Case Digest: Bracewell v. CA, G.R. No. 107427 Jan 25, 2000

Property | Property in Relation to Whom it Belongs (Arts. 420-426)

Facts:  

• In 1908, Maria Cailles acquired 9,657 square meters of land in Las Piñas, Metro Manila. from the Dalandan and Jimenez families of LasPiñas.
• Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria Cailles.
• In 1961, Maria Cailles sold the land to her son, James Bracewell, Jr., by virtue of a Deed of Sale which was duly annotated and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. 
• Tax Declarations were then issued in the name of James Bracewell, Jr before CFI-Pasig.
• In 1963, James Bracewell, Jr. filed an action for confirmation of imperfect title.
• The Director of Lands opposed, represented by the Solicitor General, claiming the land was part of the public domain.
• In 1985, the case was forwarded to the RTC-Makati.
• The Solicitor General opposed again citing failure to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time and inadequacy of tax declarations.
• RTC-Makati: Granted the application.
• CA: Reversed and set aside the lower court's Order.

Issue: 

• Whether the Honorable Court of Appeal erred and failed to consider vested rights of the applicant-appellant and his predecessors-in-interest land occupied from 1908. NO

Held:

We agree with respondents.

In Republic vs. Doldol, the requisites to acquire title to public land were laid down, as follows —

. . . . The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. 

Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.

Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the land is alienable public land. On this score, we agree with respondents that petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively shown by the government that the same were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972. 

Thus, even granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.

A similar situation in the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals, where a homestead patent issued to the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was cancelled on the ground that at the time it was issued, the subject land was still part of the public domain. In the said case, this Court ruled as follows —

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State

Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration. The applicant must show that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. This petitioners failed to do. 

We have stated earlier that at the time the homestead patent was issued to petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, the subject land belong to the inalienable and undisposable portion of the public domain. Thus, any title issued in their name by mistake or oversight is void ab initio because at the time the homestead patent was issued to petitioners, as successors-in-interest of the original patent applicant, the Director of Lands was not then authorized to dispose of the same because the area was not yet classified as disposable public land. Consequently, the title issued to herein petitioners by the Bureau of Lands is void ab initio.

Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were classified as inalienable or indisposable, therefore, the same could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and open to disposition. Indeed, it has been held that the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.

Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject Forestry Administrative Order recognizes private or vested rights under which his case may fall. We only find on record the Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest Development from which no indication of such exemption may be gleaned.

Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his application for confirmation of imperfect title, we see no need to discuss the other errors raised in this petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.