Case Digest: Purefoods Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78591, March 21, 1989

   Labor Law | Appeal 

• Private respondents Remigio Clavio, Andres Catubay, Virgilio Umali, Orlando Rey, and Jorge Del Rosario were employees of Pure Foods Corporation.
• Clavio and Catubay were hired as drivers, Umali as a utility man, Rey as a delivery man, and Del Rosario as a checker.
• Umali and Del Rosario, despite their specific appointments, were at times required to perform dispatcher duties. Clavio and Catubay's duties as drivers involved driving trucks, making minor repairs, and ensuring the security of the goods during deliveries.
• Rey's duties as a delivery man included handling invoices, loading goods, and collecting payments from customers. Umali and Del Rosario, when assigned as dispatchers, segregated carton boxes based on orders, without opening sealed boxes unless the order was less than six packages.
• On March 17, 1981, during the first shift, Umali and Del Rosario were assigned as dispatchers along with ten other employees. Clavio, assigned to the first shift, drove a truck loaded by Monteroso and noticed a deflated tire during a delivery. Rey, reporting at 3:41 A.M., loaded a truck with sealed boxes, and Clavio joined after finishing receipts at the billing section. The weighing scale showed an overweight, and Rey and Clavio helped unload the cargo for inventory.
• Private respondents were indefinitely suspended for alleged pilferage without prior investigation.
• Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unpaid wages.
• Director Severo M. Pucan: Ordered Pure Foods Corporation to reinstate private respondents with backwages.
• Petitioner appealed to the Ministry of Labor and Employment, leading to an order for compulsory arbitration by the NLRC-NCR-Arbitration Branch.
• Labor Arbiter: Partially dismissed the complaint. Except for Remigio Clavio, the dismissal of the other complainants to be justified.
• NLRC: Held in favor of all the private respondents ordering their reinstatement.
• The decision became final, and private respondents moved for a writ of execution.
• NLRC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

WoN the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion in totally reversing the findings of facts of the labor arbiter. NO

Presidential Decree No. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, formerly granted, under Article 223 thereof, an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from a decision of the National Labor Relations Commission to the Secretary of Labor. Presidential Decree No. 1391, however, amended said Article 223 and abolished appeals to the Secretary of Labor.

But, the losing party is not without recourse. Under the New Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission, a party is allowed to file a motion for reconsideration of any order, resolution or decision of the commission based on palpable or patent errors, provided that the motion is under oath and filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the order, resolution or decision.  In addition, the party may also seasonably avail of the special civil action for certiorari, where the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer. 

In the case at bar, a motion for reconsideration was belatedly filed by petitioner by reason of which the motion was denied by public respondent. In a futile attempt to elide and gloss over an obvious mistake or fatal omission, petitioner then filed this special civil action for certiorari by imputing to public respondent a supposed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the findings of facts of the labor arbiter.

This procedural maneuver is fatally flawed and unavailing on both counts. The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of respondent. In the present case, the plain and adequate remedy expressly provided by law was a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision and the resolution thereof, which was not only expected to be but would actually have provided adequate and more speedy remedy than the present petition for certiorari.  This remedy was actually sought to be availed of by petitioner when it filed a motion for reconsideration albeit beyond the 10-day reglementary period. For all intents and purposes, petitioner cannot now be heard to say that there was no plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to it and that it must, therefore, be allowed to seek relief by certiorari. This contention is not only untenable but would even place a premium on a party's negligence or indifference in availing of procedural remedies afforded by law.

The filing of such a motion is intended to afford public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of a re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. Petitioner's inaction or negligence under the circumstances is tantamount to a deprivation of the right and opportunity of the respondent commission to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly committed or to vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed. An improvident resort to certiorari cannot be used as a tool to circumvent the right of public respondent to review and purge its decision of an oversight, if any. Neither should this special civil action be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of petitioner's own negligence or error in the choice of remedies. Having allowed the decision to become final and executory, petitioner cannot by an overdue strategy question the correctness of the decision of the respondent commission when a timely motion for reconsideration was the legal remedy indicated.

Petitioner further argues that public respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion in reversing the findings of facts of the labor arbiter. Assuming ex gratia argumenti that this is true, its petition can neither prosper nor subserve its purpose.

In asserting that there was grave abuse of discretion, petitioner adverts to alleged variances in the factual findings of the labor arbiter and the respondent commission. This is inapt and erroneous. Firstly, errors of judgment, as distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special civil action for certiorari. Secondly, a careful perusal of the records of this case readily reveals that if there is any error by public respondent in its analysis of the facts and its evaluation of the evidence, it is not of such a degree as may be stigmatized as a grave abuse of discretion. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with certuries of both civil law and common law traditions. 

It is settled to the point of being elementary that the only question involved in certiorari is jurisdiction, either the want or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari only when the same is so grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, 15 as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.

It is, therefore, incumbent upon petitioner to adduce a sufficiently strong demonstration that the respondent commission acted whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to and even decisive of the controversy, before certiorari will lie. In this, petitioner has failed.

It must emphatically be reiterated, since so often is it overlooked, that the special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The reason for the rule is simple. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action of certiorari.

At any rate, in rejecting the decision of the labor arbiter and in finding that there was no pilferage committed, respondent commission held that:

After a painstaking scrutiny and diligent review of the record of the instant case giving due consideration to the points raised by the complainants in relation to the supporting documents submitted and relied upon by the respondent, it is Our considered view that the Labor Arbiter below was careless, short of being remiss in his duty, for his failure to analyze and appreciate the import of the evidence on record specially so that in the resolution of the issue of whether complainants are guilty of the charge of pilferage or not hinges on mere affidavits of the Security guards as well as the Lady Security guard-checkers. ... 

Respondent commission noted serious discrepancies in the affidavits of the witnesses presented by herein petitioner, to wit:

Lorna Manriquez a lady guard, alleged that the truck with Plate No. 757 of respondent Andres Catubay was stopped at the gate and found with an excess of 12 bags of hotdogs; whereas, Crispulo Migano another guard, alleged that the truck with Plate No. 757 was parked at the motor pool; while Capt. Gonzales, of the security detachment, stated that the truck driven by respondent Catubay had left the company premises.

The two lady security guard-checkers, Lorna Manriquez and Fe Somera, and security guard Crispulo Magano stated in their affidavits that upon discovering the suspicious activities of herein private respondents, they reported the matter to the security detachment. Respondent commission's factual finding is that their reporting to the security detachment was orchestrated. It is noteworthy that the affidavits of said lady security guard-checkers are identical in their allegations regarding the incident except as to the names of those involved, their places of assignment, and truck plate numbers.

Security guard Crispulo Magano stated that he saw several persons bringing down a package at the motor pool, whereas the investigation conducted by the security detachment revealed that respondent Catubay was the only person went to the motor pool.

As pointedly commented by the Solicitor General, "to sustain the petitioner would lead the court to speculate on the possibilities of the commission of pilferage by private respondents as a ground for their dismissal. There is no clear, positive and convincing evidence to point that private respondents were guilty as charged." 20

The foregoing considerations convince Us that the decision and resolution complained of should not be disturbed.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The decision of Labor Arbiter Raymundo R. Valenzuela, dated May 16, 1986, insofar as it orders the reinstatement of private respondent Remigio Clavio and the payment of his backwages of one and a half years is AFFIRMED. The decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission of March 23, 1987 and its resolution of May 20, 1987 are likewise AFFIRMED.

Should the reinstatement of the private respondents to their previous or substantially equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights as herein ordered be rendered impossible by the supervention of circumstances which prevent the same, the petitioner is further ordered to pay private respondents separation pay equivalent to one (1) month's salary for every year of service rendered by them to petitioner, computed at the rate of their respective salaries on March 18, 1981.