Case Digest: Gelmart Industries v. Hon. Leogardo, G.R. No. 70544 , November 5, 1987
- Gelmart Industries (Phils. Is.), Inc. (GELMART) filed a special civil action for certiorari to reverse the reinstatement order issued by the Regional Director of the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) for Jenny Juanillo.
- GELMART had a collective bargaining agreement with National Union of Garment, Textile Cordage and Allied Workers of the Philippine (GATCORD) covering its workers, including Juanillo, who was part of a strike initiated by GATCORD.
- Juanillo claimed she was on pre-filed vacation leave during the strike and was dismissed without proper clearance from the Ministry of Labor. She filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
- MOLE: Ordered Juanillo's immediate reinstatement with backwages, citing her absence from the strike due to vacation leave and lack of proof from GELMART.
- GELMART argued that Juanillo's dismissal was covered by a prior decision from NLRC Case No. RB-IV-13275-77, and her separate complaint was untimely and barred by finality of judgment.
The first three assigned errors charging the public respondents of having disregarded the clearance obtained by GELMART to dismiss workers who had staged a mass walkout and disobeyed the return to work order and the decision in the NLRC Case No. RR-IV-13275-77 upholding the dismissals are well taken. The strike was staged by GATCORD members, the return to work orders were directed to them and the decision on the Legal strike is binding on them. In this particular case, the application for clearance with preventive suspension and compulsory arbitration on the issue of termination involved GATCORD members who had not returned to work. Of these there were 334 and Juanilo was among them. However, she has taken the position that since at the time of the Legal mass walk-out she was already in the province on leave, she was not covered by NLRC Case No. RB-IV-13275-77. The compulsory arbitration precisely covered her case. All she needed to do was prove "validated absences," during the proceeding and she would have been in the list of those to be reinstated. But she did not choose to present her proof in the arbitration proceeding. Instead, she waited seven months after the decision became final before bringing a separate case. If every member of a striking union not satisfied with a decision in an arbitration case resolving the issues involved in a labor dispute arising from the strike were to be accorded the right to bring a separate individual action on an issue covered by that decision, there can be no end or solution to the controversy. The dismissal of Juanillo was an incident of the GATCORD strike against GELMART. Her action is not distinct from the issues dealt with in the compulsory arbitration case.
But even if the Court were to grant that she could bring this separate action, Juanillo would have to prove her case. The only basis of her action is the alleged leave of absence she had filed. The public respondents decided in her favor. Was there substantial evidence presented to support the decision under review?
The public respondents found as a fact Chat Juanillo had not participated in the mass walk-out because at the time it took place she was in the province taking care of a sick child: that before she left she had by letter filed a leave of absence. The petitioner GELMART denied having received any letter from Juanilo requesting leave and assailed the letter offered as selfserving evidence. Public respondents, however, found that leave was obtained, that GELMART failed to prove that Juanilo was among the workers who staged the mass walk out and that therefore her dismissal without previous clearance was illegal.
This Court will not ordinarily disturb findings of fact of administrative agencies like the public respondents. It is axiomatic that in their exercise of adjudicative functions they are not bound by strict rules of evidence and of procedure. When confronted with conflicting versions of factual matters, it is for them in the exercise of discretion to determine which party deserves credence on the basis of evidence received. [Halili v. Floro, 90 Phil. 245 (1951); Estate of Florencio Buan v. Pampanga Bus Co. and La Mallorca, 99 Phil. 373 (1956); Luzon Brokerage Co. v. Luzon Labor Union, 117 Phil. 118 (1963). 7 SCRA 116].
However, as the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations [69 Phil. 635 (1940)] has pointed out there are "cardinal primary rights which must be respected" in such proceedings. Not the least among them are those which refer to the evidence required to support a decision:
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support the decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, at least, when directly attacked.". . .
4. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.". . (at p. 642).
The Court finds merit in the respondents' fourth assignment of error. A careful review of the basis on which the decision of the labor arbiter as affirmed by the respondent Leogardo as deputy minister of MOLE reveals that not only is there no substantial evidence to support Juanillo's claim but also that the respondents' evidence to the contrary contravenes it.
Juanillo asserts that at the time of the strike she was on leave, to prove which she presented a letter purportedly requesting leave dated Sunday, July 31, 1977, the day before the illegal strike began. There is no proof that it was filed with or received by the company. She asserts that she was denied admission upon her return on August 8, 1977 and was served notice of "Termination with Preventive Suspension" on August 10, 1977. In the case between GELMART and GATCORD of which she is a member, the respondent Leogardo sustained the preventive suspension of those who failed to return to work but referred this case for compulsory arbitration on the issue of termination on October 5, 1977. The arbitral proceedings lasted eleven months, the decision became final and executory on September 13, 1978. In the decision, specific provision was made to exclude from termination.
. . . those who did not participate in the strike, who among others were absent before and during the same for justifiable causes, as for example, illness or validated absences, are herewith ordered reinstated to their former positions without back wages. . . .
Since Juanillo had received notice of the termination in August 1977 and as she claims she had made repeated representation and demands for reinstatement, it is passing strange that her claim was not ventilated in the compulsory arbitration proceeding conducted precisely on the issue of termination of GATCORD members who had not complied with the return to work order. All that was needed was to show that she had indeed not participated in the strike by presenting her letter asking for leave. Instead she filed her case seven months after the decision had become final and executory. By way of evidence all she presented was a self- serving uncorroborated letter purportedly asking for leave, receipt of which was not proved. This quantum of evidence fails the substantiality of evidence test to support a decision, a basic requirement in administrative adjudication. [Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra; Air Manila v. Balatbat, G.R. No. L-29064, April 29,1971, 38 SCRA 489].
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the order of the public respondents REVERSED.
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