Case Digest: Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 129584, December 3, 1998
Facts:
Triple Eight Integrated Services Inc. seeks to annul the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirming the decision of Labor Arbiter Potenciano Canizares, which ordered petitioner to pay various amounts to private respondent Erlinda Osdana.
Respondent Erlinda Osdana was recruited by petitioner Triple Eight Integrated Services Inc in August 1992 for employment with Gulf Catering Company (GCC) in Saudi Arabia.
She was initially hired as a "Food Server" for 36 months with a salary of SR 550.
She was later made to sign a different employment agreement approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), working as a waitress for 12 months with a salary of $280.
Osdana experienced harsh working conditions, including long hours and tasks unrelated to her job. She developed Carpal Tunnel Syndrome due to the nature of her work and underwent two surgeries.
After her second surgery, Osdana was discharged from the hospital but was subsequently dismissed from work allegedly due to her illness, without any separation pay or unpaid salaries.
Osdana filed a complaint with the POEA.
POEA: Ruled in Osdana's favor.
NLRC: Affirmed the decision.
The respondent was ordered to pay the complainant salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract, unpaid salary and salary differential, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fee..
Issues:
WoN there was factual or legal basis for the award. YES
WoN the petitioner solely liable for her claims despite the fact that its liability is joint and several with its principal. YES
Held:
Article 284 of the Labor Code is clear on the matter of termination by reason of disease or illness, viz:
“Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination – An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as the health of his co-employees: x x x.”
Specifically, Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:
“Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal – Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by competent public authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.” (Underscoring supplied)
Viewed in the light of the foregoing provisions, the manner by which Osdana was terminated was clearly in violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations.
In the first place, Osdana’s continued employment despite her illness was not prohibited by law nor was it prejudicial to her health, as well as that of her co-employees. In fact, the medical report issued after her second operation stated that “she had very good improvement of the symptoms.” Besides, “Carpal Tunnel Syndrome” is not a contagious disease.
Petitioner attributes good faith on the part of its principal, claiming that “It was the concern for the welfare and physical well being (sic) of private respondent that drove her employer to take the painful decision of terminating her from the service and having her repatriated to the Philippines at its expense. The employer did not want to risk the aggravation of the illness of private respondent which could have been the logical consequence were private respondent allowed to continue with her job.”
The Court notes, however, that aside from these bare allegations, petitioner has not presented any medical certificate or similar document from a competent public health authority in support of its claims.
On the medical certificate requirement, petitioner erroneously argues that “private respondent was employed in Saudi Arabia and not here in the Philippines. Hence, there was a physical impossibility to secure from a Philippine public health authority the alluded medical certificate that public respondent’s illness will not be cured within a period of six months.”
Petitioner entirely misses the point, as counsel for private respondent states in the Comment. The rule simply prescribes a “certification by a competent public health authority” and not a “Philippine public health authority.”
If, indeed, Osdana was physically unfit to continue her employment, her employer could have easily obtained a certification to that effect from a competent public health authority in Saudi Arabia, thereby heading off any complaint for illegal dismissal.
The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee’s illness and thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor. As the Court observed in Prieto v. NLRC,[19] “The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our overseas workers in the foreign land where they have ventured, usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future. Breach of contract, maltreatment, r@pe, insufficient nourishment, sub-human lodgings, insults and other forms of debasement, are only a few of the inhumane acts to which they are subjected by their foreign employers, who probably feel they can do as they please in their country. While these workers may indeed have relatively little defense against exploitation while they are abroad, that disadvantage must not continue to burden them when they return to their own territory to voice their muted complaint. There is no reason why, in their own land, the protection of our own laws cannot be extended to them in full measure for the redress of their grievances.”
Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate requirement by contending that since Osdana was working in Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws of the host country. Apparently, petitioner hopes to make it appear that the labor laws of Saudi Arabia do not require any certification by a competent public health authority in the dismissal of employees due to illness.
Again, petitioner’s argument is without merit.
First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy.[20] Here in the Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article XIII Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers, to wit:
“The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
x x x x x x x x x.”
This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow foreign employers to determine for and by themselves whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the ground of illness would encourage illegal or arbitrary pre-termination of employment contracts.
As regards the monetary award of salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract, unpaid salaries and salary differential granted by public respondents to Osdana, petitioner assails the same for being contrary to law, evidence and existing jurisprudence, all of which therefore constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Although this contention is without merit, the award for salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract must, however, be reduced. Paragraph 5, Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, applies in this case, thus:
“In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.”
In the case at bar, while it would appear that the employment contract approved by the POEA was only for a period of twelve months, Osdana’s actual stint with the foreign principal lasted for one year and seven-and-a-half months. It may be inferred, therefore, that the employer renewed her employment contract for another year. Thus, the award for the unexpired portion of the contract should have been US$1,260 (US$280 x 4 ½ months) or its equivalent in Philippine pesos, not US$2,499 as adjudged by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC.
As for the award for unpaid salaries and differential amounting to US$1,076 representing seven months’ unpaid salaries and one month underpaid salary, the same is proper because, as correctly pointed out by Osdana, the “no work, no pay” rule relied upon by petitioner does not apply in this case. In the first place, the fact that she had not worked from June 18 to August 22, 1993 and then from January 24 to April 29, 1994, was due to her illness which was clearly work-related. Second, from August 23 to October 5, 1993, Osdana actually worked as food server and cook for seven days a week at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, but was not paid any salary for the said period. Finally, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, she was confined to quarters and was not given any work for no reason at all.
Now, with respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the same is likewise proper but should be reduced. Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.
According to the facts of the case as stated by public respondent, Osdana was made to perform such menial chores, as dishwashing and janitorial work, among others, contrary to her job designation as waitress. She was also made to work long hours without overtime pay. Because of such arduous working conditions, she developed Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. Her illness was such that she had to undergo surgery twice. Since her employer determined for itself that she was no longer fit to continue working, they sent her home posthaste without as much as separation pay or compensation for the months when she was unable to work because of her illness. Since the employer is deemed to have acted in bad faith, the award for attorney’s fees is likewise upheld.
Finally, petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents for holding it solely liable for the claims of Osdana despite the fact that its liability with the principal is joint and several.
Petitioner misunderstands the decision in question. It should be noted that contrary to petitioner’s interpretation, the decision of the labor arbiter which was affirmed by the NLRC did not really absolve the foreign principal.
Petitioner was the only one held liable for Osdana’s monetary claims because it was the only respondent named in the complaint and it does not appear that petitioner took steps to have its principal included as co-respondent. Thus, the POEA, and later the labor arbiter, did not acquire jurisdiction over the foreign principal.
This is not to say, however, that GCC may not be held liable at all. Petitioner can still claim reimbursement or contribution from it for the amounts awarded to the illegally-dismissed employee.
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