Labor Law: Book IV; Title II; Chapter I Policy and Definitions (Arts. 172 - 173)
Health, Safety and Social Welfare
Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance Fund
Chapter I
Policy and Definitions
Arts. 172 - 173
Q: What employment benefits am I entitled to if I suffer an injury I while at work? or while on the way to work? or while going
home from work?
Q: If I suffer from a disease, must my employer pay for the
medicines?
Art. 172 [166]. Policy.
The State shall promote and develop a tax-exempt employees’ compensation program whereby employees and their dependents, in the event of work-connected disability or death, may promptly secure adequate income benefit and medical related benefits.
Art. 173 [167]. Definition of terms.
As used in this Title, unless the context indicates otherwise:
a. “Code” means the Labor Code of the Philippines instituted under Presidential Decree Numbered four hundred forty-two, as amended.
b. “Commission” means the Employees’ Compensation Commission created under this Title.
c. “SSS” means the Social Security System created under Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended.
d. “GSIS” means the Government Service Insurance System created under Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty-six, as amended.
e. “System” means the SSS or GSIS, as the case may be.
f. “Employer” means any person, natural or juridical, employing the services of the employee.
g. “Employee” means any person compulsorily covered by the GSIS under Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty-six, as amended, including the members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and any person employed as casual, emergency, temporary, substitute or contractual, or any person compulsorily covered by the SSS under Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended.
h. “Person” means any individual, partnership, firm, association, trust, corporation or legal representative thereof.
i. “Dependent” means the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted or acknowledged natural child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over twenty-one (21) years of age or over twenty-one (21) years of age provided he is incapacitated and incapable of self-support due to a physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority; the legitimate spouse living with the employee and the parents of said employee wholly dependent upon him for regular support.
j. “Beneficiaries” means the dependent spouse until he/she remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants, who are the secondary beneficiaries: Provided, That the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit.
k. “Injury” means any harmful change in the human organism from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.
l. “Sickness” means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment.
m. “Death” means loss of life resulting from injury or sickness.
n. “Disability” means loss or impairment of a physical or mental function resulting from injury or sickness.
o. “Compensation” means all payments made under this Title for income benefits and medical or related benefits.
p. “Income benefit” means all payments made under this Title to the employee or his dependents.
q. “Medical benefit” means all payments made under this Title to the providers of medical care, rehabilitation services and hospital care.
r. “Related benefit” means all payments made under this Title for appliances and supplies.
s. “Appliances” means crutches, artificial aids and other similar devices.
t. “Supplies” means medicine and other medical, dental or surgical items.
u. “Hospital” means any medical facility, government or private, authorized by law, an active member in good standing of the Philippine Hospital Association and accredited by the Commission.
v. “Physician” means any doctor of medicine duly licensed to practice in the Philippines, an active member in good standing of the Philippine Medical Association and accredited by the Commission.
w. “Wages” or “Salary”, insofar as they refer to the computation of benefits defined in Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, for SSS and Presidential Decree No. 1146, as amended, for GSIS, respectively, except that part in excess of Three Thousand Pesos.
x. “Monthly salary credit” means the wage or salary base for contributions as provided in Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, or the wages or salary.
y. “Average monthly salary credit” in the case of the SSS means the result obtained by dividing the sum of the monthly salary credits in the sixty-month period immediately following the semester of death or permanent disability by sixty (60), except where the month of death or permanent disability falls within eighteen (18) calendar months from the month of coverage, in which case, it is the result obtained by dividing the sum of all monthly salary credits paid prior to the month of contingency by the total number of calendar months of coverage in the same period.
z. “Average daily salary credit” in the case of the SSS means the result obtained by dividing the sum of the six (6) highest monthly salary credits in the twelve-month period immediately preceding the semester of sickness or injury by one hundred eighty (180), except where the month of injury falls within twelve (12) calendar months from the first month of coverage, in which case it is the result obtained by dividing the sum of all monthly salary credits by thirty (30) times the number of calendar months of coverage in the period.
In the case of the GSIS, the average daily salary credit shall be the actual daily salary or wage, or the monthly salary or wage divided by the actual number of working days of the month of contingency.
aa. “Quarter” means a period of three (3) consecutive months ending on the last days of March, June, September and December.
ab. “Semester” means a period of two consecutive quarters ending in the quarter of death, permanent disability, injury or sickness.
ac. “Replacement ratio” – The sum of twenty percent and the quotient obtained by dividing three hundred by the sum of three hundred forty and the average monthly salary credit.
ad. “Credited years of service” – For a member covered prior to January, 1975, nineteen hundred seventy-five minus the calendar year of coverage, plus the number of calendar years in which six or more contributions have been paid from January, 1975 up to the calendar year containing the semester prior to the contingency. For a member covered on or after January, 1975, the number of calendar years in which six or more contributions have been paid from the year of coverage up to the calendar year containing the semester prior to the contingency.
ae. “Monthly income benefit” means the amount equivalent to one hundred fifteen percent of the sum of the average monthly salary credit multiplied by the replacement ratio, and one and a half percent of the average monthly salary credit for each credited year of service in excess of ten years: Provided, That the monthly income benefit shall in no case be less than two hundred fifty pesos.
Notes:
Amended Rules Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation
RULE III - COMPENSABILITY
SECTION 1. Grounds.
(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. (ECC Resolution No.
2799, July 25, 1984).
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex “A” of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules.
SECTION 2. Occupational diseases.
(a) The diseases listed in Annex “A” of these Rules are occupational when the nature of employment is as described therein.
(b) The employer shall require pre-employment examination of all prospective employees; provide periodic medical examination to employees who are exposed to occupational diseases and take such other measures as may be necessary.
(c) The periodic medical examination for the early detection of occupational diseases shall be in accordance with the minimum standards prescribed in Annex “B” hereof.
SECTION 3. Authority of the Commission.
The Commission is hereby authorized to determine and approve additional occupational diseases and work-related illnesses with specific criteria based on peculiar hazards of employment.
- Compensation, in general, is synonymous to payment and may even refer to wage or salary of an employee.
- But "compensation" in this Book IV refers to the employment benefits given by law because of work-connected injury or disease that an employee suffers.
- The benefits may be in cash or in services.
- What gives rise to a compensation claim is either an injury or an occupational disease.
Injury
- For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of accident arising out of in the course of the employment.
- The two components of the coverage formula:
- arising out of; and
- in the course of employment,
- are said to be separate tests which must be independently satisfied.
- However, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "work-connection."
- An uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions of the test can in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries. (Iloilo Dock, November 27, 1968)
- With the ruling of the Supreme Court on off-premises injury, the Employee's Compensation Commission (ECC) passed Resolution No. 3914 on July 5, 1998, extending the compensable coverage for off premises injury from the near premises up to the residence of the employee.
- The resolution states that an injury or the death of a covered member in an accident while he is going to, or coming from, the workplace shall be considered compensable if the following conditions are established or definitely proven:
- The act of employee of going to, or coming from, the workplace must have been a continuing act, that is he had not been diverted from it by any other activity, and he had not departed from his usual route to, or from his, workplace and;
- Regarding an employee and special errand, the special errand must have been official and in connection with his work.
- At about 5:02 o’clock in the afternoon, Teodoro G. Pablo, a mechanic of Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (IDECO), was shot to death while walking on his way home.
- He was about 20 meters away from the main IDECO gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO road.
- The motive for the crime was unknown, and the assailant, Martin Cordero, was killed before he could be tried for Pablo’s death.
- Workmen’s Compensation Commission: Affirmed the decision of the Regional Office VII in Iloilo City, and ordered the IDECO to pay to the widow and children of Teodoro G. Pablo pursuant to Section 55 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
WoN Pablo’s death comes within the meaning of the phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment." YES
The two components of the coverage formula — "arising out of" and "in the course of employment" — are said to be separate tests which must be independently satisfied; however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "work-connection," because an uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries.
The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place.
That part of the road where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the employer’s premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related to the employee’s premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer’s premises." Pablo was using the road as a means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one of these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper security measures over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death.
"Twenty-Four Hour Duty" Doctrine
- Members of the national police are by the nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day.
- Except when they are on vacation leave, policemen are subject to call anytime and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community.
- By analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under P.D. No. 626, as amended, policemen should be treated in the same manner as soldiers.
- But the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines [on compensability] rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths.
- In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless, basically police service in character. (GSIS vs. Alegre, April 20, 1999)
- The court refused to apply the 24 hour duty doctrine and denied the claim of a fire truck driver who was insured when the owner-type jeepney he was riding in collided head-on with another vehicle when he and his friend were on their way home on at about 9:30 p.m. after having dinner. The Court ruled that he was not doing an act within his duty and authority as a fire truck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his injuries. There was no reasonable connection between the injuries and his work as a fire truck driver. (Valeriano, June 8, 2000; See also Tancinco vs. GSIS, November 16, 2001)
- On December 6, 1994, SPO2 Florencio A. Alegre, a police officer, was shot and killed during a confrontation with another officer, SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr.
- SPO2 Alegre was moonlighting as a tricycle driver at the time of his death.
- His wife, Felonila Alegre filed a claim for death benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
- GSIS: Denied the claim on the grounds that Alegre's death was not work-connected.
- ECC: Affirmed the ruling of GSIS.
- CA: Ruled in favor of Felonila, stating that by the nature of their functions, police officers are deemed to be on around-the-clock duty.
The pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits, namely:
(a) that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be;
(b) that the employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.
It is not difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre's widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer.
The 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character.
- Celerino S. Valeriano, a fire truck driver, was involved in a head-on collision while riding an owner-type jeepney.
- The accident occurred as he was returning home from dinner with a friend.
- Valeriano was thrown out of the vehicle and suffered severe injuries in the accident.
- He filed a claim for income benefits with GSIS.
- GSIS: Denied the claim based on the absence of a causal link between the accident and his employment as a fireman.
- ECC: Ruled against Valeriano, stating that the injury must be sustained while the employee is in the performance of official duties, at the place where work requires him to be, or while executing an order from the employer.
- CA: Upheld the ECC's decision, emphasizing that the accident was not work-connected.
To be compensable, an injury must have resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. It must be shown that it was sustained within the scope of employment while the claimant was performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto or while following the orders of a superior. Indeed, the standard of "work connection" must be satisfied even by one who invokes the 24-hour-duty doctrine; otherwise, the claim for compensability must be denied.
Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a firetruck driver was related to the injuries he had suffered. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal and social function — having dinner with some friends — is clear from the records of the case. His injuries were not acquired at his work place; nor were they sustained while he was performing an act within the scope of his employment or in pursuit of an order of his superior. Thus, we agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court that his injuries and consequent disability were not work-connected and thus not compensable.
The 24-hour-duty doctrine cannot be applied to petitioner’s case, because he was neither at his assigned work place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when he met an accident. But the more important justification for the Court’s stance is that he was not doing an act within his duty and authority as a firetruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his injuries. We cannot find any reasonable connection between his injuries and his work as a firetruck driver.
- On July 17, 1995, SPO1 Eddie G. Tancinco, a member of the NCR Security Protection Group of the Philippine National Police, was shot dead by five unidentified armed men while repairing his service vehicle in front of his house.
- At the time of his death, SPO1 Tancinco was assigned as part of the close-in security detail of then Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada, who was in the United States for medical treatment.
- His widow, Rufina Tancinco, filed a claim for benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
- GSIS: Denied the claim on the grounds that there was no proof that petitioner’s husband’s death was work-related.
- ECC: Dismissed the appeal, sating that the death occur while he was on off duty status and did not arise out of and in the course of his employment.
- CA: Dismissed due to procedural issues and lack of merit.
SECTION 1. Grounds — (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.
For the first requirement, at the time of his death, SPO1 Tancinco was off-duty since Vice-President Estrada was out of the country. In fact, he was at home; it is not even known if he was temporarily re-assigned to another detail while the Vice-President was away. Clearly, he was not at the place where his work required him to be.
As to the second requirement, it was not sufficiently established that SPO1 Tancinco died while performing his official functions. As a policeman, SPO1 Tancinco is part of "an organized civil force for maintaining order, preventing and detecting crimes, and enforcing the laws . ." Based on these parameters, it cannot be said that the deceased was discharging official functions; if anything, repairing a service vehicle is only incidental to his job.
Neither was the last requirement satisfied. As the fatal incident occurred when SPO1 Tancinco was at home, it was incumbent on petitioner to show that her husband was discharging a task pursuant to an order issued by his superiors. This also was not done.
Sickness
- Aside from injury or accident, the other cause that gives rise to a compensation claim is sickness, which is defined under Article 167(l) of this code.
- “Sickness” means:
- any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or
- any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.
- For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment.
- Section 1(b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation further explain "sickness" thus:
- For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules.
- The specified condition should be satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working condition.
- Proof of direct causal relation, however, is not indispensably required. It is enough that the claimant shows proof of reasonable work-connection.
- The disease should have been brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. Strict rules of evidence are not demanded.
- The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence, which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support the conclusion.
- Cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed.
- General Rule: The Court cannot conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease. (Raro, April 27, 1989)
- Exception: Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e.g., chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) the
- The decision of the Supreme Court in Raro v. Employees' Compensation Commission supersedes the decisions made in Panotes v. Employees' Compensation Commission; Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation Commission, other cases with conclusions different from those stated in the Raro v. Employees' Compensation Commission.
- The Court decided to grant compensation benefits to petitioner Venusto Panotes for the death of his wife, Agustina Garfin Panotes.
- The death was due to colon cancer, which was considered contracted or at least the risk increased by her work conditions as a public school teacher.
- GSIS: Filed a motion for reconsideration challenging the court's standard of reasonable work connection, arguing that if the cause of the ailment is unknown, it cannot be considered work-connected under the increased risk doctrine.
In the case at bar, this Honorable Court went on to describe in detail the physical, mental and emotional pressures undergone by the deceased public school teacher who entered the service in perfect health was not confined in the classroom but engaged in other school activities, was exposed to the elements, missed her meals because of workloads, etc.-all of which factors weakened her body resistance and made her susceptible to diseases.
The actual proof of causation is not necessary to justify compensability. The degree of proof required to establish proof of work-connection between ailment and the deceased's employment is only substantial evidence or reasonable work connection.
The very fact that the cause of a disease is unknown, creates the probability that the working conditions could have increased the risk of contracting the disease, if not caused by it, thus, the increased risk doctrine was applied in the present case.
The situation obtaining in the case at bar generates doubts, which by principle and in keeping with the law, should be resolved in favor of labor.
- Rosario Nemaria, a classroom teacher, suffered from severe abdominal pains, anorexia, weight loss, and jaundice, indicative of cancer of the liver, duodenal ulcer, and cancer of the breast.
- On October 16, 1978, she passed away at the age of 58.
- She had approximately 30 years of government service.
- Flaviano Nemaria, alleging that the cause of his wife's death was due to her employment as a classroom teacher, filed a claim for death benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
- GSIS: Denied the claim, stating that the causes of her ailments were not related to her work and therefore were not compensable under the law.
- ECC: Affirmed the decision.
The decedent, a public school teacher assigned in a municipality several kilometers away from the provincial capital, rendered her services for more or less twenty-nine (29) years. Under those circumstances, the possibility would not be remote, that she suffered impaired nutrition and while working in a farflung rural area where foodstuffs are not closely examined before being eaten, it is not too far-fetched to consider that she was exposed to hepatic carcinogens which reportedly were ingested therein.
Corollary thereto, it is undisputed that the deceased was in good health when she entered the government service, otherwise, she would not have been accepted for insurance purposes by the Government Service Insurance System. The conclusion is therefore inevitable, that the decedent's ailments developed during her employment while working under conditions which predisposed her thereto.
It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth development or acceleration of claimant's illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment had contributed even in a small degree. The measurement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved. Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the link exists. For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility.
- Zaida G. Raro was a clerk of the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences.
- About four years after her employment, she began suffering from severe and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision.
- The petitioner was diagnosed to be suffering from brain tumor.
- Her husband claimed disability benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
- GSIS: Denied the claim.
- ECC: Affirmed the GSIS decision.
The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed.
WoN the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease. NO
The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on social security principles. Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we now have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by employers to a trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement.
It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. If diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to winch the tens of millions of workers and their families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, salary and deaths occur.
- It is settled that injury sustained in connection with acts reasonably incidental to the employment are deemed as arising out of such employment.
- Generally, such incidents of work includes:
- acts of personnel ministration for the comfort or convenience of the employee;
- acts for the benefit of the employer;
- acts done to further the goodwill of the business;
- slight deviation from work, from curiosity or otherwise; and
- acts in emergencies.
- The employment itself may give rise to a dispute leading to the assault to the employee.
- For instance, a supervisor was assaulted by a workman he has fired, or where the argument argument was over the performance or work or possession of tools or the like, or the violence was due to labor disputes. (Iloilo Dock, November 27, 1968)
- These are work related incidents.
- At about 5:02 o’clock in the afternoon, Teodoro G. Pablo, a mechanic of Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (IDECO), was shot to death while walking on his way home.
- He was about 20 meters away from the main IDECO gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO road.
- The motive for the crime was unknown, and the assailant, Martin Cordero, was killed before he could be tried for Pablo’s death.
- Workmen’s Compensation Commission: Affirmed the decision of the Regional Office VII in Iloilo City, and ordered the IDECO to pay to the widow and children of Teodoro G. Pablo pursuant to Section 55 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
WoN Pablo’s death comes within the meaning of the phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment." YES
The two components of the coverage formula — "arising out of" and "in the course of employment" — are said to be separate tests which must be independently satisfied; however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "work-connection," because an uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries.
The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place.
That part of the road where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the employer’s premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related to the employee’s premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer’s premises." Pablo was using the road as a means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one of these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper security measures over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death.
- Recreational activities fall under the so called "Special Engagement Rule," which is one of the exceptions to the direct premises rule.
- This exception covers incidents outside of the workplace, such as field trip, intramurals, outings and picnics when initiated or sanctioned by the employer.
- Accidents befalling employees on those occasions are compensable.
- The repair of a truck used by a business associate of the employer, which is used in operations directly beneficial to the latter was held within the scope of the employment. (Afable, May 27, 1963)
- The drowning of an employee following his voluntary assistance to a fellow employee was deemed to have arisen out of the employment, since the assistance was for the benefit of the employer. (Paez, March 30, 1963)
- Teofilo Loyola was employed by the Maloma Sawmill as a mechanic.
- Arsenio Rivera, owner of a timber concession, agreed to supply the mill with logs and timber. Dy Hian Tat was an agent of the Maloma Sawmill with a contract to sell sawn lumber of the mill on commission basis.
- On February 9, 1953, an employee of Rivera requested Loyola to repair the truck of Dy Hian Tat. Loyola repaired the truck and rode on it on its way to the sawmill loaded with logs belonging to Rivera.
- Unfortunately, the truck got out of control, resulting in Loyola's death.
- Workmen's Compensation Commission: Ordering petitioners (Luis S. Afable, et al.) to pay to respondents (Antonia Leonardo Vda. de Loyola, et al.) the sum of P4,000 as compensation, plus legal interest.
The act of the late Loyola in repairing the truck may be deemed to be as one done in the course of his employment as a mechanic and as one arising out of said employment. While his main work was that of a mechanic of the sawmill, he was, however, also available to any other odd job that may be assigned to him by the management as shown by the' fact that he was living with his family within the compound of the sawmill.
When he was asked to repair the truck, he did so with the tacit consent of the mill superintendent. Loyola acted the way he did believing it to be his duty because the work to be done was in furtherance of the interest of his employer.
- Conrado Paez and his wife were in the business of buying palay.
- Palay purchased by agents needed to be transported from Isabela to Nueva Ecija or Tarlac. To do this, the palay had to be ferried across the Magat River in Aurora, Isabela, from the Cabatuan side to Guimba.
- Valentin Lagman regularly drove a truck on the Guimba side, while Primitivo Apolonio was the truck driver on the Aurora side.
- On August 1, 1953, Lagman, the regular driver, could not perform his duties because his child became seriously ill. Marciano Barawid substituted for Lagman, with an understanding to receive Lagman's pay during his absence.
- On August 2, 1953, instead of waiting on the Cabatuan side, Barawid crossed the Magat River and joined Apolonio on the Aurora side to help haul palay.
- Apolonio advised Barawid not to board the fully loaded third banca but to take another to Guimba. While in the Magat River, the overloaded banca capsized, leading to Barawid's drowning.
- The heirs of Marciano Barawid, presented with the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 3, a complaint for compensation.
- Workmen's Compensation Commission: Ordered Paez to pay compensation to the heirs of Marciano Barawid.
WoN the death arose out of and in the course of employment. YES
The activities performed by Barawid, we believe, were incidental to his duties not only as driver but as purchaser of the respondent who was engaged in the business of buying and selling palay. It is reasonable to expect an employee, as in the case of Barawid to help a co-employee in the performance of his duties. And even granting, only for the sake of argument, that the acts performed by the deceased were not strictly within the bounds of his duties, still he was, in the fullest sense of the term, in the course of the employment. For the performance of those acts — helping the other employee of the respondent load and unload palay — would inure to the benefit of the respondent in the pursuit of his business.
- An employee's status of acting in the course of his employment is not negated is not negated by the fact that he may be pursuing a dual purpose.
- The dual purpose doctrine allowing the compensation applies where a special trip would have to be made for the employer if the employee had not combined the service for the employer with his own going or coming trip.
- Stated briefly, the dual purpose doctrine considers as compensable an injury that an employee sustains while on a trip and they take it for the benefit of the employer even if in the course of of the employee pursues also personal purpose.
- This doctrine, of American origin, has been adopted by the ECC in its Resolution No. 99 -08-0469 dated Aug 31, 1999.
- This means that the doctrine may be applied in adjudication of Employees Compensation Claims.
The Test in the applicability of the dual purpose doctrine:
- The test is that is ordinarily employed for determining liability in such a case is that if the work of the employee tends to create necessity for travel, he or she is deemed in the course of employment, albeit the employee serves at the same time some personal purpose.
- The requirement is that the services of the employer is at least a concurrent cause of the trip of the employee.
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