective official. The Supreme Court ruled that the President holds exclusive executive power and may command executive agencies to investigate and discipline public officers for official conduct.

[This is in keeping with the rule announced in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, that the specific grant of executive powers is not inclusive but is merely a limitation upon the general grant of executive power.]

Frank S. Myers sued after President Wilson removed him as postmaster without Senate consent under the Tenure of Office Act. The Supreme Court ruled that restriction unconstitutional, confirming the President’s exclusive executive power to remove officers.

Lacson v. Roque, 92 Phil. 456, and Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143

However, the Supreme Court opted for a stricter interpretation of executive power, e.g., the President’s power of general supervision over local governments could be exercised by him only as may be provided by law.

Lacson v. Roque, 92 Phil. 456

Mayor Lacson was suspended by presidential order for alleged libel without any law empowering the President to remove municipal officials. The Supreme Court granted his petition and set aside the suspension, ruling that executive supervision over local governments must be based on proper legislative authority.

Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143

Mayor Mondano was suspended by his provincial governor upon a presidential referral of misconduct allegations, without any statute granting the governor suspension power. The Supreme Court voided the suspension, ruling that executive supervision over local officials must follow explicit legal provisions.

See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, on certain “residual powers” of the President of the Philippines.

Former President Marcos and his family sought to return to the Philippines from exile, but President Aquino barred their reentry citing threats to national stability and welfare. The Supreme Court ruled that the President’s executive power includes residual, unstated powers necessary to protect the general welfare, and dismissed the petition.

[c] National Artist for Literature Virgilio Almario v. The Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013:

The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws.
The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power. It simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.
This is precisely why the law provides that “administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to law or the Constitution.”

RA 7356 and Proclamation 1144 require the NCCA and CCP to forward nominees for the Order of National Artist, but in 2009 President Arroyo conferred the award on individuals not on that list. The Supreme Court annulled those conferments, ruling that the President must faithfully execute the law and cannot award honors contrary to the procedures it mandates.

[d] It is not for the President to determine the validity of a law since this is a question addressed to the judiciary.

Thus, until and unless a law is declared unconstitutional, the President has a duty to execute it regardless of his doubts on its validity.
A contrary opinion would allow him to negate the will of the legislature and to encroach upon the prerogatives of the Judiciary.

2. The Power of Appointment

[Sec. 16, Art. VII]

“The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.

He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards.”

[a] Appointment

Appointment is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office.
It is distinguished from designation in that the latter simply means the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, on a person already in the public service.
It is also different from the commission in that the latter is the written evidence of the appointment.

[b] Appointments Classified

[i] Permanent or Temporary

Permanent appointments are those extended to persons possessing the requisite eligibility and are thus protected by the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.
Temporary appointments are given to persons without such eligibility, revocable at will and without the necessity of just cause or a valid investigation; made on the understanding that the appointing power has not yet decided on a permanent appointee and that the temporary appointee may be replaced at any time a permanent choice is made.

[ia] Valencia v. Peralta, 8 SCRA 692:

A temporary appointment and a designation are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Confirmation, if given erroneously, will not make the incumbent a permanent appointee.

Valencia was named Acting Chairman of NAWASA by presidential designation and later “confirmed” by the Commission on Appointments, only to be displaced by a new President’s appointee. The Supreme Court ruled that acting designations are not subject to confirmation and that any confirmation of a non-appointment does not create permanent tenure.

[ib] Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154

It was held that where a person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority.
In this sense, a designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

Binamira was placed in office by a ministerial memorandum and later removed by a presidential recall of that designation. The Supreme Court held that such designations create only temporary, acting positions with no security of tenure and may be revoked at will.

[ii] Regular or Ad Interim

A regular appointment is one made by the President while Congress is in session, takes effect only after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and once approved, continues until the end of the term of the appointee.
An ad interim appointment is one made by the President while Congress is not in session, takes effect immediately, but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or upon the next adjournment of Congress.

In the latter case, the ad interim appointment is deemed “by-passed” through inaction.
The ad interim appointment is intended to prevent interruptions in vital government services that would otherwise result from prolonged vacancies in government offices.

[iia] Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 22

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment.

Esteban received an ad interim appointment as VP for Administration, qualified, and was later reassigned without legislative or Commission on Appointments action. The Supreme Court ruled his ad interim appointment was permanent and barred the President from withdrawing it unilaterally.

Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

It is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.

An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution:

disapproval of the appointment by the Commission on Appointments; or
adjournment by Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on the appointment.

There is no dispute that when the Commission on Appointments disapproves an ad interim appointment, the appointee can no longer be extended a new appointment, inasmuch as the disapproval is a final decision of the Commission in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President.
Such disapproval is final and binding on both the appointee and the appointing power. But when an ad interim appointment is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize, there is no final decision by the Commission to give or withhold its consent to the appointment.
Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment.

President Arroyo’s ad interim appointments of COMELEC officials took effect immediately and the appointees qualified before Commission on Appointments review. The Supreme Court held those appointments were permanent and could not be rescinded by the President except through the two constitutionally prescribed methods.

[c] Officials Who Are to Be Appointed by the President

[i] The first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII says that the President shall nominate, and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the following:

Heads of executive departments;
Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and
Those other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution.

[ia] Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549

The Supreme Court declared that the foregoing are the only categories of appointments which require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
In this case, it was held that the appointment of Salvador Mison as Commissioner of Customs needs no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments because the Commissioner of Customs is not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence, Sec. 16, Art. VII.

Petitioners challenged the appointment of Salvador Mison as Commissioner of Customs, arguing it was unconstitutional without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The Supreme Court ruled that under the 1987 Constitution, only specific high-level positions require CA confirmation, and bureau heads like Mison are not among them. It upheld the President’s authority to appoint Mison directly and dismissed the petition.

Quintos-Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commissions, Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259

On the other hand, the appointment of a sectoral representative by the President of the Philippines is specifically provided for in Sec. 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution. Thus, the appointment of a sectoral representative falls under category [a] above.

Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by the President as a sectoral representative in the House, but her assumption of office was blocked pending confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The Supreme Court ruled that such appointments, made under Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, require confirmation by the CA because they fall within the category of appointments vested in the President by the Constitution.

[ib] Soriano v. Lista, G.R. No. 153881, March 24, 2003

The Supreme Court said that because the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) is no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, but is now under the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), a civilian agency, the promotion and appointment of respondent officers of the PCG will not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Obviously, the clause “officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain” refers to military officers alone.

Petitioners challenged the appointment of PCG officers by President Arroyo, asserting a constitutional mandate for Commission on Appointments confirmation once the PCG became civilian under the DOTC. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that PCG officers are civilian appointees outside the military-officer confirmation requirement.

[ii] The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII states that he shall also appoint:

All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law; and
Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.

[iia] Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 16

The Supreme Court held that the appointment of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not otherwise provided for in the Constitution or in the law. Thus, there is no necessity for such appointment to be passed upon by the Commission on Appointments.

Mary Concepcion Bautista challenged the Commission on Appointments’ planned confirmation of Hesiquio R. Mallillin as CHR Chairman on the ground that the Constitution and law do not require CA approval. The Supreme Court held that Article XIII, Section 17 grants the President exclusive power to appoint the CHR Chair without CA review and voided the CA’s confirmation proceedings.

Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254

Article 215 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, insofar as it requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners, is unconstitutional because it violates Sec. 16, Art. VII.

R.A. 6715 amended the Labor Code to make the President’s appointment of NLRC Chairman and Commissioners subject to Commission on Appointments confirmation. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 16, Article VII’s list of appointees requiring confirmation is exclusive and struck down the statute’s confirmation requirement.

Manalo v. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999

In fact, the Supreme Court said that Congress cannot, by law, require the confirmation of appointments of government officials other than those enumerated in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII.

R.A. 6975 subjected certain PNP officer appointments to Commission on Appointments confirmation after creating the DILG. The Supreme Court held that Section 16, Article VII’s enumeration of positions requiring confirmation is exclusive and invalidated the statutory confirmation requirement.

[iib] Tarrosa v. Singson, supra

The Court denied the petition for prohibition filed by the petitioner as a “taxpayer” questioning the appointment of Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments as provided in R.A. 7653, calling attention to its ruling in Calderon v. Carale.
The petition was dismissed, however, primarily on the ground that it was in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding, which can be commenced only by the Solicitor General or by “a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another.”

A taxpayer challenged Gabriel Singson’s appointment as BSP Governor for lack of CA confirmation and sought to stop him from performing his duties and receiving pay. The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of standing, ruling that only the Solicitor General or someone claiming entitlement to the office may bring a quo warranto action.

[iic] Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 113956, July 21, 2006

The Supreme Court declared that a statute cannot circumvent the constitutional provisions on the power of appointment by filling vacancies in a public office through election by the co-workers in that office.
This manner of filling vacancies in public office has no constitutional basis. Thus, because the challenged section of the law is unconstitutional, it is the President who shall appoint the trustees, by virtue of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, which provides that the President has the power to appoint officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.

Sections 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 allowed CCP trustees to fill their own vacancies by electing new members, resulting in rival boards and competing quo warranto petitions. The Supreme Court ruled that this election scheme violated the President’s exclusive appointment power under Section 16, Article VII, declared those provisions unconstitutional, and affirmed that the President must appoint the trustees.

[d] Steps in the Appointing Process

[i] Nomination by the President

[ii] Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments

[iii] Issuance of the commission

[iv] Acceptance by the appointee

Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil. 740

The Supreme Court declared that an appointment is deemed complete only upon its acceptance.
Pending such acceptance, which is optional to the appointee, the appointment may still be validly withdrawn.
Appointment to a public office cannot be forced upon any citizen except for purposes of defense of the State under Sec. 4, Art. II, as an exception to the rule against involuntary servitude.

Antonio Lacson was nominated to two different provincial fiscal posts but chose not to accept the Tarlac appointment, whereupon Honorio Romero assumed his Negros Oriental duties. The Supreme Court ruled that an appointment takes effect only upon the appointee’s acceptance—allowing withdrawal beforehand—and that no one may be forced into public office except for state defense.

[e] Discretion of Appointing Authority

Appointment is essentially a discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee, if issued a permanent appointment, should possess the minimum qualification requirements, including the Civil Service eligibility prescribed by law for the position.
This discretion also includes the determination of the nature or character of the appointment, i.e., whether the appointment is temporary or permanent.
See Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327

Felimon Luego received a permanent appointment as Administrative Officer II, but the Civil Service Commission attested it as temporary and later revoked it in favor of another candidate deemed better qualified. The Supreme Court held that appointment is a discretionary power of the appointing officer and that the Commission may only check minimum eligibility, so it cannot disapprove a valid permanent appointment.

Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission, 197 SCRA 106

Renato Lapinid was named to a permanent managerial post in the Philippine Ports Authority, but the Civil Service Commission refused to act on his papers, claiming power to confirm the appointment. The Supreme Court ruled that appointment authority—including decisions on the nature of the appointment—belongs exclusively to the appointing officer, and the CSC may only verify eligibility, not approve or reject appointments.

Pobre v. Mendieta, 224 SCRA 738.

Hermogenes P. Pobre was appointed PRC Chairman by President Aquino but was challenged by Mariano A. Mendieta under a succession clause in P.D. No. 223, leading the RTC to enjoin Pobre. The Supreme Court held that appointment is a discretionary power of the President subject only to minimum qualifications and that the succession clause does not limit presidential choice.

[i] Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005

Several Senators, including members of the Commission on Appointments, questioned the constitutionality of the appointments issued by the President to respondents as Acting Secretaries of their respective departments, and to prohibit them from performing the duties of Department Secretaries.
In denying the petition, the Supreme Court said that the essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature.
In case of a vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of Department Secretary, the President must necessarily appoint the alter ego of her choice as Acting Secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence.
Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

Senators challenged President Arroyo’s installation of eight Acting Secretaries, arguing these temporary posts required Commission confirmation. The Supreme Court upheld the appointments as valid exercises of the President’s discretionary power to name trusted alter egos in an acting capacity and denied the petition.

[f] Special Constitutional Limitations on the President’s Appointing Power

[i] The President may not appoint his spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, as Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or -controlled corporations.

(Sec. 13, Art. VII)

[ii] Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective unless revoked by the elected President within ninety days from his assumption of office.

(Sec. 14, Art. VII)

[iii] Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

(Sec. 15, Art. VII)

[iiia] De Rama v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001

The Supreme Court ruled that this provision applies only to presidential appointments. There is no law that prohibits local executive officials from making appointments during the last days of their tenure.

Mayor Conrado de Rama tried to recall fourteen hires his predecessor made in her final weeks, claiming they were forbidden “midnight appointments” under the Constitution’s ban on late‐term appointments. The Supreme Court denied his petition, ruling that the constitutional restriction applies solely to presidential appointments and does not limit the appointing power of local executives.

[iiib] Arturo De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

However, the Supreme Court ruled that the prohibition does not apply to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court.

Arturo De Castro sought to stop the Judicial and Bar Council from beginning its selection for a Supreme Court vacancy during President Arroyo’s final two months, citing the constitutional ban on late-term appointments. The Supreme Court held that this prohibition applies only to presidential appointments and does not limit the constitutionally separate process for filling Supreme Court seats.

This ruling effectively modified In Re: Mateo Valenzuela, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998.

[iiic] See more comprehensive discussion in the next chapter on the Judicial Department.

[Note:] The presidential power of appointment may also be limited by Congress through its power to prescribe qualifications for public office; and the judiciary may annul an appointment made by the President if the appointee is not qualified or has not been validly confirmed.

[g] The Power of Removal

As a general rule, the power of removal may be implied from the power of appointment. However, the President cannot remove officials appointed by him where the Constitution prescribes certain methods for separation of such officers from public service—e.g., Chairmen and Commissioners of Constitutional Commissions who can be removed only by impeachment, or judges who are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court.
In the cases where the power of removal is lodged in the President, the same may be exercised only for cause as may be provided by law, and in accordance with the prescribed administrative procedure.

[i] Members of the career service of the Civil Service who are appointed by the President may be directly disciplined by him, provided that the same is for cause and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710

Ruben Villaluz was appointed Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office by the President, faced congressional charges of mismanagement, and was suspended, investigated, and removed after Administrative Order No. 332. The Supreme Court held that the President’s removal power is inherent in his appointing power for non-competitive service appointees with due process and dismissed the petition as barred by laches.

[ii] Members of the Cabinet and such officers whose continuity in office depends upon the pleasure of the President may be replaced at any time, but legally speaking, their separation is effected not by removal but by expiration of their term.

See Alajar v. Alba, 100 Phil. 683;

Vivencio Alajar was appointed Vice-Mayor of Roxas City but was succeeded by Juliano Alba through a presidential appointment while serving at pleasure of the President. The Supreme Court held that such pleasure-service officers may be replaced at any time and their separation is effected by expiration of their term, so Alba’s appointment was valid.

Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231.

Bruno Aparri was a member of the NARRA board whose office was abolished and succeeded by the Land Authority, whose board members the President appointed. The Supreme Court ruled that pleasure-service officers are separated by expiration of their term upon agency reorganization, so Aparri’s claim failed.

[iii] Ma. Lourdes Domingo v. Rogelio Rayala, G.R. No. 155831, February 18, 2008

The respondent, Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), was found guilty of sexual harassment by the Office of the President and was ordered dismissed from the service.
However, Sec. 215 of the Labor Code provides that the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during good behavior until he reaches the age of 65, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law or becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of the office.
Thus, when the President found Rayala guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense.
Since the penalty for the first offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six months and one day to one year, it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service—a penalty that can only be imposed upon the commission of a second offense.
The proper penalty, given that there was an attending aggravating circumstance, is suspension for a period of one year.

The President ordered NLRC Chairman Rayala dismissed for a first-offense sexual harassment despite Section 215 of the Labor Code prescribing only suspension for such conduct. The Supreme Court held the dismissal exceeded the President’s removal power, granted the petition, and imposed the proper penalty of one-year suspension.

3. The Power of Control

(Sec. 17, Art. VII)

“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. xxx”

[a] Control

Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Mondano v. Silvosa, supra.
It is distinguished from supervision in that the latter means overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties.

[b] Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department

The President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
Sec. 31 of the Administrative Code authorizes the President:

to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof, or transferring functions from one unit to another; and
to transfer functions or offices from the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency in the Executive Branch and vice versa.

[i] Banda v. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010

Thus, the President can remove the exclusive printing jurisdiction of the National Printing Office and require it to compete with the private sector for certain government printing jobs.
The President can also limit the appropriations of the National Printing Office to the agency’s own income. Sec. 20 of the Administrative Code provides for the President’s residual powers, as it states that the President shall exercise other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws.
General appropriation laws provide an inclusive and broad interpretation of the President’s power to reorganize executive offices, even to the extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose.

President Arroyo’s Executive Order No. 378 removed the National Printing Office’s monopoly and restricted its funding to its own income, requiring it to compete with private printers. The Supreme Court upheld the order as a valid exercise of the President’s constitutional reorganization authority, residual powers under the Administrative Code, and broad discretion under general appropriation laws.

[ii] Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines [MEWAP] v. Romulo, G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007:

The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and statutes. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Art. VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the Constitution
While the power to abolish an office is generally lodged in the legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch—which may incidentally include such abolition—is permissible under present laws.

[iii] MEWAP v. Romulo, supra

The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book II, Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of the Philippines), which grants the President broad organization powers to implement reorganization measures.
Further, Presidential Decree No. 1772, which amended P.D. 1416, grants the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, and to standardize salaries and materials.

[iv] MEWAP v. Romulo, supra

Be that as it may, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive department if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
R.A. 6656 enumerates the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees as a result of reorganization:

where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;
where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;
where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance, and merit;
where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; and
where the removal violates the order of separation (MEWAP v. Romulo, supra).

MEWAP challenged President Estrada’s Executive Order No. 102 for reorganizing the Department of Health and abolishing certain offices, but the Court of Appeals upheld the order. The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the President has constitutional and statutory authority to reorganize executive agencies, including incidental office abolition, provided the action is undertaken in good faith.

[v] Domingo v. Zamora, G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003

The Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292) expressly grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President. The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office “to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.”
The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch.
To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies.

[va] Domingo v. Zamora, supra

But the power to reorganize the Office of the President under Sec. 31 (2) and (3) of the Administrative Code should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper.
Under Sec. 31 (1) of E.O. 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another.
In contrast, under Sec. 31 (2) and (3), the President’s power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.

Petitioners challenged President Arroyo’s abolition and transfer of certain Office of the President units under EO 81 and related memoranda, arguing these acts required legislative approval. The Supreme Court upheld the reorganizations under Sections 31(1)–(3) of the Administrative Code and dismissed the petition.

[vb] Prospero Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012

The abolition of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing delegated legislative authority to reorganize his own office pursuant to the Administrative Code.

Prospero Pichay challenged Executive Order No. 13, which abolished the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and transferred its functions to a division of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs. The Supreme Court held that the President has constitutional and statutory authority to reorganize his own office—including abolishing agencies and reallocating functions—and denied Pichay’s petition.

[c] The Alter Ego Principle

Also known as the doctrine of qualified political agency. Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department. The heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive.

Except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person, or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments.
The acts of the Secretaries of such departments performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees, G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003

The DENR Secretary ordered the transfer of Region XII’s offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, prompting employees to challenge his authority. The Supreme Court upheld the transfer as a valid exercise of the President’s delegated reorganization power under the alter ego principle and denied the petition.

[i] The President may exercise powers conferred by law upon Cabinet members or other subordinate executive officers.

City of Iligan v. Director of Lands, 158 SCRA 158

Iligan City sought to block the sale of lands originally reserved for the National Power Corporation after President Macapagal’s 1965 proclamation donated four lots to the city. The Supreme Court held that the President, as head of the executive department, validly exercised the Secretary’s and Director’s power to grant public lands and that a later presidential revocation without congressional approval was void.

Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328

Local trawl operators challenged President Magsaysay’s Executive Orders prohibiting trawl fishing in San Miguel Bay, prompting a CFI injunction and an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court held that, as alter ego of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the President validly exercised powers granted by the Fisheries Act and the Administrative Code to regulate and ban trawling, and the executive decrees were upheld.

Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895

Even where the law provides that the decision of the Director of Lands on questions of fact shall be conclusive when affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the same may, on appeal to the President, be reviewed and reversed by the Executive Secretary.

Two rival applicants sought the same parcel of reclassified forest land, and after the Director of Lands’ decision was affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture, the President empowered the Executive Secretary to review appeals. The Supreme Court ruled that the Executive Secretary may review and reverse such departmental affirmations under the President’s residual supervisory power, and affirmed the appellate reversal.

Gascon v. Arroyo, 178 SCRA 582

Thus, it was held that the Executive Secretary had the authority to enter into the “Agreement to Arbitrate” with ABS-CBN, since he was acting on behalf of the President, who had the power to negotiate such agreement.

ABS-CBN and the Government entered arbitration over seized assets, and the Executive Secretary signed the agreement on the President’s behalf, prompting a petition challenging his authority. The Supreme Court held that, under the alter ego principle, the Executive Secretary legitimately acted for the President in negotiating and executing the arbitration agreement.

[ii] DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees, supra

Applying this doctrine, the power of the President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his Cabinet Members exercising control over a particular executive department.
Accordingly, in this case, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato.
The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, is presumed to be the act of the President because the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.

[iii] Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015

The Supreme Court held that the approval by the Secretary of Transportation and Communications of the Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (ASTOA)—as a consequence of which the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) issued the challenged Toll Operation Certificate in favor of Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO), authorizing the latter to operate and maintain Stage 1 of the Skyway—was valid.
Approval of the ASTOA by the DOTC Secretary has the same effect as approval by the President, even without the issuance of E.O. 497, wherein the President specifically delegated to the DOTC Secretary the authority to approve contracts entered into by the TRB.
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, the DOTC Secretary’s act, unless reprobated by the President, carries the latter’s presumed approval.

Petitioners challenged the DOTC Secretary’s approval of an amended toll operation agreement and related certificate for Skyway O & M, claiming only the President could give such consent. The Supreme Court upheld the Secretary’s act as a valid exercise of delegated authority and confirmed it as the President’s presumed approval under the alter ego principle.

[iv] DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees, supra

But even if he is an alter ego of the President, the DECS Secretary cannot invoke the President’s immunity from suit in a case filed against him, inasmuch as the questioned acts are not those of the President.

[d] Appeal to the President

Appeal to the President from decisions of subordinate executive officers, including Cabinet members, completes exhaustion of administrative remedies, except in the instances when the doctrine of qualified political agency applies.
Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302

Petitioner’s timberland application was denied by the Director of Forestry and its affirmation by the Secretary went unchallenged at the Presidential level before he filed certiorari. The Court held that appeal to the President is necessary to exhaust administrative remedies and that a suit against the State cannot proceed without the State’s consent, warranting dismissal.

In such cases, the decision of the Cabinet Secretary carries the presumptive approval of the President, and there is no need to appeal the decision to the President in order to complete exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Kilusang Bayan v. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92

Muntinlupa vendors lost their long-held stall permits under a new bidding ordinance and had their appeal denied by Secretary Dominguez without further recourse. The Court held that a Cabinet Secretary’s decision is deemed approved by the President, so no additional appeal was required, and granted certiorari to set aside the administrative ruling.

[e] Limitation on the Power of Control

The power of control may be exercised by the President only over the acts, not over the actor
Angangco v. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619

Collector Ang-Angco was removed by Executive Secretary Castillo—acting for the President—after an administrative inquiry into his release of imported concentrates, without his case being submitted to the Civil Service Commission. The Court held that presidential control extends only to correcting subordinate acts and that removal of classified officers must follow the Civil Service Act, making Castillo’s removal order void.

[f] Control over the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority

Hutchinson Ports Phils., Ltd. v. SBMA, G.R. No. 131367, August 31, 2000

The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) is under the control of the Office of the President. All projects undertaken by SBMA involving ₱2 million or above require the approval of the President of the Philippines under LOI 620.

HPPL was first declared the winning bidder for SBMA’s container terminal, but President Ramos—citing LOI 620—ordered a rebidding, prompting HPPL to seek an injunction. The Supreme Court held that SBMA operates under the President’s direct control and that no award is final without presidential approval, so HPPL had no clear right to injunction and its petition was dismissed.

[g] Power of Control of the Justice Secretary over Prosecutors

Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, supra

It was reiterated that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice, who exercises the power of direct control and supervision over prosecutors.
Review, as an act of supervision and control by the Justice Secretary, finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
This power may still be availed of despite the filing of a criminal information in court, and in his discretion, the Secretary may affirm, modify, or reverse the resolutions of his subordinates.
The Crespo ruling did not foreclose the Justice Secretary’s power of review. Thus, where the Secretary of Justice exercises his power of review only after an information is filed, trial courts should defer or suspend arraignment and other proceedings until the appeal is resolved.
Such deferment, however, does not mean that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, because jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite the resolution of the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case.

Dr. Ledesma appealed a libel prosecution to the Secretary of Justice, who reversed the finding of probable cause and ordered the information withdrawn. The Supreme Court held that the Justice Secretary’s review over prosecutors is a valid exercise of direct control, that trial courts must defer proceedings but independently assess appeals, and that the Secretary’s reversal must be implemented.

See also:
Solar Team Entertainment v. Judge How, G.R. No. 140863, August 22, 2000;

An estafa case was filed, and the RTC suspended arraignment because the accused appealed the prosecutor’s resolution to the Secretary of Justice. The Court upheld the suspension and affirmed that the SOJ can still review and reverse prosecutorial actions even after filing, consistent with the SOJ’s power of control and the court’s authority over the case.

Noblejas v. Salas, 67 SCRA 47;

Noblejas was cleared by a fiscal and the Secretary of Justice, but a new fiscal later added him as an accused without SOJ clearance and without a new investigation. The Court set aside his inclusion and ruled that prosecutors are bound by the SOJ’s control, which bars unilateral reversals and requires due process before changes.

Villegas v. Enrile, 50 SCRA 11;

The Mayor of Manila claimed local autonomy moved appointment and control of prosecutors to him, but the Court found no implied repeal of the Manila Charter. The Court held that prosecutors remain under the Secretary of Justice’s power of control and supervision, including the authority to review and reverse their actions.

David v. Villegas, 81 SCRA 842.

The Court upheld the Mayor’s charter-based power to investigate city employees, favoring the special Manila Charter over general statutes. The decision clarifies that this local authority does not cover prosecutors, who remain under the Secretary of Justice’s control and review powers.

[h] Power of General Supervision over Local Governments

The President exercises only the power of general supervision over local governments [Sec. 4, Art. X].

[i] Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002

On the President’s power of general supervision, however, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter had acted in a manner contrary to law.
The President or any of his alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution.
Any directive, therefore, by the President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity, because it violates the principle of local autonomy, as well as the doctrine of separation of powers of the executive and the legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.

Manila’s tax ordinance was reviewed and partially set aside by the Secretary of Justice under Section 187 of the Local Government Code, prompting a challenge by Mayor Lim who claimed the DOJ exercised control over the city. The Court upheld Section 187 as a valid exercise of general supervision, stressing that the Secretary may invalidate an ordinance only for illegality or unconstitutionality and may not substitute his policy judgment for that of the LGU.

[ii] Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135

Sec. 187, R.A. 7160, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance—and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both grounds—is valid, and does not confer the power of control over local government units in the Secretary of Justice.
Even if the latter can set aside a tax ordinance, he cannot substitute his own judgment for that of the local government unit

A group of Mandaue City judges challenged COA’s reduction of their additional allowances based on a DBM circular that capped local allowances. The Supreme Court found the circular exceeded supervisory power and lacked proper publication, nullified it, and upheld the local ordinance.

[iii] Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000

The Supreme Court held that Sec. 4, Administrative Order No. 327, which withholds 5% of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of local government units, is unconstitutional, because the President’s power over local governments is only one of general supervision, and not one of control.
A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of LGU shares in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution.

The case arose when President Estrada’s Administrative Order 327 withheld 5% of every LGU’s Internal Revenue Allotment without congressional authorization. The Supreme Court ruled that the President’s power over LGUs is limited to general supervision and invalidated the withholding as unconstitutional.

[iv] Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011

The issuance by President GMA of Presidential Proclamation No. 1946 (placing Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City under a state of emergency) and Administrative Orders Nos. 273 and 273-A (delegating the supervision of ARMM to the DILG) did not violate the principle of local autonomy, and was consistent with the President’s power of general supervision over local governments, because the issuances did not operate to place in the President or the DILG control of ARMM.

After the Maguindanao massacre, the President declared a state of emergency in three areas and delegated supervision of ARMM to the DILG while regular ARMM succession rules operated. The Court upheld these actions as valid exercises of general supervision and the calling-out power, emphasizing that neither measure placed control of ARMM in the President or DILG or infringed local autonomy.

[v] Province of Negros Occidental v. The Commissioners, Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010

Because the President exercises only the power of general supervision over local government units, the grant of additional compensation, like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits to local government officials and employees, does not require the approval of the President for validity.

Negros Occidental granted hospitalization and health-care insurance benefits to its officials and employees, which COA disallowed for lack of presidential approval. The Court ruled that presidential approval is not required because the President exercises only general supervision, not control, over LGUs, and COA cannot impose a requirement absent a clear law.

[vi] Liga ng mga Barangay v. Judge Paredes, G.R. No. 130775, September 29, 2004

Like local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the President or his alter ego.
As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILG’s authority is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed; it cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace them.

Barangay captains, through their official League, challenged a DILG circular that unilaterally changed their by-laws without participating in the League’s legislative process. The Supreme Court ruled that the DILG’s role under the President’s general supervision is limited to ensuring compliance with the Liga’s own rules and declared any attempt to modify those rules invalid.

4. The Military Powers

Sec. 18, Art. VII

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. xxx

[a] The Commander-in-Chief Clause

“The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines…”

[i] The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines

Gudani v. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006
The Senate Committee on National Defense invited several senior AFP officers to testify on matters related to the conduct of the 2004 elections. AFP Chief of Staff General Senga wrote Senator Biazon, chairman of the Senate Committee, that “no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear” at the Senate hearing.
This notwithstanding, General Gudani and Col. Balutan attended and both testified at the hearing. On recommendation of the Office of the Provost Marshal General, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were charged with violation of Articles of War 65 (willfully disobeying a superior officer) in relation to Article of War 97 (conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline).
Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, asking that the order of PGMA preventing petitioners from testifying be declared unconstitutional, the charges for violation of the Articles of War be quashed, and that respondents be permanently enjoined from proceeding against the petitioners.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

Two AFP officers defied a direct presidential order barring them from testifying at a Senate hearing and were charged under Articles of War 65 and 97. The Supreme Court dismissed their petition, upholding the Commander-in-Chief’s authority over military officers and affirming the need for strict obedience to lawful military orders.

[ia] The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing in Congress pertains to a wholly different and independent species of presidential authority — the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President.

By tradition and jurisprudence, these Commander-in-Chief powers are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control.

[ib] The vitality of the tenet that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civil supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our representative system of government.

The Court quoted Kapunan v. De Villa:

“The Court is of the view that such is justified by the requirements of military discipline. It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may be circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier’s personal view on the matter.”

[ii] To call out (such) armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

[iia] David v. Macapagal-Arroyo

The Supreme Court said that the petitioners failed to prove that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis.
The Court noted the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum showing a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the record.
Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017, calling for military aid. Indeed, judging from the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion.

[iia1] Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid her in suppressing lawless violence, invasion or rebellion; this involves ordinary police action.

But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires.
For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of her powers.
She cannot invoke a greater power when she wishes to act under a lesser power.

[iia2] General Order No. 5, issued to implement PP 1017, is valid. It is an order issued by the President, acting as Commander-in-Chief, addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017.

Significantly, it provides a valid standard — that the military and the police should take only the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.”

However, the words “acts of terrorism” found in the G.O. had not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress, and thus, should be deemed deleted from the G.O.

[iia3] PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants the President the authority to promulgate “decrees,” because legislative power is peculiarly within the province of Congress.

Likewise, the inclusion in PP 1017 of Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers. Sec. 17, Art. XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause and thus requires a delegation from Congress.

The President issued PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 during a period of serious unrest, and petitioners failed to rebut the factual basis for calling out the troops. The Court upheld the calling-out aspect of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 (minus the undefined “acts of terrorism”) but struck down PP 1017 where it purported to authorize decrees and to invoke Sec. 17, Art. XII without Congressional delegation

[iib] Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011

On November 24, 2009, one day after the gruesome Maguindanao massacre, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1946, placing the provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency, and directed the AFP and PNP to undertake such measures to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence.
She then issued Administrative Order No. 273, then Administrative Order No. 273-A, delegating the supervision of ARMM to the DILG.

[iib1] On the claim of petitioners that the presidential issuances violated the principle of local autonomy, the Supreme Court said that the DILG Secretary did not take control of the powers of ARMM.

After law enforcement agents took custody of the ARMM Governor, the Vice Governor assumed the vacated post, and pursuant to the rule on succession in R.A. 9054, the Acting Governor named the Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly as Acting ARMM Vice Governor.
The DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.

[iib2] The President did not proclaim a national emergency; she declared only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned.

The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power directly vested in the President under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution. She did not need any congressional authority to exercise this power.
The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore, and she had to act in order to prevent bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned.

[iic] Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000

The Supreme Court said that when the President calls out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence, rebellion, or invasion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.
The Court cannot overrule the President’s discretion or substitute its own.
The only criterion is that “whenever it becomes necessary”, the President may call out the armed forces.
In the exercise of the power, on-the-spot decisions may be necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property.
Indeed, the decision to call out the armed forces must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all.

Petitioner challenged President Estrada’s verbal order sending Marines to support PNP patrols during a crime wave. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the President’s call-out power as Commander-in-Chief is a discretionary, non-justiciable authority.

[iid] Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001

The Supreme Court said that the President has discretionary authority to declare a “state of rebellion.”
The Court may only look into the sufficiency of the factual basis for the exercise of the power.

Following violent unrest in May 2001, the President declared and later lifted a state of rebellion in Metro Manila; petitioners challenged the issuances. The Court dismissed the case as moot but held that the President may declare a state of rebellion, with courts allowed to review the factual basis for grave abuse, noting the declaration itself confers no additional powers.

[iie] Guanzon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623

The Supreme Court recognized as part of the military powers of the President the conduct of “saturation drives” or “areal target zoning” by members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

The AFP conducted saturation drives and areal target zoning to suppress lawless violence, which petitioners attacked as unconstitutional. The Court upheld these operations as valid exercises of the President’s calling-out power, provided officers strictly observe constitutional limits on searches, seizures, and arrests.

[iif] Sanlakas v. Reyes, supra

It was held that the President’s authority to declare a “state of rebellion” springs in the main from her powers as Chief Executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers.
However, a mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. There is also no basis for apprehension that, because of the declaration, military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests.
As held in Lacson v. Perez, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion as provided under Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Be that as it may, the Court said that, in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an “utter superfluity.” At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.
“The Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.”

After the Oakwood incident, the President declared a state of rebellion and ordered the AFP and PNP to suppress lawless violence, which petitioners challenged. The Court dismissed the case as moot but held that while the President may declare a state of rebellion, the declaration has no legal effect by itself and cannot justify warrantless arrests or rights curtailment beyond what the Rules of Court already allow.

[iif1] David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra

There is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency.
While the authority to declare a state of rebellion emanates from her powers as Chief Executive (the statutory authority being Sec. 4, Chapter 2, Book II, Administrative Code of 1997) — and the declaration was deemed harmless and without legal significance — in declaring a state of national emergency in PP 1017, President Arroyo relied not only on Sec. 18, Art. VII but also on Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution, calling for the exercise of awesome powers which cannot be deemed harmless or without legal significance.

[iig] Jamar Kulayan v. Gov. Abdusakur Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012

A provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call out the armed forces at his own bidding. The calling-out power contemplated under the Constitution exclusively belongs to the President, and an exercise of the same by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires and may not be justified by Sec. 465 of the Local Government Code.

The Sulu governor issued directives that effectively called out the AFP to address peace and order, invoking his powers under the Local Government Code. The Court ruled that only the President may call out the military and that a governor’s unilateral deployment of the AFP is ultra vires, though LGU coordination with national authorities and the PNP remains allowed.

[iii] The power to organize courts martial for the discipline of the members of the armed forces; create military commissions for the punishment of war criminals.

See Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil 875

Guerrilla officers accused of killing their commander during WWII tried to stop a Philippine Army court-martial by attacking its jurisdiction and the Articles of War. The Court upheld the President’s Commander-in-Chief authority to convene courts-martial and sustained military jurisdiction over their wartime offense.

Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 42 O.G. 4282.

A Japanese general attacked EO 68 creating military commissions, claiming constitutional and international-law defects. The Court upheld the President’s authority to create military commissions for war crimes, rejecting ex post facto and sovereignty challenges because war crimes were already punishable under customary international law and EO 68 validly implemented the Commander-in-Chief power.

[iiia] Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144

But see where it was held that military tribunals cannot try civilians when civil courts are open and functioning.

Civilians charged with common crimes were brought before a military commission despite the regular courts being open. The Court voided the proceedings, ruling that military tribunals have no jurisdiction over civilians when civil courts are available.

Quilona v. General Court Martial, 206 SCRA 821

The Supreme Court held that pursuant to R.A. 6975, members of the Philippine National Police are not within the jurisdiction of a military court.

A PNP officer was charged before a general court-martial after the PNP had been created as a civilian force. The Court ruled that PNP members are outside military jurisdiction, so only civilian disciplinary systems and regular courts may try them.

[iiib] Navales v. General Abaya, G.R. No. 162318, October 25, 2004

This is made clear where the Supreme Court said that in enacting R.A. 7055, the lawmakers merely intended to return to the civilian courts jurisdiction over those offenses that have been traditionally within their jurisdiction, but did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction over cases mandated by the Articles of War.
Thus, the RTC cannot divest the General Court Martial of jurisdiction over those charged with violations of Arts. 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War, as these are specifically included as "service-connected offenses or crimes" under Sec. 1, R.A. 7055.

AFP members charged with service-connected Articles of War offenses asked the RTC to stop their court-martial, invoking R.A. 7055. The Court ruled that R.A. 7055 returns civilian crimes to civil courts but retains military jurisdiction over service-connected AW offenses, so the RTC cannot oust the General Court-Martial from trying violations of AW 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97.

[iiic] Gudani v. Senga, supra

On the issue of whether the court martial could still assume jurisdiction over General Gudani who had been compulsorily retired from the service, the Court quoted from Abadilla v. Ramos, where it held that an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service.
Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated.

[b] Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

[i] Grounds

Invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it.

[ii] Duration

Not to exceed sixty days, following which it shall be lifted, unless extended by Congress.

[iii] Duty of the President to report action to Congress

within 48 hours, personally or in writing.

[iv] Revocation

Congress may revoke (or extend on request of the President) the effectivity of the proclamation by a majority vote of all its members, voting jointly.

[v] Review

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing (Sec. 18, Art. VII).
See Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448.

After the Plaza Miranda bombing and related unrest, President Marcos suspended the privilege of the writ; detainees challenged both the suspension and the notion that it was a political question. The Court held it can review the sufficiency of the factual basis and, finding enough evidence, sustained the suspension while stressing that courts remain open to police the legality of arrests and detentions.

[vi] Right to Bail

The suspension of the privilege of the writ does not impair the right to bail (Sec. 13, Art. III).

[vii] Application

The suspension applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

[viii] Release

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

[c] Martial Law

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ."
(Sec. 18, Art. VII)

[i] The constitutional limitations for the suspension of the privilege of the writ are likewise imposed on the proclamation of martial law.

[ii] The constitutional validity of the President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress, before it becomes a justiciable question in the hands of the Court.

Philip Sigfrid Fortun v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012

Following the 2009 Maguindanao crisis, President Arroyo placed the province under martial law and suspended the writ; the proclamation was later lifted, and petitioners sought a ruling. The Court dismissed the case as moot but reaffirmed that martial law does not suspend the Constitution or civil courts, that the same strict limits apply as with writ suspension, and that Congress has the first check while the Court may review factual sufficiency under Article VII, Section 18.

5. The Pardoning Power

Sec. 19, Art. VII:

“Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in the Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.

[a] Kinds of Clemency

[i] Pardon.

An act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment that the law inflicts for the crime he has committed.

[ii] Commutation.

Reduction or mitigation of the penalty.

[iii] Reprieve.

Postponement of a sentence or stay of execution.

[iv] Parole.

Release from imprisonment, but without full restoration of liberty, as the parolee is still in the custody of the law although not in confinement.

[v] Amnesty.

Act of grace, concurred in by the legislature, usually extended to groups of persons who committed political offenses, which puts into oblivion the offense itself.

[b] Exercise by the President

Discretionary; may not be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the courts, unless there is a constitutional violation.
Thus, it was a legal malapropism for the trial court to interject par. 2, Art. 135, Revised Penal Code, recommending the grant of pardon after the convict shall have served a jail term of 5 years, considering that this was a prosecution under a special law, and that the matter of a pardon is within the President's exclusive prerogative
People v. de Gracia, supra

De Gracia was convicted under a special law for illegal possession of firearms and explosives seized during the 1989 coup attempt, and the trial court added a recommendation that he be pardoned after five years under an RPC provision. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction but struck the recommendation as a legal malapropism, reiterating that presidential pardon is a discretionary, exclusive power not subject to judicial prescriptions or conditions.

[c] Limitations on Exercise

[i] Cannot be granted in cases of impeachment

(Sec. 19, Art. VII).

[ii] Cannot be granted in cases of violation of election laws without the favorable recommendation of the Commission on Elections

(Sec. 5, Art. IX-C).

[iii] Can be granted only after conviction by final judgment.

People v. Salle, 250 SCRA 581, reiterated in People v. Bacang, 260 SCRA 44

The Court declared that the 1987 Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction by the trial court.
Any application for a pardon should not be acted upon, or the process toward its grant should not begin unless the appeal is withdrawn.
The ruling in Monsanto v. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190, which was laid down under the 1973 Constitution, is now changed by virtue of the explicit requirement under the 1987 Constitution.

People v. Salle, 250 SCRA 581

The accused sought clemency while his criminal appeal was pending. The Court held that under the 1987 Constitution, pardon may be granted only after conviction by final judgment, so clemency cannot be processed while an appeal is ongoing unless the appeal is withdrawn.

People v. Bacang, 260 SCRA 44

The appellant sought pardon while his appeal was unresolved. The Court reiterated that presidential clemency is available only after a conviction becomes final, so clemency efforts during a pending appeal have no effect unless the appeal is withdrawn.

People v. Catido, G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997

It was held that while the pardon was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal, or before conviction by final judgment (and therefore a violation of Sec. 19, Art. VII), the grant of amnesty, applied for by the accused-appellants under Proclamation No. 347, was valid.

The accused were convicted and, while their appeal was pending, received a presidential pardon and later applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 347. The Court held the pardon void for lack of a final judgment, but upheld amnesty as valid, thereby extinguishing criminal liability and dismissing the case.

[iv] Cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt (as it would violate separation of powers) or civil contempt (as the State is without interest in the same).

[v] Cannot absolve the convict of civil liability.

People v. Nacional, G.R. No. 11294, September 7, 1995

Where the Court said that the grant of conditional pardon and the subsequent dismissal of the appeal did not relieve the accused of civil liability.

Multiple accused were convicted for two killings; four obtained conditional pardons and had their appeals dismissed. The Court ruled that pardon does not wipe out civil liability, so the civil indemnity stands and is solidarily enforceable against all accused

[vi] Cannot restore public offices forfeited

Monsanto v. Factoran, supra

A pardoned employee sought reinstatement and back pay to a forfeited civil service post. The Court held that pardon does not automatically restore public office or entitle the recipient to back salaries; reinstatement requires a new lawful appointment.

Sabello v. DECS, 180 SCRA 623

Where a pardoned elementary school principal, on considerations of justice and equity, was deemed eligible for reinstatement to the same position of principal and not to the lower position of classroom teacher.

A pardoned principal was to be returned only as a teacher; he sought reinstatement to principal. The Court, applying equity and civil service standards, allowed reinstatement to the principal position, while confirming that pardon alone does not automatically restore office.

Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, 226 SCRA 356

See on executive clemency regarding administrative decisions.

An official who received executive clemency after administrative removal claimed back pay for time not worked, but COA disallowed it. The Court upheld COA, holding that clemency does not compel payment of back salaries absent actual service or clear legal authority, and it cannot by itself restore a forfeited office.

[d] Pardon Classified

[i] Plenary or partial.

[ii] Absolute or conditional.

[iia] Conditional pardon

Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 273.

Torres accepted a conditional pardon, later allegedly violated its terms, and was rearrested after the President revoked the pardon under Sec. 64(i). The Court upheld the revocation and rearrest, ruling that a conditional pardon is contractual and that the President’s judgment on breach is not subject to judicial review.

In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong, supra.

The rule is reiterated in that a conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal.
By the pardonee’s consent to the terms stipulated in the contract, the pardonee has placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate, who is duty bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the conditions of the pardon.
Sec. 64(i), Revised Administrative Code, authorizes the President to order the arrest and re-incarceration of such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the conditions of the pardon.
The exercise of this Presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny.

Sumulong challenged his rearrest after the President revoked his conditional pardon for alleged non-compliance. The Court denied habeas corpus and reaffirmed that a conditional pardon is contractual and that the President, by statute, may determine breach and order rearrest, with that judgment insulated from judicial reweighing.

[e] Amnesty

[i] People v. Patriarca, G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000

It was held that the person released under an amnesty proclamation stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
Paragraph 3, Article 89, Revised Penal Code, provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty; the penalty and all its effects are thus extinguished.

The accused obtained amnesty under a valid proclamation and asked the court to recognize its full effects. The Court held that amnesty, under Article 89(3), totally extinguishes criminal liability and all its effects, placing the grantee as though no offense had been committed.

[ii] Vera v. People of the Philippines, 7 SCRA 152

It was held that to avail of the benefits of an amnesty proclamation, one must admit his guilt of the offense covered by the proclamation.

An accused sought amnesty without squarely admitting the covered offense. The Court ruled that amnesty requires an admission of guilt consistent with the proclamation, and absent such admission, the benefit does not apply.

[iii] Distinguished from Pardon

Basis of Distinction	Amnesty	Pardon
Nature of Offense	Political offenses	Infractions of the peace of the State
Recipients	Classes or groups of persons	Individuals
Acceptance	No need for a distinct act of acceptance	Requires acceptance by the pardonee
Authority Required	Requires concurrence of Congress	Does not require congressional concurrence
Judicial Recognition	A public act which courts may take judicial notice of	A private act which must be pleaded and proved
Effect on Offense	Looks backward and erases the offense itself from legal memory	Looks forward and merely relieves the pardonee of the legal consequences

People v. Casido, supra.

Casido and Alcorin received conditional pardons while their appeal was pending, which the Court voided for lack of a final conviction, but they were separately granted amnesty that lawfully extinguished their criminal liability. The case underscores that pardon is an individual, private act that remits punishment after final conviction, while amnesty is a public, concurred proclamation that erases the offense and thus validly grounded their release.

6. The Borrowing Power

Sec. 20, Art. VII:

The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The Monetary Board shall, within 30 days from the end of every quarter, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law

7. The Diplomatic Power

Sec. 21, Art. VII:

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.

[a] Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351,

The Supreme Court distinguished treaties from executive agreements, thus:

International agreements which involve political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character take the form of a treaty; while international agreements involving adjustment of details carrying out well-established national policies and traditions, and involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature, take the form of executive agreements.
In treaties, formal documents require ratification, while executive agreements become binding through executive action.

The case drew a clear line between treaties and executive agreements based on subject and permanence. Policy-changing/permanent matters call for treaties with Senate concurrence, while temporary/detail-implementing matters may validly be done by executive agreement.

[b] Bayan v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

But see where the Supreme Court said that the Philippine government had complied with the Constitution in that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was concurred in by the Philippine Senate, thus complying with Sec. 21, Art. VII.
The Republic of the Philippines cannot require the United States to submit the agreement to the U.S. Senate for concurrence, for that would be giving a strict construction to the phrase “recognized as a treaty.” Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the U.S. treats the VFA as merely an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is just as binding as a treaty.

The VFA passed Sec. 21 because the Philippine Senate concurred; our courts cannot compel the U.S. to submit the VFA to its Senate. Under international law, an executive agreement is just as binding as a treaty, so the VFA is valid and effective for the Philippines.

8. Budgetary Power

Sec. 22, Art. VII:

The President shall submit to Congress within 30 days from the opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations act, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures.

9. The Informing Power

Sec. 23, Art. VII:

The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time.
(SONA)

10. Other Powers

[a] To call Congress to a special session

(Sec. 15, Art. VI: “x x x The President may call a special session at any time”).

[b] Power to approve or veto bills

(Sec. 27, Art. VI).

[c] To consent to deputation of government personnel by the Commission on Elections

(Sec. 2[4], Art. IX-C).

[d] To discipline such deputies

(Sec. 2[8], Art. IX-C).

[e] By delegation from Congress:

Emergency powers [Sec. 23(2), Art. VI]; and
Tariff powers [Sec. 28(2), Art. VI].

[f] General supervision over local governments and autonomous regional governments

[Art. X].

See Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350, December 2, 2002.

Political Law Review: Executive Department

IX. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

1. Qualifications [Sec. 2, Art. VII].