Case Digest: National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Hon. Laguesma, G.R. No. 123426, March 10, 1999

Labor Law | Art. 129

Facts:

•  Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization-Kilusang Mayo Uno (ANGLO-KMU) filed a petition for certification election among Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Work, Inc.'s rank and file employees.
• Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Baradero — National Federation of Labor is the incumbent bargaining agent of the rank and file employees.
• Med-Arbiter ordered ANGLO-KMU to submit documents proving its local's creation and legitimacy within five days.
• Forced-intervenor NFL moved for dismissal, claiming ANGLO-KMU lacked legal personality, failed 25% consent requirement, and submitted requirements after the freedom period.
• ANGLO-KMU submitted documents and argued that even if the 25% requirement was not met, Med-Arbiter could order a certification election.
• Med-Arbiter: Dismissed the petition due to late submission of required documents..
• Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma: Set aside Med-Arbiter's decision, stating ANGLO-KMU complied with registration requirements during the petition filing.

Issue: 

WoN the filing of an appeal for certiorari on cases decided by the NLRC to the Supreme Court proper. NO

Held:

We will not rule on the merits of the petition. Instead, we will take this opportunity to lay the rules on the procedure for review of decisions or rulings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. (P.D. No. 442 as amended)

In St. Martin Funeral Homes v. National Labor Relations Commission and Bienvenido Aricayos, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, the Court re-examined the mode of judicial review with respect to decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission.

The course taken by decisions of the NLRC and those of the Secretary of Labor and Employment are tangent, but all are within the umbra of the Labor Code of the Philippines and its implementing rules. On this premise, we find that the very same rationale in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC finds application here, leading ultimately to the same disposition as in that leading case.

We have always emphatically asserted our power to pass upon the decisions and discretionary acts of the NLRC well as the Secretary of Labor in the face of the contention that no judicial review is provided by the Labor Code. We stated in San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor thus:

. . . It is generally understood that as to a administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute (73 C.J.S. 506, note 56).

The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decision (73 C.J.S. 507, Sec. 165). It is part of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.

Considering the above dictum and as affirmed by decisions of this Court, St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC succinctly pointed out, the remedy of an aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The propriety of Rule 65 as a remedy was highlighted in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, where the legislative history of the pertinent statutes on judicial review of cases decided under the Labor Code was traced, leading to and supporting the thesis that "since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decision of the NLRC" and consequently "all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65."

Proceeding therefrom and particularly considering that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC concluded and directed that all such petitions should be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.

In the original rendering of the Labor Code, Art. 222 thereof provided that the decisions of the NLRC are appealable to the Secretary of Labor on specified grounds. 6 The decisions of the Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the President of the Philippines subject to such conditions or limitations as the President may direct.

Thus under the state of the law then, this Court had ruled that original actions for certiorari and prohibition filed with this Court against the decision of the Secretary of Labor passing upon the decision of the NLRC were unavailing for mere error of judgment as there was a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, which was an appeal to the President. We said in the 1975 case, Scott v. Inciong, 7quoting Nation Multi Service Labor Union v. Acgoaili:8 "It is also a matter of significance that there was an appeal to the President. So it is explicitly provided by the Decree. That was a remedy both adequate and appropriate. It was in line with the executive determination, after the proclamation of martial law, to leave the solution of labor disputes as much as possible to administrative agencies and correspondingly to limit judicial participation."9

Significantly, we also asserted in Scott v. Inciong that while appeal did not lie, the corrective power of this Court by a writ of certiorari was available whenever a jurisdictional issue was raised or one of grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess thereof, citing San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor.10

P.D. No. 1367 11 amending certain provisions of the Labor Code eliminated appeals to the President, but gave the President the power to assume jurisdiction over any cases which he considered national interest cases. The subsequent P.D. No. 1391, 12 enacted "to insure speedy labor justice and further stabilize industrial peace", further eliminated appeals from the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor but the President still continued to exercise his power to assume jurisdiction over any cases which he considered national interest

cases. 13

Though appeals from the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor were eliminated, presently there are several instances in the Labor Code and its implementing and related rules where an appeal can be filed with the Office of the Secretary of Labor or the Secretary of Labor issues a ruling, to wit:

(1) Under the Rules and Regulations Governing Recruitment and Placement Agencies for Local Employment 14 dated June 5, 1997 superseding certain provisions of Book I (Pre-Employment) of the implementing rules, the decision of the Regional Director on complaints against agencies is appealable to the Secretary of Labor within ten (10) working days from receipt of a copy of the order, on specified grounds, whose decision shall be final and inappealable.

(2) Art. 128 of the Labor Code provides that an order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor in labor standards cases pursuant to his visitorial and enforcement power under said article may be appealed to the Secretary of Labor.

Sec. 2 in relation to Section 3 (a), Rule X, Book III (Conditions of Employment) of the implementing rules gives the Regional Director the power to order and administer compliance with the labor standards provisions of the Code and other labor legislation. Section 4 gives the Secretary the power to review the order of the Regional Director, and the Secretary's decision shall be final and executory.

Sec. 1, Rule IV (Appeals) of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices dated September 16, 1987 15 provides that the order of the Regional Director in labor standards cases shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Secretary of Labor.

Sec. 5, Rule V (Execution) provides that the decisions, orders or resolutions of the Secretary of Labor and Employment shall become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the case records. The filing of a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the order or decision unless the aggrieved party secures a temporary restraining order from the Court within fifteen (15) calendar days from the date of finality of the order or decision or posts a supersedeas bond.

Sec. 6 of Rule VI (Health and Safety Cases) provides that the Secretary of Labor at his own initiative or upon the request of the employer and/or employee may review the order of the Regional Director in occupational health and safety cases. The Secretary's order shall be final and executory.

(2) Art. 236 provides that the decision of the Labor Relations Division in the regional office denying an applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or workers' application for registration may be appealed by the applicant union to the Bureau of Labor Relations within ten (10) days from receipt of notice thereof.

Sec. 4, Rule V, Book V (Labor Relations), as amended by Department Order No. 9 dated May 1, 1997 16 provides that the decision of the Regional Office denying the application for registration of a workers association whose place of operation is confined to one regional jurisdiction, or the Bureau of Labor Relations denying the registration of a federation, national or industry union or trade union center may be appealed to the Bureau or the Secretary as the case may be who shall decide the appeal within twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of the records of the case.

(3) Art. 238 provides that the certificate of registration of any legitimate organization shall be canceled by the Bureau of Labor Relations if it has reason to believe, after due hearing, that the said labor organization no longer meets one or more of the requirements prescribed by law.

Sec. 4, Rule VIII, Book V provides that the decision of the Regional Office or the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the aggrieved party to the Director of the Bureau or the Secretary of Labor, as the case may be, whose decision shall be final and executory.

(4) Art. 259 provides that any party to a certification election may appeal the order or results of the election as determined by the Med-Arbiter directly to the Secretary of Labor who shall decide the same within fifteen (15) calendar days.

Sec. 12, Rule XI, Book V provides that the decision of the Med-Arbiter on the petition for certification election may be appealed to the Secretary.

Sec. 15, Rule XI, Book V provides that the decision of the Secretary of Labor on an appeal from the Med-Arbiter's decision on a petition for certification election shall be final and executory. The implementation of the decision of the Secretary affirming the decision to conduct a certification election shall not be stayed unless restrained by the appropriate court.

Sec. 15, Rule XII, Book V provides that the decision of the Med-Arbiter on the results of the certification election may be appealed to the Secretary within ten (10) days from receipt by the parties of a copy thereof, whose decision shall be final and executory.

Sec. 7, Rule XVIII (Administration of Trade Union Funds and Actions Arising Therefrom), Book V provides that the decision of the Bureau in complaints filed directly with said office pertaining to administration of trade union funds may be appealed to the Secretary of Labor within ten (10) days from receipt of the parties of a copy thereof.

Sec. 1, Rule XXIV (Execution of Decisions, Awards, or Orders), Book V provides that the decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties unless otherwise specifically provided for in Book V.

(5) Art. 263 provides that the Secretary of Labor shall decide or resolve the labor dispute over which he assumed jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from the date of the assumption of jurisdiction. His decision shall be final and executory ten (10) calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties.

From the foregoing we see that the Labor Code and its implementing and related rules generally do not provide for any mode for reviewing the decision of the Secretary of Labor. It is further generally provided that the decision of the Secretary of Labor shall be final and executory after ten (10) days from notice. Yet, like decisions of the NLRC which under Art. 223 of the Labor Code become final after ten (10) days, decisions of the Secretary of Labor come to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari even beyond the ten-day period provided in the Labor Code and the implementing rules but within the reglementary period set for Rule 65 petitions under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 

For example, in M. Ramirez Industries v. Secretary of Labor, assailed was respondent's order affirming the Regional Director's having taken cognizance of a case filed pursuant to his visitorial powers under Art. 128 (a) of the Labor Code; in Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex v. Secretary of Labor, assailed was respondent's order setting aside the Med-Arbiter's dismissal a petition for certification election; Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Laguesma, assailed was respondent's order affirming the Med-Arbiter's decision on the results of a certification election; in Philtread Workers Union v. Confessor,  assailed was respondent's order issued under Art. 263 certifying a labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.

In two instances, however, there is specific mention of a remedy from the decision of the Secretary of Labor, thus:

(1) Section 15, Rule XI, Book V of the amended implementing rules provides that the decision of the Secretary of Labor on appeal from the Med-Arbiter's decision on a petition for certification election shall be final and executory, but that the implementation of the Secretary's decision affirming the Med-Arbiter's decision to conduct a certification election "shall not be stayed unless restrained by the appropriate court."

(2) Section 5, Rule V (Execution) of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in Regional Offices provides that "the filing of a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the [appealed] order or decision unless the aggrieved party secures a temporary restraining order from the Court."

We perceive no conflict with our pronouncements on the proper remedy which is Rule 65 and which should be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Accordingly, we read "the appropriate court" in Section 15, Rule XI, Book V of the Implementing Rules to refer to the Court of Appeals.

Sec. 5, Rule V of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in Regional Offices specifying the Supreme Court as the forum for filing the petition for certiorari is not infirm in like manner or similarly as is the statute involved in Fabian v. Desierto. And Section 5 cannot be read to mean that the petition for certiorari can only be filed exclusively and solely with this Court, as the provision must invariably be read in relation to the pertinent laws on the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals in Rule 65 petitions.

In fine, we find that it is procedurally feasible as well as practicable that petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 against the decision of the Secretary of Labor rendered under the Labor Code and its implementing and related rules be filed initially in the Court of Appeals. Paramount consideration is strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of the courts, emphasized in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, on "the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our preliminary jurisdiction." 23

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, certiorari, together with all pertinent records REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for disposition.