Includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government [Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VIII].

[a] The second clause effectively limits the "political question" area which, heretofore, was forbidden territory for the courts.

[b] Tocao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127405, September 20, 2001

The inherent powers of a Court to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable with law and justice includes the right to reverse itself, especially when, in its honest opinion, it has committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party litigant.

An unregistered cookware venture led to claims of partnership liability, but the Court found Belo never shared in profits and only guaranteed obligations. Invoking its inherent power to correct error, the Court reversed in part to prevent injustice, dropped Belo from liability, and adjusted the accounting against Tocao.

De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127182, December 5, 2001

The Court is not precluded from examining its own ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality.

A government lawyer holding a CES-level post lacked the required eligibility and challenged his reassignment after winning in the CA. The Supreme Court ruled his appointment was temporary and the reassignment valid, reaffirming that judicial power allows the Court to revisit and correct rulings when rigid technicalities would defeat justice.

[c] Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. No. 171947, February 15, 2011

The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of the judicial power under Article VIII of the Constitution; the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudication function of the Court.

Citizens won a continuing mandamus compelling agencies to clean up Manila Bay; the Court later adopted detailed timelines and monitoring through the MAC. The Court held that issuing follow-on resolutions is part of judicial power, because execution and oversight are integral to deciding and enforcing rights in such cases.

[d] Limketkai Sons Milling v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 464

The reorganization (of the three divisions) of the Supreme Court is purely an internal matter in which the petitioner has no business at all.
With its new membership, the Court is not obliged to follow blindly a decision upholding a party's case when, after its re-examination, the rectification appears proper and necessary.

After a Division reorganization, the Supreme Court re-examined and reversed an earlier ruling in litigation arising from a property sale, prompting objections from the losing party. The Court ruled that Division reorganization is an internal matter and that it may rectify prior decisions upon re-examination when justice so requires.

2. Where Vested

In one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law [Sec. 1, Art. VIII].

3. Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is defined as the power to hear and decide a case.

[a] Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Sec. 5, Art. VIII [Sec. 2, Art. VIII].

[b] No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its advice and concurrence [Sec. 30, Art. VI].

[i] Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998; Villavert v. Desierto, G.R. No. 133715, February 13, 2000

Thus, Sec. 27, R.A. 6770, which authorizes an appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared unconstitutional because the provision was passed without the advice and consent of the Supreme Court.

Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998;

Fabian asked the Supreme Court to review an Ombudsman decision exonerating a DPWH official, relying on Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act that sent such appeals straight to the SC. The Court struck down Sec. 27 and directed that appeals go to the CA via Rule 43, because Congress cannot expand the SC’s appellate jurisdiction without the Court’s advice and concurrence.

Villavert v. Desierto, G.R. No. 133715, February 13, 2000

Villavert, dismissed by the Ombudsman for ticket account shortages, went to the Supreme Court under Sec. 27 and Rule 45. Applying Fabian and A.M. No. 99-2-02-SC, the Court sent the case to the CA as a Rule 43 appeal and announced that future SC-filed appeals would be denied, solidifying the jurisdictional rule that Ombudsman administrative appeals belong in the CA.

4. Deliberative Process Privilege

The privilege against disclosure of information or communication enables the members of the Court to "freely discuss the issues without fear of criticism for holding unpopular positions" or fear of humiliation for one's comments.

Resolution dated February 14, 2012, In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials and Employees as Witnesses under the Subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the Various Letters from the Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012

Philippine law, rules, and jurisprudence prohibit the disclosure of privileged information under well-defined rules.
At the most basic level, and subject to the principle of comity, members of the Court and Court officials and employees may not be compelled to testify on matters that are part of the internal deliberations and actions of the Court in the exercise of its adjudicatory functions and duties.

During the Corona impeachment, subpoenas sought testimony from Justices and staff and production of internal Court materials such as agendas, minutes, drafts, and raffle results. The Court denied disclosure of deliberative materials and barred compelled testimony on internal adjudicatory matters, while allowing certified copies of final Decisions, Orders, and Resolutions, to protect judicial independence yet maintain transparency for final outputs.

The following are privileged documents or communications and not subject to disclosure:

ADR-CP

Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court's session on acts done material to pending cases;
Court deliberations on cases and matters pending before the Court;
Court records which are "predecisional" and "deliberative" in nature;
Confidential information secured by justices, judges, court officials, and employees in the course of their official functions;
Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged material that cannot be disclosed.

The principle of comity or inter-departmental courtesy demands that the highest officials of each department be exempt from the compulsory processes of the other departments.

B. Constitutional Safeguards to Ensure the Independence of the Judiciary

CIJ-ADSDS-RTA

The Supreme Court is a constitutional body; it may not be abolished by the legislature.
The members of the Supreme Court are removable only by impeachment.
The Supreme Court may not be deprived of its minimum original and appellate jurisdiction; appellate jurisdiction may not be increased without its advice and concurrence.
The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all inferior courts and personnel.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to discipline judges/justices of inferior courts.
The members of the Judiciary have security of tenure.
The members of the Judiciary may not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Salaries of judges may not be reduced; the Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy.

The Supreme Court, alone, may initiate and promulgate the Rules of Court.

The Supreme Court, alone, may order temporary detail of judges.

The Supreme Court can appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary.

Salaries of judges may not be reduced; the Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy.

[a] In Re: Clarifying and Strengthening the Organizational Structure and Administrative Set-up of the Philippine Judicial Academy, A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-Philja, 481 SCRA 1

The Supreme Court held that fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require.
It recognizes the power and authority to

levy, assess and collect fees,
fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government, and
allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

In downgrading the positions and salary grades of two positions in the Philippine Judicial Academy, the DBM overstepped its authority and encroached upon the fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court and its power of supervision over court personnel, as enshrined in the Constitution.

The DBM downgraded two PHILJA positions and salary grades, prompting the Supreme Court to review the encroachment on its administrative and compensation decisions. The Court set aside the DBM action and held that judicial fiscal autonomy gives the Judiciary full flexibility over fees, compensation (within legal ceilings), and disbursements, and that judges’ salaries may not be reduced nor judicial staffing downgraded by the Executive.

[b] Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012:

Under the guarantee of the Judiciary's fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when, and how of the privileges and benefits they may extend to justices, judges, court officials, and court personnel within the parameters of the Court's granted power.
The use of the formula provided by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) is part of the Court's exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of.
To allow the COA to substitute the Court's policy in the disposal of its property would be tantamount to encroachment into this judicial prerogative. Any form of interference by the Legislature or the Executive on the Judiciary's fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of Government.

COA questioned the valuation method the Supreme Court used (CFAG formula) when selling Court properties to retiring Members under their benefits package. The Court upheld its policy, ruling that fiscal autonomy lets the Judiciary determine the manner of privileges and property disposal, and that COA cannot substitute its own formula without intruding on a co-equal branch.

[c] In the Matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement vs. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition filed by Rolly Mijares, praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel the Court to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress, because the petition does not comply with the requisites of judicial review.
There is no actual case or controversy, and the petitioner has no legal standing.

Rolly Mijares sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Supreme Court to assert its independence and fiscal autonomy against perceived congressional threats to the JDF, but alleged no concrete act or personal injury. The Court dismissed the petition for lack of an actual controversy and standing, and because mandamus cannot compel discretionary actions or elicit advisory opinions.

[d] Resolution dated August 26, 2014, in A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC, Re: Request for Copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and Personal Data Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the Judiciary; A.M. No. 09-8-07-CA, Re: Request of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism for the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and Personal Data Sheets of the Court of Appeals Justices; and A.M. No. 14-4-01-CTA, Re: Request for Copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs) of the Justices of the Court of Tax Appeals

The Supreme Court considered the two motions for reconsideration filed by Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), Atty. Kim Henares, seeking the reversal of the minute resolutions dated June 17, 2014, in the consolidated cases.
In the assailed resolutions, the Court denied the request of the CIR for certified copies of the Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs) of all incumbent justices of the Court and the Court of Tax Appeals for the years 2003–2012 for lack of sufficient basis.

[i] The Court was not “creating an exception for themselves” when it denied access to copies of the SALN.

It is of record that the Court has routinely granted the media, concerned citizens, and even students of law access to copies of the SALNs of its own members or any other member of the Judiciary, provided it is shown that their motives are sound and sincere.
By allowing the deserving public access to the SALNs of its members, the Court takes pride in its indubitable track record of ensuring public accountability through transparency under the rule of law. But it is also of record that the Court has denied similar requests in certain instances.

[ii] The denial of the requests of the CIR through a minute resolution is not a violation of due process.

Whether a denial be done for “lack of sufficient basis” or some other ground, the demands of due process have been satisfied.
Under Sec. 203 of the Tax Code, a three-year limit is imposed on the assessment of internal revenue taxes; while Sec. 222 extends the prescriptive period to assess deficiency taxes to ten years in cases where there is a false or fraudulent return, or non-filing of a tax return.
In this case, there is no prima facie showing or well-founded suspicion that fraud has been committed (by justices) to justify the application of the ten-year prescriptive period.
The power of the CIR to obtain information is limited only to acquiring documents used in connection with the filing of a return or those used in the ordinary course of business to enable the CIR to arrive at an assessment.
Without a prima facie showing of fraud, the SALNs of members of the Judiciary are not covered.

[iii] Even the so-called “Ma’am Arlene controversy” cannot be utilized as a blanket authority to investigate the alleged tax deficiencies of the members of the Court or the CTA.

The controversy does not involve any member of the Court or of the CTA.
At the very least, departmental courtesy demands that the CIR first allow the Court to conclude its formal investigation of the matter.
It appears that it is her dogged determination to focus the investigation of her office on just the members of this Court and the CTA—tribunals exercising jurisdiction over cases involving her office.
Thus, there appears to be a basis to agree with the position of the CTA that the request of the CIR smacks of a “fishing expedition.”

[iv] It should not be forgotten that in invoking one’s constitutional right to information—whether in the spirit of public accountability, transparency, or some other cause—the need to preserve the integrity and independence of the Judiciary must be weighed.

It must be invoked, and can only be upheld, if under the circumstances it would not result in endangering, diminishing, or destroying the independence and security of the members of the Judiciary in the performance of their judicial functions, or expose them to revenge for adverse decisions.
The independence of the Judiciary should be protected not because the Court seeks to “create an exception for themselves,” but because there is a need to ensure that the Court will be able to perform its role in the system of checks and balances.

[v] On the basis of the foregoing, the Court resolved to DENY the motions for reconsideration of Commissioner Kim Henares, for “lack of reasonable and sufficient basis.

The CIR sought decade-long SALNs of Supreme Court and CTA Justices to aid possible tax assessments, but offered no specific cases, no prima facie fraud, and no concrete assessment purpose. The Court denied the motions, holding that due process was observed, the CIR’s powers do not authorize fishing expeditions, and the right to information yields when disclosure would compromise judicial independence and security.

C. The Power of Judicial Review/Inquiry

(See: CHAPTER II)

D. Appointment to the Judiciary

1. Qualifications

Of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence [Sec. 7(3), Art. VIII].
In addition:

[a] Supreme Court

Sec. 7(1), Art. VIII

N40-15JE

Natural-born citizen of the Philippines
at least forty (40) years of age,
must have been for fifteen years or more

a judge of a lower court or
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines

[b] Lower Collegiate Courts

Sec. 7(1) and (2), Art. VIII

Natural-born citizen of the Philippines
member of the Philippine Bar
but Congress may prescribe other qualifications.

[c] Lower Courts
Sec. 7(1) and (2), Art. VIII

Citizen of the Philippines
member of the Philippine Bar
but Congress may prescribe other qualifications.

2. Procedure for Appointment

[a] Appointed by the President of the Philippines from among a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) for every vacancy; the appointment shall need no confirmation [Sec. 9, Art. VIII].

[i] Re: Seniority Among the Four Most Recent Appointments to the Position of Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC, September 20, 2010

For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, the date the commission has been signed by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date of appointment.
Such date will determine the seniority of the members of the Court of Appeals in connection with Sec. 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 8246.

Four newly appointed Court of Appeals justices disputed their seniority ranking, with one arguing that transmission order or bar code sequence should determine precedence. The Supreme Court ruled that the date the commission is signed by the President is the definitive date of appointment for judicial officers and governs seniority.

[b] Any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence thereof [Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII].

[c] For lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within ninety (90) days from the submission by the JBC of such list [Sec. 9, Art. VIII].

[i] Relation to the Constitutional Prohibition Against Midnight Appointments

Sec. 15, Art. VII states that two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or acting President shall not make appointments except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

[ia] In Re: Mateo Valenzuela, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998

It was held that during this period (when appointments are prohibited), the President is not required to make appointments to the courts, nor allowed to do so.
While the filling up of vacancies in the Judiciary is in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the issuance of the appointment during the period of the ban.

President Fidel V. Ramos appointed two judges during the constitutionally prohibited period before the presidential election, raising questions about the validity of judicial appointments during that time. The Supreme Court ruled that the President is neither required nor permitted to make appointments to the judiciary during the election ban period, and declared the appointments void.

[ib] ⭐Arturo de Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010.

The ruling in Mateo Valenzuela was abandoned.
The Supreme Court said that the prohibition does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court; and that the ruling in Valenzuela did not rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
The reasons given by the Court are:

First, the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the provisions of the Constitution. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition to the appointment of members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.

They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Sec. 15, Art. VII, as being equally applicable to Members of the Supreme Court in Art. VIII itself, most likely in Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII.
That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Second, the rationale for the prohibition in Sec. 15, Art. VII — to eliminate midnight appointments by an outgoing Chief Executive — shows that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department.

The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the Judicial and Bar Council and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.
The intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations.

Third, Secs. 14 and 15 of Art. VII, which concern the appointing power of the President, all refer to appointments in the Executive Department.

Sec. 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to revoke appointments by an Acting President, and evidently refers only to appointments in the Executive Department.
It does not apply to the Judiciary because temporary and acting appointments can undermine the independence of the Judiciary.
Meanwhile, Sec. 16 covers only appointments that require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The fact that Secs. 14 and 16 refer only to appointments in the Executive Department renders conclusive that Sec. 15 also applies only to the Executive Department.
This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context — that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.

Petitioners challenged President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s authority to appoint a new Chief Justice during the election ban period, citing Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled that the prohibition does not apply to Supreme Court appointments. The Court clarified that the Valenzuela ruling did not rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission and was not binding precedent in this context. The Court emphasized that its decision was based on constitutional interpretation and not on political considerations.

3. The Judicial and Bar Council

[a] Composition

[Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII]

[i] Ex-officio members

CSC

Chief Justice, as Chairman;
the Secretary of Justice; and
a representative of Congress.

[ii] Regular members

IPRP

A representative of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
a professor of law,
a retired justice of the Supreme Court, and
a representative of the private sector.

[iia] The Constitution mandates that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) be composed of seven (7) members only.

Francisco Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012

Thus, the inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half of it, violates that constitutional mandate.

Francisco Chavez challenged the inclusion of both a senator and a congressman in the Judicial and Bar Council, arguing that the Constitution allows only one congressional representative. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution clearly mandates only one representative from Congress in the JBC. It emphasized that the use of the singular article “a” and the phrase “a representative of Congress” is plain and unambiguous, requiring no further interpretation. The Court rejected the argument that bicameralism justifies two representatives, stating that Congress is treated as one co-equal branch in relation to the executive and judiciary.

[iib] Motion for Reconsideration

Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, Francisco Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013

In the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of government.
In so doing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of government.
Hence, the argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC, and vice versa, is misplaced.
In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress.

Historically, Congress alternated its representation in the JBC, but since 1994, both houses began sending representatives simultaneously, increasing the JBC’s membership from seven to eight. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution clearly provides for only one congressional representative in the JBC. It held that allowing two representatives, whether with full or split votes, violates the Constitution’s intent and disrupts the balance of representation.

[iii] Secretary ex-officio

The Clerk of the Supreme Court.

[b] Appointment

The regular members shall be appointed by the President for a term of four (4) years, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
They shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court [Sec. 8(2), Art. VIII].

[c] Powers/Functions:

Principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary.
May exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it [Sec. 8(5), Art. VIII].

[i] Francis Jardeleza v. Maria Lourdes Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014

In JBC proceedings, an aspiring judge or justice justifies his qualifications for the office when he presents proof of his academic records, work experience, and laudable citations.

The JBC then takes every possible step to verify an applicant’s track record for the purpose of determining whether or not he is qualified for nomination.
These proceedings are sui generis and impressed with discretion, but they do not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process.
Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing.
The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualification is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of the JBC to recommend.

After careful deliberation, the Court has reached the determination that the application of the “unanimity rule” on integrity (i.e., under Sec. 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, an applicant must obtain the unanimous vote of the JBC members in order to be included in the shortlist of nominees to be submitted to the President, whenever a question of integrity is raised against him) resulted in Jardeleza’s deprivation of his right to due process.

Without striking down the “unanimity rule,” the Court decided that Jardeleza is DEEMED INCLUDED in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Roberto Abad, because of the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process.
The Court also directed the JBC to review and adopt rules relevant to the observance of due process in its proceedings.

Solicitor General Francis Jardeleza was excluded from the JBC shortlist for Supreme Court appointment due to a late integrity objection raised by Chief Justice Sereno, without being given proper notice or opportunity to respond. The Supreme Court ruled that despite the sui generis nature of JBC proceedings, due process must be observed, and ordered Jardeleza’s inclusion in the shortlist.

E. The Supreme Court

1. Composition

A Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices.

It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members.
Any vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence thereof. [Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII]

2. En Banc / Division Cases

[a] En Banc

All cases involving the:

constitutionality of a:

treaty,
international or executive agreement, or
law;

and all other cases which, under the Rules of Court, are to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of:

presidential decrees,
proclamations,
orders,
instructions,
ordinances, and
other regulations.

These cases are decided with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues and voted thereon.

[b] Division

Other cases or matters may be heard in division and decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues and voted thereon, but in no case without the concurrence of at least three (3) such members.

[i] When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc.

Fortich v. Corona, G.R. No. 131457, August 19, 1999

The Supreme Court interpreted the provision by drawing a distinction between “cases” on the one hand, and “matters” on the other hand, such that cases are “decided”, while matters are “resolved.”
On the basis of this distinction, only “cases” are referred to the Supreme Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained.

This case involved seasonal farmworkers seeking reconsideration of a final land reclassification decision and requesting referral to the Supreme Court en banc after a tie vote. The Court ruled that only undecided “cases” may be referred en banc—not “matters” like motions—and affirmed the original decision, denying the workers’ claims due to lack of legal standing.

[ii] No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.

[iia] Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration in Arturo de Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010

The Supreme Court rejected the movants’ contention that by abandoning In Re: Mateo Valenzuela, the Court violated the principle of stare decisis.
“The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent.”
A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the Court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case.
To insist that the ruling in Valenzuela should not be reversed loses sight of the fact that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Supreme Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.

The consolidated cases centered on whether President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo could appoint a new Chief Justice during the constitutional election ban period, following the impending retirement of Chief Justice Reynato Puno. The Supreme Court en banc ruled that the President could appoint the Chief Justice during the ban, asserting its exclusive authority to interpret constitutional provisions and reaffirming the mandatory 90-day appointment rule for Supreme Court vacancies.

[iii] Limketkai Sons Milling v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 464

The reorganization (of the three divisions) of the Court is purely an internal matter in which the petitioner has no business at all.
With its new membership, the Court is not obliged to follow blindly a decision upholding a party’s case when, after its re-examination, rectification appears proper and necessary.

Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. claimed a perfected contract of sale over a parcel of land, but after an initial Supreme Court ruling in its favor, a subsequent reorganization of the Court’s divisions led to a reversal of that decision. The Supreme Court ruled that the reorganization of its divisions is an internal administrative matter that does not affect the validity of its rulings, and ultimately upheld the dismissal of Limketkai’s claim due to lack of a perfected contract.

3. Powers

[Sec. 5, Art. VIII]

[a] Original Jurisdiction

Over cases affecting:

ambassadors,
other public ministers and
consuls,

and over petitions for:

certiorari,
prohibition,
mandamus,
quo warranto, and
habeas corpus

[i] Francisco, Jr. v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 106910, October 19, 2010

Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.

Petitioners challenged the legality of tollway contracts, rate increases, and executive approvals, arguing that these actions violated constitutional provisions and bypassed legislative authority. The Supreme Court ruled that certiorari and prohibition are valid remedies to raise constitutional issues and affirmed its power to review and nullify executive and legislative acts when grave abuse of discretion is shown. It affirmed that TRB has delegated authority to issue administrative franchises and approve tollway operations, but clarified that this does not include extending legislative franchises beyond their statutory terms.

[ii] It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, even if the branch, instrumentality, or agency does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.

Jardeleza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014

Where constitutional bearings are too blatant to ignore, the Court does not find passivity as an alternative.

Solicitor General Francis Jardeleza was excluded from the JBC shortlist for Supreme Court appointment after Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, as Chair of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), raised an integrity objection without giving him proper notice or opportunity to respond. The Supreme Court ruled that it must act when constitutional violations are clear, found the exclusion procedurally flawed, and ordered Jardeleza’s inclusion in the shortlist.

[b] Appellate Jurisdiction

Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any:

treaty,
international or executive agreement,
law,
presidential decree,
proclamation,
order,
instruction,
ordinance, or
regulation is in question;

All cases involving the legality of any:

tax,
impost,
assessment, or
toll, or
any penalty imposed in relation thereto;

All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue;
All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher; and
All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

[i] Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, supra

Note that this power does not include the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of administrative bodies, but is limited to “final judgments and orders of lower courts.”

Petitioners, former guerrilla officers, challenged their trial and conviction by a military court for murder, arguing they were not subject to military law and that the Supreme Court should review the court martial’s decision. The Supreme Court ruled that its constitutional review power is limited to final judgments of lower courts and does not extend to decisions of administrative or military bodies like courts martial.

[ii] People v. Redulosa, 255 SCRA 279

Only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is death must the trial court forward the records of the case to the Supreme Court for automatic review of the conviction.

Redulosa and Carton were convicted of kidnapping for ransom with murder and initially sentenced to death, but the penalty was reduced to life imprisonment under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled that automatic review applies only when the death penalty is actually imposed, and allowed Redulosa to withdraw his appeal, remanding the case for execution of the modified sentence.

Garcia v. People, G.R. No. 106531, November 18, 1999

Where the penalty imposed is merely reclusion perpetua, the accused should appeal the decision of conviction; otherwise, the judgment of conviction will become final and executory.

Petitioners were convicted of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua but failed to appeal, mistakenly believing the Supreme Court would automatically review their case. The Court ruled that only death penalty cases are subject to automatic review, and without an appeal, the conviction became final and could not be revisited.

[iii] Sec. 30, Art. VI provides that no law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its concurrence.

Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998

Sec. 27, R.A. 6770, which provides that orders, directives, and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are appealable to the Supreme Court through Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, was declared unconstitutional because it expands the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence.

Teresita Fabian appealed the Ombudsman’s exoneration of a public official to the Supreme Court under Rule 45, relying on Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act. The Supreme Court declared that provision unconstitutional, ruling that its appellate jurisdiction cannot be expanded to include administrative decisions without its consent, and redirected such appeals to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.

See also Namuhe v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 124965, October 29, 1998

Public officials dismissed by the Ombudsman for administrative misconduct appealed directly to the Supreme Court under a provision of the Ombudsman Act allowing such review. The Supreme Court ruled that this provision was unconstitutional for expanding its appellate jurisdiction without its consent, and redirected such appeals to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.

Tirol v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 135913, November 4, 1999

Victoriano Tirol challenged the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to suspend trial in a graft case, arguing that the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause should be reviewed by the Supreme Court under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that Section 27 is unconstitutional for expanding its appellate jurisdiction without its consent, and affirmed that such appeals must go to the Court of Appeals.

Villavert v. Desierto, G.R. No. 133715, February 13, 2000.

Douglas Villavert was dismissed from public service by the Ombudsman for grave misconduct and dishonesty, and he appealed the decision to the Supreme Court under Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act. The Supreme Court ruled that this provision unconstitutionally expanded its appellate jurisdiction without its concurrence, and redirected such appeals to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.

[iv] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 135789, January 31, 2002

It was held that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited to questions of law.
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.

The Republic challenged the Sandiganbayan’s lifting of a sequestration order over HMHMI assets, arguing that the PCGG had a prima facie basis for its issuance. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming that its appellate jurisdiction over Sandiganbayan decisions is limited to questions of law and does not extend to factual disputes.

[c] Temporary Assignment

Temporary assignment of judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require; but the assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.

[d] Order change of venue or place of trial

Order change of venue or place of trial, to avoid miscarriage of justice.

See People v. Gutierrez, 39 SCRA 173.

Criminal charges for arson and homicide were filed in Ilocos Sur, but prosecution witnesses feared testifying due to threats and political influence, prompting a request to transfer the trial venue in San Fernando, La Union or Baguio City. The Supreme Court ruled that it has inherent authority to order a change of venue to prevent miscarriage of justice. It ruled that Judge Gutierrez committed grave abuse of discretion by ignoring credible threats and refusing to transfer the cases. It ordered the transfer of the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, to be heard in San Fernando or Baguio City.

[e] Rule-Making Power

Promulgate rules concerning: PP-AIL

the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights;
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts;
the admission to the practice of law;
the Integrated Bar; and
legal assistance to the underprivileged.

[i] Limitations on the Rule-Making Power
SUS

The rules must provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases
They must be uniform for all courts of the same grade; and
They must not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

[ia] Primicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil. 451

It is authority for the principle that trial by assessors is a substantive right and may not be repealed by the Supreme Court.

Cipriano Primicias sought to invoke his right to trial with assessors under the Revised Charter of Manila, but the trial court denied the request, citing the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court ruled that trial by assessors is a substantive right preserved by law and cannot be repealed by the Court’s procedural rule-making authority.

[ib] First Lepanto Ceramics v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994

It was held that Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91, which orders that appeals from decisions of administrative bodies shall now be filed with the Court of Appeals, did not repeal E.O. 226, and did not diminish, increase, or modify the substantive right to appeal.
It merely transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of said agencies to the Court of Appeals, and provided a different period (15 days from notice), both of which are merely procedural in character.

First Lepanto Ceramics challenged the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction over a Board of Investments (BOI) decision, arguing that appeals should be filed directly with the Supreme Court under E.O. 226. The Supreme Court ruled that Circular No. 1-91 did not repeal or alter the substantive right to appeal but validly redirected such appeals to the Court of Appeals as a procedural adjustment within its constitutional authority.

[ii] Pleading, practice, and procedure

In Re: Request for Creation of a Special Division, A.M. No. 02-1-09-SC, January 21, 2002

It was held that it is within the competence of the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its power to promulgate rules governing the enforcement and protection of constitutional rights and rules governing pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, to create a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan which will hear and decide the plunder case against former President Joseph Estrada.

In response to concerns over instability and fairness in the Sandiganbayan’s Third Division, the Supreme Court created a Special Division to hear the plunder case against former President Estrada. The Court ruled that this action was a valid exercise of its constitutional power to promulgate rules governing the enforcement of constitutional rights and judicial procedure.

[iii] Integrated Bar

In Re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22

An “Integrated Bar” is a State-organized Bar to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from a bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population.
This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as a condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court, acting on a petition and broad support from the legal community, ordered the integration of the Philippine Bar to unify all lawyers under a national organization. It ruled that this action was a valid exercise of its constitutional rule-making power over the legal profession. The Court found that integration does not violate freedom of association or speech, as lawyers are already members of the Bar and compelled dues serve regulatory—not expressive—purposes.

[iiia] Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP Dues, B.M. No. 1370, May 9, 2005

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, of which no one is exempt.
This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one’s membership in the IBP remains, regardless of the lack of practice or the type of practice the member is engaged in.

Atty. Cecilio Arevalo sought exemption from IBP dues, claiming he was inactive due to government service and overseas employment. The Supreme Court ruled that payment of dues is a mandatory obligation tied to IBP membership, which no lawyer is exempt from, and upheld its rule-making power to enforce such requirement.

[iiib] In Re Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, August 3, 1978

The enforcement of the penalty of removal does not amount to deprivation of property without due process of law.
The practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

Atty. Marcial Edillon refused to pay IBP membership dues and challenged the constitutionality of mandatory membership and the Supreme Court’s authority to remove him from the Roll of Attorneys. The Court ruled that the practice of law is a regulated privilege, not a property right. The Court emphasized that removal from the Roll of Attorneys for non-payment of dues is a valid enforcement mechanism and does not constitute deprivation of property without due process.

[iiib1] Re: Letter of the U.P. Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court”, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011

Lawyers, when they teach law, are considered engaged in the practice of law.
Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar, as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.

Thirty-seven UP law professors publicly criticized a pending Supreme Court decision for alleged plagiarism, prompting the Court to investigate their conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court ruled that lawyers who teach law are engaged in the practice of law and must uphold ethical standards, finding that their statement improperly interfered with judicial proceedings.

[iiic] In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, from Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao, Oliver Owen Garcia, et al. v. Leonard De Vera, A.C. No. 6052, December 11, 2003

Implicit in the constitutional grant to the Supreme Court of the power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the election of its officers.
The Court wields a continuing power of supervision over the IBP and its affairs, and it has the plenary power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws in accordance with policies it deems necessary, practicable, and appropriate in the prevailing circumstances.

Petitioners sought to disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera from running for IBP Governor, alleging improper chapter transfer and moral unfitness. The Supreme Court upheld its supervisory power over the IBP but dismissed the petition as premature and unsubstantiated. The Court found De Vera’s chapter transfer valid under IBP By-Laws, which allow preference-based membership as long as procedural requirements are met..

In the Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Elections of the IBP, Attys. Marcial Magsino, et al. v. Attys. Rogelio Vinluan, et al., A.C. No. 8292, April 11, 2013

The Supreme Court ruled that the rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP By-Laws is not absolute but subject to waiver, as when a chapter in the order of rotation opts not to field or nominate a candidate for governor during the election called regularly for the purpose.

Due to controversies in the 2009 IBP elections, the Supreme Court appointed Justice Santiago Kapunan as Officer-In-Charge to stabilize leadership and ensure continuity. The Court ruled that the rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP By-Laws is not absolute and may be waived to uphold fairness or continuity in leadership. The Court emphasized that its intervention was justified by the need to prevent disruption and uphold the integrity of the IBP’s electoral process..

[iiid] Atty. Aileen Maglana v. Atty. Jose Vicente Opinion, B.M. No. 2713, June 10, 2014

The Court reiterated that it can supervise the IBP by ensuring the legality and correctness of the exercise of its powers as to the means and manner, and by interpreting for it the constitutional provisions, laws, and regulations affecting the means and manner of the exercise of its powers.
It found that the Eastern Samar Chapter waived its turn in the first rotation cycle from 1989 to 2007 when it failed to field a candidate.
Thus, in the second rotation cycle for Governor of Eastern Visayas, Eastern Samar, along with five remaining chapters, is qualified to field a candidate; accordingly, Atty. Opinion, representing Eastern Samar, should be declared the duly elected Governor, for he obtained the highest number of votes.

Atty. Aileen Maglana challenged the IBP Board’s decision declaring Atty. Jose Vicente Opinion as Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas, arguing that her chapter was the only one yet to serve under the rotation rule. The Supreme Court upheld its supervisory power over the IBP and ruled that the rotation rule is subject to waiver, affirming Opinion’s election as valid and binding.

[iv] The Writ of Amparo

The nature and time-tested role of amparo has shown that it is an effective and inexpensive instrument for the protection of constitutional rights [Azcuna, The Writ of Amparo: A Remedy to Enforce Fundamental Rights, 37 Ateneo L.J. 15 (1993)].
Amparo, literally meaning “to protect,” originated in Mexico and spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, where it gradually evolved into various forms depending on the particular needs of each country.

[iva] By Resolution in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Supreme Court promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which took effect on October 24, 2007.

Section 1 thereof provides:

“The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.”

[ivb] An extraordinary feature is Section 14 of the Rule, which allows the grant by the court of interim reliefs, which may either be:

a temporary protection order,
inspection order,
production order, or a
witness protection order.

[ivc] Canlas v. Napico Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008

No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.
Petitioners' right to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute a right to life, liberty, and security.
There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

Petitioners sought a writ of amparo to stop the demolition of their homes and challenge alleged fraudulent land titles, despite prior final rulings against them. The Supreme Court ruled that the writ of amparo cannot be issued without a clear factual and legal basis for a violation or threat to life, liberty, or security, and dismissed the petition accordingly.

[ivd] Tapuz v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, January 17, 2008

The writ of amparo shall not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes.

Petitioners sought a writ of amparo to stop the enforcement of demolition orders arising from a forcible entry case, despite having a pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court ruled that the writ of amparo cannot be used as a substitute for appeal or certiorari, nor to interfere with judicial processes, especially when the underlying dispute concerns property rather than threats to life or liberty. The Court held that the proper remedy for their grievances lay in the ordinary judicial process, not in extraordinary writs.

[ive] Infant Julian Yusay Caram v. Segui, G.R. No. 193652, August 5, 2014

A petition for a writ of amparo is an improper remedy to regain parental authority and custody over a minor child who was legally put up for adoption. In this case, there is no “enforced disappearance” as used in the context of the Rule, because the DSWD officials never concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts; in fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC.
Clearly, what is involved in this case is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered as a ward of the State.

Ma. Christina Yusay Caram filed a petition for a writ of amparo to regain custody of her biological son, whom she had earlier surrendered for adoption through the DSWD. The Supreme Court ruled that the writ of amparo is not the proper remedy for custody disputes and denied the petition, affirming that the proper legal remedies for regaining custody are found in the Family Code and the Rule on Custody of Minors.

[v] The Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas data is an independent remedy to protect the right to privacy, especially the right to informational privacy.
The essence of the constitutional right to informational privacy goes to the very heart of a person's individuality — an exclusive and personal sphere upon which the State has no right to intrude without any legitimate public concern.
The basic attribute of an effective right to informational privacy is the right of the individual to control the flow of information concerning or describing them.

[va] By Resolution in A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, the Supreme Court promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, effective February 2, 2008.

Section 1 thereof provides:

“The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, honor and correspondence of the aggrieved party.”

[va1] Lee v. Ilagan, G.R. No. 203254, October 8, 2014

The Supreme Court reversed the RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of respondent, for failure to establish that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand and the right to life, liberty, or security on the other.
The Rule requires that the petition must sufficiently allege the manner in which the right to privacy is violated or threatened with violation, and how such violation or threat affects the right to life, liberty, or security of the aggrieved party.

Police Superintendent Neri Ilagan sought a writ of habeas data to stop his former partner from using a sex video as evidence in legal proceedings, claiming it violated his right to privacy and security. The Supreme Court ruled that the writ was improperly granted, as Ilagan failed to show a clear link between the alleged privacy violation and any threat to his life, liberty, or security, making habeas data an inapplicable remedy.

[va2] Marynette Gamboa v. P/SSupt. Marlou Chan, G.R. No. 193616, July 24, 2012

The forwarding of information by the Philippine National Police (PNP) to the Zenarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violates or threatens to violate the right to privacy in life, liberty, or security as to entitle the petitioner to the writ of habeas data.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence reports regarding private armed groups (PAGs) with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups.

Mayor Marynette Gamboa filed a petition for a writ of habeas data after being named in a government report as maintaining a private armed group, alleging that the information was unverified and violated her right to privacy. The Supreme Court ruled that the writ was not applicable, as the data collection was lawful and she failed to prove a direct threat to her life, liberty, or security.

[va3] Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014

The Supreme Court said that the petitioners have no reasonable expectation of privacy that would warrant the issuance of a writ of habeas data when their daughters shared the incriminating pictures with their Facebook friends.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Network (OSN) activity, it is necessary that the user — in this case, the sanctioned students — should manifest the intention to keep certain posts private through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or limit its visibility. The utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
The respondent, St. Theresa’s College, can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to the respondents. Respondents were merely recipients of what was posted; they did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information, as it was voluntarily given to them by those who had legitimate access to the said posts.

Parents of minor students sanctioned by St. Theresa’s College filed a petition for a writ of habeas data, claiming the school violated their children’s privacy by accessing and using Facebook photos without consent. The Supreme Court ruled that the writ was not applicable, as there was no unlawful intrusion or threat to life, liberty, or security, and the students failed to establish a protected expectation of privacy over the shared images.

[vi] Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases

By Resolution in A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, dated April 13, 2010, the Supreme Court promulgated the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
Among the new concepts under the Rules are:

[via] The Writ of Kalikasan

The writ of kalikasan is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people's organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces [Rule 7, Sec. 1, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC].

[vib] The Writ of Continuing Mandamus

When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule, or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent under the law, rules, or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. [Rule 8, Sec. 1, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC].

[vib1] Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, et al. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay G.R. No. 171947-48, December 18, 2008

This case originated as a complaint filed by Concerned Residents of Manila Bay before the RTC against several government agencies—among them MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, Philippine Coast Guard, Philippine National Police Maritime Group, and DILG—for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Concerned Residents and ordered the government agencies to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Thus, the government agencies went up to the Supreme Court.
The Court ruled that the cleaning and rehabilitation of Manila Bay can be compelled by mandamus.

The government agencies' task to perform their duties as defined by law, on the one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts.
While implementation of their tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law—or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done—is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.

Sections 17 and 20 of the Environment Code include cleaning in general. Section 17 does not in any way state that government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to containment, removal, and cleaning operations only when a specific pollution incident occurs.

The section requires them to act as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.
A perusal of the other agencies' respective charters or enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield the conclusion that these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of Manila Bay.

The cleanup and restoration of Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase.

It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching Manila Bay.
It behooves the Court to put the heads of the departments, agencies, bureaus, and offices under them on continuing notice about—and to enjoin them to perform—their mandates and duties toward cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level, in accordance with the Environment Code (P.D. 1152, as amended); the Ecological Solid Waste Management Law (R.A. 9003); the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (R.A. 9275); and all related laws.

In its Resolution dated February 15, 2014, in the same case, the Court noted that the government agencies did not file any motion for reconsideration of the Court's Decision of December 18, 2008; thus, the decision became final in January 2009. The case is now in its execution phase.

The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate the quarterly progress reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with the decision.
With the final and executory judgment, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in the Decision means that until the government agencies concerned have shown full compliance with the Court orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment.

Concerned residents sued multiple government agencies for failing to clean up Manila Bay, citing environmental degradation and violations of legal and constitutional duties. The Supreme Court issued a Writ of Continuing Mandamus, compelling the agencies to rehabilitate the bay and regularly report progress, affirming that environmental cleanup is a ministerial duty enforceable by law.

[vic] Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP)

A legal action filed to harass, vex, exert undue pressure, or stifle any legal recourse that any person, institution, or the government has taken or may take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment, or assertion of environmental rights shall be treated as a SLAPP [Rule 6, Sec. 1, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC].
In a SLAPP filed against a person involved in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment, or assertion of environmental rights, the defendant may file an answer interposing as a defense that the case is a SLAPP and shall be supported by documents, affidavits, papers, and other evidence; and, by way of counterclaim, pray for damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit [Rule 6, Sec. 2, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC].

[vii] Congress Cannot Amend the Rules of Court

Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999

The Supreme Court declared:

“But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.”

Leo Echegaray challenged the implementation of the death penalty law and the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order on his execution to allow time for legislative review. The Court ruled that Congress cannot amend the Rules of Court, as the exclusive power to promulgate procedural rules is vested in the Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution

[viii] Rules of Procedure of Special Courts and Quasi-Judicial Bodies

Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court [Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII].

[f] Power of Appointment

The Supreme Court appoints all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law [Sec. 5(6), Art. VIII].

[g] Power of Administrative Supervision

The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof [Sec. 6, Art. VIII].

Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001

The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against a judge; he must first indorse the case to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.

Judge Renato Fuentes was investigated by the Ombudsman for issuing judicial orders that allegedly led to the improper disposal of government property during an expropriation case. The Supreme Court ruled that the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate complaints against judges without first endorsing the matter to the Supreme Court, which holds exclusive administrative supervision over the judiciary.

Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 469

In the absence of any administrative action taken against the RTC Judge by the Supreme Court with regard to the former's certificate of service, the investigation conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Supreme Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Judge Bonifacio Maceda was investigated by the Ombudsman for allegedly falsifying Certificates of Service, despite the acts being tied to his judicial functions. The Supreme Court ruled that the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate such complaints against judges without first endorsing the matter to the Supreme Court, which holds exclusive administrative supervision over the judiciary. The Court held that the Ombudsman’s investigation encroached upon judicial independence and violated the doctrine of separation of powers.

Dolalas v. Office of the Ombudsman, 265 SCRA 819

Judge Ana Maria Dolalas and her staff were investigated by the Ombudsman-Mindanao for alleged undue delay in resolving a criminal case, prompting them to challenge the investigation’s legality. The Supreme Court ruled that the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate complaints against judges without first endorsing the matter to the Supreme Court, which holds exclusive administrative supervision over the judiciary.

[ii] Confidential Nature of Administrative Proceedings

Godinez v. Alano, A.M. RTJ-98-1409, February 18, 1999

Administrative proceedings before the Supreme Court are confidential in nature in order to protect the respondent therein who may turn out to be innocent of the charges; it can take years to build a reputation and only a single accusation, although unfounded, to destroy it.

The Godinez spouses filed an administrative complaint against Judge Alano and Sheriff Alano for misconduct in issuing and executing a writ of attachment, including storing seized property in the judge’s home. The Supreme Court found both respondents guilty and fined them, while also stressing that administrative proceedings are confidential to safeguard the reputation of respondents who may later be exonerated. It criticized the complainants for distributing copies of the complaint to the President, Vice President, Senators, and media, noting that such actions can unjustly damage reputations.

[h] Annual Report

The Supreme Court shall submit, within 30 days from the opening of each regular session of Congress, to the President and to Congress, an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary [Sec. 16, Art. VIII].

4. Consultations / Decisions of the Supreme Court

[Secs. 13 & 14, Art. VIII]

[a] Conclusions in any case submitted to it for decision shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court.

A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued.
This requirement is applicable also to lower collegiate courts.

[i] But this requirement does not apply to administrative cases.

Prudential Bank v. Castro, 158 SCRA 646

A party claimed a Supreme Court administrative issuance was void for lacking the Sec. 13 consultation certification. The Court rejected the claim, holding that the consultation-and-certification rule governs judicial decisions in cases, not administrative matters, thus the issuance stood.

[ii] When the votes are equally divided and the majority vote is not obtained, then pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition shall be dismissed.

Cruz v. Secretary, DENR, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

Petitioners attacked the constitutionality of the IPRA and NCIP; after en banc deliberations the Justices split evenly. Under Rule 56, Sec. 7, the petition was dismissed, leaving the IPRA intact and creating no majority doctrine beyond the dismissal itself.

[b] The decision shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

[i] But this requirement does not apply to a minute resolution dismissing a petition for habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus, provided a legal basis is given therein.

Mendoza v. CFI, 66 SCRA 96;

Petitioners attacked a minute resolution dismissing their special civil action as void for lacking a full statement of facts and law. The Court upheld the dismissal, ruling that Sec. 14, Art. VIII does not require a lengthy opinion for such summary dispositions if the legal ground for dismissal is stated in the resolution.

Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 1.

The CA issued a short/minute-style resolution that denied Borromeo’s case without stating the facts and the law. The Supreme Court set it aside and required a proper, reasoned decision, reiterating that Art. VIII, Sec. 14 applies to the CA and mandates clear findings and legal bases in decisions on the merits.

Neither will it apply to administrative cases.

Prudential Bank v. Castro, supra.

[ii] Solid Homes v. Laserna, G.R. No. 166051, April 8, 2008

This constitutional mandate does not preclude the validity of “memorandum decisions”, which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
“Memorandum decisions” are a species of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 40, B.P. 129, as amended, on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience, and docket status of our courts.
But to be valid, it cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by means of remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision.
For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision.
In other words, the memorandum decision should actually embody the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision

The CA used a memorandum decision adopting the RTC’s ruling; the Supreme Court upheld the format but required that the adopted findings and conclusions be directly accessible, typically via an annex made part of the decision. A decision need not recite all evidence, but it must state the nature of the case, summarize the facts, cite the law and jurisprudence, and explain the tribunal’s conclusions—not merely the dispositive.

[iii] A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence presented. So long as the factual and legal basis are clearly and distinctly set forth supporting the conclusions drawn therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid.

However, it is imperative that the decision not simply be limited to the dispositive portion but must state the nature of the case, summarize the facts with reference to the record, and contain a statement of applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunal’s statement and conclusions on the case.

Dizon v. Judge Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338, September 5, 1997

Thus, the decision, which consisted only of the dispositive portion (denominated as a sin perjuicio judgment), was held invalid.

The trial judge issued a sin perjuicio “decision” that contained only the fallo, with no statement of facts or law. The Supreme Court invalidated the ruling and sanctioned the judge, reiterating that decisions must clearly and distinctly explain the facts and the law supporting the outcome.

[iv] People v. Baring, G.R. No. 137933, January 28, 2002

The Supreme Court said that the trial court’s decision may cast doubt on the guilt of the accused, not by the lack of direct evidence against the accused but by the trial court’s failure to fully explain the correlation of the facts, the weight or admissibility of the evidence, the assessments made from the evidence, and the conclusion drawn therefrom, after applying the pertinent law as basis of the decision.

The RTC convicted Baring of statutory rape; on appeal, the Supreme Court stressed that a trial court’s judgment must carefully link facts, evidence, and law, because failure to do so can cast doubt on guilt. The Court affirmed the conviction while emphasizing that clear, reasoned decisions are mandatory in criminal cases.

De Vera v. Judge Dames, A.M. RTJ-99-1455, July 13, 1999

Likewise, because the respondent judge had precipitately concluded that the letter was defamatory without sufficiently explaining why, he was deemed to have violated Sec. 14, Art. VIII; and although there was no clear proof of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration, the Judge must still be sanctioned.

The judge summarily branded a letter defamatory and issued an order without explaining the facts and law, violating Sec. 14, Art. VIII. Although no bad faith or malice was proven, the Court still sanctioned him, stressing that judges are not immune from administrative liability when their rulings are devoid of factual and legal foundations.

[c] No petition for review or motion for reconsideration shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

[i] Fr. Martinez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123547, May 21, 2001

The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in this wise:

“Evidently, the motion poses nothing new. The points and arguments raised by the movants have been considered and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the same.”

The Supreme Court held that there was adequate compliance with the constitutional provision.

The CA denied an MR with a short resolution saying the motion raised nothing new. The Supreme Court upheld the denial, holding that Art. VIII, Sec. 14 was adequately complied with because the main decision already stated the facts and law, and an MR that rehashes arguments may be briefly denied with a stated basis.

[ii] Prudential Bank v. Castro, supra

The Supreme Court ruled that “lack of merit” is sufficient declaration of the legal basis for denial of petition for review or motion for reconsideration.

Komatsu Industries v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127682, April 24, 1998

It was held that when the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments or motions, decides to deny due course to a petition, and states — in a minute resolution — that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent court’s decision is shown or some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

Komatsu argued that the Supreme Court’s minute resolution denying due course violated Art. VIII, Sec. 14. The Court held there was adequate compliance because a post-deliberation minute resolution that states a clear legal ground for denial is valid and satisfies the Constitution.

This is reiterated in Tichangco v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 150629, June 30, 2004.

After deliberation on a Rule 45 petition, the Court denied due course via a minute resolution citing a specific legal ground (factual issues/no reversible error). The Court held this satisfies Art. VIII, Sec. 14, reiterating that a brief, reason-stated denial is valid and does not require a full opinion.

F. Tenure of Judges / Justices

1. Supreme Court

Justices may be removed only by impeachment [Sec. 2, Art. XI].

[a] In Re: First Indorsement from Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, A.M. No. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988

The Supreme Court said that the Special Prosecutor (Tanodbayan) is without authority to conduct an investigation on charges against a member of the Supreme Court with the end in view of filing a criminal information against him with the Sandiganbayan.
This is so, because if convicted in the criminal case, the Justice would be removed, and such removal would violate his security of tenure.

The Special Prosecutor sought to investigate and criminally charge a sitting Supreme Court Justice before the Sandiganbayan. The Court held this is not allowed because it would bypass impeachment and violate the Justice’s security of tenure; removal of Justices can occur only through impeachment and conviction

2. Lower Courts

Judges shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office [Sec. 11, Art. VIII].

[a] The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues and voted thereon [Sec. 11, Art. VIII].

[i]⭐ People v. Judge Gacott, 246 SCRA 52,

It was held that the first clause in the said section is a declaration of the grant of the disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc.
It did not intend that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court.
The second clause, intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares that the Court en banc may “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority.”
Thus, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc.

The Court held that Article VIII, Section 11 does not require all administrative cases against judges to be heard en banc; the comma-separated clause on dismissal marks the sole instance demanding en banc action. Only dismissal needs a majority vote of the en banc, while other penalties may be imposed by a Division under the Court’s procedures.

[ii] Maceda v. Vasquez, supra

In the absence of any administrative action taken against the RTC Judge by the Supreme Court with regard to his certificate of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Supreme Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Judge Caoibes v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177, July 17, 2001

It was held that because of Sec. 6, Art. VIII, vesting in the Supreme Court exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge or court employee involves an administrative matter.
The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it is referred to the Supreme Court.

A criminal complaint was filed with the Ombudsman against a sitting judge, and the Ombudsman proceeded without referring the matter to the Supreme Court. The Court held that, under Article VIII, Section 6, the Ombudsman must first refer cases against judges and court personnel to the Supreme Court, which alone decides the complaint’s nature and the proper forum, before any Ombudsman action may proceed.

See also Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001.

[iii] Office of the Judicial Administrator v. Pascual, A.M. No. MT-93-783, July 29, 1996

The Supreme Court, reiterating Raquiza v. Castañeda, declared that the grounds for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt, particularly where the charges on which the removal is sought are misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetence, etc.

Complainants sought Judge Pascual’s removal for misconduct, neglect, corruption, and incompetence, but presented largely uncorroborated and hearsay evidence contradicted by official records. The Court refused dismissal, reaffirming that ouster on grave charges requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, a standard not met in this case.

De Vera v. Dames, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1455, July 13, 1999

Thus, the Supreme Court said that judges cannot be disciplined for every erroneous order or decision rendered in the absence of a clear showing of ill motive, malice or bad faith.
This, however, is not license for them to be negligent or abusive in performing their adjudicatory prerogatives. The absence of bad faith or malice will not totally exculpate them from charges of incompetence and ignorance of the law when they render decisions that are totally bereft of factual and legal bases.

Dayot v. Judge Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1282, March 1, 2001

This was reiterated where the judge was nonetheless taken to task for issuing an order discrediting the period served by the prisoner outside the jail without giving the prisoner a chance to be heard, thus betraying his ignorance of the cardinal principles of due process.

The judge discredited a prisoner’s time purportedly served outside jail without hearing, directly affecting the prisoner’s liberty. The Court held this violated due process and sanctioned the judge for gross ignorance, emphasizing that notice and opportunity to be heard are indispensable before issuing such orders.

[iv] De Guzman v. Judge Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1629, March 26, 2001

The Supreme Court said that the respondent had shamed the judiciary by deliberately applying not only patently inapplicable but also already repealed laws.
The judge was dismissed from the service, because according to the Court, when the law violated is elementary, the failure to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

A trial judge repeatedly relied on repealed and inapplicable laws despite notice, causing erroneous rulings. The Court found gross ignorance of the law and dismissed him, holding that ignorance of elementary rules shames the Judiciary and warrants the ultimate administrative penalty.

Spouses Antonio & Elsa Fortuna v. Judge Penaco-Sitaca, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1633, June 19, 2001

Because the judge accepted at face value a mere machine copy of the bail bond issued by another court, the judge was subjected to administrative sanction, because it is highly imperative that judges should be conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines.

The judge accepted a machine-copy bail bond from another court without authentication and acted on it, affecting the accused’s liberty. The Court held this violated elementary bail procedure and reflected gross ignorance, thus imposing administrative sanctions.

Agulan v. Judge Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1354, April 4, 2001

For receiving the deposit of cash as bail and keeping the same in his office, the judge was held administratively liable, even after the complainant executed an affidavit of desistance.

The judge personally received and kept cash bail in his office, then relied on the complainant’s desistance. The Court held this violated mandatory bail-handling rules and that desistance does not erase administrative liability, resulting in a finding of misconduct.

[v] Re: Derogatory News Item Charging Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria with Interference on Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen, A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA, March 27, 2001

The Supreme Court said that although every office in government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary.
High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary — so indispensable in an orderly society — cannot be preserved.
There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.

The Court found that CA Justice Demetria interceded in the criminal case of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. To protect judicial integrity and public trust, the Court dismissed him from the service, with forfeiture of benefits and perpetual disqualification from public office.

Re: Release by Judge Manuel T. Muro, RTC Branch 54, Manila, of an Accused in a Non-Bailable Offense, A.M. No. 00-7-323-RTJ, October 17, 2001

Similarly, where the judge, despite opposition from the prosecution, simply issued an order submitting for resolution the motion and the opposition without the same being heard, and later granting the motion for extension of medical confinement for two months, the Supreme Court found the judge guilty of gross misconduct for being utterly inefficient and for manifest partiality.
And it is said that when the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elementary a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds, or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.

The judge submitted a contested motion without hearing and granted a two-month medical confinement extension that operated as a release in a non-bailable case. The Court found gross misconduct for utter inefficiency and manifest partiality, holding that bypassing basic hearing requirements in such cases is intolerable and administratively punishable.

Political Law Review: Judicial Department

1. Defined