Case Digest: Interorient Maritime Enterprises v. Pineda, GR No. 115497, September 16, 1996

 Labor Law | Policy and Definitions

• Jeremias Pineda, a seaman, was contracted to work on the vessel "MV Amazonia." 
• On September 28, 1989, he finished his contract and was discharged from the port of Dubai for repatriation to Manila.
• On October 2, 1989, He was shot and killed by a Thai policeman in Bangkok, Thailand.
• Pineda was suffering from mental disorders and had exhibited strange behavior. 
• Aggravated by threats on his life by his fellow seamen, the Ship Captain should not have allowed him to travel alone.
• The police report submitted to the Philippine Embassy in Bangkok confirmed that it was Pineda who ‘approached and tried to stab the police sergeant with a knife and therefore he was forced to pull out his gun and shot Pineda’
• Constancia Pineda, heir of her deceased son Jeremias Pineda, filed a claim for death compensation benefits against Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc., its foreign principal Fircroft Shipping Corporation, and Times Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.
• Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Administrator: Ordered the respondents to pay death compensation benefits and burial expenses, holding them liable for Pineda's death.
• NLRC: Upheld the decision.

WoN the local crewing or manning agent and its foreign principal are liable for the death of a Filipino seaman-employee who, after being discharged, was killed in transit while being repatriated home. YES

First Issue: No Direct Evidence of Mental State?

At any rate, even disregarding for the nonce the substantive as well as procedural defects discussed above, a judicious review of the records of this case turns up no indication whatsoever that the respondent Commission committed any grave abuse or acted beyond or without jurisdiction. On the contrary, the petitioners’ contention that the assailed Resolution has no factual and legal bases is belied by the adoption with approval by the public respondent of the findings of the POEA Administrator, which recites at length the reasons for holding that the deceased Pineda was mentally sick prior to his death and concomitantly, was no longer in full control of his mental faculties.

First, a word about the evidence supporting the findings of the POEA Administrator. We have held that claims of overseas workers against their foreign employers should not be subjected to the rules of evidence and procedure that courts usually apply to other complainants who have more facility in obtaining the required evidence to prove their demands. 12 Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies (like the POEA), a fact may deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. In this instance, seaman Pineda, who was discharged in Dubai, a foreign land, could not reasonably be expected to immediately resort to and avail of psychiatric examination, assuming that he was still capable of submitting himself to such examination at that time, not to mention the fact that when he disembarked in Dubai, he was already discharged and without employment — his contract having already run its full term — and he had already been put on a plane bound for the Philippines. This explains the lack or absence of direct evidence showing his mental state.

The circumstances prior to and surrounding his death, however, provide substantial evidence of the existence of such mental defect or disorder. Such mental disorder became evident when he failed to join his connecting flight to Hongkong, having during said stopover wandered out of the Bangkok airport’s immigration area on his own. We can perceive no sane and sufficient reason for a Pinoy overseas contract worker or seaman to want to while away his time in a foreign land, when he is presumably unfamiliar with its native tongue, with nothing to do and no source of income, and after having been absent from kith and kin, hearth and home for almost an entire year. Nor can we find any plausible reason for him to be wielding a knife and scaring away passersby, and even taking a stab at an armed policeman, unless he is no longer in full possession of his sanity. To our mind, these circumstances are sufficient in themselves to produce a firm conviction that the deceased seaman in this case was no longer in full control of his senses when he left his work. To reiterate, in this case, no more than substantial evidence is required.

Second Issue: Employer Exempted from Liability?

It is petitioners’ contention that "Pineda’s death caused by his own willful act of attacking a Thai policeman and getting shot at in self-defense is not compensable", inasmuch as Par. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA’s Standard Format Contract of Employment for Seamen states that:

"No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a (deliberate or) willful act on his own life by the seaman(,) provided, however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seaman." (Emphasis supplied).

Moreover, petitioners contend that this Court already held in the case of Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. v. NLRC and Cecilia Sentina that the employer is not liable for the willful act of an employee on his own life. Further, Article 172 of the Labor Code provides for a limitation on the liability of the State Insurance Fund when the "disability or death was occasioned by the employee’s intoxication, willful intention to injure or kill himself or another, notorious negligence . . ."

Petitioners are in error. This Court agrees with the POEA Administrator that seaman Pineda was no longer acting sanely when he attacked the Thai policeman. The report of the Philippine Embassy in Thailand dated October 9, 1990 depicting the deceased’s strange behavior shortly before he was shot dead, after having wandered around Bangkok for four days, clearly shows that the man was not in full control of his own self: 15

"(CAD) IN REPLY TO TELEX SENT TO EMBASSY BY ADM. SARMIENTO/DELA ROSA OF OWWA/DOLE RE CAUSE KINDLY ADVISE HIS OFFICE THAT SUBJECT ARRIVED BANGKOK 1515H ON BOARD XC903 ON STOP OVER FLIGHT FROM DUBAI ON HIS WAY TO HONGKONG PROCEEDING TO MANILA. UNFORTUNATELY PINEDA FAILED TO TAKE THE SAME FLIGHT OUT AT 1630H, CHECKED OUT OF IMMIGRATION, WENT OUT OF AIRPORT AND WANDERED OUT AND FEW DAYS LATER MET HIS UNTIMELY DEMISE. PLS. REFER TO OURAD DATED 5 OCT 89 QUOTING FULL TEXT OF POLICE REPORT ADDRESSED TO THIS EMBASSY RECOUNTING INCIDENT LEADING TO FATAL SHOOTING OF PINEDA. KINDLY FURNISH OWWA/DOLE FULL TEXT OF SAID REPORT FOR THEIR INFO.

PER REPORT RECEIVED FROM AIRPORT PERSONNEL PINEDA WAS ACTING STRANGELY, REFUSED TO BOARD HIS SCHEDULED FLIGHT AND DISAPPEARED FROM AIRPORT. POLICE REPORT ALSO CONFIRMED HIS STRANGE BEHAVIOR LEADING TO HIS ARREST, THEN RUNNING AMOK AND CAUSING TROUBLE TO PASSERS AND ATTEMPT TO STAB THE DUTY POLICEMAN WHO TRIED TO PACIFY HIM.

PINEDA SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN SUFFERING FROM SOME MENTAL DISORDER AS CAN BE GLEANED FROM HIS PERSONAL LETTERS DISCOVERED AMONG HIS PERSONAL EFFECTS. HE COMPLAINED OF SUFFERING FROM SEVERE HEAD PAINS AND EVEN REPORTED TO CAPTAIN OF A SHIP ABOUT THREATS ON HIS LIFE BY FELLOW SEAMAN WHICH INVARIABLY LEAD (sic) TO HIS BEING REPATRIATED HOME WHICH GREATLY AFFECTED HIS DISPOSITION.

SUGGEST DOLE CONTACT CAPTAIN OF M/V AMAZSON (sic) AND ASCERTAIN AS TO WHY PINEDA HAVE (sic) TO DISEMBARK AND SUBSEQUENTLY REPATRIATED. IF PINEDA WAS ALREADY SUFFERING FROM MENTAL DISORDER AS FEARED, HE SHOULD HAVE NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO TRAVEL HOME ALONE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY A PHYSICIAN." (Emphasis supplied)

The POEA Administrator ruled, and this Court agrees, that since Pineda attacked the Thai policeman when he was no longer in complete control of his mental faculties, the aforequoted provision of the Standard Format Contract of Employment exempting the employer from liability should not apply in the instant case. Firstly, the fact that the deceased suffered from mental disorder at the time of his repatriation means that he must have been deprived of the full use of his reason, and that thereby, his will must have been impaired, at the very least. Thus, his attack on the policeman can in no wise characterized as a deliberate, willful or voluntary act on his part. Secondly, and apart from that, we also agree that in light of the deceased’s mental condition, petitioners "should have observed some precautionary measures and should not have allowed said seaman to travel home alone", 16 and their failure to do so rendered them liable for the death of Pineda. Indeed, "the obligations and liabilities of the (herein petitioners) do not end upon the expiration of the contracted period as (petitioner are) duty bound to repatriate the seaman to the point of hire to effectively terminate the contract of employment." 17

The instant case should be distinguished from the case of Mabuhay, where the deceased, Romulo Sentina, had been in a state of intoxication, then ran amuck and inflicted injury upon another person, so that the latter in his own defense fought back and in the process killed Sentina. Previous to said incident, there was no proof of mental disorder on the part of Sentina. The cause of Sentina’s death is categorized as a deliberate and willful act on his own life directly attributable to him. But seaman Pineda was not similarly situated.

Incidentally, petitioners conjecture that the deceased could have been on drugs when he assaulted the policeman. If this had been the case, the Thai police and the Philippine Embassy in Bangkok would most certainly have made mention thereof in their respective reports. But they did not do so.

Third Issue: Was Death Work-Related?

Petitioners further argue that the cause of Pineda’s death "is not one of the occupational diseases listed by law", and that in the case of De Jesus v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, this Court held that." . . for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex ‘A’ of the Rules (the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation) with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions." 

Petitioner’s reliance on De Jesus is misplaced, as the death and burial benefits being claimed in this case are not payable by the Employees’ Compensation Commission and chargeable against the State Insurance Fund. These claims arose from the responsibility of the foreign employer together with the local agency for the safety of the employee during his repatriation and until his arrival in this country, i.e., the point of hire. Though the termination of the employment contract was duly effected in Dubai, still, the responsibility of the foreign employer to see to it that Pineda was duly repatriated to the point of hiring subsisted. Section 4, Rule VIII of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment clearly provides for the duration of the mandatory personal accident and life insurance covering accidental death, dismemberment and disability of overseas workers:

"Section 4. Duration of Insurance Coverage. — The minimum coverage shall take effect upon payment of the premium and shall be extended worldwide, on and off the job, for the duration of the worker’s contract plus sixty (60) calendar days after termination of the contract of employment; provided that in no case shall the duration of the insurance coverage be less than one year." (Emphasis supplied)

The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a companion for a returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the safe return of said workers. The uncaring attitude displayed by petitioners who, knowing fully well that its employee had been suffering from some mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed him to travel home alone, is appalling to say the least. Such attitude harks back to another time when the landed gentry practically owned the serfs, and disposed of them when the latter had grown old, sick or otherwise lost their usefulness.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision assailed in this petition is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.