Case Digest: Ysmael Maritime Corporation v. Avelino, No. L-43674, June 30, 1987

 Labor Law | Policy and Definitions

• Rolando G. Lim was on board the vessel M/S Rajah, owned by petitioner Ysmael Maritime Corporation, when the same ran aground and sank near Sabtan Island, Batanes.
• Rolando perished at the age of 25 as a result of that incident.
• Lim's parents, Felix Lim and Consorcia Geveia, sued the corporation for damages in Civil Case No. R-12861, alleging negligence.
• Ysmael Maritime Corporation argued that:
• the complaint lacked cause of action,
• the parents had received compensation from them, and 
• the Workmen’s Compensation Commission (WCC) had already compensated them.

WoN the compensation remedy under the Workmen’s Compensation Act [WCA], and now under the Labor Code, for work-connected death or injuries sustained by an employee, is exclusive of the other remedies available under the Civil Code. YES

At issue is the exclusory provision of Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act reiterated in Article 173 of the Labor Code.

"Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation. — The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury.

"Art. 173. Exclusive of liability. — Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, Republic Act No. 610, as amended, Republic Act No. 4864 as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System, during the period of such payment for the same disability or death, and conversely."

Petitioner invokes the case of Robles v. Yap Wing, L-20442, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 267, to support its contention that all claims for death or injuries by employees against employers are exclusively cognizable by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission regardless of the causes of said death or injuries. That case no longer controls.

In the recent case of Floresca v. Philex Mining Company, L-30642, April 30, 1985, 136 SCRA 141, involving a complaint for damages for the death of five miners in a cave-in on June 28, 1967, this Court was confronted with three divergent opinions on the exclusivity rule as presented by several amici curiae. 

1. One view is that the injured employee or his heirs, in case of death, may initiate an action to recover damages [not compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act] with the regular courts on the basis of negligence of the employer pursuant to the Civil Code.
2. Another view, as enunciated in the Robles case, is that the remedy of an employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the WCA. 
3. A third view is that the action is selective and the employee or his heirs have a choice of availing themselves of the benefits under the WCA or of suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by reason of his negligence. But once the election has been exercised, the employee or his heirs are no longer free to opt for the other remedy. In other words, the employee cannot pursue both actions simultaneously. 

This latter view was adopted by the majority in the Floresca case, reiterating as main authority its earlier decision in Pacaña v. Cebu Autobus Company, L-25382, April 30, 1982, 32 SCRA 442. In so doing, the Court rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and remedies granted by the WCA as laid down in the Robles case. Three justices dissented.

It is readily apparent from the succession of cases dealing with the matter at issue ** that this Court has vacillated from one school of thought to the other. Even now, the concepts pertaining thereto have remained fluid. But unless and until the Floresca ruling is modified or superseded, and We are not so inclined, it is deemed to be the controlling jurisprudence vice the Robles case.

As thus applied to the case at bar, respondent Lim spouses cannot be allowed to maintain their present action to recover additional damages against petitioner under the Civil Code. In open court, respondent Consorcia Geveia admitted that they had previously filed a claim for death benefits with the WCC and had received the compensation payable to them under the WCA [Rollo, pp. 22-23, 29-30]. It is therefore clear that respondents had not only opted to recover under the Act but they had also been duly paid. At the very least, a sense of fair play would demand that if a person entitled to a choice of remedies made a first election and accepted the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to exercise the second option. "Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, [he] is precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission." [See Separate Opinion by Justice Teehankee in Robles v. Yap Wing, supra on pp. 281-282].

In the light of this Court’s recent pronouncement in the Floresca case, respondent Judge Avelino’s denial order of petitioner’s motion to dismiss is adjudged to be improper.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Avelino’s orders dated December 29, 1975 and February 3, 1976 are reversed and set aside. Civil Case No. 12861, entitled "The Spouses Felix C. Lim, and Consorcia Geveia v. Ysmael Maritime Corp." is hereby ordered dismissed. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on May 5, 1978 enjoining respondent Judge Avelino from conducting further proceedings in said case is made permanent. No costs.