Csse Digest: Hinoguin v. ECC, GR No. 8430, April 17, 1989

Labor Law | Policy and Definitions

• Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin is a member of the Philippine Army.
• On August 1, 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin, along with two other soldiers, sought permission from their Commanding Officer to go on an overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. They were allowed to carry their firearms due to the area's critical security situation, that is, it had peace and order problems due to the presence of elements of the NPA in the vicinity of Aritao.
• While returning from their outing, one of the soldiers accidentally discharged his M-16 rifle, hitting Sgt. Hinoguin in the abdomen.
• Sgt. Hinoguin was rushed to the hospital but later succumbed to his injuries.
• Ciriaco Hinoguin filed his claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626, claiming that the death of his son was work-connected and therefore compensable. 
• GSIS: Denied on the ground that petitioner's son was not at his work place nor performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army at the time of his death.
• Workmen's Compensation Commission: Denied the claim since he was not on his place of work nor was he performing official functions. On the contrary, he was on pass and had just came from a merrymaking when accidentally shot by his companion, 

WoN the death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin is compensable under the applicable statute and regulations. YES

Considering that Sgt. Hinoguin died on 7 August 1985, the applicable law is to be found in Book Four, Title III of the Labor Code, as amended. It may be noted at the outset that under Article 167 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended and Section 4 (b) (1) of Rule I of the Amended (Implementing) Rules on Employees' Compensation, the term "employee" includes a "member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." Rule XIII entitled "Death", of the Amended (Implementing) Rules provides in part as follows:

SECTION 1. Conditions to Entitlement. — (a) The beneficiaries of a deceased employee shall be entitled to an income benefit if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) The employee had been duly reported to the System;

(2) He died as a result of injury or sickness; and

(3) The System has been duly notified of his death, as well as the injury or sickness which caused his death. His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such death occurred before the employee is duly reported for coverage of the System.

xxx xxx xxx

Article 167 (k) of the Labor Code as amended defines a compensable "injury" quite simply as "any harmful change in the human organism from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." The Amended (Implementing) Rules have, however, elaborated considerably on the simple and succinct statutory provision. Rule III, Section 1 (a) reads:

SECTION 1. Grounds. (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following grounds:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place work requires him to be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

It will be seen that because the Amended (Implementing) Rules are intended to apply to all kinds of employment, such rules must be read and applied with reasonable flexibility and comprehensiveness. The concept of a "work place" referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva Viscaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. We note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They were not on vacation leave. Moreover, they were required or authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably they were to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them while en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the death a compensable one.

Turning to the question of whether Sgt. Hinoguin was performing official functions at the time he sustained the gunshot wound, it has already been pointed out above that the Line of Duty Board of Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion Headquarters had already determined that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin had occurred "in line of duty." It may be noted in this connection that a soldier on active duty status is really on 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7 days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status (which Sgt. Hinoguin was not). 'Thus, we think that the work-connected character of Sgt. Hinoguins injury and death was not effectively precluded by the simple circumstance that he was on an overnight pass to go to the home of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier under his own command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not effectively cease performing "official functions" because he was granted a pass. While going to a fellow soldier's home for a few hours for a meal and some drinks was not a specific military duty, he was nonetheless in the course of performance of official functions. Indeed, it appears to us that a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an approved vacation leave. Even vacation leave may, it should be remembered, be preterminated by superior orders.

More generally, a soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain risks, for instance, that he will be fired upon by forces hostile to the State or the Government. That is not, of course, the only ask that he is compelled to accept by the very nature of his occupation or profession as a soldier. Most of the persons around him are necessarily also members of the Armed Forces who carry firearms, too. In other words, a soldier must also assume the risk of being accidentally fired upon by his fellow soldiers. This is reasonably regarded as a hazard or risk inherent in his employment as a soldier.

We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by an accidental discharge of the M-16 of Dft. Alibuyog, in the circumstances of this case, arose out of and in the course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and hence compensable.

It may be well to add that what we have written above in respect of performance of official functions of members of the Armed Forces must be understood in the context of the specific purpose at hand, that is, the interpretation and application of the compensation provisions of the Labor Code and applicable related regulations. It is commonplace that those provisions should, to the extent possible, be given the interpretation most likely to effectuate the beneficient and humanitarian purposes infusing the Labor Code.

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the GSIS taken through its Claim Review Committee dated 20 November 1986 and the Decision dated 24 May 1988 of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 3275, are hereby REVERSED and the GSIS is hereby DIRECTED to award all applicable benefits in respect of the death of Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin, to petitioner. No pronouncement as to costs.